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FOREWORD
The Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs (JLIA)
created this issue as a collection of papers presented at 17th biennial
meeting of the International Academy of Commercial and Consumer
Law. While a foreword traditionally reflects the contents of a
publication, here JLIA has elected to reflect on the passing of two of
the issues contributors, Louis Del Duca and Norbert Reich. In
memory of these two esteemed members of the legal community, JLIA
dedicates this issue. Additionally below, JLIA has included two
reflections on Louis Del Duca and Norbert Reich to commemorate
their meaningful contributions to law.
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IN MEMORY OF LOUIS DEL DUCA
By Mary Hiscock
In the 34 years of the history of
the International Academy of
Commercial and Consumer Law (the
Academy), some colleagues stand out
as exemplars and custodians of the
principles and values that are the
foundation of the Academy. These
were summarised by Professor Don
King when he wrote a Dedication at
the beginning of the published
Proceedings of the 4th Meeting of the
Academy, which was held in
Melbourne in 1989.
To the commercial and consumer lawyers of the new age, to
whom national boundaries are but a useful basis for comparison, and
international harmony of law is not just a dream, their knowledge is in
the wisdom of the past, the development of the present, and the trends
of the future; their satisfaction is in the mastery of complex subjects,
the conveyance of knowledge to students, the fellowship of colleagues,
the creativeness of scholarship, and the furtherance of just and needed
reforms.1
Don King, Louis Del Duca, and Norbert Reich immediately
come to mind as such men. Tragically we have lost the continuing
presence and contributions of all three.
Louis Del Duca was a scholar of distinction on the national
and international scene. His learning constantly evolved and reacted to
contemporary issues in commercial law. He was actively involved in
the current work of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) on developing a framework for dispute
resolution for online cross border contracts, particularly those where
Essays on Comparative Commercial and Consumer Law, v, (ed) Donald
King, Fred B. Rothman & Co, Littleton Colorado 80127 (1992).
1

ii
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there is high volume and low value of transactions. He was concerned
with not only its implications for consumer transactions, but also for
commercial transactions in domestic as well as international law. He
was immersed in planning for the next Meeting of the Academy in
2016, to be held in Fukuoka, Japan. As usual, he was scheduled to
contribute to this Meeting, as he had at every past Meeting.
Louis characteristically reached out and involved others in his
work, regularly phoning and emailing and chivvying, where necessary.
He was the most generous friends and colleague in the giving of advice
and in his concern for the welfare of friends and colleagues.
Louis was a man of transatlantic culture as well as learning. He
had a legendary love of opera and performance. In his youth he was
torn between pursuing a life of music or of law. In the end, he had
both.
Most of all, Louis was a family man. One of his gifts to the
Academy was the opportunity to establish a friendship with Frances,
his wife. When Frances was around, there was always an extra sparkle
in Louis. This was most evident in the hospitality in 2000, when Louis
hosted the 10th Meeting of the Academy at Dickinson Law at Carlisle.
Louis joined the Faculty of Law at Dickinson at the beginning
of the academic year 1956-7, and “retired” 57 years later. He had
completed military service in the US Navy. He had received the
degrees of BA at Temple, LL.B at Harvard, and a Doctorate of Law at
the University of Rome, La Sapienza. He had also briefly practised law,
and taught political science in the intermezzo between Rome and
Carlisle.
Throughout his long career, Louis taught generations of
students Secured Transactions, Comparative Commercial Law, and
European Union Law. He initiated the program for the Master of
Comparative Law for overseas students and subsequently the Summer
Session Abroad based in Europe. His editorial responsibilities included
the Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly and the Uniform
Commercial Code Law Journal. He was a member of the Committee
of the US Secretary of State on International Trade Law, and was active
in AALS.
iii
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Louis’ most recent major work was “Secured Transactions
under the UCC” with Edwin Smith, Marie Reilly and Peter Winship,
and many many articles on online dispute resolution.
We will all miss him.

iv
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IN MEMORY OF NORBERT REICH
By Hans-W. Micklitz
Norbert Reich 1937-2015,
Professor for German and
European Civil Law, co-founder of
the Journal of Consumer Policy
1976, Director of the Centre for
European Legal Policy at the
University of Bremen, 1982-1991,
Director of the Riga Graduate Law
School 2001-2004 and a faithful
member of the International
Association of Commercial and
Consumer Law.

Norbert Reich’s understanding of law as a discipline is deeply
rooted in American legal sociology and critical German and American
legal theory. That is where his interdisciplinary and cross-cultural
international understanding came from. Consumer law and policy
became a topical issue at the right moment in Norbert’s academic life.
Consumer law and policy cut across thinking in boxes, in particular
disciplines of social science or in national legal orders. There were two
stages in Norbert’s academic involvement of consumer law and policy:
first, an early commitment to German consumer law and, at a later
second stage, an ever stronger focus on European consumer law and
policy.
Norbert Reich began research on German consumer law as
early as the mid-1970s. Together with Klaus Tonner and Hartmut
Wegner, and on behalf of the then social-liberal government, he
published the first draft of what would later be referred to as consumer
law. Yet his emphasis was rather on the derivation and creation of a
critical economic law, in which consumer law played an essential and
permanent role. As early as in 1974, he advocated a structural
reorganisation of civil law that was based on status. He writes: “I would
like to distinguish between three fields following the reflections of the
v
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socialist theory of civil law:2 a) the legal communication of businesses
(in the field of production capital), i.e., company law (companies in terms
of antitrust law and not in terms of commercial law HWM), b) the
exchange of goods between businesses and final consumers (in relation
to the ownership of means of production to the ownership of
consumer goods), i.e., consumer law (in the strict sense of the term – in
the broader sense consumer law refers to administrative, penal and
procedural rules; see Reich 1974), c) the field of private legal
communication between citizens (classification and exchange of
ownership of consumption means), i.e., citizen law.” As a logical
conclusion of the case for an autonomous consumer law, he argued
persuasively for a constitutionalisation of consumer law, a reversal of
the relationship of dispositive and mandatory law and a reorientation
of the legal dogmatic principles towards social science.
If one looks back to the initial situation of the 1970s, it comes
as a surprise that the trisection of civil law has largely become a reality
– within and through the Europeanisation of consumer law. The
status-based revision of private and economic law has prevailed,
strongly promoted by the European Union that had gradually become
the driving force of consumer legislation. Norbert Reich had prepared
the shift of national consumer law towards the European level through
the then nine member states reports that the European Commission
(through Ludwig Krämer) had commissioned.3 The country reports
were published in the late 1970s with Norbert Reich as editor (Reich
1980/1981). From now on, Norbert Reich followed the creation and
the development of a genuinely European consumer law in his role as
managing director of the Centre for European Legal Politics (ZERP)
at the University of Bremen.
His own research peaked in the monograph with the title “Civil
rights in the European Union,” published in 1999. The subtitle clarifies
the topic: “Subjective rights of Union citizens and third-country
citizens with particular focus on the legal situation according to the
2
Norbert Reich wrote his habilitation on Soviet Civil Law. He translated
from Russian to German Pēteris Stučka the second important Marxist theorist
Paschukanis. Pēteris Stučka, DIE REVOLUTIONÄRE ROLLE VON RECHT UND STAAT
(Norbert Reich trans., 1969).
3
The nine country reports are available in English, the comparative
analysis in English, French and German.

vi
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case law of the ECJ and the Treaty of Amsterdam.” In order to justify
the necessity of the protection of subjective rights in a transnational
quasi-state institution such as the European Union, Norbert Reich
chose Georg Jellinek’s System of Subjective Rights (1892) as the starting
point. There is a direct link between the ground breaking contribution
on the reorientation of civil and economic law (1974), the publication
on the promotion and protection of diffuse interests in the European
legal order (1987), and his work on the civil rights in the European
Union (1999). During a period of 25 years, Norbert Reich not only
contributed to the Europeanization of civil and economic law, but also
illustrated the necessity of their integration into a European
constitution.
In 2001, Norbert Reich was appointed rector of the Riga
Graduate Law School. He focused on the eastward expansion,
especially on questions of a modernisation of consumer, civil, and
economic law in the Baltic States as well as in the former central and
eastern European block states, the integration of which into the EU
had been agreed (and came into effect in 2004). After his retirement in
2005, he again dealt with European consumer law and union law in the
shape of a conceptual and dogmatically thought-through overall
presentation. It is due to his indefatigable energy and dedication that
Intersentia published the second edition of the “European Consumer
Law” under Reich’s overall responsibility (Reich et al. 2014). Shortly
before his death, the new edition of his work “Understanding EU
Internal Market Law” was published. This is not another introduction
to EU law; rather, it focuses on the “internal market,” the civil and
economic law of the EU that is surrounded by civil rights, and their
leading principles. Although these two later works may be reason
enough to trace his enormous creative power, his intellectual legacy lies
in a dense monograph on the “General Principles of EU Civil Law”
that was published in 2014. This book brings full circle his work on
the reorientation of civil and economic law he first argued for 40 years
ago. The careful choice of the title reflects the economic and sociopolitical significance of civil law. European Civil Law should be guided
by general principles that are rooted in the constitutional order of
European society.
The International Academy of Commercial and Consumer
Law will remember him as a loyal participant to the biannual
vii
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conference, an inspiring mind who contributed heavily to our
international community he hosted the 12th biannual meeting of the
IACCL in Riga/Lativa 2004. We will miss his bright ideas and his
endurance for the role and importance of consumer law in an
international economy that is more guided by efficiency than by matter
of social justice. We did not only lose a great scholar and one of the
pillars of European consumer law, we will miss a friend who was out
there with his unlimited preparedness to provide advice and support.
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ON THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND
REGULATION
Hans-W. Micklitz*
INTRODUCTION
Are we private lawyers not convinced that we share a common
understanding of “freedom of contract,” of “freedom”1 and
“contract,” and of restrictions on that freedom of contract through
“regulation?”2 Is this common understanding not the basis on which
we all operate implicitly or explicitly in our intellectual discourse
cutting across different legal traditions and different legal cultures?3 At
the very least, is not the notion of contract freedom shared in all
countries governed by a market society and even more so if the market
society is embedded into the Westernized model of democracy?4
What if this common assumption turns out to be wrong or is
no more than a rather superficial “gentleman’s agreement,” which
allows us to communicate with each other whilst maintaining our own
preconceptions? Digging deeper into intellectual history, legal theory,
and legal philosophy reveals that, for example, a French lawyer and an
*

Professor, European University Institute Florence.
See generally UDO DI FABIO, DIE KULTUR DER FREIHEIT (2005) (for a
German understanding of freedom of contract).
2
See HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS (1999); Gary Marks,
Liesbet Hooghe & Kermit Blank, European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v.
Multi-level Governance, 34 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 3341 (1996).
3
See Kaarlo Tuori, Regulation Theories, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW:
RETHINKING EUROPEAN LAW AND LEGAL THINKING 11-57 (Miguel Maduro,
Kaarlo Tuori & Suvi Sankari eds., 2014); THE MANY CONSTITUTIONS OF EUROPE
(Kaarlo Tuori & Suvi Sankari eds., 2010).
4
Gunther Teubner, Contracting Worlds: The Many Autonomies of Private Law,
9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 399 (2000).
1
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English common lawyer may not necessarily be talking about the same
thing when they argue about “freedom of contract.” This becomes
even more complicated if we look at the limitations and restrictions on
“freedom of contract,” which are set out via statutory regulation.5
These lawyers might agree on what a state is by equating it with the
“nation state,” but might encounter more problems in understanding
and agreeing on the meaning of “regulation.” Regulation can be private
or public. When created statutorily, regulation might facilitate or
restrict freedom of contract. Statutory intervention, might, depending
on one’s perspective (liberal or welfarist), trigger very different
expectations, feelings, or sentiments. Our perception of “regulation”
very much depends on what we expect as citizens from “our” state.
This paper starts with two examples that are meant to highlight
deeper cultural differences in deciding conflicting contractual issues.
One example is taken from the French/German context, the other
example is from the German/American context. These examples serve
to underpin the hypothesis that the understanding of contract and
regulation in the three countries under investigation – France,
Germany and the United Kingdom – differs considerably and the
reasons for the differences can be found in the intellectual history of
the respective states. Further, this paper continues by contrasting the
three different models of freedom of contract and regulation with the
emerging European model. The hypothesis is that the European
Union is yielding its own model which differs from the Member States
model. This is not only due to the particular legal nature of the
European Union as a quasi-state, but also to the changing economic
and political environment after World War II. The conclusions remain
tentative. The reader is invited to stand back and carefully look at the
ongoing transformations of contract and regulation. Intellectual
history and comparative research are the appropriate tools for such an
exercise.

ROLF KNIEPER, ZWANG, VERNUNFT, FREIHEIT: STUDIEN ZUR
JURISTISCHEN KONSTRUKTION DER GESELLSCHAFT (1981).
5

2
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ENGLISH-FRENCH DEFECTIVE SWIMMING POOLS

A well-known pair of cases6 were decided before English and
French courts facing a nearly identical problem.7 In Ruxley, a
homeowner mandated a construction company to build a swimming
pool in his garden.8 The water depth did not comply with what was
agreed upon in the contract by twenty-two centimeters. The
homeowner asked the construction company to rebuild the swimming
pool. The House of Lords did not grant the homeowner specific
performance.9 The House of Lords found that the swimming pool was
usable, although not in the envisaged way; therefore, pecuniary
damages sufficed to compensate the homeowner. Implicit in the
House of Lords decision is the idea that it does not make sense to
destroy a usable swimming pool just to satisfy the original contract.
This combination of pragmatic and utilitarian considerations will be
explained as the “English model.”
Similarly, in France, a home was built thirty-three centimeters
lower than what was agreed upon in the contract. In contrast to the
House of Lords in Ruxley, however, the French Cour de Cassation held
that the construction company must rebuild the house because it did
not deliver exactly what was agreed to between the parties. Moreover,
the construction company had to bear the full cost of reconstruction,
and pecuniary damages did not suffice to compensate the homeowner
for the broken promise.10 The “reason” behind the agreement
prevailed over any other considerations one might have invoked. This
“French model” will later be examined under this rationale.

Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd. v Forsyth, [1996] A.C. 344
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial
matters] 3e civ., May 11, 2005, Bull. civ. III, no. 103 (Fr.).
7
I have taken this example from Ruth Sefton-Green. Ruth Sefton-Green,
The European Union, Law and Society: Making the Societal-Cultural Difference, in PRIVATE
LAW AND THE MANY CULTURES OF EUROPE 37, 52 (Thomas Wilhelmsson et al. eds.,
2007).
8
Id. at 52.
9
Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd., [1996] A.C. 344.
10
Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ.,
May 11, 2005, Bull. civ. III, no. 103 (Fr.).
6
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Comparative lawyers who study these and other similar cases
are aware of the differences between English common law and the
French Civil Code.11 However, the fact that a layperson, had they to
decide the case, would come to the same result tells us something
about our legal consciousness, and the deeper assumptions we share
about our own legal systems based on the expectations we have in the
functioning of the courts and of society, for good and for bad. The
Eurobarometer is a neat indicator that allows for a deeper look into
these differing preconceptions at least between the twenty-eight E.U.
Member States.12 We may speculate on what courts in the United
States, Canada, Brazil, Israel, Italy, or Germany would have decided in
a case similar to the English or French cases. I am sure there are similar,
if not identical, cases, and I assume that a survey of the citizens of these
countries would lead to results similar to my English-French
comparison.13 If my assumption is correct, there must be a deeper layer
of rationales enshrined in long-grown cultures and traditions behind
the legal rules.14
II.

GERMAN TOURISTS STRANDED IN FLORIDA

My second example deals with consumer law, which restricts
and limits freedom of contract via statutory intervention. In the early
Ruxley and the French example are not unique. They represent a wellestablished and long standing doctrine. See id.; see also Franz Werro, Comparative Studies
in Private Law: A European Point of View, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION ON
COMPARATIVE LAW 132-33 (Mauro Busani & Hugo Mattei eds., 2012).
12
Since 1973, the European Commission has been monitoring the
evolution of public opinion in the Member States, thus helping the preparation of
texts, decision-making and the evaluation of its work. The surveys and studies
address major topics concerning European citizenship: enlargement, social situation,
health, culture, information technology, environment, the Euro, defence, etc. See, e.g.,
European
Commission,
Public
Opinion,
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2015).
13
For example, the Trento Common Core Project is based on the idea
that the same case is looked at through the eyes of different legal orders. THE
COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, http://www.common-core.org/
(last visited Jan. 27, 2015).
14
At this point in my paper, I do not argue that these rationales are
“eternal” in the sense of Pierre Legrand’s argument that European legal cultures are
not converging. See Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 INT’L
& COMP. L.Q. 52 (1996).
11

4
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1990s, German tourists used a tour operator to book all-inclusive trips,
which included transportation, accommodations, and meals, to Florida
at a favorable price. The trip operator went bankrupt, and the German
tourists found themselves stranded in Florida. The tourists were forced
to buy tickets at their own cost to return to Germany.15
The German tourists sued the German state under the
Francovich doctrine.16 The tourists sought restitution or compensation
of the costs for their return tickets.17 At the time of litigation, Germany
had not implemented Directive 90/314/EEC on package tours.18 This
Directive obliges Member States to shield consumers from the
bankruptcy of tour operators and shifts the risk of default from the
individual traveler to the community of travelers. The risk is thereby
socialized, as all potential travelers must cover the costs for a fund the
tour operator provides.19 The German state lost and its liability was
later confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
in Dillenkofer.20 This was a costly lesson for the German state which
had to pay roughly 20 million German Marks (10 million Euros).
Consumer organizations and consumer victims celebrated the
judgment as a great success.
The societal dimension of the conflict underlying the case is of
particular interest here. At the time of the intense debate on who
should bear the costs of the stranded tourists, a German television
For the facts and the subsequent decision of the CJEU, see Joined
Cases C-178, 179/94 & C-188-90/94, Dillenkofer v. Germany, 1996 E.C.R. I-4845.
16
Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. I5395. The Francovich doctrine creates non-contractual liability of Member States for
violations of EU law: “a State must be liable for loss and damage caused to
individuals as a result of breaches of [European Union] law for which the State can
be held responsible.” Id. ¶ 35.
17
Dillenkofer, 1996 E.C.R. I-4845.
18
Council Directive 90/314 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 13 June 1990 on Package Travel, Package Holidays, and Package Tours,
1990 O.J. (L 15) (EC).
19
Id. at art. 7; see STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EU CONSUMER LAW AND
POLICY 98-101 (2005); Klause Tonner, Kommentierung des Kapitel 13: Reisevertrag, in
ZIVILRECHT UNTER EUROPÄISCHEM EINFLUSS: DIE RICHTLINIENKONFORME
AUSLEGUNG DES BGB UND ANDERER GESETZE – ERLÄUTERUNGEN DER
WICHTIGSTEN EG-VERORDNUNGEN (Herausgeber Gebauer & Thomas Wiedmann
eds., 2010).
20
Dillenkofer, 1996 E.C.R. I-4845.
15

5
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program invited several of the stranded tourists and an American
lawyer to discuss the proper remedy in the case. When given the
opportunity to tell their stories, the German tourists said that, since a
single return ticket cost three to four times more than the package tour,
they went to the German embassy asking for financial support. At
some point during the television program, the American lawyer asked
the stranded tourists and the listeners a simple question: why not
charter a plane? The lawyer suggested that chartering a plane would
have been much less expensive for both the stranded tourists and for
Germany.
The lawyer’s question brings to light the expectations of
German citizens, particularly the economically suspect deal of two
weeks holidays in Florida for 500 to 600 German Marks. The tourists
trusted the contract adage that a deal is a deal. Maybe the tourists
subconsciously were also convinced that the German state would bail
them out if their contractual expectations turned out to be wrong.
Would consumers of a state other than Germany have had the same
expectations of their contract with a package tour operator and of their
state? Similarly, would these consumers have bombarded their
embassies with complaints, or would they have chartered a plane? I
assume that the expectations differ considerably.
However, there is more at stake than the help provided by
national embassies for stranded citizens. As a result of the Francovich
doctrine, E.U. law equips all E.U. citizens with individually enforceable
rights to force their state to pay for the transfer, provided the
respective state has not implemented, or has not correctly
implemented, the Directive on package tours. How is this possible? It
is not that the Member States accept liability voluntarily. Instead, it is
the European Union which imposes such liability on Member States
via the CJEU. Thus, the regulation of package tours by the European
Union not only sets boundaries for the freedom of package tour
operators, who are forced to abide by the E.U. rules when exercising
their economic activity, but also paves the way for more
entrepreneurial freedom in a European market.

6
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THE CONDITIONS FOR A JOURNEY INTO INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY

This paper will now discuss the rationales behind the notion of
freedom of contract by examining the German, French, U.K., and E.U.
legal systems, all of which I am familiar with from extensive training
and practice.21 I want to ground this discussion in my experiences with
A word is needed on my knowledge of foreign legal systems, especially
since current comparative legal methodology is in a state of crisis. When I was
educated in comparative legal research in the 1970s and 1980s, the thinking in
Europe followed the ground-breaking work of Zweigert and Kötz. See generally
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
(Tony Weier trans., 3d ed. 1998); TONY WEIR ON THE CASE (Catherine Barnard et
al. eds., 2012) . Legal systems were grouped around “legal families”—namely the four
European families, the Romanic, the Germanic, the common law, and the Nordic
countries—all of which share a common European culture, i.e., Roman law and
Christian canon law. See Franz Wieacker & Edgar Bodenheimer, Foundations of
European Legal Culture, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1990); FRANZ WIEACKER,
VORAUSSETZUNGEN EUROPÄISCHER RECHTSKULTUR VERLAG GÖTTINGER
TAGEBLATT (1985). The method applied was a functional comparison by looking for
the “best solution,” or the solution that best fit the differing traditions of the states.
What is more important here was the pedagogical message inherent to the idea of
legal families. Engaging in comparative law and comparative legal method requires
not only knowledge of the language, but also knowledge of the country and the
cultural foundations of the respective societies. This kind of knowledge, however,
must be gained through training and education in the country itself. In that spirit, I
benefited from the opportunity to study law in Switzerland (the French speaking
part), France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy. Today, such a
rigorous training requirement seems old-fashioned, as comparative lawyers have to
engage in the comparison of countries and legal systems even if they know neither
the language nor have fully experienced the country’s culture. The E.U. promoted
this type of approach through its insistence on “inclusion,” which does not follow
the traditional division of legal families, but converges the legal orders of twentyeight Member States. This approach leads to a comparison of legal systems via
simplistic methods, such as tables and charts. I admit that I have been involved in
this more modern approach. Interestingly enough, legal origin theory (LOT) took
the legal families approach seriously, which could have reinvigorated the approach
of Zweigert and Kötz. See generally LEGAL ORIGIN THEORY (Simon Deakin &
Katharina Pistor eds., 2012) (analyzing the different strains of legal origin theory.
However, what actually happened was that LOT revealed the weakness of thinking
in families, as it cannot do justice to the deeper traditions and cultures of the
countries compared. Professor Ralf Michaels labelled LOT “comparison in
numbers,” and questioned why comparative lawyers remained so speechless in their
reaction and did not defend the functional method. Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law
21

7
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the countries’ culture and history. Building on previous research on
social justice in private law22 and the (un)systematics of European legal
culture,23 I seek to identify the dominating Rechtsbewußtsein, i.e., legal
conscience,24 with respect to intellectual history, legal theory, and legal
philosophy. Then, I want to transpose the intellectual history to my
question on the cultural and societal foundations of freedom of
contract. I am fully aware that modelling by country is risky and that it
might look as if traditions and cultures are not subject to political,
economic, and social change.25 I would defend, nevertheless, that such
grouping around models is useful in identifying differences and maybe
in deepening the mutual understanding of our conceptions of freedom
of contract and the regulation thereof.

by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional
Comparative Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 765 (2009); see also Mathias M. Siems,
Comparative
Law
(Oct.
21,
2014),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2512938.
22
See THE MANY CONCEPTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE
LAW (Hans-W. Micklitz ed., 2011).
23
Hans-W. Micklitz, The (Un)-Systematics of (Private) Law as an Element of
European Legal Culture, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE 81-115
(Geneviève Helleringer & Kai Purnhagen eds., 2014).
24
See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 18502000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19 (David M. Trubek &
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); The Rule of Law, Political Choices and Developing Common Sense,
in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 95 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro
Santos eds., 2006); MENTALITÄTEN-GESCHICHTE: ZUR HISTORISCHEN
REKONSTRUKTION GEISTIGER PROZESSE (André Burguière & Ulrich Raulff eds.,
1987); Hagen Schulze, Mentalitätsgeschichte – Chancen und Risiken eines Paradigmas der
französischen Geschichtswissenschaft, 36 GESCHICHTE IN WISSENSCHAFT UND
UNTERRICHT 247 (1985). See also Sebastian Conard & Shalini Randeria, Geteilte
Geschichten – Europa in einer postkolonialen Welt, in JENSEITS DES EUROZENTRISMUS:
POSTKOLONIALE
PERSPEKTIVEN
IN
DEN
GESCHICHTS-UND
KULTURWISSENSCHAFTEN 9-49 (Sebastian Conard & Shalini Randeria eds., 2002).
25
See WOLFGANG STREECK, RE-FORMING CAPITALISM: INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE IN THE GERMAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 251 (2009) (strongly critiquing that
the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ neglects the two major driving forces of change in
capitalist societies: the fear of workers and the greed of entrepreneurs); Dorothee
Bohle & Béla Greskovits, Varieties of Capitalism and Capitalism << tout court >>, 50
EUR. J. SOCIETY 355 (2009); Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties
of Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001)(a stock
taking of the debate).
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WHERE TO START WITH THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY?

The analysis of the notion of freedom contract should begin
with the Roman law. We can refer to the history of Roman law, and
how its foundations have survived the last 2,000 years in both
continental and common law countries;26 however, the historical
ground might be less stable and less safe than its promoters pretend.27
Regulation is much more complicated. The Roman Empire used what
today we call “regulation” to govern the economy. “Regulations,”
whether back then or now, have almost always been associated with
the existence of a state and a territory. This brings us to the Peace of
Westphalia, concluded in 1648, which laid the foundations for what
later became the nation state.
The benchmark for the beginning or the reinvigoration of
Roman law is the foundation of the University of Bologna around
1130/1140 and the scholastic school of law. According to Harold
Berman, the conflict between Pope Gregory VII and Henry IV, Holy
Roman Emperor, a century earlier over the independence of the
Church from the temporal power heralded and triggered the reestablishment of Roman law, private law, and contract law.28 Berman
argues that the separation of spiritual and temporal power not only
initiated early state building and paved the way for the development of
the nation state after the religious wars of the sixteenth and
seventeenth century, but also led to the creation of the scholastic
school of law first in Bologna and then elsewhere in Europe.29 The
Crusades between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries led to a
stronger intellectual exchange between the West and the East through
the reinvigoration of Greek and Roman philosophy, as well as through

See Reinhard Zimmermann, “Heard Melodies are Sweet, but Those Unheard
are Sweeter . . .” Condicio tacita, Implied Conditions und die Fortbildung des europäischen
Vertragsrechts, 193 ARCHIV FÜR CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 121 (1993).
27
Thomas Duve, Von der Europäischen Rechtsgeschichte zu einer Rechtsgeschichte
Europas in globalhistorischer Perspektive, 20 J. FOR MAX PLANCK INST. FOR EUR. LEGAL
HIST. 16 (2012) (a more nuanced analysis of the transfer and re-transfer of laws
between European countries and what later became their colonies).
28
See generally, HAROLD J. BERMAN, RECHT UND REVOLUTION: DIE
BILDUNG DER WESTLICHEN RECHTSTRADITION (2001).
29
Id. at 146, 215.
26
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commercial exchange.30 Hence, there is a connection between the
rediscovery of Roman law, the split of spiritual and temporal power,
and the Crusades, which renders the intellectual history of Western law
to that époque indispensable.
One might alternatively argue that the starting point of my
undertaking could and should be the discovery of the Americas in the
fifteenth century and the conflict between the Spanish and English
empires, without which the deeper intellectual history of the United
States cannot be fully understood. New research initiated by Thomas
Duve, the Director of the Max-Planck-Institut at Frankfurt am Main,
emphasizes the cultural, political, and economic interaction and
interchange between Europe and the “New World,” or the two
Americas.31 My approach is more modest and is more closely tied to
my European cultural roots, the younger history of codified
continental law, and the established role of the state in the economy
and society.
This paper owes its origins to an invitation to speak on social
justice in private law at the Cour de Cassation in Paris.32 Thinking
about justice in the French academic and judicial environment must
coincide–at least this is what I am convinced of–with an analysis of the
connection between state-building and constitution-building, as well as
private legal order building and codification in the aftermath of the
French revolution 1789. Whilst such a starting point offers joint
perspectives in comparing France and Germany, it falls short by not
taking the United Kingdom into account. If anything, a parallel may be
drawn between the French Revolution of the late eighteenth century
and German state-building of the nineteenth century on the one hand,
and the Civil War and the conflict between the English Crown and
Oliver Cromwell in the seventeenth century on the other. This period,
i.e. the seventeenth throughout the nineteenth century, is roughly the
period I investigated in attempting to explain where the different
patterns of freedom of social justice derive from. I use these findings

See id.
See Duve, supra note 27.
32
Hans-W. Micklitz, Speech at the Cour de Cassation Paris: From Social
Justice to Participatory Justice (2007).
30
31
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in my attempt to transfer them an understanding of the deeper layers
of freedom of contract.
V.

MODELING THE MANY FACES OF “FREEDOM OF CONTRACT”

Table 1 illustrates my understanding of freedom of contract and
regulation, rooted in intellectual history. This section will first explain the
categorization of England, France, Germany, and the European
Union.33 I will then provide a rough account of the socio-economic
and political background to the different models of autonomy and
regulation in those three countries and the European Union, thereby
elaborating on the characteristics of the many faces of freedom of
contract in a bottom-up perspective.

The following analysis is a developed and adjusted version of Hans-W.
Micklitz, supra note 23.
33
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Table 1: Understandings of Freedom of Contract, Regulation
and Their Intellectual History (France, Germany, United Kingdom
European Union)
Country
France

Germany

United
Kingdom

European
Union

Model of
freedom of
contract
A political
project
Code Civil

Intellectual
history

Regulation

French
rationalism
Enlightenment

A liberal
authoritarian/
paternalistic
project
Bürgerliches
Gesetzbuch
A liberal
pragmatic
project
Common law

German idealism
Metaphysics

Regulating
contracts as a
political
counterproject
Regulating
contracts as a
technical
bureaucratic
exercise

A technocratic
project
Regulatory
private law

Instrumentalism
and
functionalism

Empiricism and
Utilitarianism
Pragmatism

12

Regulating
contracts to
solve
‘concrete
Problems’
Regulated
freedom –
enabling and
shaping
autonomy

2015
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The English Model: Liberal and Pragmatic

In English history there is no comparable event to the
adoption of the Civil Code in France or in Germany. The civil war that
took place in the seventeenth century in England led to major changes
in society and the parliamentarian system. However, the English Civil
War neither yielded a constitution nor a coherent codified body of civil
law; rather, it only made way for the Declaration of the Bill of Rights
in 1689. The French and the German legal systems, as seen through
the eyes of a common law lawyer (daring to suggest that this is possible
for me, a civil law lawyer), share a relatively homogenous view on the
role and function of freedom of contract in society. These legal
systems are united in the idea of universal values that infiltrate legal
principles and concepts. “Autonomy” or “autonomie” is at the core of
these values, and this is exactly where common lawyers run into
difficulties.34
The true difference between continental law and common law
dates further back than the French revolution, and it was crucial to
identify the point at which the continental and common law systems
diverged. I considered the clash between different philosophies, and
to the remaining influence of the scholastic in continental Europe and
its growing critique through nominalism in the United Kingdom. I also
considered that the divergence occurred during medieval times when
the relative cultural unity of Europe broke into pieces.35 Therefore, I
think empiricism is responsible for the deep differences between
continental and common law legal systems. Despite the strong
intellectual exchange, especially between France and England, Hobbes
imported ideas from France, Rousseau referred to John Locke, and the
ideas and concepts of Francis Bacon’s empiricism became prevalent
after the failure of Cromwell. Empiricism paved the way for
utilitarianism–and here we have not only the key to understanding
English reservations against regulatory intervention into the economy,

34

See Lord R. Goff, The Future of the Common Law, 46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.

745 (1997).
35

BERMAN, supra note 28, at 265.
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but also the explanation for English pragmatism,36 which allows for
regulatory intervention when there is a concrete need for action.
Both historical strings, which are tied together in my discussion
above, justify the assumption that the continental European
understanding of freedom of contract does not comply with
philosophical, historical, economic, and legal structures in England. In
other words, England has paved the way for a legal system which is
deeply rooted in nominalistic and utilitarian thinking. Freedom of
contract lies at the crossroads of these deep roots in English
intellectual history. Nominalism served to cut away the ideological
barriers enshrined in the scholastic school of law and to free English
contract law from the Pandectist heritage; utilitarianism went hand in
hand with the rise of the English “trading state” (Handelsstaat), which
has its origins in the nineteenth century.37 The heart of English
contract law lies in the freedom of commerce and the freedom to
conclude contracts. Freedom of contract, therefore, means first and
foremost the economic freedom to voluntarily engage in economic
transactions without any risk of statutory interferences, with the
exception of paying taxes to the Crown.38
Compared to German Idealism (Kant, Fichte, Hegel,
Schelling) and French Rationalism (Descartes, Pascal, Voltaire,
Rousseau), the English view of the role and function of contract law is
much more economic in its basic assumptions. It is a much smaller
argumentative step from utility to economic efficiency and economic
effectiveness, compared with duty, reason, will, or spirit (Pflicht,
Vernunft, Wille, Verstand, Geist). English contract law can be much
more easily adapted to European “integration through law,”39 where
See Goff, supra note 34; Basil Markesinis, Learning from Europe and
Learning in Europe, in THE GRADUAL CONVERGENCE: FOREIGN IDEAS, FOREIGN
INFLUENCES, AND ENGLISH LAW ON THE EVE OF THE 21ST CENTURY (Basil
Markesinis ed., 1994); Thijmen Koopmans, The Birth of European Law at the Crossroads
of Legal Traditions, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 493 (1991).
37
See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1909).
38
LAWRENCE JAMES, THE RISE AND THE FALL OF BRITISH EMPIRE (1st
ed. 1994).
39
See “INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW” REVISITED: THE MAKING OF THE
EUROPEAN POLITY (Daniel Augenstein ed., 2012); Integration Through Law: Europe and
the American Federal Experience, in INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW 3-68 (Mauro
Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe & Joseph Weiler eds., 1986).
36
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the judicial system is given a major role in the realization of the Internal
Market.40
What is the relationship between the particular English variant
of freedom of contract and English legal culture? The English state is
a liberal state. Its function is not to control economic behavior but to
guarantee freedom of contract. In the seventeenth century this
concerned the merchant adventurer, today it concerns the business
environment at large.41 Statutory intervention in the economy is
feasible if there is a political need. Labor law and consumer law
legislation illustrate this approach. The U.K. Parliament was at the
forefront of consumer legislation. With regard to consumer credit and
consumer safety, the U.K. Parliament has long set the benchmark for
statutory intervention. Pragmatism is the guiding idea of statutory
regulation restricting the freedom to contract.
This approach can be felt in the way in which the transposition
of European consumer law directives are integrated into the English
system. Directive 99/44/EC42 is an example. The U.K. Parliament
rejected any attempt to revise the English law on contracts. Such an
attempt would have challenged the foundations of freedom of contract
by creating a separate legislation to stand side-by-side with the
common law on contracts on the one hand, and the Sale of Goods Act

40
No research has been undertaken as to whether there is a link between
the adherence of the United Kingdom to the Europe Union and the deepening of
European integration via case law. Whilst the building blocks van Gend en Loos and
Costa Enel were decided before the UK joined the EU, the ground-breaking
judgments of Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon paved the way for the development of the
Internal Market and were made with the participation of UK judges. Today’s pattern
of integration might have changed. Christian Joerges, What is left of the integration
through law project? A reconstruction in conflicts-law perspectives, in THE EUROPEAN RESCUE
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION? 37-67 (Edoardo Chiti, Augustín José Menéndez, Pedro
Gustavo Teixeira eds. 2012) (speaks of “integration without law,” referring to the
dominance of politics and the influential role of governance.)
41
PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
(1985); DAVID J. IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS (1999) (showing that the real turning point was between 1790 and
1830, when the last remnants of just price were stripped away).
42
Council Directive 99/44 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer
goods and associates guarantees, 1999 O.J. (L 171) (EC).
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on the other.43 Under E.U. Directive 93/13/EEC, a similar continuity
can be demonstrated in the recent decisions of the House of Lords on
the control of unfair contract terms in consumer contracts.44 This piece
of E.U. law has led to irritation in the English system, as it submits
standard terms to a general fairness test, an approach which runs
counter to the ideology of the English Parliament,45 where regulatory
intervention is not meant to challenge the significance of freedom of
contract in general but to solve concrete problems.46
In conclusion, the basic formula which lies at the heart of
English legal culture can be condensed into one single formula–what
is useful is right. Here nominalism, empiricism and utilitarianism come
together. Freedom of contract is foundational to the common law on
contracts, and statutory intervention is acceptable as long as it aims at
solving concrete consumer or labor concerns.
B.

The French Model: Rational and Political

France has a particular historical role in the legal and
theoretical discourse on the interrelationship between constitutionbuilding and the making of private legal order. The results of the
French revolution are still shaping our understanding of constitutions,
civil codes, “contract,” and “tort” today. In only twenty years the key
events in France which would define these notions occurred. In
contrast, in the United Kingdom similar notions developed from an
evolutionary process, where no clear-cut moment of constitution
building and private legal order making can be fixed. The French
Revolution led to a break with feudalistic structures47 and instituted a
See LUCINDA MILLER, THE EMERGENCE OF EU CONTRACT LAW –
EXPLORING EUROPEANIZATION (2011) (analyzing the struggle in the UK over the
implementation of Directive 99/44).
44
Council Directive 93/13 of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer
contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) (EC).
45
See Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How
Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergencies, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998).
46
See Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey Nat’l plc & Others, [2009] UKSC
6, [2010] 1 A.C. 696 (appeal taken from Eng. and Wales); General of Fair Trading v.
First Nat’l Bank plc, [2001] UKHL 52, [2002] A.C. 481 (appeal taken from Eng. and
Wales); Hein Kötz, Schranken der Inhaltskontrolle bei den Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen
der Banken: Entscheidung des britischen Supreme Court, 25 ZEuP 332 (2012).
47
See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1963).
43
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bourgeois society governed by individual freedom and equality of
rights, which became even more visible in the Code Civil and in the
French Constitution.48 The Revolution’s legacy can easily be found in
the German Civil Code, which was adopted a century later.
To portray the French understanding of freedom of contract
and regulation, I start from two premises. First, the vision of the
French revolution, which was proclaimed in the Declaration of Human
Rights, pinned down in a Constitution, and later codified in the Civil
Code, has deeper social, cultural, economic, and intellectual roots. I
argue that today’s conception of freedom of contract in France can
best be understood as a political forward-looking concept, which can
be traced back to French Rationalism49 and Descartes.50
Secondly, French society may be characterized by the tension
between intellectual projects guided by “les grandes idées,”–the French
Constitution and the French Code–which strengthen the power of the
Executive to the detriment of the Judiciary, and the highly politicized
bottom-up resistance against an excessively far-reaching executive
power.51 The fight over “the Social”52—the regulatory intervention to
protect workers in employment contracts and later the consumers in
business to consumer (B2C) contracts—has demonstrated that setting
limits to freedom of contract through statutory intervention is a highly
politicized matter that is subject to potential conflicts.
Just as in England, the intellectual turning point in France can
be attributed to the fading influence of scholastic thinking. Academic
48

See FRANZ WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT 343

(1967).
For a deeper analysis, see LAURENCE BONJOUR, IN DEFENSE OF PURE
REASON (1998); Laurence BonJour, A Rationalist Manifesto, 18 CANADIAN J. OF PHIL.
SUPPLEMENTARY 53 (1992).
50
See EGON FRIEDELL, KULTURGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT: DIE KRISE
DER EUROPÄISCHEN SEELE VON DER SCHWARZEN PEST BIS ZUM ERSTEN
WELTKRIEG (2007) (discussing Descartes and his methodological thinking).
51
This is my own interpretation of the French development.
52
See Kennedy, supra note 24, at 19, 95 (discussing the rise of “The Social”
and its intellectual origins); from a German perspective, but taking the French impact
into account, in particular Duguit, Salleilles and Gény, see Wieacker, supra note 48, at
543 § 28 (“Der Zerfall der inneren Einheit des Privatrechts und das Sozialrecht”.) In
that vain, law has a particular social function to fulfill.
49
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questioning of the spirit evolved from the methodological constraints
of scholasticism and paved the way for a new rational method in
philosophy. French philosopher Michel Eyguem de Montaigne (15331592) set long-lasting incentives for critical reflection of all existing
knowledge and values, which later came to be known as
“Enlightenment.”53 This new method to investigate the “truth” and
the concept of the truth was left in the seventeenth century to
Descartes, who began with his Discours de la Méthode.54 Descartes
claimed that a particular method to acquire the truth was needed to
solve all philosophical questions. Unlike utilitarianism, Descartes
believed that what is true is useful. Without Descartes’s theory, it is
difficult to understand the political conception of the French Civil
Code. Descartes’ philosophy results in the priority of theory over
practice, which is the basic thesis of French intellectualism.
Based on this premise, the link between the French political
project of freedom of contract and the particularities of the French
legal culture become clear. Freedom of contract is first and foremost
tied to the key function of the “reason,” “raison,” or “Vernunft” in the
French civil law system. The idea is that freedom of contract is more
than just an exercise to maximize mutual economic benefit. More is at
stake in the communication between the parties, namely, the
commitment to a contract is the product of a reasonable decision.
Autonomie de la volonté is bound in the belief or assumption (“Einsicht”)
in a higher reason that is deeper than the individual transaction.55 This
is the Cartesian side of the concept of autonomie de la volonté. However,
there is also the Rousseauean side, and it is here where the political
dimension of the concept of automomie de la volonté is more obvious.
Autonomie de la volonté may not be equated with individual freedom in
the meaning of German idealism, which is inward looking. To the
contrary, it is outward looking toward society itself and to the
embedding of reason into the political environment. This is what
Rousseau called the volonté générale (general will). Without Rousseau’s
concept of democracy and the conviction that the people will consent
See FRIEDELL, supra note 50.
RENÉ DESCARTES, DISCOURS DE LA MÉTHODE POUR BIEN CONDUIRE
SA RAISON, ET CHERCHER LA VÉRITÉ DANS LES SCIENCES (1637).
55
This implies the need to look for a certain substantive equivalence in
the mutual contractual relations, in German “das materielle Äquivalenzprinzip der
vernunftsrechtlichen Vertragslehre.”
53
54

18

2015

Micklitz

4:1

to the volonté générale, it is not possible to understand the political
dimension of the concept of autonomy in the French civil code.56
In France, there is also a peculiar understanding of the role and
function of regulatory intervention in the economy to protect workers
and consumers and, more in general, to restrict freedom of contract in
commercial transactions through statutory regulation. Since
mercantilist times, the French government played a strong role in the
organization and creation of the economy.57 The economy must follow
political prerogatives in order to address social concerns and any other
political requirements. What matters for our discussion is the strong
connection between the role and function of the political, and the
understanding of regulatory intervention. The political dimension
must not necessarily materialize in a top-down fashion, i.e. through
legislative acts on what nowadays is called social regulation or
executive intervention into the management of the economy of the
country. The political may also emerge bottom-up, through resistance
on the streets against the supremacy of the state managed economy
over politics.
To demonstrate the continuity of the French legal conscience
(Rechtsbewußtsein) and of the breadth and depth of the political in social
regulation, I will again start with reference to the implementation of
E.U. Directive 99/44/EC on consumer sales. Under strong pressure
from civil lawyers and civil law doctrine, the French legislature decided
that, rather than integrate the rules on consumer protection into the
Civil Code, it would place the respective articles in the Code de la
Consommation.58 This strategy preserved the integrity of the Civil Code
as an “eternal” political project, which might be regarded as an integral
part of the French identity.59 However, there is one notable difference
56

I am fully aware that Rousseau differs from Descartes in his image of

the person.
57
See KARL PRIBRAM, GESCHICHTE DES ÖKONOMISCHEN DENKENS, [A
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC REASONING] 194 (Erster Band ed., Horst Brühmann trans.,
1998); COLIN HEYWOOD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRENCH ECONOMY 17501914 (1995).
58
See MILLER, supra note 43 (reconstructing the political fights over the
correct way to implement Directive 99/44 in the French legal system).
59
French scholars had a strong reaction against the idea of a European
Civil Code. See YVES LEQUETTE, QUELQUES REMARQUES A PROPOS DU PROJET DE
CODE CIVIL EUROPEEN DE MONSIEUR VON BAR 2202-14 (2002); Bénédicte
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to the English method of transposition. Contrary to the problem based
U.K. approach on consumer protection, the French Code de la
Consommation was originally designed according to a political model, a
blueprint which was similar to the Civil Code in that it could guide the
development in Europe of a consistent body of consumer law rules.60
Contrary to most other Member States in the European Union,
the consumer movement in France bore a strong political dimension,
at least in the 1970s and 1980s, which largely derived from
politicization through integrating consumer policy into politics. Trade
unions in France were tied to various left wing parties, each of which
had to leave their footprint on the then new policy.61 It is only because
the European Union took over consumer policy in the second half of

Fauvarque-Cosson, Faut-il un code civil européen?, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT
CIVIL 463 (2002); see also Christian Joerges, Der Europäisierungsprozess als Herausforderung
des Privatrechts: Plädoyer für eine neue Rechtsdisziplin, in EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT IM
WISSENSCHAFTLICHEN DISKURS 133, 142 (Andreas Furrer ed., 2006) (interpreting
the conflict between the German professorial model of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch
(BGB) and the democratic tradition of the Code Civil); Wolfgang Wurmnest, Common
Core, Grundregeln, Kodifikationsentwürfe, Acquis-Grundsätze – Ansätze internationaler
Wissenschaftlergruppen zur Privatrechtsvereinheitlichung in Europa, 11 ZEUP 714 (2003);
Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, Droit europen des contrats: première réaction au plan d’áction
de la Commission, RECUEIL DALLOZ 1171 (2003); Philippe Malinvaud, Réponse-hors
délai-à la Commission européenne: à propos d’un code européenne des contrats, in PENSEE
JURIDIQUE FRANCAISE ET HARMONISATION EUROPEENNE DU DROIT 231
(Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Denis Mazeaud eds., 2003) ; JEAN HUET, NOUS
FAUT-IL UN ‘EURO’ DROIT CIVIL? 2611-14 (2002). Whether or not the French Civil
Code would pass the identity test under the Lisbon Treaty is another story. See HansW. Micklitz, German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht BVerfG) 2 BvE 2/08,
30.6.2009 – Organstreit Proceedings between Members of the German Parliament and the Federal
Government, 7 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 528 (2011).
60
JEAN CALAIS-AULOY, COMMISSION DE LA REFONTE, LE DROIT DE LA
CONSOMMATION EN FRANCE (1981).
61
This might explain why attempts to build connections between labor
law and consumer law were particulary strong in France, to some extent in Italy, and
only marginal in Germany. See MICHEL MIAILLE, UNE INTRODUCTION CRITIQUE
AU DROIT (1976); ENZO ROPPO, VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ UND KLASSENTHEORIE
109 (1976); KLAUS TONNER, VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ ALS GEWERKSCHAFTLICHE
AUFGABE 252 (1979); KLAUS TONNER, VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ UND
KLAASSENTHEORIE – ERWIDERUNG AUF ENZO ROPPO 241 (1976).
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the 1980s after the Single European Act62 that consumer policy became
de-politicized in France.
C.

The German Model: Liberal and Authoritarian/Paternalistic

The German Civil Code is 100 years younger than the French
Civil Code. In 1815, the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna and the
scattered German regions that comprised various kingdoms and
counties (earldoms) failed to unite into a German state under a
common constitution. It took until 1871 before Germany managed,
under the regime of the Prussian king and his chancellor Bismarck, to
finally adopt a constitution. It took an additional thirty years before the
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), as it is called in German, was enacted.
My arguments are built upon two major guiding assumptions.
First, there is a direct line from Kant to Savigny to Weber and the
formal rationality of the private law system, which serves to constitute
the capitalist society. The Kantian philosophy inspired Savigny to
formulate the so-called Historische Schule (Historical School), which was
influential during the nineteenth century among private law theorists
and, remarkably, continues to be influential even after the fall of the
wall in 1989.63 Historische Schule has created a particular way of thinking,
favoring the transition from “The Social” to the “pure” private law
system. Social issues and regulations were outsourced by a technocratic
decision to specialize private law legislation outside the BGB, although
adopted 100 years later than the more integrative approach of the
French Code Civil.64 This time period gave the German BGB a
62
Single European Act, Feb. 28, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) (entered into
force July 1, 1987).
63
See Reinhard Zimmermann, Savigny’s Legacy: Legal History, Comparative
Law, and the Emergence of a European Science, 112 L.Q. REV. 576 (1996); Horst
Eidenmüller et al., The Common Frame of Reference for European Private Law – Policy Choices
and Codification Problems, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 659 (2008) (criticizing the
European private law codification project, which is inspired from and based on the
destruction of the common philosophical ground of private law in the civil and
common law systems).
64
Both the French Code Civil and the German BGB covered tenant law.
In France, tenant law has remained an integral part of the civil code, whereas German
tenant law has become a legal field in itself, outsourced in special acts and only
partially integrated in the BGB through the modernization of the law of obligations
(Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz) in 2002. For details on the development of
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particular ideological outlook, which maintained and defended an early
nineteenth century bourgeois model of society and economy against
the rising political and social transformations brought about by the
industrial age and the labor movement.65
Second, there is the link between Fichte, Hegel, Thibaut,
German idealism, and legal naturalism, as expressed in Jhering, von
Gierke, Ehrlich, Weber, and Kantorowicz wherein national ideals were
tied to the social ideals of a society and a nation.66 Such a vision can
hardly be connected to the authoritarian Prussian state, which
provided social protection to workers67 only as a means to compensate
workers for their exclusion from political participation (Sozialistengesetze
1978). The German version of legal naturalism favors an instrumental
use of social regulation, but carefully avoids and downplays the
political dimension inherent in “The Social.”68
The intellectual quarrel between two German law professors,
Thibaut and Savigny, over the value of a codified German Civil Code
is paradigmatic for tensions arising in the German legal system:
Thibaut fought enthusiastically in Heidelberg–inspired by German
Idealism and les grandes idées of the French revolution–for a genuine
German Code; Savigny fought brilliantly (but not enthusiastically) for
the maintenance of the old Roman law.69 Law-making in Germany in
the early nineteenth century was understood as an academic exercise,
quite contrary to the democratic discussion that surrounded the
tenant law in Europe, see Christoph U. Schmid & Jason R. Dinse, The European
Dimension of Residential Tenancy Law, 9 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 201 (2013).
65
There is a connection between the late industrialization relative to the
UK, the labor movement, and the Bismarckian reaction. See, e.g., HUGO SINZHEIMER,
EIN ARBEITSTARIFGESETZ: DIE IDEE DER SOZIALEN SELBSTBESTIMMUNG IM
RECHT (1916).
66
See WIEACKER, supra note 48. Most of the legal auxiliary sciences such
as criminology and legal sociology have their origin in legal naturalism and in the
Freirechtsschule (Free Law Movement).
67
E.g., 1883 health insurance, 1884 accident insurance.
68
See Hermann U. Kantorowicz who attacks Savigny’s influence on the
construction of the Civil Code and on what I call here “Rechtsbewußtsein”.
Hermann U. Kantorowicz, Was ist uns Savigny, 1 RECHT UND WIRTSCHAFT 47, 76
and seq. (1911).
69
ANTON FRIEDRICH JUSTUS THIBAUT & FRIEDRICH CARL VON
SAVIGNY, IHRE PROGRAMMATISCHEN SCHRIFTEN, MIT EINER EINFÜHRUNG VON
HANS HATTENHAUER (1973).
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adoption and distribution of the French Civil Code.70 The outcome
was a civil code that lacked the required “socialist oil.”71 This defect
was remedied in the twentieth century by judges through judge-made
law, and by the legislator through the adoption of numerous special
laws.
German legal culture has two main components: a liberal
dimension, which is shared by English law and enshrined in
commercial freedom to contract; and a political dimension, which is
shared by French law and enshrined in the much stronger commitment
to “The Social.”72 The English streak dates back to the merging of the
German Länder (states) under a tight Prussian grip, which triggered the
industrial revolution and led to an amazing boost for the economy. In
this context, the predominance of the market and a sense of English
pragmatism can be felt. The German state, however, is not a liberalenabling state in the Anglo-Saxon sense. The German state is rooted
in the authoritarian heritage of pre-democratic times. As such, the state
is seen as the key regulator to realize not only economic but also
political objectives, which brings German legal culture nearer to its
French counterpart. However, contrary to France where the political
also bears a strong top-down dimension, the political dimension in
Germany is more bottom-up as it is always connected to expectations
set by the citizens of the state. Today, the early Bismarkian regulatory
state and the post-World War II welfare state still bears elements of
authoritarian care-taking, which is different from England due to the
strong interventionist side and different from France due to the lack
of an open political discourse. The tension between the liberals and the
70
See Reinhard Zimmermann, Consumer Contract Law and General Contract
Law: The German Experience, 58 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 415 (2005); Harm Schepel,
Professorenrecht? The Field of European Private Law, in LAWYER’S CIRCLES – LAWYERS
AND EUROPEAN LEGAL INTEGRATION 115 (2004); Rainer Maria Kiesow,
Rechtswissenschaft – was ist das?, 12 JURISTEN ZEITUNG 585, 586 (2010).
71
OTTO VAN GIERKE, DIE SOZIALE AUFGABE DES PRIVATRECHTS 13
(1889); TILMAN REPGEN, DIE SOZIALE AUFGABE DES PRIVATRECHTS: EINE
GRUNDFRAGE IN WISSENSCHAFT UND KODIFIKATION AM ENDE DES 19.
JAHRHUNDERTS (2001).
72
GERT BRÜGGEMEIER, ENTWICKLUNG DES RECHTS IM
ORGANISIERTEN KAPITALISMUS, BAND 1: VON DER GRÜDERZEIT ZUR WEIMARER
REPUBLIK (1977); GERT BRÜGGEMEIER, ENTWICKLUNG DES RECHTS IM
ORGANISIERTEN KAPITALISMUS, BAND 2: VOM FASCHISMUS BIS ZUR GEGENWART
(1979).
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authoritarians explains why political debates in Germany so easily turn
into ideological conflicts, just as it was between Thibaut and Savigny.
What does this mean for the German variant of freedom of
contract—or private autonomy (Privatautonomie) as phrased in the
context of the intellectual history—and the limitation of freedom of
contract via statutory regulation? Private autonomy centers on the
individual. But who is the individual? The reasonable Cartesian French
person/citizen, the utilitarian Englishman, or the idealistic
Kantian/Hegelian subject? The key question in German legal theory—
although not in commercial transactions, freedom of contract, the
common law of contracts, or the droit des obligations—is how this
individual can bind himself legally. The conceptual difference is visible
in the comparison between the common law and the German Civil
Code. Only the German BGB contains a General Part (Allgemeiner Teil),
which not only precedes the law of contract, but also precedes family
law and the law of succession. The General Part holds the entire
German private law system, as laid down in the BGB, together. Its
content triggers irritation and uncertainty outside Germany (what is a
juridical act? Ein Rechtsgeschäft?73). The key to understanding the
idealistic German concept of private autonomy is to appreciate its
roots in the so-called “will theory” (Willenstheorie), which states that the
individual is bound through his will, rather than through his
declaration (Erklärung).74 It is true that the Prussian legislator
introduced corrections to the “will theory” into the BGB, which have
been amplified by the judiciary in the twentieth century. Idealistic
thinking embedded in the concept of private autonomy is still alive: it
has been taken up by the Freiburg school, ordo-liberalism, and the
private law society.75 Its counterpart, the resistance against restrictions,
more often than not bears a strong ideological bias that is outweighed

73
The Academic Draft Common Frame of Reference contains such a
general part in compliance with the German BGB.
74
The “will theory” is extremely helpful because it combines European
legal thought with American legal thought. See Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory
to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and Form,” 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 94 (2000).
75
See ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMÄCKER, A LEGAL THEORY WITHOUT LAW:
POSNER V. HAYEK ON ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 174 (2007) (responding to the
critics of law and economics against ordo-liberalism).
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by intense legislative activities in the twentieth century for the benefit
of those contracting parties with weaker bargaining power.
Again, I will use Directive 99/44/EC as a blueprint to explain
the continuity of the German Rechtsbewusstsein and the tension between
the liberal and authoritarian views of freedom of contract. In the
shadow of the so-called modernization of German contract law
(Schuldrechts-Modernisierungsgesetz) in 2002, the executive, i.e., the
Ministry of Justice, used the expiry of the two-year implementation
period to complete the twenty-year long pending project of revising
the German Civil Code, thereby “smuggling” the bulk of consumer
contract law rules into the German Civil Code. This integration of Civil
Code and consumer contract law perhaps was not an authoritarian, but
a paternalistic move.76 The academic debates focused almost entirely
on the proposed revision of the prescription rules, in particular, on
Leistungsstörungsrecht (law on the interference with or impairment of the
performance of an obligation). This revision has been performed as a
technical bureaucratic exercise.77 Pragmatism might have guided
German scholars to accept the development of a new sales law, as a
common pattern for business to business (B2B) and B2C relations;
however, contrary to France and the Netherlands, there was no deeper
political discussion, especially on the possible role of consumer law as
an integral part of the civil code, in the open democratic fora in
Germany. Until today, consumer law has remained a foreign body in
76
There is a deeper discussion needed on the difference between
(Prussian) authoritarianism and (post-Second World War) German paternalism. See
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA ch. VI (1835), for a starting
point on this distinction (“[a]bove this race of men stands an immense and tutelary
power, which takes upon itself alone to secure their gratifications and to watch over
their fate. That power is absolute, minute, regular, provident, and mild. It would be
like the authority of a parent if, like that authority, its object was to prepare men for
manhood; but it seeks, on the contrary, to keep them in perpetual childhood: it is
well content that the people should rejoice, provided they think of nothing but
rejoicing. For their happiness such a government willingly labors, but it chooses to
be the sole agent and the only arbiter of that happiness; it provides for their security,
foresees and supplies their necessities, facilitates their pleasures, manages their
principal concerns, directs their industry, regulates the descent of property, and
subdivides their inheritances: what remains, but to spare them all the care of thinking
and all the trouble of living?”).
77
See, e.g., Stephan Lorenz, Fünf Jahre “neues” Schuldrecht im Spiegel der
Rechtsprechung, 1-2 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1 (2007).
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the German BGB. The integration of “The Social” has not led to an
overall re-thinking of the foundations of the German BGB. Instead,
the two parts, although located in the same civil code, are each rooted
in their very particular intellectual history.78
D.

The European Model: Enabling and Restricting

Over the last sixty years, the European legal order and the
European constitutional charter79 have yielded a genuine model of
freedom of contract to protect participants in an ever-growing Internal
Market. At the same time, however, the European legal order and
constitutional charter have also set boundaries to this established
freedom of contract.80 How is it possible that the European Union is
able to generate a distinct model, different from national ones? I am
not so much interested in whether the emerging European model
should be understood as some kind of reaction to the globalization of
markets.81 My focus is on the intellectual history of the European legal
order that underpins Europe and the European Union. Although
Europe and the European Union are intertwined, they must be kept
separate in our discussion.
Perspective matters. Europe is treated as a homogenous whole
by those on the outside, and particularly by U.S. legal scholars. Two
examples of such over-generalized discussions about Europe include
the work of James Whitman on U.S. consumerism versus E.U.

78
See HANS-W. MICKLITZ, BRAUCHEN KONSUMENTEN UND
UNTERNEHMEN EINE NEUE ARCHITEKTUR DES VERBRAUCHERRECHTS? GUTACHTEN A ZUM 69. JURISTENTAG 129 (2012); Hans-W. Micklitz, Do Consumers and
Business Need a New Architecture for Consumer Law? A Thought Provoking Impulse, 32 Y.B.
EUROPEAN L. 266 (2012).
79
Neil Walker, Big “C” or Small “c”?, 12 EUR. L.J., 12 (2006).
80
See Guido Comparato & Hans-W. Micklitz, Regulated Autonomy between
Market Freedoms and Fundamental Rights in the Case Law of the CJEU, in GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW AND EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 121-54 (Ulf Bernitz, Xavier
Groussot & Felix Schulyok eds., 2013); NORBERT REICH, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
EU CIVIL LAW (2013).
81
KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944); KARL
POLANYI, GLOBALISATION AND THE POTENTIAL OF LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL
MARKETS (Christian Joerges & Josef Falke eds., 2011).
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producerism,82 and the work of Daniel Kelemen on Eurolegalism.83 In
general, scholars tend to treat the south and north, the east and west,
and the European Union and European Council the same. Similarly,
there is little discussion in contemporary research on where Europe
ends: European countries are considered a single entity, this entity is
often implicitly equated with the European Union, and then the entity
is compared with the United States.84
Does the conception of freedom of contract and its statutory
limitation reflect a common denominator of English Utilitarianism,
French Rationalism, and German Idealism? Is there a foundation
shared by the English liberal and pragmatic, French rational and
political, and German liberal and authoritarian? To what extent does
this intellectual crossover mutually impact England, France, and
Germany? Those who stress a common cultural foundation insist on
an intellectual exchange between the great minds behind the concepts
of empiricism, utilitarianism, rationalism, enlightenment, and idealism.
For centuries, European intellectuals shared a common language,
Latin, which gradually vanished between the seventeenth and
nineteenth centuries. The deeper cultural foundation, however, cannot
be based in language alone. For example, in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, leading private lawyers from all over Europe
and the United States were involved in intellectual exchange, but all
wrote in their respective languages.85 It seems as if the intellectual
James Q. Whitman, Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in
Comparative Law, 117 YALE L.J. 340, 407 (2007).
83
R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
LAW AND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011).
84
This kind of stereotyped, over-simplified thinking has been promoted
by the Integration Through Law Project by Mauro Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe,
and Joseph Weiler to compare the constitutional architecture of the then European
Economic Community and the United States. See INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW:
EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 39, at 3-68;
“INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW” REVISITED: THE MAKING OF THE EUROPEAN
POLITY, supra note 39. This kind of thinking might be due to the historical
circumstances in which it took places. In the mid 1980s there was still the political
idea pending that the Member States of the European Union would be ready and
willing to transform the European Union into a fully fledged federal United States
of Europe.
85
René Demogue, La Notion de Sujet De Droit, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE
DROIT CIVIL 611-55 (1909); RECUEIL SIREY, ÉVOLUTIONS ET ACTUALITES
CONFERENCES DE DROIT CIVIL 29-51 (1936).
82
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exchange was much more intense hundreds of years ago than it is
today, since today the English language dominates the intellectual
discourse and non-English contributions to the intellectual history of
Europe are no longer perceived.
Wieacker is perhaps one of the few scholars who looks behind
the three main intellectual historical strains and condenses the
common European legal culture that unites the private law in der
Neuzeit86 (in modern times) into three invariables. The first invariable
is personalism, which is directly connected to the role of the individual,
autonomy, and freedom in private law. The second invariable is
legalism in which decisions are bound to the rule of law. The third
invariable is European intellectualism, which drives European legal
thinking in the direction of thematization, conceptualization, and
contradiction-free consistency of the law.
Is Wieacker’s theory correct? Is the revitalization of the
common European legal culture after the Second World War not
guided by the political purpose it had to fulfill? Can the common
European legal culture be regarded as an attempt to rewrite legal
history? I fear that these questions are too broad for this paper.87 The
debate on the possible legal philosophical foundations of Europe88 and
European private law89 is just about to start. The handbook edited by
Julie Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis90 on the philosophical
foundations of E.U. law mainly focuses on European constitutional
86
This is the title of Franz Wieacker’s masterpiece, which was translated
into English by Tony Weir. See generally WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER
NEUZEIT, supra note 48.
87
See, e.g., WOLFRAM KAISER, CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY AND THE
ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN UNION (2007); RAOUL CHARLES VAN CAENEGEM,
EUROPEAN LAW IN THE PAST AND THE FUTURE: UNITY AND DIVERSITY OVER TWO
MILLENNIA (2002); FRIEDRICH HEER, THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF EUROPE
(1968); see also Kolleg-Forschergruppe Working Paper Series, KOLLEG-FORSCHERGRUPPE:
THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF EUROPE, (2009-2015) available at
http://www.polsoz.fuberlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/publications/working_paper/index.html.
88
See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE LEGACY OF ROMAN LAW IN THE
GERMAN ROMANTIC ERA: HISTORICAL VISION AND LEGAL CHANGE (2014).
89
THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Roger
Brownsword et al. eds., 2011).
90
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW (Julie
Dickson & Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds., 2012).
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theory, rather than European private law and European private law
theory.91
To understand the European model of freedom of contract, it
is helpful to look at the intellectual history, and perhaps the
constitutional history, of the European Union. This understanding
requires a leap to the post-war period, when the European Economic
Community was launched and the European Union was created.
Scholars92 advocated for the revitalization and re-invigoration of a
common European culture to enable a peaceful and prosperous future
for the European peoples. For example, scholars advocated for peace
through economic integration, and in 1986, the Single European Act
added social integration to the new European legal order.93
Economic integration of the European Union is based on the
free movement rights and competition. In particular, German
academics in the ordo-liberal tradition have argued that private
autonomy is enshrined into the free movement rights.94 Economic
integration aims at enabling the growth of, or paving the way for,
private entrepreneurship in the ever-bigger common European
market. The abundant case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
on the four freedoms often involves contractual disputes in which one
party seeks access to the market but is barred by national statutory

91
The Oxford University Press series, where Julie Dickson and Paylos
Eleftheriadis also appeared, includes an ongoing project on the philosophical
foundations of private law.
92
These scholars include academics such as Wieacker, Grossi, and Coing,
and political scholars such as Monnet, Schuman, de Gaspari, de Gaulle, and
Adenauer.
93
Fritz Scharpf was one of the most influential scholars in this field. See
generally FRITZ SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC?
(1999) (analyzing the relationship between economic and social integration in
Europe).
94
See Stefan Grundmann, The Concept of the Private Law Society: After 50
Years of European and European Business Law, 16 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 553 (2008). For
a nice account of the European economic constitution and its influence on
(European) private law, see Sabine Frerichs & Teemu Juutilainen, Rome under Seven
Hills? An Archeology of European Private Law (Helsinki Legal Studies Research Paper
Ser.,
Paper
No.
32,
2014),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2465873.
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regulation.95 Private autonomy then obtains a different meaning,
namely, it is bound to trans-border business and European economic
integration. The European variant is functional and instrumental.
Social regulation in European private law is very much focused
on consumer protection.96 The tone of such social regulation is set by
the famous Sutherland Report.97 Consumers and consumer protection
rules are needed to complete the Internal Market (the 1986 program
behind the Single European Act). Putting it differently, the price to pay
for the Completion of the Internal Market is the adoption of minimum
social (protection) standards.98 The overall philosophy is enshrined in
the wording of Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
Europe Union (TFEU), formerly Article 95 EC and Article 100a
respectively, which adopted measures to complete the Internal Market
in realizing social protection standards.99 In the late 1970s and early
1980s, several consumer and labor protection rules were adopted
under the unanimity principle, the enabling of autonomy and the
limitation of autonomy go hand-in-hand. The broadening of economic
freedoms, similar to common law freedom of contract, preceded the
development of protective standards that limited freedom of contract,
mainly through binding legal standards.
This development is by no means limited to the field of
traditional private law, contract law and consumer protection, or
employment contracts and labor protection. European private law is
95
Gareth Davies, Freedom of Contract and the Horizontal Effect of Free
Movement Law, in THE INVOLVEMENT OF EU LAW IN PRIVATE LAW RELATIONSHIPS
(Dorota Leczykiewicz & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2013).
96
See Weatherill, supra note 19; HANS-W. MICKLITZ ET AL., EUROPEAN
CONSUMER Law (2d ed., 2014).
97
PETER SUTHERLAND ET AL., THE FUTURE OF THE WTO: ADDRESSING
INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENIUM: REPORT BY THE
CONSULTATIVE BOARD TO THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL SUPACHAI PANITCHPAKDI
(2004).
98
The European Commission has made an enormous effort after 2000
to transform the minimum social protection standards into maximum standards.
However, this effort has largely failed. See Hans-W. Micklitz & Norbert Reich, Crónica
de una Muerte Anunciada: The Commission Proposal for a “Directive on Consumer Rights,” 46
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 417 (2009).
99
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union art. 114, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
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regulatory by nature, as the European Union is and will be under
constant construction. Legal rules remain a key instrument for
regulation. The most prominent field of action beyond traditional
private law and even traditional fields of social regulation (e.g.,
consumer and labor protection) has been the so-called regulated
markets. The liberalization and privatization policy implemented by
the Single European Act in telecom, energy, postal services, transport,
and financial services, the dismantling of former state monopolies,
amounts to a political decision to establish markets where there were
none.100 This policy enabled freedom of contract with statutory
limitations. Therefore, enabling and restricting are the two parameters
that characterize the European model of freedom of contract.
E.

Stand and Stare

Provided my analysis contains an element of truth–and I hope
it does–what is the added value of this finding for our understanding
of freedom of contract and even more so for the communication
between lawyers across legal cultures and traditions, just like those
lawyers in our Academy for International Commercial and Consumer
Law? First and foremost, the value added is to “Stand and Stare,”101
and to distance ourselves from our subjects of analysis and own
cultural roots and traditions.
“Stand and Stare,” however, is just the first step. I do not want
to argue that our legal cultures and traditions are set in stone and that
there is no room for mutual learning and for change. Indeed, there is
arguably an emerging European legal culture, certainly in key areas of
See Hans-W. Micklitz, The Visible Hand of European Private Law, 28
YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW 3 (2009); in Italian, La mano visibile del diritto privato
europeo in materia normativa – La trasformazione del diritto privato europeo dall’autonomia al
funzionalismo nella concorrenza e enella regolamentazione, in SEMINARI DEL CONSIGLIO
NAZIONALE FORENSE: COLLANA “STUDI STORICI E GIURIDICI” 125-92 (Guido
Alpa & Roberta Mazzei, eds. 2010); in Finnish, Lakimies 3/2010, 330-56; in Japanese,
Yōroppa kisei watashi-hō no mokuteki-teki shuhō: Yōroppa watashi-hō no, kyōsō to kisei ni okeru
jiritsu kara kinō shugi e no hen’yō, 12 HOKKAIDO JOURNAL OF NEW GLOBAL LAW AND
POLICY 17 (2011); in French, La main visible du droit privé réglementaire Européen, 28
REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT ECONOMIQUE 5-57 (2014).
101
Roger Brownsword, The Theoretical Foundations of European Private Law:
A time to Stand and Stare, in FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 159 (Roger
Brownsword et al. eds., 2011).
100
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private law102–some would argue this legal culture has been enshrined
in Europe since the ius commune. There is also an emerging culture of
transnational law,103 which is now gaining ever stronger attention with
a refocused understanding and design of comparative and
transnational (legal) history.104 I fear, however, that we are approaching
a divided legal world—a world where each state contains a national
legal order in which the territory and language are transnational. There
is a chance for deepening our understanding of the “many faces of
freedom of contract,” for learning from each other and for developing
even a common cultural ground.105

TOWARDS A EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE (Genevieve Helleringer &
Kai Purnhagen eds., 2014).
103
See Kaarlo Tuori, Transnational Law: on Legal Hybrids and Legal
Perspectivism, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW, RETHINKING EUROPEAN LAW AND LEGAL
THINKING 11 (Miguel Madur, Kaarlo Tuori & Suvi Sankari eds., 2014).
104
See Thomas Duve, European Legal History – Global Perspectives Working
paper for the Colloquium “European Normativity – Global Historical Perspectives” (Max Planck
Inst. for Euro. Legal Hist. Research Paper Ser. No. 2013-06, 2013).
105
See Hans-W. Micklitz, An Essay on the Bifurcation of Legal Education National vs Transnational (forthcoming 2015).
102
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INTRODUCTION
Freedom of contract is regarded to be a general core principle
in international Business to Business (B2B) contractual relationships.1
This is especially true for sales contracts governed by the U.N.
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG),
which in Article 6 explicitly provides that “[t]he parties may . . .
derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.”
Although domestic legal systems also recognize the principle
of freedom of contract in commercial practice, they still vary
considerably with regard to the extent of this principle and to its
possible limitations. First, this paper will discuss how international
instruments as well as domestic legal systems draw the line between
Business to Consumer (B2C) and B2B contracts. Second, the validity
of exclusion and limitation of liability clauses will be examined as the
most prominent example for the exercise of judicial control of clauses
in B2B contracts.
I.
A.

PROTECTED PERSONS AND/OR TRANSACTIONS

Consumers

It is generally agreed that consumers deserve special protection
in B2C relationships.2 However, the definition of who is a consumer
considerably differs on both the international and the domestic level.
The most widely used definition of “consumer” is found in
Article 2(a) CISG, according to which a consumer is a person who
buys goods for “personal, family, or household use.”3 This definition

1
M. G. BRIDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS ¶ 1.28 (3d. ed.
2013); 1 CHITTY ON CONTRACTS ¶ 1-029 (H. G. Beale et al. eds., 31st ed. 2012); E.
A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 23 (4th. ed. 2004).
2
CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON CONSUMER LAW 2-3 (Hans-W.
Micklitz, J. Stuyck, E. Terryn, & Dimitri Droshout, eds. 2010); G. WOODROFFE &
R. LOWE, CONSUMER LAW AND PRACTICE ¶ 1.15 (9th ed. 2013); G. HOWELLS & S.
WEATHERILL, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW 8-9 (2d. ed. 2005).
3 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, art. 2(a) (1980), available at
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is also typically used by common law4 and some Asian jurisdictions.5
The emphasis here is clearly on the intended use of the goods sold.6
The European Directive on Consumer Rights, which entered into
force on 13 June 2014, defines consumer as a “natural person who . . .
is acting . . . outside its trade, business, craft or profession.”7 Thus, this
approach is slightly different to the CISG’s; however, it should not
yield very different results. The UNIDROIT Principles, on the other
hand, do not contain a specific definition of the “consumer.” Instead,
they focus on the term “commercial” contracts, which leaves much
leeway for interpretation.8
In Ibero-American legal systems it is common to find
references to the ultimate purchaser, which suggests a focus on the
relative position of a person in the supply chain.9 This definition is
much broader than the ones described above. It may well lead to
friction when dealing with a contract governed by an international
instrument such as the CISG.

http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-ebook.pdf [hereinafter CISG].].
4
Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 2, pt.
1(1) (Can.); Unfair Contracts Term Act 1977, c. 50, § 12(1) (U.K.).
5
Framework Act on Consumers, Act. No. 8372, Sep. 27, 2006, art. 2(2)
(S. Kor.); Consumer Act of the Philippines, Rep. Act No. 7394, art. 4(n), (q) (July 2,
1991) (Phil.); Ordinance of Protection of Consumer’s Interest, art. 1 (Viet.).
6
M. P. FURMSTON, ET AL., LAW OF CONTRACT 28 (16th ed. 2012); CASES,
MATERIALS AND TEXT ON CONSUMER LAW, supra note 2, at 31; I. Schwenzer & P.
Hachem, in SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER: COMMENTARY ON THE UN
CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES OF GOODS (CISG) (3d. ed. 2010).
7
Council Directive 2011/83, art. 2(1), 2011 O.J. (L 304)(EC) [hereinafter
Directive 2011/83]. Art. 2(f) of the Common European Sales Law (CESL) contains
a similar definition. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council on a Common European Sales Law, at art. 2(f), COM (2011) 635 final (Oct.
11, 2011) [hereinafter CESL].
8
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2010) [hereinafter UNIDROIT
Principles],
preamble,
cmt.
2,
available
at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2010/integralvers
ionprinciples2010-e.pdf.
9
Consumer Protection Law, art. 2 (Costa Rica); Consumer Code, L. No.
29571, art. 2 (Peru).
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Small and Medium Size Enterprises

Many legal systems broaden the scope of protection so as to
also encompass certain small and medium size enterprises. In essence,
there are two different approaches to extend the protection to this
group. A variety of jurisdictions include into their consumer protection
laws those artisans and small companies who acquire products or
services to integrate them into a production process for the supply of
products or services to third parties. For example, under Chinese and
Mongolian law, farmers who purchase materials for production still
qualify as consumers.10 In other jurisdictions—especially in IberoAmerica—the same result is achieved by using the ultimate purchaser
approach.11
Other legal systems distinguish according to the size of the
respective enterprise. With regard to the control of standard terms, the
English and Scottish Law Commission suggests a revision to the
Unfair Contract Terms Act to extend protection to small enterprises
that do not employ more than nine persons.12 A similar approach can
be found in the Netherlands. There, enterprises having less than fifty
employees or otherwise not obliged to publish their annual balance are
put on a par with consumers.13
Another approach sets a monetary limit in distinguishing the
level of judicial protection. Again, the English and Scottish Law

10

SCHWENZER, HACHEM & KEE, GLOBAL SALES AND CONTRACT LAW

¶ 6.25 (2012).
11
Law No. 22240, Sept. 22, 1993, art. 1 (Arg.); Lei No. 8.078, de 11
septiembre de 1990, art. 2, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÁO [D.O.U.] 12.09.1990 (Braz.);
Law No. 19496, Marzo 7, 1997, art. 1, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile); Law on
Consumer Protection, July 10, 2000, art. 2 (Ecuador); Ley No. 842, 10 Oct. 2013,
Ley de Protección de los Derechos de las Personas Consumidoras y Usuarias [Law
on Protection of the Rights of Consumers and Users] art. 4, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.],
10 Oct. 2013 (Nicar.); Law No. 1334, 1998, art. 4 (Para.); Consumer Protection Law,
art. 2 (Uru.). See also E. MUÑOZ, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS AND SALES IN LATIN
AMERICA, SPAIN AND PORTUGAL 47 (2011).
12
The Law Comm’n & The Scottish Law Commission, UNFAIR
CONTRACT TERMS: REPORT ON A REFERENCE UNDER SECTION 3(1)(E) OF THE LAW
COMMISSIONS ACT 1965 ¶ 5.40 [hereinafter Unfair Contract Terms], available at
http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/files/2512/7989/6621/rep199.pdf.
13
Art. 6:235(1)(a) BW (Neth.).
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Commission suggests, in the course of the Unfair Contract Terms Act,
to apply the same control of standard terms as for consumers to
transactions involving small enterprises with a volume of less than
₤500.00 GBP.14 The Australian Competition and Consumer Act 2010
applies to all transactions for the supply or sale of goods and services
up to a limit of approximately $40.00 AUD.15
C.

Standard Terms or Individually Negotiated Terms

The classical German approach draws a sharp line between
standard terms and individually negotiated terms. In general,
individually negotiated clauses are not subject to special judicial
scrutiny. The picture immediately changes as soon as a clause is part of
standard terms.16 Judicial practice shows that virtually the same
standard applies to both B2C and B2B contracts.17 Recently, this
approach has received severe criticism.18 Anecdotally, German
companies frequently opt out of German law and choose Swiss law to
circumvent the German courts’ scrutiny of standard terms.19
Unfortunately, the German approach has made its way to the
European level. The distinction between standard terms and
Unfair Contract Terms, supra note 12, ¶ 5.59.
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 4B(2)(a) (Austl.).
16
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896,
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 195, as amended, § 307 (Ger.) [hereinafter BGB].
17
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], May 16, 2007,
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2007 (2176) (Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof
[BGH][Federal Court of Justice], Sept. 19, 2007, BeckRS 2007 (18417);
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Mar. 3, 1988, NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1785, 1988 .
18
C. Kessel, Zur Frage einer Reform des AGB-Rechts im unternehmerischen
Rechtsverkehrs, in STÄNDIGE DEPUTATION DES DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGES 69
2012; E.M. Kieninger, AGB-Kontrolle von grenzüberschreitenden Geschäften im
unternehmerischen Verkehr, in EINHEIT UND VIELHEIT IM UNTERNEHMENSRECHT 179
2013; I. Schwenzer & F. Lübbert, Neues AGB-Recht im unternehmerischen Rechtsverkehr?,
ANWALTSBLATT, H. 4. S. 292 (Apr. 2012); K.P. Berger, Für Eine Reform des AGBRechts im Unternehmerverkehr, NJW 2010, 465 .
19
Ingeborg Schwenzer, in STÄNDIGE DEPUTATION DES DEUTSCHEN
JURISTENTAGES 69 (2012); T. Pfeiffer, Flucht ins schweizerische Recht, in ZWISCHEN
VERTRAGSFREIHEIT UND VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR FRIEDRICH
GRAF VON WESTPHALEN 555 (F.C. Genzow, B. Grunewald & H. Schulte-Nölke eds.,
2010); S. Brachert & A. Dietzel, Deutsche AGB-Rechtsprechung und Flucht ins Schweizer
Recht, ZGS 2005, 441.
14
15
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negotiated terms was first introduced into the Directive on Unfair
Terms in Consumer Contracts.20 It was restricted to B2C contracts;21
however, the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR),22 and
subsequently the Common European Sales Law (CESL),23 which was
approved by the European Parliament in February 2014, extended the
distinction between standard terms and negotiated terms to the area of
B2B relationships.
In many other legal systems—at least insofar as B2B contracts
are concerned—the fact that a certain clause formed part of standard
terms is only one criterion among many others when assessing the
fairness of the respective clause. This is true for most Common law
jurisdictions,24 and also for Switzerland25.
II.

EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY CLAUSES

The litmus test for any approach of judicial control of freedom
of contract in B2B relationships is the question how a certain system
deals with exclusion and limitation of liability clauses. These clauses
can be found in almost every commercial contract, especially on an
international level. Together with the description of the contractual
duties, they form the core part of the contract and decide whether the
aggrieved party may rely on a breach of contract and—if so—can get
redress for it. It is all the more problematic that the different

20

Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 095) (EC) [hereinafter Directive

93/13].
Id. art. 3(1).
PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS, AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN
PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) OUTLINE
EDITION, art. II.-9:405 (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2009), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/dcfr_outline_edition_en.pdf
23
CESL, supra note 7, at art. 86.
24
INGEBORG SCHWENZER, PASCAL HACHEM & CHRISTOPHER KEE,
GLOBAL SALES AND CONTRACT LAW ¶ 12.03; FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 58291.
25
R.M. HILTY, BASLER KOMMENTAR: BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DEN
UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB (UWG), Art. 2, ¶ 2 (2013); M.M. PEDRAZZINI & F.A.
PEDRAZZINI, UNLAUTERER WETTBEWERB (UWG) ¶ 4.06 (2d ed. 2002);
C. BAUDENBACHER, LAUTERKEITSRECHT: KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ GEGEN DEN
UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB (UWG), Art. 2, ¶ 7 (2001).
21
22
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approaches yield different results, thus making the outcome of a
possible dispute highly unpredictable.
A.

Typical Clauses

Limitation of liability clauses typically appear in three forms.
First, they may seek to exclude liability entirely by excluding a certain
cause of action or by increasing the threshold to meet the requirements
for a certain cause of action. Second, they may seek to exclude liability
for certain types of losses. Third, these clauses may seek to put an
upper limit to the quantum of recoverable losses. In practice, more
often than not all three forms of limitation of liability clauses are
combined. For example, a clause may stipulate that the seller is liable
only for gross negligence, that recovery of consequential losses is
excluded, and that in all instances the quantum of recoverable loss is
limited to the contract price.26
B.

Restrictions

There is agreement among all legal systems that, in both B2C
contracts and B2B relationships, exclusion and limitation of liability
clauses are subject to certain legal restrictions.27
1. Reasonableness - The common starting point seems to be that
such a clause is only valid if it is not unreasonable, unfair,
unconscionable, or the like. Some legal systems explicitly refer to such
a standard, including the English and Scottish Unfair Contract Terms
Act,28 the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) in the United States,29
or the general clause in the German Civil Code.30 It is noteworthy,

Cf. 1 CHITTY ON CONTRACTS ¶ 14-003 (H. G. Beale et al. eds., 31st ed.
2012); SCHWENZER, ET AL., supra note 24, ¶ 44.299; EWAN MCKENDRICK,
CONTRACT LAW: TEXTS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 406–09 (4th ed. 2010).
27
See, e.g., BGB, supra note 16, § 276(3); Art. 1229 C.c. (It.); Art. 1102 C.C.
(Spain); Obligationenrecht [OR] [Code of Obligations] Mar. 30, 1911, art. 100
(Switz.) [hereinafter Code of Obligations]; U.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-719 (2014); Civil Code
of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 1474 (Can.).
28
Unfair Contracts Term Act 1977, supra note 4, § 2(2) (U.K.).
29
U.C.C. § 2-302 (2014).
30
BGB, supra note 16, at § 307.
26
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however, that the majority of legal systems do not distinguish between
an outright exclusion and a mere limitation of liability.31
2. Personal Injury - It is often alleged that it is universally
recognized that a party may not limit or even exclude its liability for
personal injury.32 However, this is only clear in the case of personal
injury to a consumer and where the exclusion or limitation of liability
clause is found in standard terms.33 Although it is true that personal
injury will mostly occur to the ultimate purchaser or user of goods, and
that in those situations the exclusion or limitation of liability most likely
will be part of standard terms, there are no convincing reasons why the
threshold of protection should be lowered in the case of personal
injury to a business person or where the respective clause has been
individually negotiated. Explicit equation of all cases of personal injury
can be found in the English and Scottish Unfair Contract Terms Act,34
as well as in the Civil Code of Quebec35. Similarly, in Switzerland, at
least some scholarly writings suggest this result.36
3. Gravity of Fault - Civil law legal systems follow the fault-based
liability approach.37 Accordingly, restrictions on the ability of the
parties to exclude or limit their liability are directed to the gravity of
the culpa. However, the restrictions on the freedom of the parties to
limit their liability to a certain degree of fault differ among legal systems
and even differ within individual legal systems depending on whether

31

See id. § 309, No. 7; C.C. art. 1229 (It.); Civil Code of Québec, supra

note 27.
Cf. SCHWENZER, ET AL., supra note 24, at ¶ 44.317; MARCEL FONTAINE
& FILIP DE LY, DRAFTING INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 386 (2009).
33
See BGB, supra note 16, at § 309, No. 7(a); Directive 93/13, supra note
20, at annex (a); U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (2014).
34
Unfair Contracts Term Act 1977, supra note 4, at § 2(1) (U.K.).
35
Civil Code of Québec, supra note 27.
36
INGEBORG SCHWENZER, SCHWEIZERISCHES OBLIGATIONENRECHT
ALLGEMEINER TEIL ¶ 24.14 (6th ed. 2012); P. TERCIER & P. PICHONNAZ, LE DROIT
DES OBLIGATIONS ¶ 1267 (5th ed. 2012); W. WIEGAND, H. HEINRICH & N.P. VOGT,
BASLER KOMMENTAR: OBLIGATIONENRECHT I art. 100, ¶ 4 (5th ed. 2011).
37
SCHWENZER, ET AL., supra note 24, ¶ 44.63; KONRAD ZWEIGERT &
HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 494 (3d. ed. 1998).
32
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the clause is part of non-negotiated terms and whether it is a B2C or a
B2B contract.38
Broadly speaking, legal systems employing a fault-based
liability approach agree that in consumer transactions liability for one’s
own gross negligence and intent cannot be excluded in standard
terms.39 Again, this approach is similar to the one with regard to
exclusion or limitation of liability in the case of personal injury. Some
of these systems allow an exclusion of liability for gross negligence
where the clause has been individually negotiated and/or is part of a
B2B contract.40 Furthermore, if the breach of contract is due to the act
or omission of an auxiliary, exclusion or limitation is possible even if
this person acted intentionally,41 at least if it is not part of standard
terms in a B2C contract.42
4. Warranty and Guarantee – Many, if not most, legal systems
prohibit exclusion and limitation of liability if the obligor expressly
warrants or guarantees certain features of the contract, especially
specific features of the goods in sales contracts.43 It would appear
contradictory to allow the obligor to limit or even exclude its liability
where an express warranty or guarantee is given.44 Here, however,

SCHWENZER, ET AL., supra note 24, ¶¶ 44.311, 44.312.
See, e.g., CÓDIGO CIVIL (Civil Code), Apr. 2, 1976, art. 350(1) (Bol.);
BGB, supra note 16, §§ 309, No. 7(b), 475; Art. 1.102 C.C. (Spain); Código Civil
Federal [CC][Federal Civil Code], as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO],
Aug. 30, 1928, art. 2106 (Mex.); Código Civil (Civil Code), art. 1328 (Peru).
40
See, e.g., Civil Code, art. 417(4) (Arm.); Civil Code, art. 372(4) (Belr.);
BGB, supra note 16, at § 276(3) (Ger.); Code of Obligations, art. 395(2) (Geor.);
GRAZHDANKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 401
(Russ.).
41
BGB, supra note 16, §§ 278, 276(3); Civil Code, art. 809, 800 (Port.);
Code of Obligations, supra note 27, art. 101(2) (Switz.).
42
BGB, supra note 16, § 309 No. 7(b).
43
See, e.g., BGB, supra note 16, § 444. See also U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (2014).
44
H. P. Westermann, in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM
BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, VOL. 3 § 444 ¶ 14 (F.J. Säcker & R. Rixecher, eds.,
6th ed. 2012); JAMES WHITE & ROBERT SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
576 (2010).
38
39
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everything will depend on when and how such a warranty or guarantee
can be assumed in a B2B relationship.
5. Minimum Adequate Remedy - In accordance with the notion
that no party may relieve itself of all risks under a contract by excluding
its liability entirely, legal systems agree that each party must retain a
minimum of remedial protection under a contract. A particularly
visible statement is found in the United States where the Official
Comment on Section 2-719 U.C.C. states, “it is of the very essence of
a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies be
available.”45 The same reasoning underlies the German rule that, if
repair of defective goods fails, the obligee at least must retain the right
to either reduce the purchase price or avoid the contract.46
III.

EXCLUSION AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITY CLAUSES IN
CISG CONTRACTS

The question whether a party may exclude or limit its liability
under a CISG sales contract is important yet controversial. The CISG
Advisory Council is currently preparing an opinion on this subject.
According to Article 4 CISG, the “Convention . . . is not concerned
with: (a) the validity of the contract or any of its provisions . . . .”47
However, the CISG itself defines which questions are considered to
be questions of validity and thus to be decided under domestic law.48
It is, in essence, agreed that exclusion and limitation of liability clauses
are questions concerning matters governed by the Convention in the
sense of Art. 7(2) CISG.49 Debate remains among the CISG Advisory
Council, however, if general principles within the CISG can be found
to settle this question.

U.C.C. § 2-719, cmt. 1 (2014).
BGB, supra note 16, § 309 No. 8(b)(bb).
47
CISG, supra note 3, art. 4.
48 H.P. WESTERMANN, MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCH, Vol. 3, art. 4 CISG, ¶ 8 (W. Krüger & H.P. Westermann, eds., 6th ed.
2012); Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 6, art. 4, ¶ 31; C. BRUNNER, UNKAUFRECHT – CISG, Art. 4, ¶ 5 (2005).
49
Cf. WESTERMANN, supra note 48, art. 4 CISG, ¶ 6; Schwenzer &
Hachem, supra note 6, art. 4, ¶ 43.
45
46
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CONCLUSION
A.

B2B v. B2C

It seems to be unanimously agreed that, with regard to judicial
control of contract terms and exclusion and limitation of liability
clauses, there must be a clear distinction between B2C and B2B
relationships.50 Whereas consumers typically can neither influence the
content of a contract nor have any real alternative to turn to, and thus
freedom of contract has lost its justification altogether, in B2B
contracts the situation is completely different. It is there where
freedom of contract still retains its legitimate place as a starting point.
However, this does not mean that there is unchained freedom of
contract in these relationships below the threshold of public policy.
B.

Unified Approach in International B2B Contracts

It has been shown that many different approaches and levels
of scrutiny can be found in domestic legal systems. However, in cross
border transactions, foreseeability and predictability is of utmost
importance. This is particularly true for the core area of any contract,
the respective liability regime, and its limits. Therefore, it is a matter of
priority to achieve uniform results in this respect. If it were not
possible to have these questions governed by the CISG, at least in
international sales contracts, it must be a primary aim to strive for
unification on an international level.
Having regard to the comparative overview the starting point
for judicial control of contract terms in international B2B relationships
seems straight forward. Hard and fast rules as they can be found in
black (conclusively invalid) or grey (presumptively invalid) lists (or
unfair or invalid contract terms) are suitable for B2C relationships. In
50
Eva–Maria Kieninger, AGB bei B2B-Verträgen: Rückbesinnung auf die Ziele
des AGB-Rechts, ANWALTS BLATT 301, 306 (Apr. 2012) (Ger.), available at
https://ius.unibas.ch/uploads/publics/40215/20121206163733_50c0bbbd851e8.p
df; Barbara Dauner-Lieb, &Constantin Axer, Quo vadis AGB-Kontrolle im
unternehmerischen Geschäftsverkehr?, ZIP, 2010, at 312-14 (Ger.); Barbara Dauner-Lieb
& A. Khan, Betriebsausfallschäden als Gestaltungsproblem, in ZWISCHEN
VERTRAGSFREIHEIT UND VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR FRIEDRICH
GRAF VON WESTPHALEN 70-71 (Genzow, Grunewald, Schulte-Nölke, eds.).
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B2C relationships, the bargaining positions and relevant interests of
the parties involved do not differ very much. As previously indicated,
business parties generally have the superior bargaining power.
Likewise, the content of contracts in specific branches of trade is
comparable. Therefore, in B2C relationships, standard terms prevail in
these relationships. This militates unitary and simple rules.
In contrast, B2B contracts, and especially international B2B
contracts, cannot be measured by the same yardstick. The respective
bargaining position of the parties to an international contract can vary
considerably. The same holds true for the contents of such contracts.
Therefore, B2B contracts require differentiated solutions that can be
adjusted to the individual circumstances of the case. Instead of black
and grey lists, a general clause seems to be preferable.
The approach to the validity of exclusion and limitation of
liability clauses in international B2B contracts should be one of fairness
or reasonableness. As already explained above,51 reasonableness and
fairness can be found in the English and Scottish Unfair Terms Act, 52
the UNIDROIT Principles talk about clauses being grossly unfair,53
the U.C.C. uses the term unconscionability,54 and the German Civil
Code employs the term of contravening principles of good faith albeit
only related to standard terms.55 As regards the CISG reasonableness
can be regarded as a general principle underlying the CISG in the sense
of Art. 7(2) CISG.56 To meet the needs of foreseeability and
predictability, a general clause must be accompanied by a list of criteria
to be considered in the individual case.

Unfair Contracts Term Act 1977, c. 50, §§ 4(1), 11(1) (U.K.).
UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 8, art. 7.1.6.
54
U.C.C. § 2-302 (2014).
55
BGB, supra note 16, § 307(1).
56
CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 6, Calculation of Damages under
CISG Article 74, cmt. 2.1, available at
http://www.cisgac.com/default.php?ipkCat=128&ifkCat=148&sid=148; J. VON
STAUDINGERS KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, WIENER UNKAUFRECHT (CISG) art. 7, ¶ 45 (ULRICH MAGNUS & MICHAEL MARITNEK eds., Jan.
2005).
52
53
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Criteria to be Considered

One of the first criteria to be considered should be the position
of the parties in the market and their respective bargaining power. This
takes up the idea that many legal systems tend to extend the protection
provided for consumers to small and medium sized enterprises
(SMEs). A flexible approach certainly seems advisable, as there is a
great variety also among SME’s.
The fact of a specific clause forming part of standard terms or
being individually negotiated might also be one criterion among others.
However, this should not be the sole approach used to decide which
level of judicial control to apply in international B2B contracts. To save
transaction costs and due to the complex nature of the subject matter
of the contract, most international B2B contracts depend on preformulated contract terms without one party necessarily being in a
superior bargaining position. This is clearly evidenced by the current
discussion in Germany, which heavily criticizes the practice of control
of standard terms in B2B contracts.57
In assessing the validity of an exclusion and limitation of
liability clause in a B2B contract, regard should be given to the contract
as a whole, especially in relation to other contractual terms. 58 This
holds true for the interplay between warranties and guarantees on the
one hand and exemption clauses on the other.
Unlike in many existing legislation which apply the same rules
to exclusion as well as to limitation of liability clauses59 the two should
be clearly distinguished. There undoubtedly exists a difference whether
liability is entirely excluded where certain kinds of damages are
excluded or where the amount of recoverable damages is capped.
Consequently, the level of scrutiny must be higher when liability is fully
excluded than in the case of a mere limitation. It is here, too, where
the principle of minimum adequate remedy should have its legitimate
scope of application.

57
58
59

Kessel, supra note 18.
See CESL, supra note 7, art. 86(2)(c).
See id., § III(B)(1).
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Neither gross negligence nor intentional breach of contract
should lead to a limitation of liability clause to be void ab initio as is
currently the case in many legal systems. Rather, the gravity of fault
should be only one criterion among others to invalidate such a clause.
The only case in which an ab initio invalidity is conceivable relates to
personal injury where a differentiation between consumer and business
person seems hardly justifiable.
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SHOULD CLAUSES PROHIBITING
ASSIGNMENT BE OVERRIDDEN BY
STATUTE?
Louise Gullifer*
Many contracts for the supply of goods or services include a
clause prohibiting assignment by the supplier of its rights under the
contract. The existence of such clauses, both in particular contracts
and more generally, can have a chilling effect on the use of receivables
as collateral to obtain financing. Thus, there is a legislative override for
such clauses so that they are not enforceable against third parties.
There has been an ongoing debate as to whether the law of England
and Wales should follow suit and, if so, what form the override should
take. While the debate continues among academics and practitioners,
the Government has enacted a power to make reforms in the Small
Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015.1 This paper examines
the arguments for and against an override in English law, informed by
two small-scale surveys undertaken by the author and others over the
last four years.2 The detailed form of an override will not be discussed
* Professor of Commercial Law, University of Oxford; Fellow and Tutor
in Law, Harris Manchester College, Oxford.
1
The Department of Business, Innovation and Skills has consulted on
draft Regulations and further work is continuing, of which the author is a part. See
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Invoice finance: nullifying the ban
on
invoice
assignment
contract
clauses,
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/invoice-finance-nullifying-theban-on-invoice-assignment-contract-clauses (2015); see also Small Business,
Enterprise and Employment Act, 2015, c. 26 (U.K.).
2
One of the surveys was carried out by Hugh Beale and Louise Gullifer
in 2011 (“2011 Study”) with the assistance of Anna Kloeden. The survey was funded
by the Asset Based Finance Association (ABFA), which stressed from the outset that
it wanted a completely independent view. The second survey was carried out in 2014
as part of the work of the Secured Transactions Law Reform Project (“2014 Study”)
by Sarah Paterson. I am grateful to both Hugh Beale and Sarah Paterson for
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for reasons of space. The model that is likely to be adopted in England
and Wales is that found in the Uniform Commercial Code Article 9,
which provides that an anti-assignment clause is generally ineffective.3
I.

THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST AN OVERRIDE

In order to maximize the availability of finance and credit in
the economy, it is important that as many sources of wealth as possible
can be used as collateral. To do this, the source of wealth (the asset)
must be able to be alienated to the secured creditor. The obvious assets
which could be alienated are tangible assets: goods and land. However,
sources of wealth also include intangible assets, most importantly,
rights to be paid by another. Thus, many centuries ago, it became
possible to use obligations owed to a borrower as collateral for a loan,
first by pledging a document which represented that obligation (a
documentary intangible), and then by enabling the benefit of
obligations to be assigned, either absolutely or by way of security. A
major difference between the use of tangible property as collateral, and
the use of such obligations, known in English law as choses or things
in action,4 is that in the latter case there is another person to consider,
namely the obligor. There is no real problem when the obligor takes
on an obligation that is designed to be transferred, for example, a
negotiable instrument. But, where the obligation can be transferred
without the agreement, or even the knowledge, of the obligor, a policy
imperative arises in competition to that of maximizing available
collateral by permitting alienability: that of protection, where
necessary, of the obligor. This policy can be seen in English law, for
example, by the rule that only an assignee who has taken a statutory
assignment can sue the debtor.5 If an equitable assignment is taken, the
assignor must be joined in any action. There are three main criteria for
a statutory assignment: (1) the assignment must be in writing; (2) the
assignment must not relate to part of a debt or a future debt; and (3)
permitting me to use the results of the surveys in this paper, and for many useful
discussions.
3
U.C.C. § 9-406(d) (2015).
4
Also known as intangibles; however, the category of intangibles is
potentially wider than just choses in action, e.g., intellectual property and carbon
trading units.
5
Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 136 (Eng.).
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notice of the assignment must be given to the debtor. All serve some
function in protecting the debtor. Additionally, the policy of protecting
the obligor can be seen by the rule that the benefit of a contract for
personal services cannot be assigned,6 and more generally, by the fact
that an obligor is permitted to protect himself by restricting the ability
of the obligee to assign the benefits of the obligation to another. This
permission, though, is justified by the even more fundamental policy
of protection of freedom of contract.
Thus, whether there should be a statutory override of antiassignment clauses can be seen as a matter of balancing competing
policy imperatives: alienability of assets, which maximizes available
collateral, and freedom of contract, which allows obligors to protect
themselves against adverse effects of assignment of the right to which
their obligation correlates. On that basis, many jurisdictions and
transnational instruments favor alienability.7 Gilmore described the
view in favor of the unrestricted and unrestrictable alienability of
contract rights as “so fundamental an order [that] belief is instinctive
and irrational, not logical and reasoned.”8 This argument has been used
to justify a statutory provision making an anti-assignment clause
unenforceable against third parties.
I would like to suggest that the policy position is not so simple.
At least from the English law perspective, there is a view that the policy
imperatives can be satisfied without any statutory interference and that
legislative change has to be justified both by economic arguments
(based on the effects of uncertainty of outcome), and by evidence that
the availability and cost of borrowing is actually affected by the
6

Tolhurst v. Assoc. Portland Cement Mfrs. (1900) Ltd., [1903] A.C. 414

(H.L.).
See ANTHONY DUGGAN & DAVID BROWN, AUSTRALIAN PERSONAL
PROPERTY SECURITIES LAW 32 (2012) (relating to Personal Property Securities Act 2009
(Austl.)); UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS, at sec. II
par.
107,
U.N.
Sales
No.
E.09.V.12
(2010),
available
at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/09-82670_EbookGuide_09-04-10English.pdf; see also U.N. Secretary-General, Legal Aspects of
Receivables Financing, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/397 (Apr. 29, 1994); U.N. Secretariat,
Receivables Financing: Analytical Commentary on the draft Convention on Assignment of
Receivables in International Trade, ¶ 100, U.N Doc. A/CN.9/489 (Mar. 13, 2001).
8
GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 212
(1965).
7
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existence (or potential existence) of anti-assignment clauses in
contracts giving rise to receivables. This is for several interconnected
reasons. First, the current law, to a large extent, accommodates the
protection of the obligor and validity of a proprietary interest of the
assignee. Second, receivables financiers in England and Wales have
managed reasonably well by adopting “workarounds” to enable
themselves to function within the current system. Third, the main
concern about anti-assignment clauses relates to borrowers who are
small businesses, and is part of a larger problem of inequality of
bargaining power. Finally, anti-assignment clauses play an important
and justifiable role in loan agreements, derivative contracts, and other
financial transactions. In fact, there is real concern about defining the
scope of statutory controls so that these benefits are not lost.
II. THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE CURRENT LAW
In analysing the law, terminology can be confusing. In this
analysis, terms are adopted that relate to receivables arising from
supply contracts, since this is the context in which anti-assignment
clauses are said to cause most problems.9 The parties to the contract
giving rise to the receivable are called the “supplier,” (the obligee) and
the “customer,” (the obligor). The supplier is the client of the
“financier” to whom it assigns, or attempts to assign, the receivable.
A financier is concerned about three things in relation to the
receivables it takes as collateral. First, a financier has a proprietary
interest in the receivables and their proceeds, which will survive the
insolvency of the supplier. Second, a financier has priority over any
subsequent assignee or other person claiming an interest in the
receivables. Third, if the customer does not pay, the financier can
ensure that the debt is enforced, and it has a proprietary claim to the
proceeds of that enforcement.
Under English law, there are two types of assignments. The
first type of assignment is a statutory assignment under section 136 of
the Law of Property Act 1925, which takes place when certain

Another context, i.e., receivables under loan agreements, is considered
infra section V.
9
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conditions are satisfied.10 The most important condition, for purposes
of this paper, is that there must be notification to the obligor (the
customer). This means that the customer will, and indeed must, pay
the financier rather than the supplier.11 If the customer fails to pay, the
financier is able to sue the customer directly. In effect, the supplier
drops out of the picture. A statutory assignment will also give the
financier a proprietary interest in the receivable in the event of the
insolvency of the supplier, or if there are competing interests.12 There
is clear authority that a receivable containing an anti-assignment clause
cannot be the subject of a statutory assignment13 so that the customer
can continue to pay the supplier and cannot be sued (at law) by the
financier.
The second type of assignment is an equitable assignment. An
assignment is equitable when one of the conditions for a statutory
assignment is not fulfilled. For example, a valid equitable assignment
can occur without notifying the customer. A financier who takes an
equitable assignment has a proprietary interest in the receivable, which
survives the insolvency of the supplier, and will also have priority over
a competing interest, subject to the rules on priority. Until the
customer is notified, if it pays it will, of course, pay the supplier and
will get a good discharge by so doing. The supplier will then hold those
proceeds on trust for the financier.14 Further, valid set-offs may
See Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20 (Eng.).
If the customer pays the supplier, it will have to pay the financier as
well and try to recover the payment made to the supplier.
12
The priority rules, which depend on those set out in the nineteenth
century case Dearle v. Hall, (1828) 38 Eng. Rep. 475, are somewhat complex. If a
receivable is assigned twice, the first assignee to give notice to the debtor will have
priority, providing that he did not have notice of the other assignment at the time he
took his own assignment. If the debtor has not been notified at all, the assignment
that is first in time wins. The position is even more complex if one or both of the
assignments is a security interest, as security interests are required to be registered,
and registration can, but does not necessarily, constitute notice.
13
See Linden Gardens Trust Ltd. v. Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd., [1994]
1 A.C. 85, 106-09 (H.L.). Of course, the true effect of any contractual provision
(including an anti-assignment clause) will always depend on its exact wording. Thus,
the Linden Gardens case, though laying down certain principles, was considering a
particular form of words.
14
This trust is often expressly declared, but would arise in any event. See
G.E. Crane Sales Pty. Ltd. v. Comm’r of Taxation (1971), 126 CLR. 177, 213-14 (Austl.);
Barclays Bank Ltd. v. Willowbrook Int’l Ltd., [1987] 1 F.T.L.R. 386 (Eng.).
10
11
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continue to arise between the supplier and customer until the customer
receives notification of the assignment;15 after this, only set-offs arising
from the contract itself or closely connected claims can arise. 16 If the
customer does not pay, the financier cannot, in theory, sue the
customer for non-payment without joining the supplier to the action,
although this rule is less restrictive than it sounds. It is easy to join a
party to an action since no consent is needed if they are joined as a
defendant, and the court will not require joinder if there is no good
reason.17 Also, if the financier wishes to enforce, it will first give notice
of the assignment to the customer. Doing so will not only require the
customer to pay the financier rather than the supplier,18 but will also,
in most cases, convert the equitable assignment into a statutory
assignment,19 thus enabling the financier to sue the customer direct. Of
course, where the financing is on a non-notification basis, such as
invoice discounting, the financier would normally expect the supplier
to enforce against the non-paying customer. If the financing is with
recourse, the financier would have contractual rights against the
supplier so that the risk of non-payment is on the supplier.20 It is only
when the supplier either refuses to sue or is insolvent that the financier
would be concerned to have the right to sue the customer itself. Even
then, the financier might not need to enforce directly if there is an

Roxburghe v. Cox, [1881] 17 L.R. 520 (Ch. D.) (Eng.); Gov’t of Nfld.
v. Nfld. Ry. Co., [1888] 13 App. Cas. 199 (P.C.); Bus. Computers Ltd. v. AngloAfrican Leasing Ltd., [1977] 1 W.L.R. 578 (Eng.).
16
Known in English law as “transaction set-off.”
17
See William Brandt’s Sons & Co. v. Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd., [1905] 2
A.C. 454 (Eng.); Sim Swee Joo Shipping Sdn. Bhd. v. Shirlstar Container Transp.
Ltd., (unreported) 17 Feb. 1994; Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v. Five Star
General Trading LLC, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 68, 60, [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1344 (Eng.).
Good reasons include the possibility that the supplier might contest the assignment,
or that the assignment is only part of the debt, so that unless the supplier is before
the court, the customer might face more than one action.
18
Jones v. Farrell, [1857] 1 De G & J 208; Brice v. Bannister, [1878] 3
Q.B.D. 569; William Brandt’s Sons & Co. v. Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd., [1905] 2 A.C.
454 (H.L).
19
This would not be the case if the conditions for a statutory assignment
were not fulfilled, for example, if the assignment was for part of a debt.
20
See HUGH BEALE ET AL., THE LAW OF SECURITY AND TITLE-BASED
FINANCING (2d ed. 2012).
15
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efficient means of enforcing against the customer through the
insolvency process of the supplier.21
If the receivable contains an anti-assignment clause, some, but
not all, of the above analysis changes. The customer, who is discharged
by paying the supplier before notification of the assignment, is also
discharged by paying the supplier after notification: it is entitled to
ignore the notification. Once the debt is paid, though, the supplier will
hold the proceeds on trust for the financier despite the anti-assignment
clause. There is little direct authority on this point in English law, but
there are a number of dicta22 and academic support23 supporting this
view. In fact, it is extremely common for invoice discounting
agreements to include an express provision that the proceeds are held
on trust for the financier, and an anti-assignment clause will not
prevent such provision being effective.24 It is thought that even if the
clause purported to prohibit such a declaration, it would be ineffective
to prevent such a trust arising since the customer has no interest in
preventing the alienation of the proceeds and such a clause would be
against public policy.25 However, this point has never been litigated, so
the position is not entirely clear.

See discussion in the rest of this section.
Re Turcan, [1888] 40 Ch. D. 5, 10-11 (supported by Lord BrowneWilkinson in Linden Gardens, [1994] 1 A.C. at 106; Barbados Trust Co. Ltd. v. Bank
of Zambia, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 148, 28, 77 (C.A.) (Eng.). See also Devefi Pty. Ltd. v.
Mateffy Perl Nagy Pty. Ltd., [1993] 113 ALR. 225, 236 (Austl.); Don King Prods. Inc.
v. Warren, [2000] 3 W.L.R. 276 (C.A.) (Eng.).
23
See Bob Allcock, Restrictions on the Assignment of Contractual Rights, 42
C.L.J. 328, 335–36 (1983); Gregory Tolhurst, Prohibitions on Assignment and Declaration
of Trust: Barbados Trust v. Bank of Zambia, LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 278 (2007);
Gerard McMeel, The Modern Law of Assignment: Public Policy and Contractual Restrictions
on Transferability, LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 483, 507-08 (2004); MARCUS SMITH,
THE LAW OF ASSIGNMENT 347 (2007); Peter Zonneveld, The Effectiveness of Contractual
Restrictions on the Assignment of Contractual Debts, 22 J. INT’L BUS. & F. L. 313 (2007);
Chee Ho Tham, Notice of Assignment and Discharge by Performance, LLOYD’S MAR. &
COM. L.Q. 38, 77 (2010); GOODE ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CREDIT AND SECURITY
3-39 (Louise Gullifer ed., 5th ed. 2013).
24
Don King Prods. Inc., [2000] 3 W.L.R. 276; MARCUS SMITH & NICO
LESLIE, THE LAW OF ASSIGNMENT: THE CREATION AND TRANSFER OF CHOSES IN
ACTION, Part 25.33–25.36 (2nd ed. 2013).
25
Roy Goode, Inalienable Rights?, 42 MOD. L.R. 553 (1979); Linden
Gardens, [1994] 1 A.C. at 108 (per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 108). The supplier
21
22
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If the customer does not pay, it is clear that the financier
cannot sue directly, as there can be no statutory assignment. However,
provided that the agreement between the supplier and financier can be
said to give rise to a trust of the unpaid receivable (either expressly or
impliedly),26 it is likely that the financier can sue the customer, joining
the supplier as defendant to the action under a procedure known as
the Vandepitte procedure. A beneficiary under a trust of a right can
bring an action to force the trustee to bring an action to enforce that
right for its benefit. The Vandepitte procedure merely short-circuits this
process by enabling the beneficiary to instigate an action, which brings
all parties before the court. In a case dealing with the purported
assignment of a syndicated loan containing a restriction on assignment,
a majority of the Court of Appeal decided that the Vandepitte
procedure27 was available to the “assignee.”28 However, other judges
have expressed doubt as to the appropriateness of the Vandepitte
procedure in this context.29
Further, if there is an effective trust of the receivable, the
financier will have a proprietary interest which survives the supplier’s
insolvency, and is effective against competing interests in the
receivable. What is not entirely clear, however, is whether it is possible
for a well-drafted anti-assignment clause to prevent a trust of the
receivable from arising. The judges in Barbados Trust were divided on
would be in breach of contract by declaring the trust, but it is hard to see what the
damages would be.
26
Whether this is the case depends on the interpretation both of the antiassignment clause and the purported assignment. Two recent cases show that this
interpretation is fact specific, and therefore subject to considerable uncertainty. See
Co-operative Group Ltd. v. Birse Developments Ltd., [2014] EWHC (TCC) 530
(Eng.); Stopjoin Projects Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Engineering Services (HY) Ltd.,
[2014] EWHC (TCC) 589.
27
The Vandepitte procedure is named after the case of Vandepitte v.
Preferred Accident Insurance Corp. of New York, [1933] A.C. 70 (P.C.) (Eng.).
Where there is a trust of an obligation, the trustee would usually enforce the
obligation by suing the obligor. If the trustee refuses to sue, the beneficiary can sue
the trustee to force him to do so. The Vandepitte procedure avoids the duplicity of
actions, by allowing the beneficiary to sue the obligor direct, providing that the
trustee is joined as defendant. If the action is successful, the court will order payment
to the trustee, who will then hold those funds on trust for the beneficiary.
28
Barbados Trust, [2007] EWCA (Civ).
29
Don King Prods. Inc., [2000] 3 W.L.R. 276 (Lightman J); Barbados
Trust, [2007] EWCA (Civ) at 139 (Hooper LJ).
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this issue.30 A strong case can be made for an analysis whereby the trust
is invalid to the extent that it affects the customer, but is valid as
between the financier and the supplier.31 However, there is still
considerable uncertainty as to the correct legal analysis.32
From the point of view of the customer, the anti-assignment
clause protects its position by enabling it to get a good discharge by
paying the supplier: it will never be required to pay anyone else. Even
if it is sued by the financier under the Vandepitte procedure,33 the order
will be that the customer pay the supplier (the trustee), who will then
hold the proceeds on trust for the financier. Further, a notice of
assignment received by the customer is ineffective to prevent set-offs
arising between the supplier and the customer.34
Therefore, the overall legal position is that the interests of the
financier and the customer can both have a certain degree of
protection if an anti-assignment clause is used. This position is subject
to several caveats. First, the law is complex and quite uncertain in some
areas. There are few cases precisely on the relevant point, and even
those that there are have generally not arisen in the context of
receivables financing.35 Second, the legal position will depend on the
Barbados Trust, [2007] EWCA (Civ) at 44-47, 88, 129-39.
GOODE ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CREDIT AND SECURITY 3-42 (Louise
Gullifer ed., 5th ed. 2013).
32
A contrary view is that the clause renders the receivable inalienable so
that a valid trust cannot be declared of it. See Andrew McKnight, Contractual
Restrictions on a Creditor’s Right to Alienate Debts, 18 J. INT’L BANK. L. & REG., no. 2,
2003, at 43 (2003); Gerard McMeel, The Modern Law of Assignment: Public Policy and
Contractual Restrictions on Transferability, LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 483 (2004);
Gregory Tolhurst & John Carter, Prohibitions on Assignment: A Choice to Be Made, 73
C.L.J. 405 (2014); Peter Turner, Charges of Unassignable Rights, 20 J. CONT. L. 97 (2004).
33
This would only occur if, despite the clause, a valid trust of the
receivable existed.
34
If, despite the clause, there is a valid declaration of trust, this will break
the mutuality required for set-off. If the clause renders a trust invalid to the extent
that it affects the customer, then the notification of the trust could be said to be
ineffective for all purposes, including preventing set-offs. See J. Marshall, Declaring a
Trust Over Rights Under an “Unassignable” Contract, 12 INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 1
(1999).
35
Linden Gardens, [1994] 1 A.C. 85; Don King Prods. Inc. v. Warren,
supra note 23; Barbados Trust, [2007] EWCA (Civ) EWHC (TCC) 530. The one
exception is Stopjoin, [2014] EWHC (TCC) 589.
30
31
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precise wording of the anti-assignment clause and the purported
assignment or declaration of trust.36 Third, even if a financier is
protected by the rule that the proceeds are held on trust, this will not
help if the supplier has not kept the proceeds in an identifiable state so
that they can be traced on its insolvency. A financier might be better
off with a proprietary right to a debt owed by a solvent customer, than
to proceeds that may or may not be held by an insolvent supplier.
It should be pointed out that the fact that there is a reasonable
degree of protection in the current law does not necessarily rule out
statutory intervention. For example, Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) (1952) article 9-318(4),37 which contained an override of antiassignment clauses, was included in the original U.C.C. (1952) to reflect
existing U.S. law rather than to change it.38 However, this was in the
context of a codification of commercial law and the introduction of a
new system for secured financing. To make a case for free-standing
legislation, a policy imperative is essential.
III. INDUSTRY WORKAROUNDS
Until recently, there were two main types of receivables
financing: factoring, which is on a notification basis, and invoice
discounting, which is non-notification.39 Factoring tends to be used for
smaller suppliers, where a financier has concerns about the ability of
the supplier to run its ledger properly and to operate a trust account,
and also where the financier has concerns about the supplier’s financial
position.40 Since factoring involves a statutory assignment, it gives the
financier much more control over the collection of the debts.
Id.
Now revised U.C.C § 9-406(d) (2010).
38
This is made clear by the official comment to the original U.C.C. Article
9, which states: “[the provision] can be regarded as a revolutionary departure only by
those who still cherish the hope that we may yet return to the view entertained some
two hundred years ago by the Court of the King’s Bench.” However, this is an
overstatement. There were contrary cases that were overruled by the legislation, such
as Allhusen v. Caristo Construction Corp., 103 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 1952).
39
Much of the information in this section comes from the 2011 Study,
updated to take into account recent developments.
40
Sometimes a financier will shift a client from an invoice discounting
basis to a factoring basis if the client gets into financial difficulties.
36
37
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Factoring is more expensive for the supplier than invoice discounting,
and a supplier can pay even more for extra services, such as the taking
on by the financier of the credit risk of the customer.41 In invoice
discounting, the collection of the receivables is carried out by the
supplier, who holds the proceeds in a trust account for the financier.
Recently, two variations on these structures have become more
popular, although the details vary in each case. One is discounting of
individual invoices over an online platform: this takes place on a nonnotification basis, with the platform merely acting as an intermediary.
Another is supply chain financing whereby a customer arranges with a
financier that the latter purchases receivables owed by the customer to
its suppliers at the point when the receivables arise, once the invoice
has been confirmed by the customer. This has the advantage that there
is less likely to be disputes about the invoice, and also that it allows the
financing to be based on the credit rating of the customer rather than
that of the (smaller) supplier.42 Having said this, this kind of financing
is usually only offered to established suppliers whose invoices reach a
certain, reasonably high, level and is also only offered by large
customers.43 There is also a concern that supply chain financing
encourages large customers to extend the credit period they require,
forcing small businesses to pay for a longer period of financing, albeit
at a lower rate.44

41
Most receivables financing is on a recourse basis whereby the supplier
either guarantees payment of the receivables or agrees to repurchase unpaid
receivables.
42
The U.K. Government launched a scheme in 2012 to encourage
businesses and government agencies to offer supply chain financing. See Prime
Minister’s Office, Prime Minister Announces Supply Chain Finance Scheme, GOV.UK
(Oct.
23,
2012),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-ministerannounces-supply-chain-finance-scheme.
43
2011 Study, supra note 2.
44
See John Antunes, The Supply Chain Finance Scheme: Hit or Miss?,
REALBUSINESS (Nov. 8, 2012), http://realbusiness.co.uk/article/15791-the-supplychain-finance-scheme-hit-or-miss; James Hurley, Payment Concerns Over Supply-Chain
Finance
Move,
TEL.
(Oct.
26,
2012
7:00
AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/yourbusiness/9634184/Payment-concernsover-supply-chain-finance-move.html; Supply Chain Finance Scheme: A Good Idea?
SELECT FACTORING (2012), http://www.selectfactoring.co.uk/supply-chainfinance-scheme.
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Although some of the workarounds discussed below are
adopted regardless of whether particular receivables arise from
contracts containing an anti-assignment clause, English financiers very
frequently check for the presence of anti-assignment clauses (and for
other problematic clauses) in the invoices they finance.45 Thus, one of
the major arguments for a statutory override made in other
jurisdictions (that it is not feasible for a receivables financier to
discover anti-assignment clauses, causing the whole cost of financing
to rise)46 is not really made out in England and Wales. However,
checking contracts is burdensome and takes time, particularly if it is
necessary to consult lawyers about the effect of a particular clause. 47
The need to do so clearly increases costs, although it is probably the
case that some checking would still take place even if there were to be
a statutory override of anti-assignment clauses. It is also the case that
most supply contracts are on a customer’s standard terms, and
financiers get to know the terms of large customers and whether they
contain an anti-assignment clause, so checking involves merely looking
at who the customers are rather than reading individual contracts.
If the financing is on a non-notification basis, the presence of
an anti-assignment clause does not create problems for the financier
on a day-to-day basis, since the customer does not know of the
assignment and continues to pay the supplier.48 Of course, the supplier
would be in breach of contract: this may be of concern if, for example,
the breach entitled the customer to terminate the supply agreement.49
45
Those interviewed for the 2011 Study all said that they checked for the
presence of anti-assignment clauses. The picture was more mixed in relation to the
2014 Study, although most said that they checked at least in many cases.
46
Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Austl.); ANTHONY DUGGAN &
DAVID BROWN, supra note 7.
47
2011 Study, supra note 2.
48
In the 2011 Study we were told that anti-assignment clauses created
great problems for online auctions. However, the 2014 Study revealed that since
then this part of the industry has developed workarounds similar to those in regular
invoice discounting, and so what is said in relation to that also applies to online
auctions.
49
Although such a breach is unlikely to be repudiatory, it could fall within
a clause entitling the customer to terminate for “any material breach” (which is quite
common) or could trigger a cross-default clause. The absence of a general duty of
good faith in English law could mean that a customer could rely on such a
termination clause even if its real motivation for termination was something entirely
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The financier might worry about two situations: (1) if the supplier
becomes insolvent, and (2) if the customer does not pay and the
supplier refuses to enforce.50
In relation to the first situation, financiers almost universally
protect themselves by taking a security interest over all assets of the
supplier.51 This has the effect, under English law, of enabling the
financier to appoint an administrator of the supplier should it become
insolvent.52 The financier is then in a good position to direct the
administrator to collect the receivables and pass the proceeds to it.
There seems to be little concern among financiers about the collecting
in of debts if an administrator is appointed (even if not appointed by
that particular financier), although the costs are sometimes a problem
if the supplier is a very small business.53 Financiers also see an “all
assets” security interest as having an additional benefit, namely that it
will cover receivables that are not assigned to the financier because of
an anti-assignment clause. Sometimes, financiers specify that such
“non-vesting debts” fall within a fixed charge, while much of the all
assets security interest will be a floating charge. However, depending
on the wording of the clause, to the extent that it prevents a valid
assignment, an anti-assignment clause may also prevent the creation of
a valid security interest.54

different. In theory, a breach could entitle a customer to obtain an injunction to
prevent further breaches (although this is unlikely) or to sue for damages. However,
it is usually hard to see what loss is suffered.
50
The 2014 Study indicated that the latter concern is at least as important,
and, for invoice discounters, more important than the 2011 Study, although the
sample for this particular question was small.
51
2011 and 2014 Study, supra note 2.
52
The Insolvency Act 1986 provides that a qualifying floating charge
holder can appoint an administrator out of court. The Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45,
sch. B-1, ¶ 14 (U.K.).
53
Seminar to explore and discuss the merits of an online register for all
security interests, including outright assignments of receivables, Secured
Transactions Law Reform Project, May 8, 2014; 2014 Study, supra note 2.
54
Although a charge is not, in theory, an assignment, many charges are
drafted as equitable mortgages, which involve an equitable assignment of the
receivables. A fixed charge has been treated as an assignment in a number of cases.
See Biggerstaff v. Rowatt’s Wharf Ltd., [1896] 2 EWCH 93 C.A. (U.K.); N W Robbie
& Co. v. Witney Warehouse Co., [1963] 1 W.L.R. 1324 (C.A.) (U.K.); Foamcrete
(UK) Ltd. v. Thrust Engineering Ltd., [2000] EWCA (Civ) 351. See also Re Turner
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Another mode of protection often coupled with the all assets’
security interest is for financiers to take a personal guarantee from the
directors of the supplier company.55 Of course, the effectiveness of
such guarantee depends on the credit-worthiness of the directors, and
also may entail costs in enforcing the claims under the guarantees, to
which there could be arguable defenses.
Yet another possibility is for the financier to take a power of
attorney enabling it to sue the customer in the name of the supplier.56
This protection tends to be more useful in the second situation: when
the supplier is solvent but refuses to sue. For the power of attorney to
be irrevocable on the insolvency of the supplier, the financier must
have some sort of proprietary right in the receivables or must be owed
the receivables directly.57 Where there is an anti-assignment clause, the
latter is clearly not the case, and it is unclear whether a right under a
trust is a sufficient proprietary interest to render the power irrevocable.
The legal position is uncertain and untested.58
An anti-assignment clause causes much greater problems for
financiers who operate on a notification basis. Here, there is a
likelihood that the customer will refuse to pay the financier when
notified, and will, instead, pay the supplier. The financier is then at
risk of the proceeds being dissipated by the supplier, leaving the
financier at the credit risk of the supplier. As a result, such financiers
often refuse to finance receivables arising from contracts containing
such clauses, or demand that the customer agrees to a waiver.59 The
evidence from the 2014 study is that financiers only sometimes pursue
a waiver. There was considerable agreement60 that the time and effort
Corp. Ltd. (In Liq), [1995] 17 ACSR 761 (Austl.) (where the Federal Court of Australia
took the view that a clause prohibiting assignment also prohibited a charge).
55
2011 and 2014 Study, supra note 2.
56
2014 Study, supra note 2.
57
Powers of Attorney Act, 1971, c. 27, § 4 (Eng.).
58
See M. BRIDGE, L. GULLIFER, G. MCMEEL & S. WORTHINGTON, THE
LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 29-43 (2013).
59
2011 Study, supra note 2. It should be pointed out that invoice
discounters also sometimes refuse to finance receivables if they contain an antiassignment clause, will only finance them on a factoring basis, or will demand a
waiver. This is particularly true if, for some reason, a security interest over the
supplier’s assets is not taken.
60
Twelve out of the eighteen respondents agreed.
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involved in obtaining a waiver was substantial or significant, and that
by no means all customers were willing to agree to a waiver. Some
customers would only agree to a waiver on terms that were
disadvantageous to the supplier: this depended on the bargaining
power between them and also on whether the financing was being
sought at the beginning of the supplier/customer relationship.
In one sense, the increasing availability of supply chain
financing is a workaround. This is customer driven: the customer
waives the anti-assignment clause to enable supply chain financing
with its nominated financier, but relies on the clause to prevent the
supplier obtaining financing elsewhere. This means that the supplier is
locked into the supply chain financing deal, which could be seen as
anti-competitive. The discount rate for such financing is usually
reasonably low since it is based on the credit rating of the (large)
customer, but the period for which financing is required may be
increased.61 Nevertheless, supply chain financing does achieve
protection for the customer; only invoices approved by the customer
are financed, which reduces disputes, and the customer does not have
to deal with a financier with whom it has no relationship.
It can be seen that the receivables industry has developed a
number of workarounds which mean that, with the exception of the
situation where factors cannot or do not try to obtain a waiver,
receivables containing anti-assignment clauses are actually being
financed. The workarounds, however, are costly in terms of time and
effort, and also create more uncertainty, which can lead to costly
disputes. In fact, one concern of the industry is that the existence of
an enforceable anti-assignment clause may give a customer traction in
disputes which it would not otherwise have, or will enable the
customer to negotiate benefits for itself which would otherwise not
exist. Although it is hard to prove, it seems likely that the existence of
enforceable anti-assignment clauses will increase the cost of
financing.62

See above, [text to notes 43 – 45].
In the 2014 Study, eleven out of eighteen answered “always” or
“sometimes” to the question: “Do you consider that (a) receivables are purchased at
a greater discount to face value, or (b) the advance rate applied to the purchase of
receivables will be reduced, as a result of the possibility that the contract governing
61
62
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IV. INEQUALITY OF BARGAINING POWER
At this point it is necessary to consider the reasons why a
customer might want to include an anti-assignment clause in a supply
contract. The reasons usually given in the literature are that the
customer wishes to avoid paying the wrong party, that the customer
wishes to make sure that set-offs can continue to arise between it and
the supplier, and that the customer wishes to continue to deal with the
supplier rather than the financier, who is an unknown quantity.63 The
information gathered from the two surveys (which came from all three
constituencies: customers, suppliers, and financiers) shows that the
motivations are more mixed. There appeared to be little concern about
paying the wrong party per se,64 but there did appear to be genuine
concern about incorrect invoicing and the sorting out of disputes. 65 It
was thought that financiers would be more concerned that the invoice
was paid, and would wish disputes to be sorted out afterwards between
the customer and the supplier. The problem of incorrect invoicing was
being tackled both by self-invoicing and electronic invoice platforms.66
However, the desire to retain the relationship with the supplier in order
to sort out disputes is ongoing.67 Not surprisingly, opinions varied as

the receivable may contain a valid prohibition on assignment than would apply if
such prohibitions on assignment were not binding as against an assignee?” However,
only a small minority answered “yes” to the question: “Do you consider that the cost
of finance is increased as a result of the inclusion of a prohibition on assignment
within funded ledgers?” This discrepancy may be explained by the latter question
being interpreted as relating only to where receivables with anti-assignment clauses
were actually included in the funded ledger, which is seldom the case in factoring
arrangements.
63
See, e.g., Orkun Akseli, Contractual Prohibitions on Assignment of
Receivables: an English and UN perspective, 7 J. BUS. L. 650, 656 (2009); LOUISE
GULLIFER & JENNIFER PAYNE, CORPORATE FINANCE LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICY 378–79 (2011); Roy Goode, Contractual Prohibitions against Assignment,
LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 300, 302 (2009).
64
This was only mentioned by the financiers in the 2011 Study, but by
no one else.
65
Especially evidence from customers. 2011 Study, supra note 2.
66
See,
e.g.,
TUNGSTEN,
http://www.tungstennetwork.com/uk/en/expertise/e-invoicing/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
67
This desire was mentioned by a number of respondents to the 2014
Study.
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to how helpful the financiers were in sorting out disputes and how
aggressively they sought payment.
Perhaps surprisingly, the issue of set-off did not seem to be of
great importance to the parties.68 This may reflect the fact that
transaction set-off, that is, set-off of cross-claims arising out of the
same contract or closely related to the claim, is not affected by
assignment of the receivable. The desire to lock the supplier into a
supply chain finance agreement was mentioned by one respondent to
the 2014 Study and one respondent to the 2011 Study mentioned one
customer who wanted total confidentiality and did not want its identity
revealed to a financier. However, there seemed to be considerable
consensus that, in many cases, customers did not include antiassignment clauses to prevent receivables financing, but rather to
prevent “assignment” (or sub-contracting) of suppliers’ obligations
under the contract. Of course, under English law an obligation cannot
be assigned, and so such a clause would be unnecessary, but it might
be included out of ignorance or in order to make the sub-contracting
of obligations a repudiatory breach, which would entitle the customer
to terminate the relationship. In any event, many financiers felt that
the clauses, in the form in which they precluded receivables financing,
were included without a great deal of thought: out of habit or fear of
the unknown or out of an over-abundance of caution by lawyers who
drafted the boilerplate contract.69
It is certainly the case that anti-assignment clauses are generally
found in standard form contracts used by large companies for their
small and medium-sized suppliers.70 The suppliers cannot negotiate the
terms of the contracts and, as previously discussed, may find it difficult
to obtain a waiver. Where the balance of bargaining power is reversed
so that the supplier is a large company and the customer is a small
company or consumer, the latter are not able to bargain for the
protection of an anti-assignment clause. Control of anti-assignment
clauses therefore raises the broader question of protection of small
68
This was the view of the customers in the 2011 Study, though one
supplier thought that it was critical.
69
2014 Study, supra note 2.
70
All respondents to the 2014 Study selected either large companies or
government agencies (or both) as likely to include anti-assignment clauses in their
contracts, although four also selected small companies.
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businesses against potentially unfair terms. Under English law,
unreasonable exclusion and limitation clauses in standard form
contracts are unenforceable against businesses of all sizes71 and penalty
clauses are sometimes unenforceable,72 but otherwise any control of
unfair terms relates to consumer contracts. The Law Commission
suggested in 200573 that some control should be extended to contracts
with micro businesses,74 but this suggestion has not been implemented.
Some of the suppliers who responded to the 2011 Study suggested that
there was a problem with unfair terms in supply contracts75 which was
wider than just with anti-assignment clauses, and that either legislation
or wider codes of practice76 were needed.
If it is right that inequality of bargaining power enables large
customers to impose potentially unfair terms on small suppliers, then
statutory control of anti-assignment clauses could have the effect that,
deprived of this protection, the customers just imposed more
swingeing terms in other areas.77
V. THE ROLE OF ANTI-ASSIGNMENT CLAUSES IN FINANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS
In many financial transactions, there are specific reasons for
the inclusion of anti-assignment clauses that are important for the
proper functioning of the market. In some cases, the clause does not
ban assignment, but permits it to certain entities and requires consent
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, c. 50, §§ 3, 6(3), 7(3) (U.K.).
GUENTER H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 20-129 to 20-145
(Edwin Peel ed., 14th ed. 2015).
73
THE LAW COMMISSION AND THE SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION,
UNFAIR TERMS IN CONTRACTS, 292 (2005).
74
Micro businesses are defined as businesses with nine or fewer
employees.
75
One example is a term making large sums payable on termination of
the contract by the supplier.
76
See, e.g., GROCERIES CODE ADJUCIATOR, GROCERIES SUPPLY CODE
OF
PRACTICE,
2009
(U.K.),
available
at
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/groceries-supply-code-of-practice.
77
For example, a term that an invoice for goods or services is not payable
until the invoice has been approved by the customer. This possibility was discussed
with the respondents to the 2011 Study, but is, of course, speculation because there
can be no hard evidence.
71
72
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for assignment to others. Thus, for example, in syndicated loan
agreements, it is very common for the relevant clause to permit
assignment to certain financial institutions, but require consent for
assignment to others. This stems from a concern that were the loan to
be assigned to, for example, a hedge fund specializing in distressed
debt, it would be enforced in a much more aggressive way than it
would be by a bank.78 It also stems from a concern that a loan might
be sold to one of the competitors of the borrower.79 In derivatives
contracts, which depend on close-out netting to protect against credit
risk and for enforcement, it is critical that mutuality of parties is
maintained and so restrictions on assignment are very important.
The existence of these reasons for anti-assignment (or
restrictions on assignment) clauses to be enforceable means that any
statutory override of anti-assignment clauses has to be limited in scope
to the context in which such clauses cause most problems, namely,
receivables financing. This, of course, raises definitional issues: for
example, how do you exclude contracts for financial products without
also excluding contracts for the provision of services relating to finance
(such as computing services and financial advice)? The difficulties that
such definitional issues pose, and the concern about the effects on the
financial industry for getting the limitation of scope wrong, have led to
considerable opposition to the statutory control of anti-assignment
clauses from lawyers operating in the City of London and bankers.
VI. SHOULD THERE BE A STATUTORY OVERRIDE?
As I have indicated, the debate in England and Wales has
moved from a clash of policies to a discussion based on pragmatism
and cost-benefit analysis. In most situations, the presence of antiassignment clauses does not prevent suppliers from financing their
receivables. This is because the law has developed in such a way that a
financier will generally have an equitable interest in, at least, the
proceeds of the receivables and probably in the receivables themselves.
The market has therefore developed ways of transferring the risk and
benefit of the loan without actually assigning it, such as loan participation and, more
commonly, credit default swaps.
79
THE LAW COMMISSION NO. 296, COMPANY SECURITY INTERESTS,
2005, Cm. 6654, at126, (U.K).
78
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Further, the industry has developed a number of workarounds, which
means that the receivables will be collected for the ultimate benefit of
the financier both where the customer does not pay and when the
supplier is insolvent. None of this is surprising. In the absence of any
statutory control of anti-assignment clauses it is to be expected that
both the law and the industry will accommodate the interests of all
parties to the extent that it can.
This, however, is not the end of the story. If the current
position imposes costs on the industry, and thus on financing, which
are not outweighed by the benefit of such clauses to the customers,
then this would be a good reason for legislation. A further reason could
be if certain suppliers were unable to obtain financing. Moreover, if it
were felt that legislation could do little or no harm, but would have the
beneficial effect of clarifying the existing law and making the balance
of protection between all parties clear, this could also justify legislative
change. All three of these arguments pertain in England and Wales
today.
It is reasonably clear from both surveys80 that some small
suppliers, whom financiers will not finance on the basis of invoice
discounting because of concerns about their ability to collect in the
receivables and hold them on trust for the financier, are unable to have
certain invoices financed because they contain anti-assignment clauses.
The only way round this problem is for the customer to waive the
clause, and this is only possible on some occasions. Often it will not
be possible, either because the costs of waiving outweigh the benefits
to both the supplier and the financier, or because the supplier has little
bargaining power compared to the customer. The U.K. Government
is very concerned about the funding of small businesses at the
moment: they are seen as critical to economic recovery.81 The effect
on small businesses, then, is a good reason for a statutory override of
anti-assignment clauses.

It should be born in mind that both surveys were fairly small-scale.
Small Business, Big Support Confirmed by Prime Minister, GOV.UK (Jan. 27,
2014),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/small-business-big-supportconfirmed-by-prime-minister.
80
81
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It is also clear that the presence of such clauses leads to costs
for the financing industry. While it should not be overemphasized,82
there is the cost of discovering such clauses. Waivers can also be costly,
as is the development and execution of the workarounds discussed
above. Moreover, the existence of the workarounds themselves
increases ex ante uncertainty, both in terms of the law83 and also in that
it increases the possibility of disputes. Finally, the law itself is complex
and uncertain. A financier cannot be sure that it has a valid interest in
a receivable containing an anti-assignment clause. It is clearer that it
has an equitable interest in the proceeds, but this is not any good if the
proceeds are not traceable.
Are these costs outweighed by the benefits of the clauses? It is
clear that such clauses are of value in the context of financial contracts.
However, some of the reasons why customers seem to include them
in their contracts are of little or no merit,84 and the results from the
(small-scale) surveys suggest that some do not seem of concern in the
real world.85 The concern about preserving a relationship with the
supplier in the event of dispute or incorrect invoices is a real one. Yet,
the latter concern can be overcome with modern invoicing techniques,
and the former argument is undermined by the fact that customers are
prepared to permit assignment to a financier of their choice under a
supply chain finance scheme. The argument that a financier might be
more aggressive than a supplier in enforcing invoices is also flawed,
since the risk of a third party influencing enforcement is an ever
present one: the supplier could be taken over by more aggressive
management. The customer’s concern to remain in a relationship with
the supplier may have more to do with the fact that the supplier is a
small business compared to the customer, and therefore the customer
is more likely to have the upper hand in negotiations than it would with
This is because financiers are familiar with the standard terms of the
big customers, and also because they would read the contracts anyway for other
adverse clauses.
83
For example, whether a power of attorney will be enforceable on
insolvency of the supplier, or whether an anti-assignment clause renders a charge
void.
84
The prevention of sub-contracting does not require an anti-assignment
clause, and the “habit” or “fear of the unknown” reasons seem unmeritorious.
85
There seems to be little concern about set-off, or about the danger of
paying the wrong party.
82

67

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:1

a financier. The use of an anti-assignment clause to lock a supplier into
supply chain financing also seems unmeritorious. If the supply chain
financing was sufficiently attractive to the supplier, it would choose it
over other sources of financing.
This brings us to the argument that a statutory override would
do little harm, and could do some good in clarifying the law. One
possible harm, however, is that the override is not sufficiently limited
and might cause problems in the financial markets. This is a serious
risk, but could be overcome by careful drafting, even if this were at the
expense of not including some borderline cases within the override.
Another possibility is that an override may lead to harsher terms being
imposed by large customers on small suppliers in other areas. This
again would be serious, but could be controlled by a code of practice.86
It therefore seems that the benefit in clarifying the law would outweigh
any possible detriment.
CONCLUSION
This paper has sought to elucidate the arguments both for and
against a statutory override of anti-assignment clauses in English law.
It is suggested that the arguments are not ones of principle, or even
policy, but are more pragmatic. Since such clauses have not ever been
the subject of statutory intervention, the common law has developed
in such a way as to give all parties limited protection, and the industry
has worked around the law to enable receivables financing to take
place. However, on the basis of two recent surveys, the pragmatic
arguments are assessed, and it appears that a statutory override would
be beneficial.

See, e.g., GROCERIES CODE ADJUCIATOR, GROCERIES SUPPLY CODE
PRACTICE,
2009
(U.K.),
available
at
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/groceries-supply-code-of-practice.
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AZIZ CASE AND UNFAIR CONTRACT
TERMS IN MORTGAGE LOAN
AGREEMENTS: LESSONS TO BE
LEARNED IN SPAIN*
Immaculada Barral-Viñals**
INTRODUCTION
This paper provides an overview of the judgments given by the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) concerning unfair contract terms
(UCTs) in mortgage loan agreements. My analysis of recent ECJ
decisions will focus on three aspects. First, focusing on the consumerfriendly interpretation of the UCT Directive,1 which has led to the
development of substantive criteria for ascertaining unfairness, most
notably in Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa.2 Second, I will identify various points
at which the Spanish transposition of the UCT Directive needs to be
revised. Third, I will focus on the possibility of controlling UCTs in
mortgage foreclosure proceedings.
This article’s approach will be based on a comparison of
developments in ECJ decisions and recent decisions by Spain’s
Supreme Court, the Tribunal Supremo (T.S.). This comparison
indicates that the T.S. has adopted an interpretation rule for mortgage
loan agreements that is far from consumer-friendly. This finding is

The final version of this text was ended on October 15, 2014.
University of Barcelona; ibarral@ub.edu.
1
Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 95) (EC).
2
Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013).
*
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supported by decisions made by the T.S. on May 9, 2013,3 a month and
a half after the ECJ decision in Aziz, and September 8, 2014.4
The “social engineering” that emerges from ECJ decisions is a
clear indication of the situation in Spain today, where judges seek
preliminary rulings concerning the scope and interpretation of the
UCT Directive to develop principles for a more consumer-friendly
interpretation of mortgage foreclosure proceedings.5 The lower courts
in Spain are taking the lead to further develop these principles to
protect consumers in real estate transactions, because the Spanish
legislature and the T.S. seem reluctant to do so in what has become a
major concern of Spain’s social policy.6 For instance, the most farreaching legislation requires renegotiation of mortgage terms only
when “low-income borrowers” are involved.7 “Low income
borrowers” is a category that varies in the different statutes but which
is highly limited in scope to include only those with very low or none
incomes, and a high average of the rent used in paying the loan (more
than 60%).8 The ultimate option in this case for this category of
consumers is the datio pro soluto, i.e., providing the same effects as
non-recourse loans available in the United States, which affects an
even smaller group of borrowers. Besides carving out an exception for
this small, unique group of consumers, legislation reforms have
focused chiefly on what constitutes unfair contract terms.

S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) (Spain).
S.T.S., Sept. 8, 2014 (R. J., No. 3903/2014) (Spain).
5
See JOSÉ MARÍA FERNÁNDEZ SEIJO, LA DEFENSA DE LOS
CONSUMIDORES EN LAS EJECUCIONES HIPOTECARIAS (2013).
6
Hans-W. Micklitz, Unfair Contract Terms—Public Interest Litigation before
European Courts—Case C-415/11 Mohamed Aziz, in LANDMARK CASES OF EU
CONSUMER LAW: IN HONOUR OF JULES STUYCK 615 (Evelyne Terryn, Gert
Straetmans & Veerle Colaert eds., 2013).
7
See Urgent Measures to Protect Low Income Mortgage Debtors (B.O.E.
2012, 60) (Spain); Urgent Measures to Strengthen Protection Measures to Mortgage
Debtors (B.O.E. 2012, 276) (Spain); Rights of Persons with Disabilities and their
Social Inclusion (B.O.E. 2013, 289) (Spain) [hereinafter Rights of Persons with
Disabilities].
8
Id.
3
4
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This article seeks to ascertain the consequences of ECJ Aziz
case on UCTs.9 My main goal is to examine the way in which the ECJ’s
interpretation of UCTs has given rise to the construction of a
substantive concept of unfairness by analysing standard contract terms
(SCTs) included in almost all mortgage loans granted in Spain.
Further, this paper will focus on the way in which these non-binding
clauses can result in a stay of foreclosure proceedings and can also
reduce the mortgager’s debt. Indeed, UCTs in Spain today constitute
an indirect remedy against foreclosure, which can dramatically impact
medium to low income families.
I. UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS: WHY THEY SEEM TO BE A USEFUL
TOOL IN MORTGAGE LOAN AGREEMENTS
SCTs often used in mortgage loan agreements are considered
a means of unilaterally fixing contract clauses. As such, SCTs
significantly limit freedom of contract, a notion embodied in the term
“free will” in Article 1255 C.C.10 The seller or supplier of mortgage
loans fixes SCTs in advance, and the borrower must accept or reject
them on a “take it or leave it” basis. Since SCTs are not individually
negotiated, they are subject to both an incorporation and a fairness test
when the adherent－the non-professional party－is legally considered
a consumer.11 In Spain, SCTs are governed by two different
regulations, depending on whether the adherent is a consumer or not:
the Standard Contract Terms Act of 1998 (Ley de Condiciones
Generals de la Contratación (LCGC)),12 which governs SCTs in any all
kinds of contract, and the General Law for the Protection of
Consumers (consolidated by Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007, Que
Aprueba el Texto Refundido de la Ley General para la Defensa de
Consumidores y Usuarios y Otras Normas Complementarias

9
I will not conduct an in-depth analysis of mortgage foreclosure
proceedings, which is the main issue raised by Aziz.
10
C.C., art. 1255 (2011) (Spain); Elena Lauroba Lacasa, Rapport Introductif:
Les Clauses Abusives, in LES CLAUSES ABUSIVES, SOCIETE DE LEGISLATION
COMPAREE 9 (Yves Picod, Denis Mazeaud & Elena Lauroba eds., 2013).
11
General Law for the Defense of Consumers and Users (B.O.E. 2007,
287) (Spain) [hereinafter TRLGDCU].
12
General Conditions of Contract (B.O.E. 1998, 89) (Spain) [hereinafter
LCGC].
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(TRLGDCU)),13 which only applies to business-to-consumer (B2C)
contracts. For contracts that do not involve consumers, if the adherent
has knowledge of existence of SCTs in the contract, the contract will
be binding on both parties, even if the adherent has not yet read or
understood the SCTs. As such, the law deals only with the external
control of SCTs by employing the incorporation test, under which
SCTs may be considered part of the binding contract if the adherent
has had the possibility of knowing that the contract contains SCTs. 14
The incorporation test also applies when a contract containing SCTs
involves a consumer. However, a fairness test is an additional internal
control applied with respect to the content of the SCTs. This test
determines whether there is a significant imbalance between parties’
bargaining power so that and if an SCT is deemed unfair, it will not be
binding on the consumer.15
The Spanish legal framework in relation to UCTs has not
evolved due to the economic crisis of 2008, except in one aspect:
Article 27 of Act 3/201416 referring to the non-revision of a UCT,
which is explored further below. However, the ECJ’s ruling in Aziz
lead to the Act 1/2013 of 14 May,17 on measures to strengthen the
protection to mortgagors, debt restructuring and social rent that had

TRLGDCU (B.O.E. 2007, 287).
However, the adherent’s acceptance does not imply that he has actual
knowledge of the material scope of each term. Whether the SCTs are incorporated
as part of a binding contract depends on “accessibility” of the adherent to the SCTs.
Thus, it is unreasonable to uphold that the adherent has consented to the content of
the STCs, since the existence of a possibility for the adherent to know the STCs does
not necessarily mean that the adherent has made an informed decision. See EUGENIO
LLAMAS POMBO, COMENTARIOS A LA LEY GENERAL DE DEFENSA DE
CONSUMIDORES Y USUARIOS 284 (2005).
15
A further condition for enforcing SCTs is that they must be drafted in
plain, intelligible language and have an interpretation contra proferentem, i.e., the
supplier must assume the consequences of confusing wording. A lack of
transparency is a ground for non-incorporation, since confusing clauses cannot form
part of a contract. LCGC art. 5, 7 (B.O.E. 1998, 89). This idea is developed further
in the T.S. judgment of 9 May 2013, S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013)
(Spain), which seeks to construe unfairness in terms of a lack of transparency.
16
See Consumer Protection Act (B.O.E. 2014, 76) (Spain).
17 Measures to Protect Mortgagees, Debt Restructuring and Social Rents
(B.O.E. 2013, 116) (Spain) [hereinafter Measures to Protect Mortgagees, Debt
Restructuring and Social Rents].
13
14
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modified the Mortgage Act (Ley Hipotecaria –LH-)18 and the Code of
Civil Procedure (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil) with regard to the
consequences for mortgage foreclosure proceedings when the
mortgage loan agreement contains clauses or terms that are be deemed
unfair. Although various ECJ cases have redefined Spanish legislation
on UCTs in mortgage agreements,19 these cases are contrary to the May
9, 2013 decision issued by the T.S., which has generated considerable
controversy. The practical impact of these ECJ judgments on SCTs is
of great importance, since the majority of mortgage loan agreements
in Spain contain STCs.
The lower Spanish courts—Audiencias provinciales—have
examined a number of frequently used SCTs in mortgage loan
agreements that might be deemed unfair, including SCTs relating to:
(1) the early maturity of the loan, (2) the default interest rate, (3) the
unilateral determination of the amount owed, and (4) the so-called
“floor clause” in variable interest loans. In Aziz, the ECJ ruled on the
fairness of the first three types of SCTs. Preliminary rulings by the ECJ
focused on two aspects: the criteria to be applied in examining the
fairness of a clause and the effects of an unfair clause. Similarly, the
T.S. has ruled on the “floor clause,” which is a problem only in Spain
in the context of the UCT Directive concerning the scope of
application of the fairness test to the main subject matter of the
contract.
We start by examining this latter point as a prius for the analysis
of the above-mentioned clauses.
II. THE APPLICATION OF THE FAIRNESS TEST TO THE MAIN
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONTRACT
An initial set of ECJ and T.S. decisions deal with the
transposition of the UCT Directive by the Spanish legislature. Article
Mortgage Act) (B.O.E. 1946, 58) (Spain) [hereinafter Mortgage Act].
Case C-484/08, Caja de Ahorros de Madrid v. Ausbanc, 2010 E.C.R.
I-04785; Case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito v. Joaquín Calderón Camino,
2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 4274 (June 14, 2012); Case C-415/11, Mohamed
Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013); Case
C-226/12, Constructora Principado v. José Ignacio Menéndez-Álvarez, 2014 EURLex CELEX LEXIS 7 (Jan. 6, 2014).
18
19
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4(2) of the UCT Directive states that the assessment of the unfairness
of a contractual term should not include the “main subject matter of
the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration . . . as
against the services or goods supplied in exchange . . . .”20 As such, the
ECJ has been requested to give a preliminary ruling as to whether it is
actually possible to assess the fairness of the subject matter of the
contract and the adequacy of the price and remuneration in light of the
value of the services or goods supplied in exchange, that is to say, the
fairness of the contract price.
The question is whether the transposition of the UCT
Directive by the Spanish legislature complies with Article 4(2) of the
Directive, given that Spanish law has not expressly transposed this
limit to the assessment of fairness. This question was answered by the
ECJ in Caja de Ahorros de Madrid v. Ausbanc.21 The Court in Ausbanc held
that a Spanish law providing for an assessment of the fairness of terms
relating to the main subject matter of the contract was consistent with
the UCT Directive.22 The ECJ determined that Article 4(2) is not a
binding provision. Member States may opt not to transpose Article
4(2) and, in so doing, may afford a higher level of protection than that
established by the Directive.23 This option satisfies the requirement in
the UCT Directive of “minimum harmonisation” of national
Council Directive 93/13, supra note 1, art. 4(2).
See Ausbanc, 2010 E.C.R. I-04785.
22
In Ausbanc, the T.S. requested the ECJ make a preliminary ruling
regarding the unfairness of a SCT that allowed the bank to round up the interest rate
in a variable mortgage agreement to the next quarter of a percentage point. See id.
23
It follows from the wording of Article 4(2) of the UCT Directive that
“[Article 4(2)] . . . cannot be regarded as laying down the scope ratione materiae of the
Directive.” Id. at I-4837. Article 4(2) cannot be inferred as constituting “a mandatory
and binding provision and that, as such, its transposition by Member States was
obligatory. On the contrary, the Court merely held that, in order to safeguard in
practice the objectives of consumer protection pursued by the Directive, any
transposition of Article 4(2) had to be complete, with the result that the prohibition
of the assessment of the unfairness of the terms relates solely to those which are
drafted in plain, intelligible language.” Id. at I-4838. Further, the Court in Ausbanc
stated that “it must be held that, in authorising the possibility of a full judicial review
as to the unfairness of terms such as those referred to in Article 4(2) of the Directive,
provided for in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer,
the Spanish legislation at issue in the main proceedings makes it possible for
consumers to be afforded, in accordance with Article 8 of the Directive, a higher
level of protection than that established by that directive” Id. at I-4838.
20
21
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legislation.24 A number of decisions by the T.S. adhere to this
interpretation of the UCT Directive, as I will explain. Notably, prior to
Ausbanc, the T.S. had already ruled in a manner consistent with the
ECJ’s holding. For example, in T.S. judgement of 1 July, 2010,25 which
concerned clauses defining risks in insurance contracts, the T.S. ruled
that courts should assess the fairness of clauses related to the main
subject matter of such contracts because it determines the price of the
insurance.
Yet, more noteworthy is the judgment against this
interpretation, since it deals with mortgage contracts, bearing in mind
that only a clause unrelated to the subject matter of the contract or the
adequacy of the price can be submitted to the unfairness test. Thus,
the question is that the T.S. resolution of 18 June, 2012, which is
concerned with remunerative interest rate, states that Spanish
legislation on UCTs prohibits the assessment of the fairness of
contract clauses that are related to price.26 It appears that the
remunerative interest rate, which is the main tool for calculating the
contract price, is outside the scope of the unfairness test.
Control of the remunerative interest rate clearly entails an
analysis of the adequacy of the contract price, since the assessment of
the nominal interest rate applied is the “price” of the loan. No
assessment of fairness, however, is undertaken in fixing this rate.
Instead, fairness is assessed as to the price agreed to by the parties.
This conceptual separation of Article 4(2) of the UCT Directive of the
control of the price as the main subject matter of the contract, and the
adequacy of the price and the remuneration, on the one hand, as
against the services or goods supplied in return, on the other, was
highlighted by the ECJ in Constructora Principado v. Álvarez.27 The nature
of unfairness does not require an economic imbalance in the contract,
which the Court understands as not being relevant. Instead, unfairness
refers to the legal imbalance created by those contract clauses that
Id. at I-4836.
S.T.S. Jul. 1, 2010 (R.J., No. 6031/2010) (Spain).
26
S.T.S. June 18, 2012 (R.J., No. 5966/2012) (Spain).
27
In Constructora Principado (like Ausbanco, a preliminary request from a
Spanish judge), the ECJ was asked to determine whether obliging consumers to pay
for expenses that by law need to be borne by the sellers is unfair. See Case C-226/12,
Constructora Principado, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 7, ¶ 44 (Jan. 6, 2014).
24
25
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impose on the consumer certain charges for which he is not liable
under the applicable law. In other words, it is unfair to create a legal
imbalance, irrespective of the economic impact on the parties.28
Spanish scholars29 have reached a consensus that UCTs are not
the appropriate tool for determining the adequacy of the contract price
and remuneration as against the services or goods supplied in return.
Spanish law calls for complete freedom of parties to determine
contract prices, and therefore, there are no remedies30 for seeking a fair
price.31 Thus, the control assessment of fairness is not about the
adequacy of the price, which is separate from the possibility of
assessing unfairness, but about the way some clauses help to determine
the total price that consumers have to pay for the loan. This is precisely
why many SCTs in mortgage loans might be considered unfair.32

See IMMACULADA BARRAL VIÑALS, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE
CONSUMO, ABUSIVAS POR DESEQUILIBRIO IMPORTANTE, PERO NO IMPORTA LA
CANTIDAD (2014) (detailing a discussion on legal imbalance not being an economic
imbalance in the ECJ decisions).
29
See SERGIO CÁMARA LAPUENTE, EL CONTROL SOBRE LAS CLÁUSULAS
“ABUSIVAS” SOBRE ELEMENTOS ESENCIALES DEL CONTRATO 71 (ThompsonAranzadi ed., 2006) (discussing the tension between unlimited freedom to negotiate
the contract price and social justice).
30
An exception to the general rule that no remedies exist for seeking a
fair contract price is the laesio ultra dimidium in Catalonia for immovable property
under certain circumstances. This exception, however, is beyond the scope of this
paper.
31
See IGNASI FERNÁNDEZ DE SENESPLEDA, PABLO IZQUIERDO WHITE,
ADELA RODRIGUEZ SERRA & GUILLEM SOLER SOLÉ, CLÁUSULAS ABUSIVAS EN LA
CONTRATACIÓN BANCARIA 86 (2014) (calling for the impossibility of controlling the
price by the fairness test). Nevertheless, the argumentation cited deals precisely with
the idea of adequacy between the price and the services and goods supplied. See also
LAPUENTE, supra note 29, at 71 (discussing the liberal doctrine of freedom of pricing
and the social justice of the contract). However, we understand that the thesis of
social intervention of the contract exceeds the issue of unfair terms and seeks, not
to determine whether there is an imbalance in a specific contract, but rather to restore
a prior balance when starting from the premise that both parties have very different
powers of negotiation.
32
Article 32 of the Directive on Consumer Rights inserts Article 8 to the
UCT Directive, stating that when a Member State adopts provisions in accordance
with Article 8, it must inform the Commission, especially if those provisions “extend
the unfairness assessment to . . . the adequacy of the price or remuneration.” Council
Directive 2011/83, on Consumer Rights, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64 (EU), amending
Council Directive 93/13, supra note 1, and Council Directive 1999/44, 1999 O.J. (L
28
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In terms of remunerative rates of interest, it should be stressed
that control of the amount, if any, is concerned directly with assessing
the adequacy of the service provided against the remuneration. In
short, the control of the amount impacts pricing freedom. Article 1 of
the Repression of Usury Act of 23 of July 1908 governs the
determination of whether the remunerative rate of interest is excessive
or not.33 The Usury Act is useful for controlling the adequacy of the
loan price because it mandates that the lending of money cannot be
considered binding where there is an “interest notoriously higher than
the normal price of money or clearly out of proportion in the
circumstances of the case, or leonine. . .”34 However, when the lending
is excessive or leonine, the loan is void in its entirety. Thus, the
requirements of the Usury Act differ from the unfairness test, under
which only the unfair clauses would be non-binding. In short, there is
a specific tool in Spanish law for analysing when the price of the loan
is excessive, namely, the adequacy of the price, which lies outside the
scope of laws that address UCTs.
An important case that addresses the issue of price control is
the Judgement of 9 May 2013,35 a T.S. decision which was published
shortly after the ECJ decided Aziz. The T.S. held that, although the
rate of default interest constitutes part of the main subject matter of
the contract, it can only be deemed unfair if the clause lacks
transparency. These issues are discussed below in section IV, sub171) 12 (EC), and repealing Council Directive 85/577, 1985 O.J. (L 372) 31 (EC) and
Council Directive 97/7, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19 (EC). The Directive on Consumer
Rights was transposed by the Spanish legislature in the Consumer Protection Act,
(B.O.E. 2014, 76) (Spain), amending TRLGDCU. Importantly, note that Article 8
does not deal directly with the price as the main subject matter of the contract, but
rather with the adequacy of the price or remuneration.
33
Represión de la Usura (Usury Repression Act) (B.O.E. 1908, 206)
(Spain) [hereinafter Usury Repression Act].
34
Nevertheless, the main idea of the Usury Repression Act is to provide
a subjective approach by taking into account the personal characteristics of the
debtor in determining whether the loan is usurious or not. See Immaculada BarralViñals, Freedom of Contract, Unequal Bargaining Power and Consumer Law on
Unconscionability, in UNCONSCIONABILITY IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE FINANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS: PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE (Mel Kenny, James Devenney &
Lorna Fox O’Mahony eds., 2010) (relating the concept of unconscionability in
common law and how this Act might be considered the first Spanish law protecting
the weak part of the contract).
35
S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) (Spain)
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section C in conjunction with the criteria for determining fairness,
because unlike remunerative interest rates, default interest rates do not
form part of the price. Instead, default interest rates are part of the
compensation for the eventual damage suffered by the creditor
because of non-payment. In other words, these rates fall outside the
notion of price and, as such, are susceptible to an unfairness test.36
These T.S. cases permit application of the fairness test to any
kind of clause in a mortgage loan, and this application should be the
first step in considering individual clauses typically included in
mortgage loan agreements in Spain.
III. SUBSTANTIVE CRITERIA FOR DEALING WITH THE CONCEPT OF
“UNFAIRNESS”
The ECJ has issued a number of guidelines on determining the
fairness of SCTs. These guidelines are only of persuasive authority for
judges in national courts because the Court in Luxembourg only gives
instructions to the referring court in accordance with the interpretation
of the scope of the fairness control provided in the UCT Directive.37
In Aziz, however, the ECJ provided national courts with direct
guidance—which has been cited in subsequent cases such as
Constructora Principado—for analysing SCTs. All in all, the ECJ analyses
36
MARIA CARMEN GONZALEZ CARRASCO, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE
CONSUMO, LA CLÁUSULA QUE IMPONE UN INTERÉS DE DEMORA
DESPROPORCIONADO DETERMINA LA APRECIACIÓN DE OFICIO DE LA NULIDAD
DE LA MISMA SIN POSIBILIDAD DE ONTEGRACIÓN JUDICIAL(2013).
37
The judgments that stress the idea that the ECJ only gives instructions
to the referring court in accordance with the interpretation of the scope of the
fairness control provided in the UCT Directive are numerous. See Case C-243/08,
Pannon GSM Zrt. v. Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi, 2009 E.C.R. I-04713; Case C-137/08,
VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. v. Ferenc Schneide, 2010 E.C.R. I-10847; Case C-92/11,
RWE Vertrieb AG v. Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen eV, 2013 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 4659 (Mar. 21, 2013). A summary of this construction can be found
in Case C-472/10, Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v. Invitel Távközlési Zrt.,
2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 4104 (Apr. 26, 2012) (“it is for that [national] court
to determine, in light of those criteria, whether a particular contractual term is
actually unfair in the circumstances of the case . . . . It is thus clear that the Court of
Justice must limit itself, in its response, to providing the referring court with the
indications which the latter must take into account in order to assess whether the
term at issue is unfair.”).
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three different clauses used in virtually all mortgage loan agreements.
These clauses are discussed separately below.
A. The “Early Maturity of the Loan” Clause
The “early maturity” clause is an SCT that confers on the bank
the right to call in the totality of the loan on expiry of a stipulated time
limit where the debtor fails to fulfill his obligation to pay any part of
the principal or the interest on the loan. This clause implies the
acceleration of the loan due to any kind of non-compliance. The ECJ
in Aziz referred to this clause as the “acceleration clause.”
There is considerable variety of early maturity clauses used for
a range of circumstances, such as when a debtor enters into insolvency
proceedings and in the sale of an immovable property. The discussion
in this section focuses on the type of early maturity clause considered
in the case brought before the ECJ: one that provides for early maturity
on account of non-payment of a loan installment. For this clause to
take effect, there must be a failure to comply with an obligation that is
of essential importance in the contractual relationship, such as nonpayment in due time by the borrower.38 But, the substantive issue
discussed by the ECJ was the early maturity that occurred, or could
occur, as a consequence of the non-payment of a single installment,
and whether the early maturity clause may be considered unfair
because of being disproportionate. The problem is not the possibility
of calling in the loan because of the debtor’s non-compliance. Rather,
the problem is the imbalance between the term and the amount of the
loan, and the non-payment of a single installment.39 Some Spanish
scholars argue that, since early maturity for non-compliance is
authorized by Spanish regulations on UCTs,40 the central problem is
whether absolute non-compliance can be assumed after defaulting on
just one installment.41 The meaning of non-payment is not defined in
See, e.g. S.T.S., Dec. 16, 2009 (R.J., No. 8466/2009) (Spain).
See PASCUAL MARTÍNEZ ESPIN, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE CONSUMO,
ES ABUSIVA LA CLÁUSULA DE VENCIMIENTO ANTICIPADO POR IMPAGO DE UNA
CUOTA DE LA HIPOTECA (2013).
40
TRLGDCU art. 85(4) (B.O.E. 2007, 287).
41
See Carlos Ballugera Gómez, Carácter Abusivo del Vencimiento Anticipado
por Impago de una Sola Suota del Préstamo Hipotecario en la STS de 16 de Diciembre de 2009,
7507 DIARIO LA LEY 10, 10 (2010); Maria Teresa Alonso Pérez, Cláusulas Frecuentes
en Préstamos Hipotecarios para Adquisición de Vivienda: Cláusula Suelo, Cláusula de
38
39
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the regulations. However, the ECJ provides three criteria –marked in
bold- for determining whether the non-compliance is sufficiently
serious: “whether that right is provided for in cases in which such noncompliance is sufficiently serious in the light of the term and amount
of the loan, whether that right derogates from the relevant
applicable rules and whether national law provides for adequate
and effective means enabling the consumer subject to such a
term to remedy the effects of the loan being called in.”42
Even though the ECJ does not conclude whether this clause is
unfair, its criteria reflects the normal circumstances of a mortgage loan
for a family home in Spain. Typically, banks in Spain grant mortgage
loans with pay back time of at least thirty years.43 As such, nonpayment of a single monthly installment, without more, does not
appear to be a severe violation of the borrower’s payment obligation.
In line with these criteria, the Spanish legislature set a limit on
the maximum delay of payment, beyond which would indicate a
serious intention of the borrower to breach his payment obligation. In
2013, the legislature promulgated Act 1/2013,44 which modifies Article
693(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure to require a finding of noncompliance with the loan agreement based on non-payment of
monthly installments for three or more months or its equivalent if the
terms are not quantified in a monthly basis.
Act 1/2013 also takes into account the second criterion
provided by the ECJ, and addresses the question of whether the right
to call in the loan for the non-payment of one installment derogates
from the relevant applicable rules. If there is no early maturity clause
in the contract, the mortgage can only be executed following the
“essential non-compliance” in the terms provided by Article 1124
C.C.,45 which seems to require more than the non-payment of a single
Vencimiento anticipado y Cláusula de Cntereses Moratorios Excesivamente Elevados, in
VIVIENDA Y CRISIS ECONÓMICA 183 (María Teresa Alsonso Pérez ed., 2014).
42
L.E. CIV art. 693(2) (Spain).
43 See, e.g., Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EURLex CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013) (the mortgage loan at issue was for thirtythree years).
44
See Measures to Protect Mortgagees, Debt Restructuring and Social
Rents (B.O.E. 2013, 116).
45
C.C. art. 1124 (Spain).
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installment. Thus, by specifically requiring three months of nonpayment, Act 1/2013 establishes a criterion in which non-compliance
is of essential importance.
However, the last criterion provided by the ECJ on the need
to examine whether there are adequate means to remedy the effects of
the clause is largely ineffective. Article 693(3) of Code of Civil
Procedure clearly provides for the possibility of the debtor thwarting
the execution of the mortgage by paying the due installments, a power
conceded to the debtor of the mortgage on the family home, without
the consent of the creditor. Therefore, in light of the effectiveness of
reacting to the implementation of the clause, the Spanish legal system
provides reasonable solutions to ensure the clause is not deemed
unfair.
Act 1/2013 establishes that, in the absence of non-payment for
at least three months, the judge cannot proceed to foreclosure.
However, the question remains as to whether, even if the bank has
declared the loan is expired after the minimum time limit for
compliance established by law, the contract contains a clause for early
maturity for non-payment of a single installment. Courts are likely to
declare this clause unfair and therefore not binding on the debtor, in
which case there would be a stay on mortgage foreclosure due to the
lack of necessary procedural prerequisites, i.e., the credit has not fallen
due.46 Here, however, judges must decide on a case-by-case basis
whether the elements listed above for determining whether a clause is
unfair are present. In fact, the Code of Civil Procedure does not make
early maturity clauses unfair only upon one or two non-payments.
Instead, the Code of Civil Procedure only limits the foreclosure of the
mortgage to three unpaid installments, which indicates a poor
understanding of the judgment in Aziz.
B. The Clause for Unilateral Quantification of the Amount Owed
Clauses for unilateral qualification of the amount owed allow
banks to immediately and unilaterally determine the balance of a loan
by submitting a certificate indicating the amount owed. This clause is
Encarna Cordero, Y Ahora Viene lo Difícil: ¿Cómo Controlar en el Ejecutivo
Hipotecario el Carácter Abusivo de la Cláusula?, 5 REVISTA CESCO DE DERECHO DE
CONSUMO 26 (2013).
46
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essential to the security provided by a mortgage because it provides the
creditor with recourse to the procedures set out in Article 572(2) of
Code of Civil Procedure.47 Article 572(2) requires providing for the
presentation of certification of the amount owed, duly verified before
a notary, to determine the outstanding balance to proceed to
enforcement. If such certification does not exist, the enforcement
proceedings cannot be initiated owing to the absence of one of the
procedural requisites, viz., the liquidity of the debt.48 Prior to the
enforcement proceeding, the debtor would be required to initiate a
declaratory proceeding to establish the amount due. Therefore, the law
allows unilateral declaration to establish the liquidity of the debt.
Clauses for unilateral qualification of the amount owed might
seem unfair because they require only unilateral declaration by the
bank. However, such a clause whose requirements and effects are
provided for by procedural legislation49 can hardly be considered unfair
provided that all the requirements and effects of the clause are clear.
In fact, this was the approach used by the Advocate General in Aziz,
which highlights the essential character of this type of SCT for
initiating enforcement.50 He also pointed out the need to analyze the
rules of this procedure and, in particular, the debtor’s power of
challenge, which appears guaranteed when claiming more than is due
as regulated in Art. 558 Code of Civil Procedure.51
Aziz, however, deviates from Advocate General opinion for
analyzing the procedures of mortgage enforcement proceedings and
directly adopts the comparison with national legislation in the absence
of an agreement.52 Yet, without a unilateral determination clause,
L.E. CIV.art. 572(2) (Spain).
See FERNÁNDEZ DE SENESPLENA, supra note 31, at 175.
49
L.E. CIV. art. 572 (Spain).
50
See Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013).
51
L.E. CIV. art. 558 (Spain).
52
Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS, at ¶ 75 (“With regard, finally, to
the term concerning the unilateral determination by the lender of the amount of the
unpaid debt, linked to the possibility of initiating mortgage enforcement
proceedings, it must be held that, taking into account paragraph 1(q) of the Annex
to the directive and the criteria contained in Articles 3(1) and 4(1) thereof, the
referring court must in particular assess whether and, if appropriate, to what extent,
the term in question derogates from the rules applicable in the absence of agreement
47
48
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enforcement proceedings may not be initiated, so, this SCT is clearly
carrying consequences detrimental to the consumer. Therefore, Aziz
indicates that the unilateral declaration of the amount is unfair, since
this requires an agreement that derogates the applicable law. In the
absence of an agreement, the law provides for the creditor to initiate
declaratory proceedings to settle the debt, thus losing the advantages
of the mortgage enforcement, which is one of the lender’s most
obvious advantages. Enforcement based on unilateral declaration of
the amount owed offers few safeguards for the debtor, because
unilateral declaration does not contain a phase in which objections
might be lodged, nor is it corrected by the intervention of the notary.
In short, in light of Spanish procedural law, it seems more effective to
address the issue of the clauses for unilateral qualification of the
amount owed from the perspective of the guarantee of procedures
rather than from that of the unfair nature of the clause itself.
C. Disproportionate Default Interest Rate Clause
The disproportionate default interest rate clause is also
analyzed in Aziz. Unlike the remunerative rate of interest, which forms
part of the price, the default interest is the price (compensation) for
the debtor’s failure to pay, which derives from the default and is
provided for under Article 1108 C.C.53 Thus, as indicated in Section
III, the critical issue is not whether it is possible to control the content
of the clause. Rather, the issue is whether the interest rate is
disproportionate, and because of that, become unfair.
The ECJ opined in Aziz that the rate of default interest should
be appropriate for ensuring the attainment of its objectives: so, a
disproportioned default interest rate cannot be imposed because it
settles a disproportionate compensation. The ECJ establishes two
criteria for establishing a proportionate default interest rate: first, a
comparison with what is provided for under national law in the
absence of any agreement; and second, the rate of default interest
applicable in art. 1108 Civil Code.54 Clearly, the agreement of a default
between the parties, so as to make it more difficult for the consumer, given the
procedural means at his disposal, to take legal action and exercise rights of the
defence.”).
53 C.C. art. 1108 (Spain).
54
See Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS,¶ 74 (“regarding the term
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interest rate alters the legal framework under Article 1108 C.C., which
provides that the legal interest rate should be four percent,55 a figure
that is well above the usual percentage in mortgages. The question is
what standard of comparison should be employed, and there are at
least three possible answers: first, to take Article 1108 C.C., which
establishes the legal interest rate of borrowing in the event of no
agreement,56 as a point of reference; second, to apply in accordance
with Spanish legislation the limit on the legal interest rate of tacit
overdrafts on personal loans subject to Article 20(4) LCC,57 which is
2.5 times the legal interest rate;58 and third, to compare the
remunerative rate of interest of the loan itself with the default interest
rate.
Consumers often default on their loan payments at the risk of
foreclosure proceedings and find themselves unable to pay high rates
of default interest. Therefore, RD-L 6/2012, before providing a ruling
in the Aziz case, determined an upper limit for default interest rate in
mortgage foreclosures affecting debtors with few resources (Article 4
RD-L 6/2012).59 This regulation provides for the so-called “debtor on
the threshold of social exclusion,” who enjoys special protection and
concerning the fixing of default interest, it should be recalled that, in light of
paragraph 1(e) of the Annex to the Directive, read in conjunction with Articles 3(1)
and 4(1) of the directive, the national court must assess in particular, as stated by the
Advocate General in points 85 to 87 of her Opinion; first, the rules of national law
which would apply to the relationship between the parties, in the event of no
agreement having been reached in the contract in question or in other consumer
contracts of that type; and, second, the rate of default interest laid down, compared
with the statutory interest rate, in order to determine whether it is appropriate for
securing the attainment of the objectives pursued by it in the Member State
concerned and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them”). See also Case
C-488/11, Dirk Frederik Asbeek Brusse, Katarine de Man Garabito v. Jahani BV,
2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2538 (May 30, 2013).
55
State Budget 2014 (B.O.E. 2013, 309) (Spain) (stating the state budget
for 2014. Additional disposition 32).
56
C.C. art. 1108 (Spain).
57
Consumer Credit Act art. 9 (B.O.E. 1995, 72) (Spain) (derogated by
Consumer Credit Act (B.O.E. 2011, 151) (Spain) [hereinafter Consumer Credit Act].
Neither of the two statutes apply to mortgage loan agreements.
58
See FERNÁNDEZ DE SENESPLEDA, supra note 31, at 145. This criterion
has been followed by provincial courts seeking a limit in the default interest rate in
the face of recent legal reforms.
59
Urgent Measures to Protect Low Income Mortgage Debtors (B.O.E.
2012, 60) (Spain).
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is limited to the remunerative interest agreed to by parties at the time
of making the loan agreement plus 2.5% of the loan principal.
Nevertheless, the requirements for being recognized as this type of
debtor are cumbersome and complicated, and few debtors are deemed
eligible for this protection.
The ceiling on default interest in Article 114 LH, amended by
Law 1/2013 limits default interest to a rate that is three times the
statutory interest rate when the mortgage is for the acquisition of the
main residence and the mortgage agreement has been secured on that
residence. Thus, a solution was implemented to depart from the
statutory interest rate provided by the C.C. and to increase the ceiling
on personal loans. Today, there is a legal limit on interest rates when
the rate has been agreed to in a new mortgage contract. Hence,
disposicion trasitoria (DT) 2 of Act 1/2013 applies this limit to
foreclosures that are pending or to be initiated after the effective date
of Act 1/2013 that will have a greater impact as a lot of cases can be
in its scope of application.60 This indicates that the court clerk or
notary will recalculate the rate of interest if it exceeds the statutory
limit. As such, DT 2 of Act 1/2013 seems to represent an effort to
moderate the clause in opposition to ECJ case law and the provisions
in Article 85 TRLGDCU, which will be further discussed in Section V
below.
Another interesting aspect of disproportionate default interest
rate clauses concerns the proceedings taken when an interest rate is
declared unfair and therefore void. The provincial courts have adopted
two approaches to this issue. The first approach is to apply a zero
interest rate if a court declares the default interest rate void as
disproportionately high and the judge is unable to moderate the clause,
as demonstrated in Section V. The second approach is to apply Article
1108 C.C., which provides that, in the absence of an agreement
between the parties, the rate of default interest shall be the statutory
interest rate. I favor this second approach because the supplementary
application of Article 1108 C.C. does not constitute a revision of the
clause, but only a use of the statutory interest rate in the absence of an
agreement between the parties, defined as lack of foresight or
60
See Measures to Protect Mortgagees, Debt Restructuring and Social
Rents (B.O.E. 2013, 116).
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unenforceability by other cause.61 The logic of Article 1108 C.C. is to
provide a model for the quantification of the legal obligation for paying
default interest, which is used by the ECJ as a reference for finding
unfairness. The agreement on a default interest rate modifies the
application of this precept.62
D. The “Floor” Clause
In Spain, most loan agreements for purchasing a family home
charge a variable interest rate. A “floor” clause affects the variability of
a loan by providing a fixed interest rate. Floor clauses do not allow
lower rates of interest to be applied, even if a lower rate is available
under the Euribor or other mechanism of calculation. Financial
institutions use floor clauses to protect themselves against possible
falls in the Euribor. Hence, the potential unfairness of floor clauses
has been called into question because such clauses cause an imbalance
in the contract, since the debtor is unable to benefit from interest rate
cuts lower than the limit established by the floor clause, and it can be
deemed unfair because the lack of financial knowledge of the debtor
means he may be unaware that the clause might be applied, which has
occurred during the present economic crisis. Although the ECJ has not
addressed the fairness of floor clauses, the T.S. ruled on this issue in
the May 9, 201363 and September 8, 2014 decisions64 and applied much
more restrictive criteria.
The T.S. cases considered floor clauses from two points of
view. The first, which is contrary to the interpretation by the ECJ in
Aziz, is that “floor” clauses, insofar as they determine the contract
price, cannot be considered unfair. The second is that floor clauses can
only be considered invalid for lack of transparency. Thus, the test for
fairness is its inclusion within the loan agreement (Articles 5 and 7
LCGC and 80 of TRLGDCU), which is understood to be made when
See Miguel Martin Casals, Les Clauses Abusives Dans le Projet de Cadre
Commun de Reference, in LES CLAUSES ABUSIVES: APPROCHES CROISEES FRANCOESPAGNOLES 73 (Yves Picod, Denis Mazeaud, & Elena Lauroba eds., 2012) (pointing
out that the contract remains when a clause is unfair either because the clause is not
essential to the contract’s purpose or because the law includes a defective application
of the norm. In our case, the defective norm is C.C. art. 1108).
62
See GONZALEZ CARRASCO, supra note 36, at 4.
63 See S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) (Spain).
64 See S.T.S., Sept. 8, 2014 (R.J., No. 3903/2014) (Spain).
61

86

2015

Barral-Viñals

4:1

the bank complies with all previously established information and
documentation requirements.65 Surprisingly, the T.S. checks the
transparency of contractual clauses that cannot be deemed unfair as
they form part of the price in function of the criterion of transparency
in what is known as “double filter transparency”. Indeed, this criterion
for the transparency of contract clauses is not contemplated by Article
82 TRLGDCU, which is limited to requiring only that the content of
the clauses shall not be “contrary to the requirement of good faith” or
“cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations
arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer and user.”
Nor does Article 3 of the UCT Directive require a check on the
transparency of contract clauses. Thus, the transparency control in
Spanish law is effectively a control of the incorporation of general
contract conditions, and not a control over the fairness of the SCT. 66
Indeed, the control of accessibility tackles the issue of fairness more
directly than the control of transparency because the former is based
on whether the consumer had the opportunity of knowing the content,
while the latter is only a posterior analysis of whether the clause is
worded clearly or not. Further, even if the wording of the contract term
is unclear, it will be ineffective rather than unfair.67
In practice, the T.S. adopts the ECJ’s interpretation of the
concept of unfairness due to a lack of transparency, which provides
that the clarity of the contract language requires the lender to fulfill its
affirmative duty of supplying sufficient information for the consumer
to appreciate the circumstances related to contract formation. 68 This
requirement is grounded in the idea that the test for unfairness should
require that consumers understand the economic significance of the
contract terms. This is precisely the concept that the T.S. adopts in
65 See Orden Sobre Transparencia de las Condiciones Financieras de los
préstamos hiptecarios (May 5, 1994) (B.O.E. 1994/112) (on transparency of the
financial conditions of mortgage loans or credits) (derogated by Orden
EHA/2899/2011, de Transparencia y Protección del cliente de servicios bancarios
(Oct. 28, 2011) (B.O.E. 2011/261) (on transparency and protection of bank clients)).
66
FRANCISCO PERTÍÑEZ VÍLCHEZ, LAS CLÁUSULAS ABUSIVAS POR UN
DEFECTO DE TRANSPARENCIA (2004).
67
See Consumer Protection Act art. 10 (B.O.E. 2014, 76) (Spain)
(amended to require clarity with the material delivery of the conditions).
68
See Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v. Invitel Távközlési Zrt., supra
note 37; Hans-W. Micklitz & Norbert Reich, The Court and Sleeping Beauty: The Revival
of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD), 51 C.M.L.R. 771, 771-808 (2014).
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determining the lack of transparency: the floor clause is void due to a
lack of transparency because such a clause prevents the consumer from
understanding the economic significance of the loan. However, the
problem is that both transparency and reporting obligations to
highlight the economic significance of the contract are for the ECJ,
examples of substantive criteria for determining the unfair nature of a
clause because they generate imbalance and are contrary to good faith,
regardless of the clarity of writing. In other words, the argument of the
economic importance of the contract is useful, but then we talk about
content control, which is precisely what the T.S. rejects at the
beginning of its argument, indicating that the floor clause refers to an
essential contract element. In my opinion, it is more useful to start
from the fact that floor clauses are unfair terms, and avoid the question
of transparency because the content control would address the fairness
issue in a more direct manner.
IV. ON THE EFFECTS OF UNFAIRNESS: NON-REVISION AND FULL
RESTITUTION
Another important issue concerns the difference between the
way in which the Spanish legislature and the T.S. interpret the effects
of unfair terms and the doctrine established by the ECJ. First, until
2013, the TRLGDCU had authorized judges to integrate terms that
had been declared unfair. Second, the T.S., in its 9 May, 2013
decision,69 stated that the law did not require restitution of the amounts
paid under a “floor clause” that had been declared unfair due to a lack
of transparency. Here, the discussion will focus on these two points:
the non-revision of an unfair contract term, and the restitution effect
when it is declared unfair.
A. Non-revision of an Unfair Contract Term
An even more surprising issue that arises from the
transposition of the UCT Directive by the Spanish legislature is that
Article 85 of RD 1/2007 allowed Spanish courts to revise unfair
clauses. However, as reported in a number of ECJ judgments,70
69
70

S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) (Spain).
Case C-76/10, Pohotovosť s. r. o. v. Iveta Korčkovská, 2010 E.C.R. I-

11557.
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revision of UCTs by courts is not permissible under Article 6 of the
UCT Directive.71
In 2014, the Spanish legislature amended the TRLGDCU: L
3/2014, which transposes the 2011 Directive on consumer rights,
provides in Article 27 that unfair terms are null and void and cannot
be revised by judges: Article 27 amends Article 83 of TRLGDCU. So,
judges are not permitted to revise unfair contract terms because the
supplier or seller bears the risk of the use of the clause, i.e., the supplier
or seller cannot benefit from a partial implementation of the agreement
when the clause is unfair.72
This subject is currently of great interest because of its effects
on default interest clauses. Besides what has been discussed regarding
the application of the statutory limit provided in art. 1108 C.C. in the
absence of agreement, there is another controversial provision, the DT
2 1/2013 that appears to permit revision by judges upon finding UCTs.
DT 2 1/2013, which amends Article 114 LH, grants the court clerk or
notary the power to authorize the creditor to recalculate interest if the
clerk or notary finds that the default interest clause exceeds the
statutory limit in C.C. This rule, the constitutionality of which has been
questioned,73 seems to permit the revision of a term that is no longer
See, e.g., Case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito SA v. Joaquín
Caldéron Camino, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX Lexis 4274 (June 14, 2012). “Article 6(1)
of Directive 93/13 cannot be understood as allowing the national court, in the case
where it finds that there is an unfair term in a contract concluded between a seller or
supplier and a consumer, to revise the content of that term instead of merely setting
aside its application to the consumer.” Id. at ¶ 71. In addition, it is for the court to
ascertain what which national rules are applicable to the dispute and to take the whole
body of domestic law into consideration and apply the interpretative methods
recognized by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that Article 6(1) of Directive
93/13 is fully effective and achieves an outcome consistent with the objective
pursued by it. Id. at ¶ 72. See also Case C-282/10, Dominguez v. Centre Informatique
du Centre Ouest Atlantique, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 4658, ¶ 27 (January 24,
2012). The answer to the second question is that Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13
must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State, such as Article 83
of Legislative Decree 1/2007, which allows a national court, if it declares void an
unfair term in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer, to
modify that contract by revising the content of that term. Banco Español de Crédito
v. Joaquín Calderón Camino, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 4274.
72
See Micklitz & Reich, supra note 68, at 793.
73
Spain’s Constitutional Court has admitted application 4985-2013,
71
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permitted under Article 83 TRLGDCU. If the interest rate in the SCT
exceeds the statutory maximum, its unfairness can be assessed by the
court or the debtor can make the corresponding allegation so the
interest rate is not applied.
B. Full Restitution
The unfairness of a term might imply that the debtor has paid
more than what he should have been paid, so he is entitled to
restitution in accordance with the regulations of each Member State.
Restitution is clearly recognized by the ECJ.74 The T.S., however, has
held that the annulment of floor clauses is not retroactive, so
restitution is not warranted.75 Yet, Article 1303 C.C.76 provides that the
nullity involves recovery of benefits and that it acts ex tunc. Besides this
rather unusual ruling－or “invention”－of non-retroactive annulment,
the T.S.’s holding in judgement 9 May, 2013 has no legal basis.77 The
T.S. judgement is presenting four arguments: First, the existence of
rules that do not involve retroactivity in case of annulment, but it is
clear that in the case of unfair terms, there is no reason to deviate from
the general system. Second, the lack of transparency does not entail
annulment because the clause could be lawful. However, the reasoning
for this argument is clearly circular because the term is either unfair for
lack of transparency as held by the T.S., or the term is unfair but does
not lack transparency, in which case the law permits annulment. Third,
judges may make a retroactive revision. However, this possibility was
removed by the amendment of Art. 83 TRLGDCU, which was
promulgated after the T.S. judgment.78
Finally, the only argument of any weight, although not a legal
argument, is the “risk of serious difficulties in the economic public

presented by more than fifty members of parliament from the Socialist Group,
against this precept. Also the judge in the Avilés court of first instance (nº 7) has
presented a claim of unconstitutionality.
74
Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v. Invitel Távközlési Zrt., supra
note 37; Case C-397/11, Joros v. Aegon, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2540 (July
18, 2013).
75
S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) (Spain).
76
C.C. art. 1303 (Spain).
77
For an impeccable analysis, see Alonso Perez, supra note 41, at 170.
78
TRLGDCU art. 83 (B.O.E. 2007, 287).
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order.”79 So, the T.S. permitted revision of the amount of the
execution, but did not allow recovery of the amounts unduly paid.
V. EXPLORING THE RESULTS OF UNFAIRNESS CRITERIA IN
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS
The most significant consequence of Aziz is the promulgation
of Act 1/2013 to reform mortgage foreclosure proceedings. Indeed,
besides the unfair nature of certain clauses, Aziz holds that the
mortgage foreclosure process, by not permitting the control of unfair
terms, is inconsistent with the principle of effectiveness in the UCT
Directive.80 Aziz also points out that the rules of Member States
contradict those of the Community if they do not provide for the
possibility of controlling unfair terms in foreclosure proceedings, or if
these proceedings cannot be suspended providing interim relief, if the
unfair nature of these terms is discussed in a declaratory judgment.81
Although the law regulates the effects of an unfair contract term in
these proceedings, the legislation on unfair terms remains the same:
the reforms have led to the redrafting of the Mortgage Act (Article
129) in those cases in which the foreclosure is made extrajudicially
before a notary. In these cases, the notary has control of the unfair
terms and has the authority to suspend the sale of the mortgaged
property if a claim on the UCT has been filed.82
For practical purposes, greater importance should be attached
to the amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, which are widely
used by lawyers to identify the effect of suspending foreclosure
proceedings, although the suspension only delays the loss of the
mortgagor’s house as he is unable to repay the loan.83 Two
amendments have been made to the Code of Civil Procedure. First,
the Code directly foresees an avenue for controlling the terms by the

S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013, ¶ 293) (Spain).
See Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013)
81
Id.
82
See Mortgage Act art. 129 (B.O.E. 1946, 58) (Spain).
83
Andres Dominguez Luelmo, La STJUE de 14 de Marzo De 2013:
Dificultades de Interpretación y aplicación por los Tribunales, 5 REVISTA CESCO DE
DERECHO DE CONSUMO 5 (2013).
79
80
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judge with a pre-hearing process,84 the need for which has been called
into question.85 The pre-hearing process is resolved via a judicial writ
in which the decision is made as to whether to proceed with the
foreclosure as presented given the absence of any unfair terms; or, if
unfair terms are thought to exist, foreclosure can be denied if the unfair
term is the basis for the foreclosure or to reach an agreement, but for
a smaller amount, if the term only affects the amount.86
Second, a procedural step was introduced to enable the debtor
to invoke the unfairness of a term, which is a direct consequence of
Aziz: the possibility of objecting to foreclosure because of the
existence of an unfair term in the loan agreement.87 These proceedings
(incidente de oposicion) only permit an allegation of the unfairness of a
term that either allows the proceedings to be stayed, or for the amount
due to be modified, while all other remedies must be sought in
declaratory proceedings.88 If the judge finds the clause to be fair, the
foreclosure proceedings continue; otherwise, the judge must either
dismiss the proceedings on grounds that the term forms the basis of
the foreclosure or continue the proceeding for a smaller amount of
money.89 The first draft of this incidente de oposición only allows the bank
to appeal against the writ, which is the subject of the recent judgment
of the ECJ of 17 July 2014.90 The response of the Spanish legislature,
in this case, has been nothing short of instantaneous: RD Law

L.E. Civ., art. 552.1, 681.1 (Spain).
Alberto Lafuente Torralba, El Control de las Cláusulas Abusivas en la
Ejecución Hipotecaria: Luces y Sombras de la Regulación Legal, in VIVIENDA Y CRISIS
ECONÓMICA 232 (Maria Teresa Alonso Perez ed., 2014).
86
L.E. Civ., supra note 42, art. 561.1.3, 695.3.
87
According to Carrasco Perera a coherent solution would be to allow
the judge to arbitrate and then to open contentious proceedings, but not to duplicate
the routes available for controlling unfairness. See ANGEL FRANCISCO CARRASCO
PERERA, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE CONSUMO, LA LEY 1/2013, DE 14 DE MAYO, DE
84
85

REFORMA HIPOTECARIA Y LA ARTICULACIÓN PROCESAL DEL CONTROL SOBRE
CLÁUSULAS ABUSIVAS EN LA EJECUCIÓN HIPOTECARIA (2013).

L.E. Civ. art. 557.1.7, 695.1.4 (Spain).
Id. at art. 695.3.
90
Case C-169/14, Juan Carlos Sánchez Morcillo and María del Carmen
Abril García v Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA (July 17, 2014), available at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?td=ALL&language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C169/14.
88
89
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11/2014, of 5 September, amending Art. 695 Code of Civil Procedure,
allows both parties the right of appeal.91
Thus, both in the judge’s assessment of unfairness and the
incidente de oposicion, the possibility of avoiding the foreclosure process
by analysing the unfairness of the contract terms so far is discrete.
Indeed, the appreciation of the early maturity clause is the basis of this
incidente de oposición, because if the clause is declared invalid, the debt is
not due and cannot be executed; however, this SCT can hardly be
regarded as unfair. The unfairness of a unilateral declaration of a debt
clause suspends foreclosure, because the debt would have no liquidity
and cannot be executed. Moreover, neither the unfairness of the
default interest clause nor the “floor clause” permits proceedings to be
suspended. The unfairness of such clauses only results in modifications
to the amount due, and in the latter case, involving only very small
amounts relative to the sum for which foreclosure is executed, as
occurred in Aziz.
Moreover, the criteria of unfairness provided by the ECJ can
be used to determine whether a clause is unfair in declaratory
proceedings. In addition, Aziz focused on the assumption that, after
initiating foreclosure proceedings–and without the legal means to
analyze the fairness–the debtor can initiate declaratory proceedings
concerning the existence of unfair terms that lack suspensory effect of
the foreclosure proceedings. The bottom line is that the judge in
declaratory proceedings could grant interim relief92 –the staying of
those enforcement proceedings and this possibility was explicitly
accepted by the ECJ93. However, the Spanish legislature has not
addressed this issue, so the possibility of a suspensory effect in the
foreclosure proceeding continues to be of uncertain application given
the rigidity of the precepts that govern the enforcement process. This
is unfortunate because declaratory proceedings are a better forum for
discussing the scope of an unfair term than foreclosure proceedings.

Urgent Insolvency Matters (B.O.E. 2014, 217) (Spain).
See Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013).
93
See id. at ¶ 77.
91
92
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CONCLUSION
The legal developments following Aziz on the control of
unfair SCTs have been somewhat limited. However, these
developments highlight the difference between European consumer
protection law and domestic procedural law with regard to
enforcement proceedings and have given grounds for challenging the
legal system and some lessons are to be learned:
First, in Aziz, a consumer-friendly interpretation has been
given to the UCT Directive which has led to the development of
substantive criteria for ascertaining unfairness in three SCT that almost
every housing mortgage loan has in Spain: the early maturity of the
loan, the unilateral declaration of the debt and the default interest rate.
Second, coming from Aziz, various points at which the
Spanish transposition of the UCT Directive needs to be revised have
been identified: On the one hand, the non-revision of the unfair clause
by the judge has been finally stayed by an amending of art. 83
TRLGDCU, but it still remains in the foreclosure proceedings by the
means of DT 2 Act 1/2013. That shows how the Spanish legislature
has not understood the Aziz doctrine. On the other hand, the ECJ opts
for a full restitution when a clause is deemed unfair, nevertheless that
has not been the case in the two Spanish T.S. judgements referring to
a floor clause considered unfair by lack of transparency.
Third, the possibility of controlling UCTs in mortgage
foreclosure proceedings has not become a reality. Even if Aziz states
that a way of controlling fairness should be granted in the foreclosure
proceedings, it is true that the clauses abovementioned have no deep
impact on the possibility of staying the foreclosure, and in some cases
–disproportioned default rate- are only able to low the amount of the
debt.
In short, the problem of defaulting on mortgage loan
repayments is not strictly an issue of controlling UCTs, and consumer
protection provides no more than indirect tools to stay the mortgage
foreclosure. Given that many mortgagors find themselves unable to
make their loan payments—and thus at risk of losing their homes—
shifting attention to UCT legislation has been helpful in seeking a stay
94
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on foreclosure proceedings and the ECJ judgements have questioned
the Spanish procedural law in mortgage foreclosures. Yet, problems
still exist in areas such as the over-indebtedness of consumers (a
question that the Spanish legislator has largely ignored); weak Spanish
legislation protecting consumer rights with regard to financial products
and the role of the Bank of Spain as regulator of the sector; and
mortgage foreclosure regulations that provide the banks with many
facilities of recovery while lenders may fail to clear their debt if the
value of their home does not cover the total amount owed. Deeper
research in these three mentioned areas is needed to find a legal
solution to unpaid housing mortgages as a whole.
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FROM PAPER TO ELECTRONIC ORDER:
THE DIGITALIZATION OF THE CHECK
IN THE USA*
Benjamin Geva**
INTRODUCTION
A check is a paper instrument embodying an unconditional
order in writing. It is signed by a drawer and addressed to a drawee
bank with which the drawer typically maintains an account. The check
instructs the bank1 to make payment on demand to, or to the order of,
a designated payee, or to the bearer.2 The person to whom a check is
payable and who is in the possession of the check is its holder.3 A check
is issued when the drawer delivers it to the first holder,4 who is either
the payee of a check payable to order or the first bearer of a check
* Reprinted with editorial changes from the Law of Electronic Funds
Transfers with permission. Copyright 2014 LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
** Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall York University, and Counsel, Torys
LLP, Toronto, Canada. The article substantially updates and expands on Benjamin
Geva, Recent International Developments in the Law of Negotiable Instruments and Payment and
Settlement Systems, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 685, 687-99 (2007) and is a sequel to B. Geva, Is
Death of the Paper Cheque upon Us? The Electronic Presentment and Deposit of Cheques in
Canada, 30 B.F.L.R. 113 (2014). I am grateful to Joe Wahba of the 2016 graduating
class of Osgoode Hall Law School for his research assistance. All errors are mine.
1
“Bank” is broadly defined to include any person “engaged in the
business of banking.” See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(4) (2014). Undoubtedly, any institution
that either takes deposit and/or offers account services falls into this definition.
Technically, however, the account relationship requirement is not spelled out by
statute.
2
U.C.C. §§ 3-104(f), 3-103(a)(8) (2014).
3
U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(21)(B) (2014).
4 See U.C.C. § 3-105(a) (2014) (defining “issue” as “the first delivery of an
instrument by the maker or drawer, whether to a holder or nonholder, for the
purpose of giving rights on the instrument to any person.”). Issue to a non-holder is
less common and is outside the scope of the present discussion.
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payable to bearer. Once issued, a check may circulate from hand to
hand by negotiation, namely by its delivery from one holder to another.
In the case of a check payable to order, negotiation consists of delivery
accompanied by the signature of the holder, called “indorsement.”5 To
obtain payment, the last holder is to have the check physically
presented to the drawee bank.6
Nowadays, there is very little circulation of checks, so
presentment is usually made by or on behalf of the first holder.
Regardless, a holder typically will not present the check to the drawee
bank in person. Rather, the holder is likely to have the check deposited
with and collected by a depositary bank with which the holder
maintains an account. The depositary bank will then either present the
check directly to the drawee bank, or will negotiate it to an intermediary
bank. There may be one or more negotiations with one or more
intermediary banks. The last intermediary bank will present the check
for payment to the drawee. In that process, all banks other than the
drawee, namely the depositary bank and each intermediary bank, are
collecting banks, the drawee bank is the payor bank, and the collecting
bank that presents the check for payment to the drawee bank is the
presenting bank.7
The normal life cycle of a check thus entails a series of physical
deliveries of the piece of paper embodying it. First, the check is
physically issued by the drawer to the first holder. Second, there may
be one or more physical negotiations outside the banking system.
Third, there is the physical delivery of the check by the holder to the
depositary bank. Fourth, there may be one or more deliveries of the
check to intermediary bank(s). Fifth, the process concludes with a
physical presentment of the check to the drawee. Following payment,
there is possibly a sixth and post-concluding stage in which the
cancelled check is delivered by the payor bank to the drawer, together
with the periodic statement containing it. Alternatively, where the

U.C.C. §§ 3-201(a), 3-201(b), 3-204 (2014).
This point is implied, though not specifically provided for, in U.C.C.
§ 3-501(b)(2) (2014), which addresses the exhibition of the check to, and its handling
by, the drawee.
7
For applicable definitions, see U.C.C. §§ 4-104, 4-105 (2014).
5
6
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drawee dishonors the check, the check is returned in a reversed
itinerary.
Modern law facilitates variations by agreement. On occasion,
it may further provide for the impact of such variations on third parties
not privy to agreed variations. First, a check may be given as a source
of
information
to
be
used
to initiate a one-time electronic fund transfer, often described as an
“electronic check.” Second, a check may be remotely created. Third, a
check may be presented for payment electronically. Fourth, a check
may be negotiated to a collecting bank, whether by its customer the
holder or another collecting bank, by means of electronic transmission.
At the same time, a practice of electronic negotiation other than to
banks has not developed so that no provision for such electronic
transmission has been made. Finally, there is the possibility that a
payment order will be issued electronically and will not be embodied
in a piece of paper at its inception.
As a source of information, a check may be given to the payee
with the authority to convert it to an electronic image. A remotely
created check is drawn by the payee, as an agent of the drawer, on the
basis of information provided by the drawer to the payee, typically over
the telephone. This practice is more concerned with the remote
creation of a paper check rather than with its dispensation and thus is
not addressed in this article. Both electronic negotiation and
presentment involve check truncation, namely a procedure in which
the physical movement of checks is curtailed or eliminated, being
replaced, in whole or in part, by electronic transmission of
information.8 Issued and processed electronically, and thus not being
“written,” an electronic payment order is not an “order” under U.C.C.
Section 3-103(a)(8). As such it is not a “draft” under Section 3-104(e)
and thus not a “check” under Section 3-104(f). However, an electronic
payment is a functional equivalent for a check. Being the logical

See, e.g., the definitions listed in COMMITTEE ON PAYMENT AND
SETTLEMENTS, A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN PAYMENTS AND SETTLMENT
SYSTEMS (2003). For similar definitions focusing on the conversion of data on a
paper to an electronic image, see Wells Fargo Bank v. Burrier (In re Burrier), 399 B.R.
258, 264 (Bankr. D. Co. 2008).
8
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conclusion of the check electronification process, this method of
payment is addressed in this article.
This article explores the various stages in the check payment in
which electronic transmission has replaced physical delivery. Part I
discusses converting the check into an electronic entry at a point of
sale of goods and services. Part II addresses the electronic presentment
of a check. Part III deals with the possible conversion of the check
from paper to electronic, and vice versa, within the interbank check
collection system. Interbank exchange of check images is the subject
of Part IV. Part V addresses the electronic order that operates like a
check but that has never been in a paper format. This article examines
the applicable provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, U.S.
federal regulations and legislation, and proposals for reform, as well as
private-sector norms. Having explored existing norms and proposals,
the article concludes with a plea for advancing the process of the
complete electronification of the check and its collection process as
well as for the establishment of a comprehensive legal scheme to
govern such matters
I. THE SO-CALLED “ELECTRONIC CHECK”
On occasion, a check may not be “issued” with the view of
giving the payee the rights to enforce payment on it in discharge of the
underlying obligation.9 Rather, contrary to the usual presumption of
conditional payment by check,10 a check may be given to the payee
merely as a source of information to be used to initiate a one-time
electronic fund transfer from the drawer’s account in payment of the
obligation. The check is then used as a source document for the
drawer’s routing number and account number, as well as the check’s
serial number, and the sum payable. In effect, the check is thus
converted to a single debit entry, which is then input into the
Automated Clearing House (ACH) Network. This arrangement is
9
“Issue” is defined as “the first delivery of an instrument by the maker
or drawer, whether to a holder or nonholder, for the purpose of giving rights on the
instrument to any person.” U.C.C. Section 3-105(a) (2015).
10
For an explanation of this presumption, see U.C.C. Section 3-310(b)
(2015) (“[u]nless otherwise agreed . . . if . . . an uncertified check is taken for an
obligation, the obligation is suspended . . . until dishonor of the check or until [the
check] is paid or certified”).
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particularly common in consumer transactions. Thus, where the check
is mailed to the payee-merchant, the check is converted to an ARC—
Accounts Receivables Entry. Similarly, where the check is given to the
payee-merchant in a face-to-face transaction, the check is converted to
a Point-of-Purchase (POP) Entry.11 Once converted, the check itself is
voided; practically speaking in a face-to-face transaction the voided
check is typically returned to the consumer-drawer.12
The electronic image created by the merchant, usually at the
point-of-sale, is often colloquially referred to as an “electronic check.”
However, as will be further discussed below, the term may have been
“hijacked” by the Federal Reserve Board to denote the digital image of
a check. In any event, in the present context, “electronic check” is a
misnomer; rather, what is generated, is an ACH debit entry. Payment
is thus not governed by U.C.C. Articles three and four, but instead is
covered by Regulation E, issued by the Federal Reserve Board, which
governs consumer electronic fund transfers.13 Regulation E requires
the merchant to “provide a notice that the transaction will or may be
processed as an EFT14 and obtain a consumer’s authorization for each
transfer.”15

Related entries are TEL and WEB, respectively, ACH entries made on
the basis of payment instructions made by phone-calls and over the Internet rather
than at a physical point of sale as the POP entry.
12
See, e.g., NACHA OPERATING RULES AND GUIDELINES AND ACH
OPERATING RULES, A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE RULES GOVERNING THE ACH
NETWORK, Sections 3.7 and 3.8 (2014) (providing a brief explanation of the “ACH
Primer” preceding National Automated Clearing House Association (NACHA)
Operating Rules) [hereinafter NACHA OPERATING GUIDELINES].
13
Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. § 205(c) (2015)
(Regulation E does not cover “[a]ny transfer of funds originated by check.”). The
theory of the check conversion is, however, that the transfer is initiated by the
converted debit entry, rather than the check that has been used as a mere source of
information.
14
EFT stands for Electronic Fund Transfer.
15
12 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(2). See also generally 12 C.F.R. § 205 (Briefly stated,
the underlying theory of the requirement is that conversion may change the
consumer’s position, e.g., insofar as payment is likely to be speedier and the cancelled
check will not prove payment.).
11
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II. ELECTRONIC CHECK PRESENTMENT
Electronic presentment is provided for by U.C.C. Section 4110. Thereunder, the presentment of a check may be made pursuant
to an interbank agreement for presentment. An “agreement for
electronic presentment” can be in the form of an agreement, clearinghouse rule, or Federal Reserve regulation or operating circular.16 The
agreement is to provide “that presentment . . . may be made by the
transmission of an image of [a check] or information describing [it] . . .
rather than delivery of the [check] itself.” The transmission of the
image or information constitutes a “presentment notice”; its receipt is
the actual presentment. Other elements that may be covered by the
agreement for electronic presentment are “procedures governing
retention . . . payment, dishonor and other matters.” Arguably, return
procedures fall within the scope of the agreement.
An interbank voluntary agreement may be either bilateral or
multilateral.17 In any event, per the language quoted above, an
“agreement for electronic presentment” under U.C.C. Section 4-110
may not be entirely consensual. This is, however, consistent with the
general principle under which “Federal Reserve regulations and
operating circulars, clearing-house rules, and the like have the effect of

See, e.g., Collection of Checks and Other Items by Federal Reserve
Banks and Funds Transfers Through Fedwire (Regulation J), 12 C.F.R. § 210 (2015)
(defining “item” in Section 210.2(i) to include “electronic item,” such as an electronic
image of a check or any other paper item). See also FEDERAL RESERVE FINANCIAL
SERVICES FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS, OPERATING CIRCULAR NO. 3: COLLECTION
OF CASH ITEMS AND RETURNED CHECKS (2012) (electronic access to Reserve Bank’s
Services is governed by Section 5 and Appendices E (MICR presentment services),
E1 (truncation service), E2 (MICR presentment plus service), and E3 basic (MICR
presentment service)).
17
One such multilateral agreement is under the rules of the check
truncation program of NACHA for electronic images of truncated checks input to
the ACH Network. See NACHA OPERATING GUIDELINES, supra note 12, at § 1(2)(c)
(check truncated items input to the ACH Network are TRC/TRX entries referred to
as a category of Payment Applications which are governed by Art. 10 of the NACHA
Operating Rules). See also NACHA OPERATING GUIDELINES, supra note 12, at ACH
Primer § C(3). For bulk electronic payments processed through the ACH Network
and for NACHA, as well as for NACHA Operating Rules and Guidelines, see Section
5 infra.
16
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agreements . . . whether or not specifically assented to by all parties
interested in items handled.”18
III. THE “SUBSTITUTE CHECK”
Electronic negotiation to a collecting bank is the most
elaborate statutory and regulatory scheme. The scheme is governed by
the Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (“Check 21 Act”)19 and
implemented by Regulation CC subpart D.20 In essence, the Check 21
Act authorizes a collecting bank to create a substitute paper check21 for
further negotiation or presentment. Having agreed to receive a check
in an electronic form, a collecting bank that receives the electronic
check image or information is authorized under the Check 21 Act to
create a substitute check. Upon compliance with specified
requirements, the substitute check becomes “the legal equivalent of the
original check for all purposes.”22 The Check 21 Act further includes
warranty and indemnity provisions, as well as expedited re-credit
procedures, designed to protect substitute check recipients.23
In practice, the creation of a substitute check by a collecting
bank is predicated upon the existence of two preconditions. First, the
creating bank must receive a transmission of an image of the original
check, instead of the check itself. The sender of that transmission
could be a customer, the holder of the check, in which case the creating
bank is the depositary bank. Alternatively, the sender of that
transmission could be a collecting bank, in which case the creating
bank is an intermediary bank. Second, the bank to receive the
U.C.C. § 4-103(b) (2015).
12 U.S.C. §§ 5001 et seq. (2003).
20
Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks (Regulation CC), 12
C.F.R. § 229 (2015).
21
See 12 U.S.C. § 5001(b)(1) (where an explicit purpose of the Check 21
Act was “[t]o facilitate check truncation by authorizing substitute checks.”)
22
12 C.F.R. § 229.51(a).
23
For a comprehensive overview, though written prior to the
promulgation of the final text of 12 C.F.R. § 229.51, see PAUL S. TURNER, ANALYSIS
OF THE CHECK CLEARING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY ACT (“CHECK 21”) (2004). For
more on the background of the Check 21 Act, see Availability of Funds and
Collection of Checks, 12 C.F.R. § 229, 69 Fed. Reg. 1470 (July 26, 2004) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 229), and Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks, 69
Fed. Reg. 47290 (Oct. 22, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 229).
18
19
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substitute check, being either an intermediary bank or the drawee bank,
has not agreed to accept electronic transmission of an image, which
would be the case for a small bank that does not have the required
processing equipment.
Stated otherwise, the Check 21 Act does not require banks to
accept electronic transmissions of check information or check images.
Rather, it authorizes a collecting bank that agrees to accept the
electronic transmission, whether from its customer or a prior collecting
bank, to issue a substitute check to be processed onward as if it were
the original check. A bank, either a subsequent collecting/intermediary
bank or the drawee bank, must accept the substitute check as the
equivalent of the original check. By the same token, a customer who
has received original checks with the periodic statement showing
account activity cannot object to receiving the substitute check in lieu
of original checks that have been so truncated in the collection
process.24
By truncating the paper check, the Check 21 Act eliminates
long-distance transport of the physical checks, though the act does not
eliminate or bypass intra-city or local check transportation. For
example, suppose Drawer has a bank account with Drawee/Payor
Bank in New York. Drawer sends a check drawn on that account to
Payee in California who in turn deposits the check in their account
with a California Depositary Bank (Depository Bank). Assume the
Depositary Bank is a large institution that has equipment necessary for
the transmission of the check’s image. At the same time, the Payor
Bank is a small institution that lacks the processing equipment capable
of receiving the electronic transmission of a check. There is nothing
within the U.C.C, the Check 21 Act, or anywhere else, to force Payor
Bank to accept electronic transmission; hence, electronic presentment
is precluded for this transaction. Rather, Depositary Bank may transmit
the image of the check to an Intermediary Bank in New York, which
is capable of accepting such transmissions.25 In effect, this is an
24
See 12 U.S.C. § 5003(a) (an agreement of the recipient is dispensed with
for a substitute check deposited, presented, sent for collection, or returned, “so long
as a bank has made the warranties in section 5 with respect to such substitute check.”)
25
Interbank settlement between California Depositary Bank and New
York Intermediary Bank may take various forms. For example, it may be either
bilateral (on a correspondent account one bank has with the other), or part of
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electronic negotiation of the check. Having agreed to accept the
electronic transmission, the New York Intermediary Bank is now
required under the Check 21 Act to create a paper substitute check.
The Act further requires Payor Bank to accept the presentment of the
substitute check as if it were the original check. Finally, any
requirement, either by statute or agreement, to provide the canceled
check, as under the contract between Drawer and Payor Bank, is to be
satisfied under the Check 21 Act by providing the substitute check. In
this hypothetical example, coast-to-coast physical transportation was
eliminated; only local delivery of the substitute check could not be
avoided.
A substitute check is a paper production of the original check
that contains the image of the front and back of the original check. It
bears a MICR26 line containing the same information whichs appears
on the MICR line of the original check, and conforms, particularly in
paper stock and dimension, to generally applicable standards for
substitute checks. As a result, the check is suitable for automated
processing in the same manner as the original check.27 Moreover, a
substitute check, to be the legal equivalent of the original, must
“accurately represent . . . all of the information on the front and back
of the original check as of the time the original check was truncated”
and bear the legend “This is a legal copy of your check. You can use it
the same way you would use the original check.”28
As in the hypothetical above, a substitute check is typically
created by a collecting intermediary bank. A substitute check, however,
can also be created by the depositary bank when it agrees to receive
the deposit of the check from the payee/holder by means of electronic
multilateral clearing house settlement. If the check is collected through the Reserve
Banks, settlement will take place on the books of the Reserve Banks. The Check 21
Act does not deal with interbank settlement arrangements. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 50015018.
26
MICR stands for Magnetic Ink Character Recognition Code (MICR
Code), which is a character-recognition technology facilitating the automated
processing of checks. The code typically includes the document-type indicator, bank
code, bank account number, cheque number, cheque amount, and a control
indicator. The technology allows MICR readers to scan and read the information
directly into a data-collection device.
27
12 U.S.C. § 500(16); 12 C.F.R. § 229.2.
28
12 U.S.C. § 5003(b)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 229.51(a).
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transmission. Furthermore, a substitute check may be created even by
the payee/holder. For example, substitute check creation may be
desirable for a large organization that receives checks in various
locations, but would rather deposit them in one place. The
organization may then arrange for the electronic transmission of check
images to one place where substitute checks will be created.
Alternatively, even an individual may transmit a check image to a
depositary bank using a mobile device. In general, a check may be
transformed from electronic form to substitute checks form several
times in the course of the collection and return process.
In connection with a substitute check, the Check 21 Act
provides for warranties and an indemnity. The warranties ensure the
substitute check meets the requirements for legal equivalence and also
protects against double payment on the original check, or any other
representation of the check.29 The indemnity is “to the extent of any
loss incurred . . . due to the receipt of a substitute check instead of the
original check.”30 Other than for costs, expenses, and reasonable
attorney’s fees, amount to be indemnified is the extent of loss
proximately caused by the breach of warranty.31 In the absence of a
breach of a warranty, amount of indemnity is limited to the amount of
the substitute check.32 Either way, amount of loss to be indemnified is
reduced by amount representing loss resulting “from the negligence or
failure to act in good faith on the part of an indemnified party.”33 An
example of loss incurred notwithstanding the lack of any breach of
warranty occurs where forgery, proof of which would have allowed a
purported drawer to avoid liability, cannot be proved on the substitute
check, but allegedly could have been proved on the original. Thus, on
occasion, an effective method to determine the authenticity of a
manual signature could be by measuring the pen pressure input by the
signer.34 This feature does not carry over to the copy of the check and
certainly not to a substitute check created from the image of the check.

29
30
31
32
33
34

12 U.S.C. § 5004 (2003); 12 C.F.R. § 229.52(a).
12 U.S.C. § 5005(a).
12 U.S.C. § 5005(b)(1).
12 U.S.C. § 5005(b)(2).
12 U.S.C. § 5005(c) (2003); see also 12 C.F.R. § 229.53 (2015).
See e.g., PAUL S. TURNER, supra note 23, at 26.
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Substitute check warranties are given by each bank “that
transfers, presents, or returns a substitute check and receives
consideration for the check.”35 A “reconverting bank” is not listed.
Being the bank that creates the substitute check or, where the
substitute check is created by the depositor, the first bank that transfers
or presents the substitute check, this bank can hardly be described as
a bank that transfers a substitute check, unless “transfer” is to include
the first delivery or issue. This indeed appears to be the view of the
Federal Reserve.
In turn, indemnity liability is incurred by “[a] reconverting bank
and each bank that subsequently transfers, presents, or returns a
substitute check in any electronic or paper form, and receives
consideration for such transfer, presentment, or return.”36
Accordingly, the reconverting bank is listed as one to become liable to
indemnify for loss caused by the breach of warranty.
As indicated, a substitute check need not necessarily be created
by a bank; rather it may be created by a person other than a bank,
typically a large organization-payee. In such a cases, under the Check
21 Act, warranties and indemnity liability originate from not from
either payee or the creator of the substitute check, but rather from the
first bank that transfers or presents such substitute check; such a bank,
being the depositary bank, is then considered to be the “reconverting
bank” in the collection process.
Both substitute check warranties and the indemnity are stated
to run to the benefit of the transferee, any subsequent collecting or
returning bank, the depositary bank, the drawee, the drawer, the payee,
the depositor, and any endorser.37 Since a check can be transformed
from electronic form to substitute check form several times in the
course of the collection and return process, it is possible that there
could be multiple substitute checks, and thus multiple reconverting
banks, with respect to the same payment transaction. A subsequent
participant may thus benefit from warranties and indemnity of more
than one reconverting bank. As well, a collecting bank receiving an
electronic representation of a substitute (rather than original) check
35
36
37

12 U.S.C. § 5004.
12 U.S.C. § 5004-5005; see also 12 C.F.R. §§ 229.52, 229.53.
12 U.S.C. §§ 5004-5005.
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will both receive and pass on the reconverting bank’s Check 21 Act
warranty and indemnity protections.
The Check 21 Act further contains provisions covering
expedited re-credit for consumers and banks. First, Section seven
permits a consumer to challenge a debit for a substitute check either
where the check was not properly charged to the consumer’s account
or where the consumer has a warranty claim.38 In each case, the
consumer must have suffered a resulting loss, and the production of
the original check or a better copy of it is necessary to determine the
validity of the challenge or claim. Second, Section eight governs a claim
by a bank that is obligated to provide an expedited re-credit to the
consumer or that has otherwise suffered loss in circumstances where
“production of the original check . . . or a better copy of [it] is
necessary to determine the validity of the charge to the customer
account or any warranty claim connected with such substitute check.”39
The claim is a claim for indemnity from another bank that incurred the
indemnity liability to the claimant bank under Section eight.40
The Check 21 Act allocates losses only among banks that
handle a substitute check. However, it is possible that the problem
giving rise to liability under the Check 21 Act was created prior to the
creation of a substitute check. For example, electronic information
derived from the check may have consisted of a poor image of the
original check. This would preclude the reconverting bank from
creating a legally equivalent check and thus cause it to be in breach of
a substitute check warranty. Otherwise, a substitute check created by
the payee and deposited at the depositary bank may have been deficient
in one way or another. At the same time, neither warranties nor
indemnity liabilities are provided in the Check 21 Act in connection
with the electronic transmission of check image or information.
Similarly, no warranties or indemnity liability are fastened on a payee
who creates a substitute check. Responsibilities of transmitters of
electronic information and depositors of substitute checks are thus to
be provided by their respective contracts with the immediate recipients
of electronic information and substitute checks. This is consistent with
12 U.S.C. § 5006.
12 U.S.C. § 5007(a)(1)(D).
40
See 12 C.F.R. §§ 229.54-.55 (corresponding to and implementing 12
U.S.C. §§ 5006-5007).
38
39
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the overall position under the Check 21 Act, under which no bank is
required to receive electronic transmission of check data and no
depositary bank is required to accept the deposit of substitute checks.
Having nevertheless agreed to accept such information or substitute
checks, it is up to the collecting banks to execute their contractual
obligations.
Contract, however, is not the exclusive source of regulating
responsibilities outside the Check 21 Act. Under Regulation J, a sender
of an electronic item derived directly from the original check makes
two sets of warranties for the electronic item. First, the sender makes
transfer warranties as if the item was a paper check governed by the
U.C.C. Second, the sender makes warranties as if the item were a
substitute check governed by the Check 21 Act.41 For checks handled
by Reserve Banks governed by Regulation J, an end-to-end combined
U.C.C and Check 21 liability structure is thus provided.42
IV. INTERBANK EXCHANGE OF CHECK IMAGES
The Check 21 Act43 does not provide rules to govern image
exchange, inter-bank electronic negotiation, or electronic presentment
or return. Rather, the Check 21 Act requires a collecting bank that
agrees to accept the electronic transmission, whether from its customer
or a prior collecting bank, to issue a substitute check to be processed
onward as if it were the original check.
A bank’s authority to accept an electronic check transaction
derives from the U.C.C. As indicated, under U.C.C Section 4-110 (b),
“[p]resentment of an item pursuant to an agreement for presentment
is made when the presentment notice is received.” Under U.C.C
Section 4-110(a), “Agreement for electronic presentment” is defined
to mean “an agreement, clearing-house rule, or Federal Reserve
regulation or operating circular, providing that presentment of an item
may be made by transmission of an image of an item or information
describing the item (“presentment notice”).” While this is limited to
See Collection of Checks and Other Items by Federal Reserve Banks
and Fund Transfers Through Fedwire, 12 C.F.R. §§ 210.2, 210.6, 210.12 (2015).
42
For background see 12 C.F.R. 210 (2015).
43
12 U.S.C. § 5001 et seq.
41
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the electronic presentment of checks, U.C.C Section 4-103(a) is
broader. Thereunder, in general and subject to limitations relating to
disclaimer clauses, “[t]he effect of the provisions of . . . Article [4] may
be varied by agreement.” While such agreements bind only those who
are parties to them, under U.C.C. Section 4-103(b), “Federal Reserve
regulations and operating circulars, clearing-house rules, and the like
have the effect of agreements under subsection (a), whether or not
specifically assented to by all parties interested in items handled.”
“Clearing house” is defined in Section 4-104(a)(4) as “an association
of banks or other payors regularly clearing items.” Accordingly,
bilateral and multilateral agreements, clearing house rules, and Federal
Reserve regulations and operating circulars may govern the exchange,
namely the interbank negotiation presentment and return of check
images or information relating to them, as substitutes to physical
delivery.
In practice, there are two principal sets of image exchange
rules. Essentially, both endeavor to equate the position of check
images to that of the checks themselves under existing legislation and
other sources of law. In fact, they extend the legal framework of the
Check 21 Act44 to cover image exchanges. The first set of image
exchange rules is Subpart A of Regulation J governing interbank
exchange through Federal Reserve Banks.45 Further implemented by
Operating Circular No. 3, it specifically deals with the collection of
checks and other items by Federal Reserve Banks. Thereunder, an
“item” is broadly defined to cover an electronic image of a paper
check.46 The second is Electronic Check Clearinghouse Organization
(ECCHO) Operating Rules.
ECCHO47 is “a national not-for-profit ‘rule-making
organization’ owned entirely by its member banks.”48 As “an
12 U.S.C. §§ 5001 et seq. (2003).
12 C.F.R. § 210.
46
12 C.F.R. § 210.2(i)(1)(ii).
47
See ELECTRONIC CHECK CLEARING HOUSE ORGANIZATION, RULES
SUMMARY
(2012);
see
also
Membership
Overview,
ECCHO,
http://www.eccho.org/membership (last visited Oct. 18, 2015); see also VIVECA Y.
WARE, CHECK IMAGE EXCHANGE: COVERING LEGAL BASES (2008).
48
Alvin C. Harrell, Electronic Checks, 55 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 283
(2001).
44
45
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association of banks or other payors regularly clearing items,” ECCHO
is a clearing house under U.C.C Section 4-104(a)(4). This is so even
though ECCHO does not process payments. Rather, ECCHO
develops rules governing electronic exchanges of check images. Such
rules qualify as “clearing-house rules” under U.C.C Section 4-103(b),
which govern bilateral and multilateral exchanges of member banks
that choose to adhere to them. Per that provision, “all parties
interested in [the checks]” are bound by such rules governing their
exchange.49
ECCHO was established in 1990. It is common knowledge
that the primary drive behind its establishment was to address the
increased risk resulting from the introduction of tight funds availability
schedules for checks under Regulation CC.50 The use of electronics
expedited both the forward presentment and return processes so as to
allow banks to meet the statutory tight schedules.
ECCHO has four membership classes: Full Members, Affiliate
Members, Participating Members, and Sponsored Members. The
different classes reflect variations in Members’ roles in the corporate
governance of the organization. A Member must establish the
technological and communication methods for exchanging electronic
check transactions with another Member.
ECCHO Rules apply to the interbank exchange, by negotiation
or presentment, of check images. ECCHO Rules do not, however,
apply to the substitute checks that reproduce check images. Substitute
checks, and to some extent, images of substitute checks, are governed
by Check 21 Act51 and provisions of Regulation CC52 implementing it.
ECCHO Rules govern only electronic check transactions between two
Members. A Member is not required, by virtue of its membership, to
send and receive electronic check transactions with another Member.
Member agreements may designate a particular electronic
communication switch or a check image archive to exchange electronic
check images and are outside the ECCHO framework. While
U.C.C. § 4-103(b) (2015).
Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks (Regulation CC), 12
C.F.R. § 229 (2015).
51
12 U.S.C. §§ 5001 et seq. (2003).
52
12 C.F.R. § 229.
49
50
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supporting a number of processes for check image exchange, ECCHO
Rules do not establish the rules for accessing or using private
networks/archives. Members may thus exchange electronic check
transactions in whatever way they choose. On occasion, two networks
may agree to establish a “bridge” or link to facilitate an exchange
between sending and receiving Members each using a separate
network.
A Member which agreed with another Member to exchange
electronic check transactions under ECCHO Rules is bound to comply
with ECCHO Rules. These Rules do not constitute customer
agreements, but they bind customers by virtue of U.C.C Section 4103(b).
ECCHO Rules provide for the legal framework for both
forward check image presentment and return of a check image. In a
forward check image presentment, both the Electronic Image and the
related MICR line information are sent53 or made available to the
receiving Member by an applicable deadline. The check itself is not
sent to the receiving Member. Under ECCHO Rules,
the Electronic Image is an “item” as well as “check” under the U.C.C
and Regulation CC.54 ECCHO Rules also provide for the time
presentment is actually made and further address diverse matters such
as indorsements and storage and retrieval of the original check.55 To
protect the receiving Member in each electronic check transaction,
ECCHO Rules provide for indemnifications and warranties, some of
which are in addition to those provided under the U.C.C and
Regulation CC.56 Particularly, these warranties relate to the compliance
with ECCHO Rules as well as the accuracy and quality of the
Electronic Image.
An important warranty given by a sending bank is a warranty
against double payment. This warranty is originated by the first bank
53
For transmission of an electronic image of a check via wire
communication, albeit to a Federal Reserve Bank, see, e.g., United States v. Jinian, 712
F.3d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir. 2013).
54
12 C.F.R. § 229.
55
ELECTRONIC CHECK CLEARING HOUSE ORGANIZATION,
OPERATING RULES AND COMMENTARY (2014).
56
Id.
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that transferred an image. A bank may mistakenly send the same image
more than once. Where the first image is created by the depositor, a
few alternative scenarios may develop as the result of either error or
fraud. The holder may send an image of the check for deposit more
than once, and may not send it to the same bank. Alternatively the
holder may send the image of the check for deposit to a bank and then
negotiate the paper check to a subsequent holder. Practically, the latter
may be a check cashing service, or even another depositary bank. The
chance is that any subsequent holder, including a depositary bank
which took either the paper check or an electronic image of it, will be
a holder in due course.57
The warranty given by the bank that originated the image is
designed to protect the payor bank in all such scenarios. Thus, a payor
bank that paid twice may not be able to debit the drawer-customer’s
account more than once and will recover on the aforesaid warranty.
The Paying Bank is only required to establish the existence of a double
payment for the same item and that the Paying Bank incurred a loss as
a result. ECCHO Rules do not provide for a warranty or any other
responsibility on a depositor who remotely deposited the check by
capturing its image and sending it to the depositary bank. It is up to
the latter to provide for a recourse against the capturing depositor in
its customer agreement.
The application of the warranty against double payment in the
context of a holder in due course is consistent with and furthers the
general underlying policy as expressed in the warranty provisions of
the Check 21 Act,58 Regulation CC59 provisions applicable to substitute
checks, and the ECCHO Rules. This policy aims at protecting the
payor bank and drawer customer from losses associated with double
payment of a check image or substitute check. Moreover, where the
first image was created by the depositor, it is appropriate for the
depositary bank to bear risk of loss from any resulting double payment.
This is so because the bank that transferred the first check image
introduced the risk of double payment into the system by allowing its
customer to engage in remote deposit capture.

57
58
59

U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 4-211.
12 U.S.C. §§ 5001 et seq. (2003).
12 C.F.R. § 229.
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Under a proposal of the Board from 2013,60 and unless
otherwise agreed by the sending and receiving banks,61 electronic
images of checks and electronic information related to checks that
banks send and receive by agreement would be subject to Subpart C
of Regulation CC as if they were paper checks. Under the earlier
version of the Proposal from 2011, the object of each such electronic
transmission was called “electronic collection item” or, in the case of
returning it dishonored, “electronic return.” The 2013 Proposal
preferred to rename them “electronic check” and “electronic return
check,” respectively. 62 In departure from the 2011 version, under the
2013 Proposal, electronic checks and electronic returned checks could
consist of either check electronic image or check electronic
information, and not necessarily both.63
Since under proposed Section 229.30(a)64 electronic checks
and electronic returned checks are subject to the provisions of subpart
C as if they are checks, a bank that handles them gives all checks
warranties and indemnities.65 Proposed §229.34(a) will provide for
additional “Check-21-like warranties”66 specifically given with respect
to electronic checks and electronic returns. Under proposed
§229.34(a)(1), each bank that transfers or presents an electronic check

Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks, 79 Fed. Reg. 66736737 (Feb. 4, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 229) [hereinafter FRS Availability
Proposal].
61
In 12 C.F.R. § 229.37(a), the FRS Availability Proposal would permit a
sending and receiving bank by agreement to vary the warranties the sending bank
makes to the receiving bank for electronic checks and electronic returned checks.
Such an agreement could provide, for example, that the bank transferring the
electronic check does not warrant that the electronic image or information are
sufficient to create a substitute check. The agreement would not, however, vary the
effect of the warranties with respect to banks and persons not bound by the
agreement. Id. at 6684.
62
Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks, 76 Fed. Reg. 16862
(Mar. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 279).
63
See FRS Availability Proposal, supra note 60.
64
Id.
65 See Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks (Regulation CC), 12
C.F.R. §229.34(d)-(f) (2015) (warranties relating to (i) settlement amount, encoding,
and offset; (ii) returned checks; and (iii) notice of nonpayment).
66
See FRS Availability Proposal, supra note 60 at 6683.
60
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or electronic returned check and receives a settlement or other
consideration for it warrants that:
(i)

The electronic image accurately represents all
of the information on the front and back of the
original check as of the time that the original
check was truncated and the electronic
information contains an accurate record of all
MICR line information required for a
substitute check . . . and the amount of the
check, and

(ii)

No person will receive a transfer, presentment,
or return of, or otherwise be charged for an
electronic check or electronic returned check,
the original check, a substitute check, or a
paper or electronic representation of a
substitute check such that the person will be
asked to make payment based on a check it has
already paid.67

This is a double warranty for (i) the accuracy and completeness
of the electronic record, and (ii) double payment of the check. Under
paragraph 2, the beneficiary of the double warranty, is:
(i)

In the case of transfers for collection or
presentment, the transferee bank, any
collecting bank, the paying bank, and the
drawer; and

(ii)

In the case of transfers for return, the
transferee returning bank, any subsequent
returning bank, the depositary bank, and the
owner.68

See id. at § 229.34(a)(1).
See id. (Board requested comment on whether the drawer under subparagraph (i) or owner under sub-paragraph (ii) should be required to make a claim
against his or her bank before making a breach of warranty claim against a prior
collecting bank.).
67
68
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Under proposed §229.34(g), an additional indemnity is given
in the case of a remote deposit capture, namely where an electronic
check is created by the depositor. This indemnity inures to the benefit
of a depositary bank to which the depositor, having deposited the
electronic check, deposited the original paper check with another
depositary bank. In such a case, an indemnity is given by a depositary
bank which “(i) [i]s a truncating bank under § 229.2(eee)(2) because it
accepts deposit of an electronic check related to an original check; (ii)
[d]oes not receive the original check; (iii) [r]eceives settlement or other
consideration for an electronic check or substitute check related to the
original check; and (iv) [d]oes not receive a return of the check
unpaid.”69 Such a depositary bank shall indemnify a depositary bank
that accepts the original check for deposit for losses incurred by that
depositary bank if the loss is due to the check having already been paid.
The indemnity would allow a depositary bank that accepted a
deposit of an original (paper) check to recover directly from a bank
that permitted its customer to deposit the check through remote
deposit capture.
Under proposed §229.34(i)(1), the indemnity amount shall not
exceed the sum of—
(i)

The amount of the loss of the indemnified
bank, up to the amount of the settlement or
other consideration received by the
indemnifying bank; and

(ii)

Interest and expenses of the indemnified bank
(including costs and reasonable attorney’s fees
and other expenses of representation).70

However, under proposed §229.34(i)(2)(i), and without
reducing “the rights of a person under the UCC or other applicable
provision of state or federal law,”71 if such loss

69
70
71

See id.
See id.
See id. at §229.34(i)(2)(ii).
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results in whole or in part from the indemnified bank’s
negligence or failure to act in good faith, then the
indemnity amount . . . shall be reduced in proportion
to the amount of negligence or bad faith attributable to
the indemnified bank.72
In its Commentary to the Proposal, the Board rationalized the
allocation of the double deposit risk to the truncating bank as follows:
[T]he depositary bank that introduced the risk of
multiple deposits of the same check by offering a
remote deposit capture service should bear the losses
associated with multiple deposits of a check. A
depositary bank that receives the benefit of permitting
its customers to use remote deposit capture should also
internalize any risk or cost to other banks that may
result from remote deposit capture. One such risk is
that the customer will deposit the original check at
another bank. That bank that accepted the check by
remote deposit capture is in a better position than any
other bank to minimize those costs and risks through
the terms of its contract with its customer.73
At the same time, the Board requested comments on
unintended consequences that might result from the indemnity as well
as “on whether the depositary bank that accepts the original check for
deposit would be able to identify the depositary banks against which it
may bring a claim for indemnity . . . and whether there are other more
efficient or practical remedies to address the underlying problem.”74
However, no remedy is provided in the case of multiple electronic
checks created by a depositor related from the same paper check.
It should be noted that, under the U.C.C., a bank that receives
an electronic deposit of a check may arguably be able to control the
risks of multiple deposits and negotiation of the paper check to a

72
73
74

Id.
Id. at 6685.
Id.
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holder in due course by having the negotiability of the check
curtailed.75 Thus, U.C.C Section 3-104(d) effectively provides76 that:
a check is [a negotiable instrument even] if, at the time
it is issued. . ., it contains a conspicuous statement,
however expressed, to the effect that the promise or
order is not negotiable or is not an instrument
governed by this Article.77
This language does not appear to preclude a requirement made
by a bank receiving an electronic deposit to have the check marked as
“non-negotiable” or some other language to that effect at the time of
the deposit (as opposed to the time of its issue). Such marking may
even preclude a competing depositary bank from claiming a holder in
due course status to the extent that U.C.C Section 4-205 protects a
depositary bank claiming a holder in due course status only against the
lack of indorsement but not otherwise.78
A more limited protection appears to be offered under U.C.C
Section 4-201(b), providing that once an item has been indorsed with
words such as “pay any bank,” “only a bank may acquire the rights of

For the holder in due course and the holder in due course power to
defeat competing claims to the instrument, see U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 305, 306 (2015).
76
The provision reads in full as follows: “A promise or order other than
a check is not [a negotiable instrument] if, at the time it is issued or first comes into
possession of a holder, it contains a conspicuous statement, however expressed, to
the effect that the promise or order is not negotiable or is not an instrument governed
by this Article.”
77
U.C.C. § 3-104 (2015).
78
See U.C.C. § 4-205 (2015) (stating that “[i]f a customer delivers an item
to a depositary bank for collection: (1) the depositary bank becomes a holder of the
item at the time it receives the item for collection if the customer at the time of
delivery was a holder of the item, whether or not the customer indorses the item,
and, if the bank satisfies the other requirements of U.C.C. § 3-302 (2015), it is a
holder in due course.”); see also U.C.C Section 4-104(a)(9) (2015) (where “item” is
defined as “[a negotiable] instrument or a promise or order to pay money handled
by a bank for collection or payment”.). While an item need not necessarily be
“negotiable,” under U.C.C § 3-302, a holder in due course may exist only in
connection with a negotiable instrument.
75
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a holder”79 so as to be able to defeat an adverse claim by a non-bank,
albeit not necessarily by a competing depositary bank. However, along
these lines, protection expands and becomes maximal under U.C.C
Section 3-206(c) covering a check bearing:
an indorsement (i) described in Section 4-201(b), or (ii)
in blank or to a particular bank using the words “for
deposit,” “for collection,” or other words indicating a
purpose of having the instrument collected by a bank
for the indorser or for a particular account . . . .80
In this case, Section 3-206(c) states:
(1) A person, other than a bank, who purchases the
instrument when so indorsed converts the
instrument unless the amount paid for the
instrument is received by the indorser or applied
consistently with the indorsement.
(2) A depositary bank that purchases the instrument or
takes it for collection when so indorsed converts
the instrument unless the amount paid by the bank
with respect to the instrument is received by the
indorser or applied consistently with the
indorsement.81
Effectively, this means that to achieve maximum protection,82
and notwithstanding the fact that from a business perspective this may

See U.C.C § 4-201(b) (2015) (where this is so, until the item has been:
“(1) returned to the customer initiating collection; or (2) specially indorsed by a bank
to a person who is not a bank.”)
80
U.C.C. § 3-206(c) (2015).
81
Id.
82
Having transmitted to Bank A an image of a check indorsed to Bank
A, a defrauding depositor may erase the indorsement, indorse the check to Bank B
(or to non-bank C), and transmit the image for deposit to Bank B (or negotiate the
paper check to non-bank C). I would argue that in such a case, the defrauding
customer effectively either forged the holder’s indorsement on the check or altered
the check in which the starting point for the discussion on the loss allocation is either
U.C.C. §§ 3-403 or 3-407 (2015).
79
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be unappealing, a depositary bank would be advised to accept
electronic deposit only of images of checks indorsed specifically to it.
V. ELECTRONIC PAYMENT ORDER (EPO) AS “PAPERLESS CHECK”83
So far, the electronification of check transaction has been
discussed as it relates either to the issue of a check on the basis of the
issue of electronic instruction, or to the “conversion,” deposit,
interbank negotiation, and presentment of the check. Other than interparty negotiation outside the bank collection system for which, so far,
no strong business case has been made, the “last mile” in check
electronification is concerned with the elimination of paper as early as
on the issue of the “check.” This is feasible technologically and
efficient economically; it is indeed said that the EPO possesses features
such as “speed, finality, relatively low cost, and ubiquity.”84 At the same
time, from a legal perspective, the legal features of the EPO are not
entirely clear. Particularly, strictly speaking, this payment method is not
a “check” as it does not involve anything tangible in writing. Indeed,
check truncation in all its forms is premised on an image as well as a
substitute check as derivations of a paper check issued by the drawer
to the payee (or bearer).
In the absence of a statutory or otherwise precise definition,
broadly speaking, an electronically issued payment order, with all other
characteristics of a check, which is treated as a ‘paperless check’ is
known as an EPO. Like a paper check,85 an EPO is typically issued by
the drawer/payer and is addressed to the drawee/payor bank, ordering
the payor bank to pay on demand a sum certain in money to the payee
(or bearer) to whom the order is issued. As with a paper check, an EPO
may be issued on behalf of the drawer by the payee or at the drawer’s
See, e.g., KATY JACOB ET AL., FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO:
FINANCIAL MARKETS GROUP, DIGITAL CHECKS AS ELECTRONIC PAYMENT
ORDERS (2009); see also MARY KEPLER, RETAIL PAYMENTS RISK FORUM, A
SUMMARY OF THE ELECTRONIC PAYMENT ORDER FORUM (2013); see also PHYLLIS
MEYERSON, ELECTRONIC PAYMENT ORDERS (EPOS) (2013). The discussion in this
subsection draws on these sources.
84
See generally KEPLER, supra note 83.
85
“Paper-check,” as defined in U.C.C. § 3-104(f) (2015), in conjunction
with U.C.C. §§ 3-103(a)(8) and 3-104(e) (2015), is used in this section in the sense of
a “check” to distinguish it from the EPO.
83
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instruction by the bank itself. In the former case it is the equivalent of
either a Remotely Created Check (RCC), or even an electronic check.
In the latter case, when issued by the drawer’s bank, it is the equivalent
of a cashier’s check or a teller’s check.86
An EPO generated from a mobile device such as a mobile
phone is also referred to as a “digital check.” It is issued under a
banking application which exploits the computing properties of the
mobile platform to provide built-in authentication, communications,
and security for electronic check writers. Thus, an account holder who
wishes to make payment may use his or her mobile device to issue a
“digital check.” He or she may access the address book on the mobile
device for a list of potential payees. The list can be updated by the
account holder using the mobile device at any time. The account
holder then sets out the amount of the “check” and the date, and then
physically ‘signs’ on the screen as if he or she signs manually on a piece
of paper. As a security safeguard, the pressure and speed the writer
uses in making the signature can be recorded for the transaction. This
“improves” on the loss of the ability to determine pen pressure in
images and, in the case of substitute checks, prevents disputes as to the
authenticity of the payment instructions. A proposed complementary
security method is that of a national check registry.87

See U.C.C § 3-104(g) (2015) ( a “‘[c]ashier’s check’ means a draft with
respect to which the drawer and drawee are the same bank or branches of the same
bank.”). A “‘[t]eller’s check’ means a draft drawn by a bank (i) on another bank, or
(ii) payable at or through a bank.” Effectively, a cashier’s check as well as a teller’s
check is a check drawn by a bank.
87
Id. (“Such a national registry would have been totally impractical to
implement in an all-paper environment, but would be relatively straightforward in a
digital environment. Given a national registry operating as a utility, EPO users could
download blank check images from the national check registry. As EPOs were
processed and cleared through the banking system, the existence of each item could
be verified in the national registry. Each device could obviously have its own internal
check registry for each separate account. As items cleared against an individual
account, the update would be reflected on the internal registry so account holders
would have an up-to-date picture of their account balances. In addition to helping
with budgeting and self-control issues, this concurrent information would also be
useful to detect potential fraud.” JACOB, supra note 67, at 15-16. However, the
authors add a warning: “While straight forward conceptually, a national registry
[being ‘organized as a top-down utility’] could end up being a roadblock to enhanced
security over time.”)
86
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The software check program then creates a visual image of
both the front and the back of the “check,” and takes a screen shot of
the image. The program then transmits an encrypted version of the
imaged “check” (to which the “handwritten” signature is attached) to
the payee who will then deposit it electronically to his or her account
with the depositary bank. In principle, there is no preclusion from
devising a scheme that will allow the electronic negotiation of the
“check” outside the banking system prior to its deposit by the last nonbank holder.
Arguably, so far as payments out of consumer accounts are
concerned, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act88 and Regulation E89
implementing it would govern the relationship between the drawer and
the drawee bank.90 In the absence of an existing comprehensive
statutory and regulatory framework, private agreements are required to
fill the gap and determine legal issues involving the EPO. A natural
inclination is to resort to the U.C.C. and the Check 21 Act. Briefly
stated, two caveats are to be mentioned. First, both U.C.C. Articles 3
and 4 envisage paper documents and as such cannot be made to apply
mechanically on a wholesale basis. Second, since there is no paper item
to begin with, Article 4 does not apply on its own force as a statute.
Accordingly, Section 4-103(b), under which “Federal Reserve
regulations and operating circulars, clearing-house rules, and the like
have the effect of agreements . . . whether or not specifically assented
to by all parties interested in items handled,” cannot be relied upon to
affect “parties interested in items handled” who have “not specifically
assented to” them.91

15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq. (2010).
Electronic Fund Transfers, 12 C.F.R. § 205 (2015).
90
See generally 12 C.F.R. § 205.3; see also 12 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (“The term
electronic fund transfer [to which the Regulation applies] means any transfer of funds
that is initiated through an electronic terminal, telephone, computer, or magnetic
tape for the purpose of ordering, instructing, or authorizing a financial institution to
debit or credit a consumer’s account.”); see also 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (Enumerated
non-exclusive example focus on public access terminals. “Consumer” is defined as
“a natural person.”).
91
U.C.C. § 4-103(b) (2015).
88
89
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Purporting to address the collection of EPOs,92 the Federal
Reserve Board (“Board”) noted that not being derived from an original
paper check, an electronically-created check image cannot be used to
create a substitute check that meets the requirements of the Check 21
Act and Regulation CC. The Board, however, observed that as a
practical matter a collecting bank receiving an electronically-created
check image cannot distinguish it from an image of a paper check that
it receives electronically. The bank may transfer the image as if it were
derived from a paper check, or produce a paper item that is
indistinguishable from a substitute check. Under a proposed revision
to Section 229.34 of Regulation CC, the Board proposed that a bank
that transfers an image in the collection system would make all
warranties the bank would make if the image were derived from a
paper check. By the same token, such an image could be the basis from
which a valid substitute paper check be created.
In addition, under the proposal a bank receiving a warranty
claim related to an electronic collection item, electronic return, or a
nonconforming substitute check would be able to pass back its liability
for the item to the bank from which it had received the electronicallycreated image and information. Recognizing that in some instances the
first bank to make the warranty may not know whether an image and
information came from a paper instrument, the Board nevertheless
expressed its view that that bank is in the best position to know and to
protect itself contractually against the risk.
Accordingly, under the Board’s 2013 Availability Proposal,93
proposed Section 229.34(b) provides for an indemnity with respect to
an electronic image or electronic information not related to a paper
check. It covers situations where either the drawer or the payee under
the drawer’s authority creates an electronic image. The latter case may
be referred to as an eRCC.94 Under proposed Section 229.34(b):
Each bank that transfers or presents an electronic
image or electronic information that is not derived
Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks, 76 Fed. Reg. 16862
(March 25, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 229); see also FRS Availaibility Proposal,
supra note 60.
93
Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks, supra note 92.
94
eRCC stands for a Remotely Created Electronic Check.
92
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from a paper check and for which it receives a
settlement or other consideration shall indemnify each
transferee bank, any subsequent collecting bank, the
paying bank, and any subsequent returning bank
against losses as set forth in paragraph (i) of this section
that result from the fact that the electronic image or
electronic information is not derived from a paper
check.95
Presumably, the reference is to Proposed Section
229.34(a)(1)(i) under which the warranty given with respect to
electronic checks and electronic returns is that:
The electronic image accurately represents all of the
information on the front and back of the original check
as of the time that the original check was truncated and
the electronic information contains an accurate record
of all MICR line information required for a substitute
check . . . and the amount of the check.96
As explained in the Commentary to the Proposal:
Proposed § 229.34(b) would provide that a bank that
transfers an electronic image or electronic information
that is not derived from a paper check indemnify the
transferee bank, any subsequent collecting bank, the
paying bank, and any subsequent returning bank
against any loss, claim, or damage that results from the
fact that the image or information was not derived
from a paper check. This proposed indemnity would
protect a bank that receives an electronically-created
item from a sending bank against any loss or damage
that results from the fact that there was no original
check corresponding to the item that the sending bank
transferred.97

95
96
97

See FRS Availability Proposal, supra note 60.
Id.
See id. at 6695.
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In particular, this purports to cover all losses caused by
warranty breaches had the electronically-created item been derived
from a paper check. It also covers losses caused by the absence of
paper at any stage of the life of the payment item, a fact of which the
drawee bank may be unaware.
The indemnity under proposed Section 229.34(b) would not
flow to the drawer, payee, or the depositary bank. The Board
rationalized that “the payee and the depositary bank are in the best
position to know whether an item is electronically created and to
prevent the item from entering the check collection system.” 98 The
Board went on to explain that the depositary bank can contractually
pass the risk to the payee. Finally, it is the drawer who introduced
“items electronically created by the [drawer]” into the check collection
system.99 At the same time, had the item been introduced as an eRCC
without the purported drawer’s authority, the latter will be protected
under U.C.C 4-401(a) as an item which is not “properly payable.”
Under proposed Section 229.34(i)(1) the indemnity amount
shall not exceed the sum of:
(i)

The amount of the loss of the indemnified
bank, up to the amount of the settlement or
other consideration received by the
indemnifying bank; and

(ii)

Interest and expenses of the indemnified bank
(including costs and reasonable attorney’s fees
and other expenses of representation).

However, under proposed Section 229.34(i)(2)(i), and without
reducing “the rights of a person under the UCC or other applicable
provision of state or federal law” if such loss “results in whole or in
part from the indemnified bank’s negligence or failure to act in good
faith, then the indemnity amount . . . shall be reduced in proportion to
the amount of negligence or bad faith attributable to the indemnified
bank.”100 The Board requested comment on its proposal to provide an
98
99
100

See id.
Id. at 6696.
See id. at § 229.34(i)(2)(ii).
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indemnity claim related to electronically-created items instead of
extending the check warranties of § 229.34 to electronically-created
items.101
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Wishing to accommodate both manual and electronic handling
of checks by the various participants in a check transaction, regulators
have been providing for an extremely flexible scheme covering diverse
situations and facilitating maximum freedom of movement between
paper and image, original and copy. However, an environment in
which one set of rights and duties is embodied in original paper, it any
copy, and its electronic image, all of which co-exist, albeit not
necessarily in the same hands, is quite unsafe, as it may lead to
conflicting claims to the paper and its image. It is bound to create an
‘explosive’ mixture leading to conflicting legitimate expectations. To
minimize surprises, rules are to be detailed. At the same time they
cannot satisfy every innocent party in the check transaction.
In the final analysis, a move towards complete electronification
from end to end seems to be appropriate in the electronic age and is
to be encouraged. A fully electronic check transaction is
interchangeable with a one-time electronic debit transfer. In the latter,
the payor authorizes the payee to draw funds out of the payor’s
account. The issuance of an EPO to the payee serves the same
purpose. It is obvious then that the two transactions converge. From
that perspective, the convergence between the laws that govern those
transactions ought to be seriously considered. A cohesive forwardlooking legal framework, consisting of statutory, regulatory, and
contractual sources, ought to address debit transfers as a distinct form
of payment. This is true even if in response to business demands a
mixed paper and electronic image environment is still to be
accommodated, at least for some time. Indeed, Articles 3 and 4 of the
Uniform Commercial Code provide a comprehensive framework
governing the payment and collection of paper based debit
instruments. At the same time consideration is to be given to the
Id. at 6684 (the Board further requested comment on whether losses
proximately caused from not being able to make the warranty claim should be
interpreted to cover damages awarded for violations of Regulation E).
101
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drafting of a new Article 3A of the Uniform Commercial Code to form
a comprehensive piece of legislation governing electronic debit
transfers including the electronic cheque transaction. The current
mixture of state and federal laws as well as private agreement is too
segmented to guaranty a sound evolution of the law to address
forthcoming innovations and the new issues they raise.
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CLEAN BILL OF LADING IN CONTRACT
OF CARRIAGE AND DOCUMENTARY
CREDIT: WHEN CLEAN MAY NOT BE
CLEAN
Časlav Pejović*
INTRODUCTION
X is a small producer of plastic products from China. Searching on
internet for suppliers of plastic raw materials X found Y, a supplier
based in the United States, offering these materials at a very favourable
price. X and Y entered into sale contract under Cost, Insurance, and
Freight (CIF) terms. Following CIF terms, payment was to be made
by letter of credit. Y shipped the goods in a container and delivered for
carriage within the agreed time. Carrier then inserted a “said to
contain” clause into the bill of lading, and the bank accepted such
document. When X opened container it discovered that the goods were
in such bad condition that they could not be used in the manufacturing
process. X contacted Y, by email, and demanded delivery of substitute
goods, which would conform to the contract. Y refused, claiming that
the goods were delivered for carriage in good condition. Y could not be
reached by telephone, and its address stated on its website was wrong.
X had no redress against the Carrier, because the Carrier validly
excluded its liability with a “said to contain” clause. The Bank was
also not liable, because this clause was acceptable under the letter of
credit rules. X contacted a lawyer in the United States, and after
receiving an estimate of attorney expenses, which would not be
recoverable under the U.S. law, X decided to give up the case and bear
the loss.1

* Professor of Law, Kyushu University, Faculty of Law; LL.B.,
Montenegro University; LL.M., Belgrade University; LL.M., Kyoto University;

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:1

It is common knowledge, in international trade community,
that bills of lading (bills), under certain conditions, may contain
reservations inserted by the master, and that banks normally should
reject bills that are not clean. Yet, it is far less known that clean bills of
lading, under the rules governing carriage of goods and those
governing letters of credit may be not only different, but even
contradictory. Specifically, certain clauses may make a bill of lading
unclean under rules of carriage, but not under the letter of credit rules.
It is interesting to note that all leading texts on letters of credit are
silent on this issue.2 One of the few scholars who has identified this
issue is Hugo Tiberg, one of the world’s leading maritime law
authorities. Tiberg suggested that the Uniform Customs and Practices
for Documentary Credits (UCP) 3 should expand the meaning of
“uncleanliness.”4

Ph.D., Zagreb University. The author is grateful to Hugo Tiberg, Jan Ramberg, and
Rawi Meckvichai for their constructive comments and suggestions, which helped to
refine this article. I owe special thanks to David Meynell, Senior Technical Adviser
to the ICC Banking Commission who provided valuable information regarding
background of relevant provisions of the UCP.Of course, I remain responsible for
all eventual errors in this paper.
1
This is not hypothetical but a real case brought to my attention by my
ex-student whose family was subjected to this kind of trouble.
2
Ebenezer Adodo in his recent book on letters of credit, in an attempt
to justify omission of a detailed discussion of transport documents in his text states
that transport documents have not been “the subject of serious controversies in the
last several decades”, and that the banks are not “in great need of fresh insights”
regarding this theme: EBENEZER ADODO, LETTERS OF CREDIT: THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF COMPLIANCE 7.02 (2014).
3
The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits were
promulgated by the International Chamber of Commerce (I.C.C.) in 1933, and were
revised in 1951, 1962, 1974, 1983, 1993, and 2007 (I.C.C. Pub. No. 600). For most
current version, see Int’l Chamber of Commerce, Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits, I.C.C. Pub. No. 600 (2007) [hereinafter UCP].
4
Hugo Tiberg, Carrier’s Liability for Misstatements in Bills of Lading, in
MARITIME FRAUD 71 (1983). I have also written one paper on this issue, but from a
different angle, with the main focus on the cause of the discrepancy of rules and
different legal effects of clauses under two different sets of rules. Časlav Pejović,
Clean Bill of Lading in Contract of Carriage and Contract of Sale: Same Name and Different
Meanings, 2 J. INT’L COM. L. (2003).
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The main objective of this article is to analyze the discrepancies
between the rules governing carriage of goods by sea and the rules
governing letters of credit, as well as highlight the potential problems
that may arise as a consequence of this discrepancy, particularly in light
of the risk of documentary fraud. The ultimate goal of this article is to
draw attention to the need to revise the definition of a clean bill of
lading in future UCP revisions.
I. BACKGROUND
The two most basic obligations in contracts of sale are (1) the
obligation of the seller to deliver the goods and (2) the obligation of
the buyer to pay the price. In international sales, the performance of
both of these obligations is met with certain difficulties, mainly because
of the distance between the parties. International sales involve a
number of parties that are often geographically distant from each
other; the seller’s obligation of delivery is performed through a carrier
under a contract of carriage, while the buyer’s obligation of payment is
normally performed through a bank, typically by letter of credit. The
payment is regularly conditioned on evidence of the movement of the
goods, i.e. by evidence that the goods are loaded onboard and are on
their way to the destination.
An essential characteristic of overseas sales is that the buyer
pays not against the delivery of the goods, but against the tender of a
set of documents usually comprised of an invoice, a bill of lading, and
a marine insurance policy. This implies that the seller has an obligation
to make two kinds of delivery: (1) delivery of the goods and (2) delivery
of the documents.5 Because the documents appear to be the subject
matter of the sale, this sale is sometimes referred to as a “sale of
documents.” 6 Once in possession of documents required by the
5
Article 30 of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods (CISG) provides for this double obligation: “The Seller must deliver the
goods, hand over any documents relating to them . . . .” United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 10, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3,
19 I.L.M. 671, art. 30 [hereinafter CISG].
6 In Arnhold Karberg & Co. v. Blythe Green Jourdain & Co. [1915], 2 K.B. 379 at
388 (Eng.), Scrutton J referred to a CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) contract as a sale
of ‘documents relating to goods’ but this was disapproved on appeal Arnhold Karberg &
Co. v. Blythe Green Jourdain & Co. [1916], 1 K.B. 495 at 510, 514 (Eng.).
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contract of sale, the seller notifies the buyer that he will tender those
documents against payment or acceptance. The seller then presents the
bill of exchange to the buyer’s bank, together with a bill of lading and
other documents. The bank should pay against the documents only if
those documents are in accordance with requirements set by the UCP
and the specific instructions of the buyer.
This specific character of a documentary sale is based on the
bill of lading. When the parties agree that payment is to be made
against documents, the seller must transfer to the buyer the bill of
lading at the moment the buyer pays the price. By transferring the bill
of lading to the buyer, the seller furnishes proof that he exercised his
obligations under the sale contract and transfers to the buyer the right
to receive the goods when they arrive at the port of destination. In this
way, the seller can receive the price while the goods are still in transit
and is assured that the title to the goods cannot pass to the buyer
before he pays the price, while the buyer is assured that the goods will
be delivered to him after he pays the price. One of the factors that
contribute to the reliability of bills of lading is that the carrier warrants
the accuracy of statements regarding the goods and is liable to their
third party lawful holders in case of their inaccuracy. A buyer cannot
inspect the goods while they are at sea, so he has to rely on the
statements in the bill of lading. These statements provide evidence that
the seller has properly performed his obligations by loading on time
the conforming goods.7
II. CLEAN BILL OF LADING IN CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE
After the goods are delivered to the carrier, and upon demand
of the shipper, the carrier must issue a bill of lading. Under Article 3(3)
of the Hague-Visby Rules, bills of lading must show the leading marks,
quantity, weight, or number of packages or pieces, and the apparent
condition of the goods, furnished in writing by the shipper.8 Similar
7
Under clause CIF A8 of the Incoterms 2010, the seller has a duty to
provide the buyer with a “usual transport document.” This is usually understood to
mean a clean on board bill of lading providing for the carriage of goods under deck, and
for carriage to be performed without unreasonable deviation. INT’L CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, INCOTERMS 2010 cl. CIF A8 (2010), .
8
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law
Relating to Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 120 L.N.T.S. 155 (entered into force June
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provisions are found in the Hamburg Rules 9 and the Rotterdam
Rules.10
The carrier can, under certain conditions, insert reservations in
the bill of lading, which can drastically lessen its evidential value.
Reservations are remarks inserted in a bill of lading by the carrier, his
master, or his agent, which indicate the carrier does not guarantee the
accuracy of particulars concerning the marks, nature, or quantity of the
goods contained in the bill of lading, or that there are defects noticed
in the condition of the goods or its packing for which the carrier is not
responsible.
Under Article 3(3) of the Hague-Visby Rules:
no carrier, captain or agent of the carrier shall be bound
to state or show in the bill of lading any marks, number,
quantity, or weight which he has reasonable ground for
suspecting not accurately to represent the goods
actually received, or which he has had no reasonable
means of checking.
The literal meaning of this provision refers to something which
its drafters probably never intended. It is difficult to imagine that they
meant that the carrier can issue a bill of lading without particulars
concerning the “marks, number, quantity or weight,” since those
particulars are essential for the existence of a bill of lading.11 Under
2, 1931) [hereinafter Hague Rules], as amended by Protocol to Amend the
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to
Bills of Lading, Feb. 23, 1968, 1412 U.N.T.S. 128 [hereinafter Hague-Visby Rules].
For the matter of simplicity, I will use the Hague-Visby Rules and will not refer to
the Hague Rules, which are still applied in a number of jurisdictions.
9
United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Mar.
31, 1978, 1695 U.N.T.S. 3, 17 I.L.M. 608 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1992)
[hereinafter Hamburg Rules].
10
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, G.A. Res. 63/122, U.N. Doc
A/RES/63/122 (Feb. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Rotterdam Rules].Rotterdam Rules are
not yet in force.
11
It should be noted that the original text of the Hague Rules (1921)
adopted by the International Law Association (ILA) was somewhat different. It
provided that, “no carrier, master or agent of the carrier shall be bound to issue a bill of
lading showing description, marks, number, quality, or weight which he has reasonable
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this literal interpretation, problems may have arisen with Article 3(3)
of The Hague-Visby Rules. Instead, remedying this error, the content
of Article 3(3) has been interpreted to imply that the carrier, in fact,
should insert particulars concerning the goods as furnished by the
shipper. Additionally, the carrier is entitled to qualify those particulars
by inserting in the bill of lading reservations under conditions specified
in this article.
The Hamburg Rules and the Rotterdam Rules expressly
provide that the carrier has a duty to insert a reservations in the bill of
lading under conditions that are essentially the same as in the HagueVisby Rules.12 Reservations are aimed at protecting the carrier from
liability for inaccurate or false particulars furnished by the shipper. The
justifications for these reservations are that the carrier cannot be asked
to take responsibility for the accuracy of particulars that he cannot
check and the necessity to protect the good faith of third party bill of
lading holders. The reservations are not aimed at relieving the carrier
from liability, but only at excluding the presumption that the goods are
received for carriage by the carrier as described in the bill of lading.
In practice, it is often disputed whether loss of, or damage to,
the goods occurred during the voyage, or whether it existed before the
goods were delivered for carriage. One of the crucial problems for the
buyer is to establish who is responsible for damage: the carrier or the
seller. Here the bill of lading may play a key role as evidence. If the bill
of lading contains remarks stating that the cargo was loaded in poor
condition, this may provide evidence of the seller’s liability for delivery
of non-conforming goods. On the other hand, if the bill of lading
contains no such remarks, this may evidence the carrier’s liability.
If the carrier signs a bill of lading presented by a shipper
without controlling the accuracy of the particulars furnished by him,
he risks liability to a third party holder of the bill of lading if those
particulars are inaccurate. This is why the carrier should be very careful
ground for suspecting do not accurately represent the goods actually received.” It is one
thing that the carrier is not bound to issue a bill of lading, and a different one that the
carrier issues the bill of lading but is not bound to state in the bill of lading the particulars
concerning the goods (on file with author).
12
Hamburg Rules, supra note 9, art. 16(1); Rotterdam Rules, supra note
10, art. 40(1).
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when receiving the goods from the shipper and should check the
accuracy of the description of the goods as furnished by the shipper,
as well as the apparent condition of the goods. However, sometimes it
is impossible to perform such checks, e.g., if the goods are delivered
for carriage shortly before the ship’s departure or if the goods are in
sealed containers so that the number of packages and condition cannot
be verified. In such cases the carrier is entitled to insert reservations
into the bill of lading.
There are two types of reservations: (1) reservations which
refer to the particulars furnished by the shipper concerning the general
nature, marks, number, and weight of the goods and (2) reservations
concerning the condition of the goods. The legal effect of these two
types of reservations is different.
A.

Reservations Referring to the Nature, Marks, Number, and
Weight of the Goods

Reservations referring to the particulars furnished by the
shipper deprive those particulars of their evidential value. It is assumed
that the carrier delivered the goods to the consignee as he received
them from the shipper. Such a bill of lading is not even prima facie
evidence of the particulars to which the reservation refers. Those
particulars are deprived of every evidentiary effect, and are considered
to be only a declaration made by the shipper, without the carrier’s
liability for their accuracy. The carrier is only liable on the basis of the
receipt of the goods (ex recepto), which means that he must deliver
the goods to the consignee as he received them from the shipper. As a
result, a third party holder of the bill of lading is entitled to the goods
not as they are described in the bill of lading, but as they were delivered
for carriage by the shipper.
Reservations limit, but do not eliminate, the evidentiary effect
of the bill of lading. Only the particulars to which the reservations refer
lose their evidentiary value, while other particulars retain their
evidentiary effect. For instance, a reservation referring to weight has
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no influence on the evidentiary effect of the number of pieces stated
in the bill of lading.13
Reservations do not exempt the carrier from his responsibility,
but only switch the burden of proof (onus probandi) from the carrier
to the consignee. If the carrier fails to insert notations, he would be
precluded from proving against third party holders of the bill of lading
that the particulars in the bill of lading were inaccurate and would bear
the burden to prove that he is not liable for loss or damage. In that
case the consignee would not be bound to prove the carrier’s liability,
but the carrier has the burden to prove that he is not liable for loss or
damage. A reservation switches the burden of proof to the consignee,
who must prove that the particulars in the bill of lading were correct
and that the carrier is liable for loss or damage.
The effect of reservations is that they make such proof more
difficult. If the bill of lading does not contain reservations, the
consignee would only have to prove that the goods he received from
the carrier do not correspond with the bill of lading description leaving
to the carrier to avail himself of any defenses to avoid liability. If the
bill of lading does contain reservations, then the consignee cannot rely
on the bill of lading as proof but must offer other evidence of carrier’s
liability for damage.
B.

Reservations Referring to the Condition of the Goods

The bill of lading should show only the apparent condition of
the goods, which means the external condition of the goods “so far as
meets the eye.”14 Even if a bill of lading does not contain this clause,
the goods will be considered as delivered for carriage in apparent good
condition, unless the master has inserted remarks in the bill of lading
stating the goods defects.
Reservations referring to the condition of the goods are based
on the carrier’s observation and represent, in fact, his statement of any
defects in the goods noticed during the inspection of the goods at the
port of loading. These reservations are prima facie evidence that the
Attorney General of Ceylon v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., India
[1962] A.C. 60 (Eng.).
14
The Peter der Grosse [1875] 1 P.D. 414 (Eng.).
13
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goods were loaded in the condition as described in the reservations.
Therefore, they place the burden of proof on the consignee, who needs
to prove that the goods were loaded in good condition, and that the
damage occurred during the voyage.
If the carrier fails to insert reservations concerning the
condition of the goods and the goods are found to be damaged when
delivered to the consignee, the carrier will be held responsible for
damage unless he proves that the damage was caused by one of the
circumstances for which he is not responsible. Where the goods are
loaded in poor condition, it is still possible to avoid clausing a bill of
lading. If the shipper’s description of the goods in the bill of lading
provides a complete and accurate description of the cargo, there would
be no need for any clausing of the bills of lading by the master. The
goods that are properly described as damaged can be considered as “in
good condition” in the sense of being in “proper” order and
condition. 15 The cargo that is properly described as damaged or
imperfect in some way can be stated to be in “good order and
condition” in the sense of being in “proper” order and condition. Thus
a cargo described in a bill of lading as “scrap” or as “hot rolled steel
coils with pitting and gouging” can be stated to be in “good order and
condition.”16 If the description of the goods is such that the master
can sign a bill of lading that says that those goods, as described, are in
“apparent good order and condition,” then the cargo will not be
“subject to clausing of the bill of lading.” But if the master would have
to make a notation on the bill of lading so as to reconcile the
description of the goods with a statement that they are in “apparent
good order and condition,” then the cargo is “subject to clausing of
the bill of lading.”17
The fact that the bill of lading does not state that the goods
loaded are in bad condition does not exclude the possibility that there
are defects in loaded goods.18 If the carrier proves that the damage to
the goods was of such a character that it was impossible to discover it
15
Sea Success Maritime Inc. v. African Maritime Carriers Ltd. [2005]
EWHC (Comm) 1542 (Eng.).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Tokio Marine Fire & Ins. Co. v. Retla S.S. Co., 426 F.2d 1372 (9th
Cir. 1970).
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by an ordinary examination of their external condition, the cargo
claimant would not only have to prove that the goods were not
damaged when delivered for carriage, but also provide such proof as
may be needed to impose carriage liability, e.g., that the ship was not
seaworthy. However, if the consignee proves that the carrier knew, or
should have known, that the goods were damaged when he received
them for carriage, the carrier will be responsible if he failed to insert
the reservation in the bill of lading stating that damage.19
IV. CLEAN BILLS OF LADING IN LETTERS OF CREDIT
In a documentary sale, the bill of lading serves as evidence of
whether the goods are loaded, when they are loaded, and which goods
are loaded. Based on the bill of lading, it can be established whether
the goods were delivered for carriage and loaded on time, as stipulated
by the contract of sale, as well as whether the goods delivered for
carriage correspond with the goods agreed by the contract of sale. To
perform its role in a documentary sale, the bill of lading must provide
certainty to its holder with respect to the accuracy of the particulars
contained in it, and the carrier must be precluded from denying the
accuracy of those particulars.
The letter of credit rules provide specific requirements related
to reservations. As a matter of principle, the bill of lading should be
free of all notations with respect to the apparent condition of the
goods and packaging. Under Article 27 of the UCP, a clean bill of
lading is defined as “one that bears no clause or notation which
expressly declares a defective condition of the goods and/or the
packaging.” Banks must refuse bills of lading that contain such clauses
or notations, unless the letter of credit expressly stipulates the clauses
or notations that may be accepted. The buyer can give instructions to
its bank with respect to the requirements of the documents; if there
are no such instructions, the requirements contained in the UCP rules
will apply.

The Nogar Marin [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 412 (Eng.); Dent v. Glen Line
[1940] 67 Lloyd’s Rep. 72 (Eng.); Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Rouen,
Oct. 10, 1991, D.M.F. 1993, 108 (Fr); Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal]
Paris, Apr. 17, 1995, D.M.F. 1985, 173 (Fr.).
19
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V. DISCREPANCIES AND CONFUSION
When the meaning of clean bill of lading under the rules
applying to carriage of goods and to letters of credit is compared,
discrepancies become obvious. All international conventions
governing carriage of goods by sea provide that reservations regarding
leading marks, quantity, the general nature of the goods, and their
condition make a bill of lading unclean. 20 The UCP limits the
definition of a clean bill of lading to notations declaring defective
condition of the goods and/or packages. This definition is in line with
some well-known cases.21 On the other hand, it deviates from other
cases that gave effect to notations related to quantity, making such bills
unclean under the rules governing carriage by sea.22 There are also
other discrepancies, e.g., regarding the effect of “said to contain”
clauses.
At a more general level, the confusion about the meaning of a
clean bill of lading is caused by the fact that the parties in a contract of
carriage are usually also the parties in the contract of sale (the shipper
is often the seller, while the consignee is often the buyer), and because
the subject matter of these contracts is the same (the carried goods are
identical with the sold goods). However, even though the same parties
and goods appear in both the contract of carriage and the contract of
sale, these two contracts are regulated by different rules. The rules
regulating the contract of carriage are aimed at defining the duties and
rights of the carrier and the shipper and/or consignee, while the rules
regulating the contract of sale are aimed at specifying the duties and
rights of the seller and the buyer.
The rules regulating the liability of the carrier are limited in
scope to the contract of carriage and are not concerned with the
contract of sale. If the carrier issues a clean bill of lading, it does not
mean that the goods are in conformity with the goods under the
20
Hague-Visby Rules, supra note 8, art. 3(3), Hamburg Rules, supra note
9, art. 16(1); Rotterdam Rules, supra note 10, art. 40(1) referring to art. 36(1).
21
British Imex Indus. Ltd. v Midland Bank Ltd. (1958) 1 Q.B. 542
(Eng.); Golodetz & Co. v Czarnikow (1980) 1 W.L.R 495 (Eng.).
22
New Chinese Antimony Co. Ltd. v. Ocean S.S. Co. [1917] 2 K.B. 664
(Eng.), Attorney General of Ceylon v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., India
[1962] A.C. 60 (Eng.); The Mata K [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 614 (Eng.).
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contract of sale. The carrier is not entrusted with checking whether the
goods comply with sale contract, but only with their carriage; he is
responsible only if the goods do not correspond with their description
in the bill of lading. The rationale of the carrier for inserting
reservations is the protection of his own interests as a party in the
contract of carriage. From the carrier’s perspective, the fact that he
inserted reservations in a bill of lading, or that he failed to do so, is
relevant only for his relation with the bill of lading holder. However,
that fact can be very important for the relation of the parties in the
contract of sale, as well as in letters of credit.
The bill of lading is a transport document issued under a contract
of carriage and is not always suitable to serve as evidence in a contract of
sale. The buyer cannot rely on the carrier and transport documents as
sufficient grounds for establishing whether the goods were in
conformity at the moment of loading because the carrier applies his
own standards and rules based on rules governing carriage of goods,
and not sale, when checking the goods.
The fact that the carrier has issued a clean bill of lading does not
necessarily mean that the seller has delivered for carriage the goods as
provided by the contract of sale, but only that the carrier acknowledged
that the goods correspond with their description in the bill of lading and
that they are in apparent good order and condition. For example, the
seller might deliver for carriage the goods of a quality which does not
correspond to one agreed by the contract of sale, but the carrier cannot
be expected to state this discrepancy of quality in the bill of lading, since
he is usually not an expert on the goods and is not liable for the quality
of the goods.
VI. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS UNDER THE UCP
The UCP contains rather imprecise guidance regarding “clean
bills of lading,” which deviates from the rules on clean bills of lading
in the law governing carriage of goods by sea. There are even some
discrepancies with the rules governing international sales, while some
of problems are confined to the UCP. The problems may arise in cases
of all particulars on the goods, as will be shown below.
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Quantity

A bill of lading containing a notation that states a shortage of
the goods cannot be clean. This fact is clearly stated in all international
conventions regulating carriage of goods by sea and is confirmed by
numerous court decisions. In a clear contrast to the rules governing
carriage by sea, the UCP definition of clean bill of lading is restricted
to the condition of the goods and packages. For some unclear reason,
the reservations regarding quantity are omitted from the definition of
clean bill of lading. Hugo Tiberg proposed a wider meaning of unclean
bill of lading to refer to a “document bearing an express notation of
insufficiency concerning either the quantity or condition of the goods
or their packaging.”23 This proposal is the starting point for a more
detailed elaboration on this issue below.
The failure to include reservations related to quantity in the
definition of clean bill of lading raises the issue of whether this failure
can be remedied by other provisions of the UCP. To certain extent,
Article 30 of the UCP may play this role. This provision does not
specifically make reference to transport documents, but it obviously
applies to them, as well as to the invoice. Article 30(b) provides for
tolerance of 5% for quantity “provided the credit does not state the
quantity in terms of a stipulated number of packing units or individual
items and the total amount of the drawings does not exceed the
amount of the credit”. This means that reservations indicating
shortages of less than 5% of quantity would be acceptable, but this
tolerance is not applicable to the number of packing units or individual
items when stated in the letter of credit.
The application of Article 30(b) depends on the type of
merchandise shipped. 24 Article 30(b) would apply where the credit
states, e.g., “1000kg of coffee.” In this case, the beneficiary could ship
up to 5% less, i.e., between 950kg and 1000kg, or up to 5% more, i.e.,
between 1000kg and 1050kg (subject to credit amount not being
See Tiberg, supra note 4, at 78.
Example: letter of credit value is $100,000.00 (USD); Goods shipped:
1000kg of coffee. In this case, the exporter is allowed to ship up to 1050kg (or 950
kg) of coffee but not allowed to draw more than $100,000.00 (USD). This tolerance
disappears in case of the number of packing units or individual items, e.g., if the bill
of lading states that 1000 boxes containing bottles of wine are loaded.
23
24

139

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:1

exceeded). This means that banks should reject bills of lading when
there is a discrepancy higher than 5% in the case of quantity, as well as
in case of any discrepancy related to the number of packages. A
problem may arise if a bill of lading indicates a shortage within the
tolerance defined by Article 30(b), e.g., when it contains a clause
stating: “10 tons missing” (if we assume that the total amount is 1000
tons, a shortage of ten tons is just 1% of the total amount). Should the
bank accept such bill of lading? From the position of the buyer, a
shortage of the quantity should be valid cause for rejecting documents.
On the other hand, under the UCP, the bank will be required to accept
such bill of lading, unless specifically instructed not to do so.
Article 30(b) creates a discrepancy in the rules applicable to
letters of credit, as well as a number of ambiguities that may arise in
various situations related to its application to bills of lading. For
example, why should a bank accept a bill of lading containing a
shortage of ten tons of cargo when the quantity stated in the bill of
lading is 1000 tons, and why should it reject the bill of lading when one
out of a hundred boxes is missing? What is the logic? Is one box
containing twelve bottles of mineral water more valuable and
important than ten tons of coffee? There should be some reason for
this kind of drafting of the UCP, but if so, it is far from obvious.
A notation that refers to a minor defect may be acceptable to
the buyer, but not to the bank, because such notation makes a bill of
lading unclean under the UCP rules. On the other hand, a notation
within the tolerance defined by Article 30(b) would be acceptable to
the bank, but not necessarily to the buyer. Would the buyer agree to a
every shortage that is less than 5%? There have been many cases where
a buyer has sued the seller or carrier for far lower percentages of
shortage. Article 30(b) may contradict the law governing contract of
sale, for the law of each country sets out its own percentage of
tolerance. The problem will arise particularly where the law governing
contract of sale provides a lower tolerance. This means that Article
30(b) of the UCP may contravene both the rules applying to carriage
of goods by sea and those applying to contract of sale. The real risk for
the buyer is that this provision requires the bank to pay against bill of
lading which contains express reservation regarding shortage of
quantity, where the shortage is within the tolerance of 5%.
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The report on clean bills of lading prepared by the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) states that clauses relating
to quantity “are in a different class, in that they merely reflect a
difference of opinion between seller and carrier as to the exact quantity
of good loaded on board.” 25 It is true that these clauses are in a
different class, but not merely because they reflect a different opinion,
because the clauses related to condition may also reflect a difference in
opinion between seller and carrier. For example, there is often a
discussion between the shippers and the master (or his agent) as to the
proper description of the condition of the cargo.26 In fact, shipper and
carrier are more likely to have “a difference of opinion” regarding
condition rather than regarding quantity; quantity can be more easily
verified, when in dispute, while the assessment of apparent condition
of the goods is often based on subjective impression.
The difference between these two types of clauses lies in their
different legal effects: while clauses related to quantity deprive them of
evidential legal effect, clauses related to condition create a presumption
that the goods are loaded with defects as stated in the reservation. This
difference does not justify omitting reservations related to quantity
from the definition of clean bill of lading. It is obvious that a bill of
lading with a notation stating shortage of quantity of goods cannot be
a clean bill of lading, particularly from the perspective of the buyer’s
interests. To avoid the risk, the buyer should specifically instruct its
bank to reject clauses that refer to a shortage of the goods.
While banks normally have no problem with accounting, why
should the banks bear a duty to calculate the percentage of shortage
and then determine whether the shortage is within the tolerated
amount? Would it not be more practical to simply adopt the same rule
as in carriage of goods: any reservation regarding quantity should make
the bill of lading unclean? The tolerance of shortage should not be
prescribed as a standard in the UCP, but it should be an exception
agreed upon by the parties to the contract of sale. If the parties agreed
certain degree of tolerance, the buyer should arrange to have this
condition in the letter of credit so as to override the default 5%
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE PROBLEM OF
CLEAN BILLS OF LADING 14 (1962).
26
Sea Success Mar. Inc. v. African Mar. Carriers Ltd. [2005] EWHC
(Comm) 1542 (Eng.).
25
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tolerance. In such case the applicant should expressly instruct the bank
in the letter of credit that specified tolerances may be allowed; if the
instructions are silent on this, there should be no tolerance. As it is
shown above, there are plenty of arguments speaking in favor of
expanding the UCP definition of clean bill of lading so as to include
notations regarding quantity.
B.

“Said to Contain” Clauses

Another point of confusion relates to Article 26(b) of the UCP.
According to this article, banks will accept bills of lading that contain
clauses such as “shipper’s load and count,” “said by shipper to
contain,” or words of similar effect.27 In the context of the UCP, this
provision can be justified by the fact that these clauses do not expressly
declare a defective condition of the goods and, therefore, do not make
bills of lading unclean under the UCP rules. The situation, however,
can be different in contract of carriage.
In contracts of carriage clauses, “shipper’s load and count” or
“said by shipper to contain” are often not given effect by the courts
when they are pre-printed in bills of lading. In such cases, Article 31(ii)
of the UCP would not cause problems. However, under certain
conditions, these clauses can have effect under the rules governing
carriage of goods and make a bill of lading unclean. Where the goods
are carried in containers packed and sealed by the shipper, the carrier
has no duty to open them to check the contents. In this case it is clear
in re ipsa that the carrier cannot check the contents due to the
conditions of carriage. This means that there is no need for the
reservations to be specific and the carrier can insert reservations such
as “said by shipper to contain” or simply “said to contain.” This kind
of reservations has been upheld in a number of jurisdictions.28
English courts give effect to general reservations relating to
weight or quantity unknown.29 If a bill of lading states that the weight
27
28

See UCP, supra note 3, art. 26(b).
Robert Wijffels, Aspects juridiques du transport par conteneurs, E.T.L. 337

(1967).
The Mata K [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 614 (Eng.); Noble Res. Ltd. v.
Cavalier Shipping Corp. [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 642 [hereinafter The Atlas] (Eng.); The
Esmeralda [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 206 (Eng.).
29
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of goods is unknown, the carrier can rely on it as evidence to contradict
the weight recorded in the bill of lading.30 In such case, no estoppel
can be raised against the carrier, since he made no representation. In
common law the main focus is on the fact of whether a representation
is made, rather than whether the qualification is true.31 If the statement
of the weight or quantity of goods in the bill of lading is qualified by
such words as “weight or quantity unknown”, the bill of lading is not
even prima facie evidence against the carrier of the weight or quantity
shipped.32 Similarly, where goods are shipped in a container and the
bill of lading is “said to contain” a given number of packages, so that
it is plain that the carrier has no knowledge of the contents of the
container, the carrier is not estopped from denying that the stated
number of packages were in fact in the container. The onus is on the
cargo-owner to prove what was in fact shipped.33
Many other jurisdictions have taken a similar stance. In the
United States, Section 7-301(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) recognizes the validity of clauses such as “contents, condition,
and quality unknown,” and “said to contain,” in case of the goods
“concealed in packages.”34 German law provides for the possibility of
inserting the reservation “contents unknown” (“Inhalt unbekannt”) if
the goods are carried packaged or in containers.35 Italian courts take a
similar view “when it is reasonably impossible to establish if the carrier
has no reasonable means of checking the information furnished by the

The Atlas, 1 Lloyd’s Rep. at 646.
RICHARD AIKENS, RICHARD LORD & MICHAEL BOOLS, BILLS OF
LADING 4.32 (2006).
32
Conoco (UK) Ltd. v Limai Mar. Co. [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 613 (Eng.)
[hereinafter The Sirina].
33
WILLIAM TETLEY, MARINE CARGO CLAIMS 351 (4th ed. 2008).
34
Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency v. M/V IBN Zuhr, Civ. A. No.
CV 493–292, 1994 WL 654548 (S.D. Ga. May 27, 1994); Recumar Inc. v. S/S Dana
Arabia, 83 Civ. 6486 (BN) (JES), 1985 WL 479 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5,1985); Aetna Ins. Co.
v. General Terminals, 225 So.2d 72 (La. Ct. App. 4 1969); THOMAS SCHOENBAUM,
ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 10-22 (4th ed. 2004).
35
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Hamburg Regional Court] Oct. 2, 1969
VersR 1125, 1970 (Ger.); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Hamburg Regional Court] Nov.
30, 1972 VersR 344, 1973 (Ger.); SEEHANDELSRECHT 511 (Prussman-Rabe eds., 5th
ed. 2000); SCHAPS/ABRAHAM: SEERECHT 821 (Walter de Gruyter ed., 1964).
30
31

143

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:1

shipper.”36 A similar position is taken by Belgian courts, which have
held that the notation “said to contain” inserted in a bill of lading
represents a valid qualification where the carrier is not able to check
the condition of the goods.37
Article 40(4) of the Rotterdam Rules contains specific
provisions for situations in which goods are delivered for carriage to
the carrier in a closed container. In such case the carrier may qualify
the particulars on the goods if the goods inside the container have not
actually been inspected by the carrier and the carrier did not have actual
knowledge of its contents before issuing the transport document. With
respect to the particulars on the weight of the goods, the carrier may
qualify those particulars if he did not weigh the container, and the
shipper and carrier had not agreed prior to the shipment that the
container or vehicle would be weighed and the weight would be
included in the contract particulars, or there was no physically
practicable or commercially reasonable means of checking the weight
of the container or vehicle. Another scenario is found in Article 40(1)
of the Rotterdam Rules, which deals with situations in which goods are
not delivered for carriage in a closed container, or when they are
delivered in a closed container and the carrier actually inspects them.
In this case the carrier may insert reservations in the transport
document if he had no physically practicable or commercially
reasonable means of checking the information furnished by the
shipper, or he has reasonable grounds to believe the information
furnished by the shipper to be inaccurate.38

36
Corte di Cassazione 29 November 1999, No. 13341, Giur. it. 2001,
III, 729 (It.); Corte di Appello di Napoli, 21 June 1996, unreported, Rocco Giuseppe
& Figli S.p.A. v. DI.A.R. Maritime S.r.l. (It.).
37
Hof Van Beroep [HvB] [Court of Appeal] Antwerpen May 27, 2013,
European Transport Law [E.T.L.] 2013, 581 (Belg.).
38
Article 40(1) of the Rotterdam Rules may create problems in practice.
For example, there might be disagreement as to what extent the carrier who actually
inspected the goods in a closed container was able to verify the information furnished
by the shipper. It is also not very clear who would have the burden of proof in case
of a dispute: would the carrier have the burden of proof that he was entitled to insert
qualification in the transport document, or would it be on the claimant to prove that
the qualification was not justified? The answer to these questions can be obtained
only if the Rotterdam Rules enter into force, and it is very likely that those answers
may not be the same in all jurisdictions. Rotterdam Rules, supra note 10, art. 40(1).
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The previous examples from several leading maritime
jurisdictions and the text of the Rotterdam Rules demonstrate a clear
discrepancy between the UCP and the laws governing carriage of
goods by sea. Namely, under the UCP, clauses such as “said to
contain” do not have effect on the status of bills of lading, which
remain clean and acceptable by banks. On the other hand, similar
clauses may have an effect under carriage by sea rules, making bills
unclean.
The UCP’s unreserved acceptance of “said to contain” type
clauses can make the buyer a victim of fraud, if the seller as shipper
furnishes the carrier with a false description of the goods loaded in a
container (e.g., the bill of lading states that music records are loaded,
while in fact some garbage is loaded), and the carrier inserts in the bill
of lading the clause “said by shipper to contain.”39 In such a case the
bank will pay against such a document, the carrier will not be liable for
wrong description of the goods, and the seller may ‘disappear’ or
become insolvent. Bills of lading should provide security to the buyer,
and that security may be compromised if the banks accept bills which
would not be acceptable to the buyer. The UCP needs a revision of
its text to avoid potential risks, confusion, and problems arising from
the discrepancy of rules applicable to “said to contain” type clauses.
One possible solution is simply to delete Article 26(b) and leave the
parties to deal with these issues on a case-by-case basis.
Under the existing rules the buyers can still protect their
interests and ensure that banks will not accept transport documents
that are not acceptable to them. The buyers are advised to include in
the letter of credit requirements obligating the beneficiary (seller) to
produce the certificate of control where the goods are to be carried in
container sealed by the shipper. Less experienced traders may not be
familiar with these protective devices, as the illustration that opened
this text has shown, but such problems may happen even to large
companies.40

39

Discount Records Ltd. v Barclays Bank Ltd. [1975] 1 W.L.R. 315

40

Daewoo Int’l (America) Corp. v. Sea-Land Orient Ltd., 196 F.3d 481

(Eng.).
(3d Cir. 1999).
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Condition

Serious difficulties may also arise with respect to notations on
the condition of goods. It is not always clear which notations make a
bill of lading unclean in documentary sale. Even a notation that is
acceptable to the buyer is likely to cause a bank to refuse the bill of
lading due to the “strict compliance” rule.41 A clean bill of lading does
not always mean that the condition, and especially the quality, of the
goods is in conformity with the sale contract in much the same way as
an unclean bill of lading does not always mean that the goods are not
in conformity with what the seller and buyer have agreed. This is
because the notations in a bill of lading are aimed at protecting the
carrier from liability under the contract of carriage. The notations are
inserted by the carrier, who is not expected to know whether the goods
delivered for carriage are in conformity with the goods under sale
contract. Therefore, those notations cannot be expected to offer a
firm answer as to whether the goods correspond with the sold goods.
A requirement for a clean bill of lading may serve the buyer as an
excuse to refuse an unclean bill of lading, even when the reservation
states a fact the seller and the buyer have agreed upon.
A notation inserted by the carrier does not necessarily make a
bill of lading unclean as between the seller and the buyer, even if it
expressly declares the defective condition of the goods or packaging.
For example, a bill of lading with the notation “atmospheric rust
spotted” relating to iron products should not be refused by the buyer,
because in the case of sea carriage of iron products traces of
atmospheric rust are usual and perhaps even inevitable.
Similar situations may arise in cases of description of packing.
Buyers are, of course, mainly interested in goods rather than packing,
which only serves to protect the goods. For example, the notation
“used bags” would not necessarily make a bill of lading unclean, unless
the buyer insists on new bags. Actually, it may well be that the buyer
and the seller have agreed in a contract of sale on cheaper packing,
which might not be very suitable for the goods but would enable the
buyer to cut the price, e.g., carboard boxes instead of wooden boxes.
In such a case a notation inserted by the carrier in the bill of lading
41

Golodetz & Co. v Czarnikow (1980) 1 W.L.R 495 (Eng.)..
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stating insufficient packing will not give the buyer the right to refuse
the bill of lading because the buyer agreed to such packing in the
contract of sale.
As far as the carrier is concerned, he is usually not interested
in the transaction between the seller and buyer, but only in the proper
performance of the duties he has under the contract of carriage. If he
noticed upon receipt of the goods that the packing was insufficient and
has stated this in the bill of lading, he will be protected in case of loss
or damage caused by such packing. Needless to say, such notation will
require the bank to refuse documents, unless specifically authorized to
accept them.
On the other hand, the buyer should also be aware that the
carrier’s duty of control over the condition of the goods is limited to
the apparent condition, so that a clean bill of lading does not have to
mean that the goods are actually in good condition.
The present UCP definition of clean bill of lading does not
require change in the part regarding condition of the goods, but certain
caution may be necessary in relying on such definition. Depending on
the kind of goods, the buyer might need the services of a surveyor at
the port of shipment to determine whether the goods correspond with
the requirements of the contract of sale.
D.

Marks and General Nature of the Goods

Reservations related to marks should be stamped in such a
manner that they are clear and legible not only at the moment of
loading, but also at the time of delivery to the consignee. Marks can be
very important for the buyer, and when the goods are properly marked
they can be identified at the destination. On the other hand, improper
leading marks may expose the buyer to serious risk and difficulties. It
is not clear why the UCP failed to include reservations regarding
deficiency of marks in the definition of clean bill of lading. Maybe
those reservations are not often used, and practical importance is lower
than in the case of remarks concerning condition. But, as a matter of
principle, the UCP should have at least made a reference to those
reservations. The same applies to the nature of the goods, although it
may be assumed that reservations regarding the nature of the goods
are very seldom used.
147
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CONCLUSION
The fact that a clean bill of lading has two different and
sometimes contradictory meanings has not been adequately addressed
so far in the literature on letters of credit. Problems related to
discrepancy of rules may exist in cases of all particulars on goods
inserted in bills of lading. Such discrepancies can cause serious
difficulties to all parties involved. It is rather cumbersome and can be
confusing to assess the legal effect of the same document by applying
different and even conflicting rules and standards when there is no
obvious reason for that. This is a flaw in the system that could be
rectified by clearer rules.
The UCP rules on clean bills of lading are not sufficiently clear,
which may expose buyers to serious risks. The main controversies exist
in cases of reservations related to quantity and “said to contain” type
clauses.
Serious problems may arise in case of reservations regarding
the quantity of the goods, since the UCP lacks clear guidance in such
situations. There is also a clear departure from the rules on clean bills
that apply to contract of carriage, which is particularly confusing and
difficult to explain. Reservations stating shortage of the quantity are
usually not acceptable for the buyers, and it is difficult to understand
why the UCP ignored this. Buyers should be aware of the risk that
banks would pay against a bill of lading containing a reservation related
to quantity where the shortage is within the tolerance of 5% as
provided by Article 30(b). This provision, however, has a different
objective and may not be suitable for applying to the reservations
regarding quantity, which may create additional confusion and
problems to buyers. To avoid this risk, buyers should expressly instruct
banks not to pay against a bill of lading containing reservations
regarding the quantity.
Another problem that may arise is related to different
standards regarding the legal effects of “said to contain” type clauses.
This clause may make a bill of lading unclean under the contract of
carriage, but will never do so under the UCP, thus exposing buyers to
a potentially great risk. Drafters of the next UCP may consider deleting
Article 26(b), which contravenes the carriage rules and may even
148
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facilitate the fraud. To avoid the risk imposed by “said to contain” type
of clauses, the buyer should arrange for inspection of the goods before
their delivery to the carrier and demand the seller to produce the
certificate of inspection. Relating to documentary fraud, the principle
of autonomy applying to letters of credit, and the fact that banks are
bound to examine merely whether the documents comply with the
terms of the credit makes it easier for dishonest sellers to commit
fraud. Part of the problem is that the UCP often rely on trust instead
on verification. Things are made even worse by some court decisions,
which restricted the fraud exception to fraud by the beneficiary,
making third party fraud outside the scope of the fraud exception.42
The shortcomings in the present text of the UCP are obvious.
For an outsider, it is difficult to understand why the ICC failed to
rectify them in numerous revisions of the UCP. One possible
explanation is that banks are not prepared to take additional burdens
in examining transport documents. Another possible reason is that
letters of credit function relatively well and not many problems actually
arise in practice. However, the risk of fraud should not be
underestimated, as even large companies may be defrauded under the
existing system. 43 Manoeuvring through the murky waters of fraud
infected letters of credit can be very risky and cumbersome. Revisions
of the relevant UCP provisions may substantially reduce the potential
for fraud. Prevention is better than cure.

42

United City Merchs. (Inv.) Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Can. [1983] 1 A.C.

168 (Eng.).
See, e.g., Discount Records Ltd. [1975] 1 W.L.R. 315; see also Daewoo
Int’l., 196 F.3d 481. Recently (June 2015) I received information about similar
problems facing one of the largest companies in Thailand. This company bought
steel scrap from an U.S. company. The goods were shipped in containers sealed by
the shipper. Carrier inserted “said to contain” clause in the bill of lading, the bank
has made payments pursuant to the UCP. After the containers were opened it was
found that 80% in the cargo was soil, and not scrap. The lawyers of the buyer are
aware that there is no valid claim against the carrier, or against the bank. The only
chance is to sue the seller, which seems to be without significant assets, so even if
successful, the award may not be enforceable. This kind of trouble was ultimately
caused by a defect in the UCP, and not only by failure to engage a surveyor. After
all, many companies may not employ the surveyor’s services to verify condition of
the scrap cargo.
43
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The UCP should be drafted in the way to protect the
customers, and many of its provisions on transport documents serve
that purpose. Revisions of the UCP suggested by this text would not
be difficult and would not cause problems in implementation.
Harmonizing the rules on letter of credit with rules applying to
contract of carriage, where possible, would reduce legal uncertainty
and problems that arise in practice. This would also help the letters of
credit to maintain its position as a leading instrument of payment in
international trade in the face of challenges by other forms of
financing.
Under the assumption that at least some arguments in this
paper are correct, the drafters of the next revision of the UCP should
take care to correct shortcomings in its present text and make efforts
to harmonize letter of credit rules on clean bills of lading with
corresponding rules that apply in carriage of goods.
Another recommendation would be that all provisions related
to clean bills of lading should be placed in one article rather than being
scattered in different provisions. This would contribute to greater
clarity and would reduce unnecessary confusions.
The UCP has proven to be a great success, achieving greater
uniformity than any other international instrument has ever been able
to achieve in the area of transnational commercial law. Of course, the
credit for this success goes to its drafters. But nothing is so good that
it cannot be improved further. It is hoped that ideas expressed in this
paper may contribute to a still better UCP.44

I have shared this text and my views in informal contact with the ICC
Banking Commission and the reaction was receptive and positive. I hope that some
of the ideas from this text may eventually be incorporated in the next revision of the
UCP.
44
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THE HAGUE PRINCIPLES, THE CISG,
AND THE “BATTLE OF FORMS”
Peter Winship*
The Hague Conference on Private International Law is about
to adopt Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial
Contracts (Principles).1 Assume an enterprise in Texas agrees to
provide commercial services to an enterprise in Peru, and the parties
agree that the law of Texas applies to any dispute arising from their
contract. Will a court enforce this choice-of-law agreement? Courts in
most States will do so. For these States the Principles provide a
codification of basic rules together with some refinements. Some
States, however, do not enforce such agreements or restrict their
enforceability. The Principles and the accompanying Commentary
seek to persuade these latter States that recognizing party autonomy as
to the choice of law is preferable. As the Introduction to the Principles
states, “[p]arty autonomy . . . enhances certainty and predictability . . .
*

James Cleo Thompson Sr. Trustee Professor, SMU Dedman School of

Law.
The Hague Conference on Private International Law published a revised
draft in July 2014. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE
DRAFT HAGUE PRINCIPLES ON CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS, Prel. Doc. No. 6 (revised) (July 2014) [hereinafter Hague Principles or
Principles], available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap2014pd06rev_en.pdf.
Member States of the Hague Conference had until August 31, 2014 to submit
comments on recent amendments to the text of the Commentary. COUNCIL ON
GENERAL AFFAIRS AND POLICY OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE
COUNCIL,
¶
2
(April
2014),
available
at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2014concl_en.pdf. In the light of these
comments, the Conference’s Working Group will prepare a definitive final text,
which the Conference will then circulate to Member States. If there are no objections
within sixty days the draft will be an official text of the Hague Conference. Id. [Ed.
The Principles entered into force on March 19, 2015. The final text may be found at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt40en.pdf].
1

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:1

and recognises that parties to a contract may be in the best position to
determine which set of legal principles is most suitable for their
transaction.”2
The Hague Principles are no stranger to the International
Academy of Commercial and Consumer Law. At the Academy’s July
2012 meeting in Mexico City, Neil Cohen, a participant in the Working
Group drafting the Principles, traced the history of the project and
identified the principal issues addressed by the Hague draft.3 Since his
report the number of commentaries analyzing the Principles has
grown.4 Most of this literature comments on the Principles as a whole.
This paper, however, is more limited in scope. It considers only one
issue: the relation of the Hague Principles to the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)5
when parties to an international contract of sales refer during
negotiations to their standard terms and these standard terms include
choice-of-law terms that conflict.
Paragraph 1 b) of Article 6 of the Principles purports to answer
whether parties to an international commercial contract—including an
international contract of sale—have agreed on a choice of law when
they make such references without resolving differences in their
standard terms. Article 6 as a whole provides:
Hague Principles
Article 6 (Agreement on choice of law and battle of
forms)
Paragraph 1

Hague Principles, supra note 1, at ¶ I.3.
Neil B. Cohen, The Proposed Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International
Commercial Contracts, in THE EVOLUTION OF THE GLOBAL TRADE OVER THE LAST
THIRTY YEARS 157-71 (Elvia Arcelia Quintana Adriano, ed., 2014).
4 See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, HAGUE
DRAFT PRINCIPLES ON CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS:
BIBLIOGRAPHY, available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/draft_principles_bibl-e.pdf.
5
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 10,
1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 671 [hereinafter CISG].
2
3
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Subject to paragraph 2 whether the parties have agreed to a choice of law is
determined by the law that was purportedly agreed to;
if the parties have used standard terms designating two
different laws and under both of these laws the same
standard terms prevail, the law designated in the
prevailing terms applies; if under these laws different
standard terms prevail, or if under one or both of these
laws no standard terms prevail, there is no choice of
law.
Paragraph 2
The law of the State in which a party has its
establishment determines whether that party has
consented to the choice of law if, under the
circumstances, it would not be reasonable to make that
determination under the law specified in paragraph 1.6
The solution in paragraph 1 b) draws heavily on the thoughtful
analysis of Thomas Kadner Graziano, a Swiss member of the Working
Group.7 In his preliminary analysis of the Hague Principles, Symeon
Symeonides rightfully pays tribute to Professor Kadner’s contribution
to resolving this “difficult problem”8—a problem acknowledged to be
one of the more challenging problems in private international law.9
Because of its novelty, the solution in Article 6 will no doubt attract
considerable attention from scholars and possibly judges and
arbitrators. To assist the reader, the Commentary to Article 6 analyzes
four scenarios, the fourth of which purports to apply the Principle to
a contract of sale governed by the CISG.

Hague Principles, supra note 1, at art. 6.
Thomas Kadner Graziano, Solving the Riddle of Conflicting Choice of Law
Clauses in Battle of Forms Situations: The Hague Solution, 14 Y.B. PRIV. INT’L L. 71 (2013).
8
Symeon C. Symeonides, The Hague Principles on Choice of Law for
International Contracts: Some Preliminary Comments, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 873, 877 (2013).
9
See generally Gerhard Dannemann, The “Battle of the Forms” and the Conflict
of Laws, in LEX MERCATORIA: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW IN
HONOUR OF FRANCIS REYNOLDS 199 (F.D. Rose ed., 2000).
6
7
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This paper considers only this last scenario: the relation of the
Hague Principles to the CISG when a seller and a buyer fail to resolve
differences in their choice-of-law standard terms. I leave to separate
papers the analysis of Article 6 and an evaluation of the Principles as a
whole. The thesis of this paper is that the solution offered in the
Commentary is not the only reasonable way to analyze the scenario.
I.
A.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

The “Battle of Forms”

The “battle of forms” is to academic lawyers what a candle is
to moths. Most of my acquaintances have written about the “battle.”
They ask: Do persons who exchange forms with different preestablished standard terms have a contract when neither reads the
other’s form but each performs as if there is a contract? And if there
is a contract, what are its terms? They classify national and
international solutions to these questions with descriptive tags—”no
contract”; “first shot”; “last shot”; “knock out”; “hybrid”—used by
aficionados who barely pause to elaborate.10 These classifications and
the concept of non-negotiated standard terms are so familiar I will not
take up space to define them.
Something, however, should be said about the “battle of
forms” and the CISG. As with other laws, there is a growing literature
analyzing the problem.11 Attempts at the 1980 Diplomatic Convention
to address the issue with a specifically-tailored provision failed.12 It is

10

See generally Kadner Graziano, supra note 7; see also Dannemann, supra

note 9.
A search in the bibliography of published commentaries maintained by
the CISG Database maintained by Pace Law School yielded seventy-four entries with
the word “battle” in the title. Bibliography, PACE LAW SCH. INST. OF INT’L
COMMERCIAL LAW,
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/biblio.html (last visited June 30, 2014).
12
At the 1980 diplomatic conference, Belgium proposed to add a
paragraph (4) to Article 19 (“(4) When the offeror and the offeree have expressly (or
implicitly) referred in the course of negotiations to general conditions the terms of which
are mutually exclusive the conflict clauses should be considered not to form an
integral part of the contract.”). Report of the First Committee, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.97/11 (Apr. 7, 1980).
11
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generally agreed that the solution must be found in Article 19 CISG,
which, with slight modifications, requires the terms of an acceptance
to be the same as those in the offer.13 Two solutions–”knock out” and
“last shot”—have found favor with both courts and commentators.
There appears to be a trend among commentators to favor the knockout solution;14 it is more difficult to identify a trend in the decisions of
judges and arbitrators.15
Despite the academic interest in the subject, most authors
concede that it is far from clear that the “battle” is of much interest in
practice. This is certainly true with respect to the CISG. During the
last twenty-five years, only a relatively small number of reported CISG
cases have wrestled with the issue of conflicting standard terms. 16 As
for a “battle” between differing choice-of-law terms, the number of
reported cases can be counted on the fingers of one hand.17
B.

CISG Policies

Before turning to analysis of the specific issue addressed,
several basic policies embodied in the provisions in CISG Part I
(Sphere of application and general provisions) should be noted.
Article 1(1) is the basic provision defining when the
Convention is applicable:
CISG
Article 1
(1) This Convention applies to contracts of sale of
goods between parties whose places of business are in
different States:

CISG, supra note 5, at art. 19.
See COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS Art. 19, ¶¶ 34-38 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg
Schwenzer, eds., 2d ed. 2005).
15 See generally UNCITRAL, Digest of Case Law on the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, at 103-07 (2012).
16
Id.
17
Id.
13
14
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when the States are Contracting States; or
when the rules of private international law lead to the
application of the law of a Contracting State.18
Subsequent articles qualify this statement by excluding, for
example, particular sale transactions and particular issues. For the
purpose of this paper, however, the most relevant qualification is
Article 6, which allows a seller and buyer to agree to exclude
application of the CISG when the Convention would otherwise be
applicable. Article 6 provides in relevant part:
CISG
Article 6
The parties may exclude the application of this
Convention . . . .19
It is the interplay between these CISG scope provisions and
Article 6 of the Hague Principles that is at issue in this paper.
When considering this issue, three general provisions in CISG
Part I are of particular importance. Two of these provisions direct the
reader as to how to interpret or construe the Convention, while the
third sets out rules on the interpretation of a party’s acts or statements.
Article 7(1) states:
CISG
Article 7
(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard
is to be had to its international character and to the
need to promote uniformity in its application and
the observance of good faith in international trade.20

18
19
20

CISG, supra note 5, at art. 1.
Id. at art. 6.
Id. at art. 7(1) (emphasis added).
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Article 7(2) goes on to provide that:
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this
Convention which are not expressly settled by it are to
be settled in conformity with the general principles on
which it is based or, in the absence of such principles,
in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the
rules of private international law.21
As for the interpretation of a party’s statements, sub-articles
(1) and (2) of Article 8 state:
CISG
Article 8
(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements
made by and other conduct of a party are to be
interpreted according to his intent where the other
party knew or could not have been unaware what that
intent was.
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable,
statements made by and other conduct of a party are
to be interpreted according to the understanding that a
reasonable person of the same kind as the other party
would have had in the same circumstances.22
Article 9 supplements this article by binding parties to usages
of trade and their course of dealing with each other.23
II.

THE BASIC SETTING

The Commentary to Article 6 of the Hague Principles analyzes
the following scenario (Scenario 4):

21
22
23

Id. at art. 7(2) (emphasis added).
Id. at art. 8(1) and (2).
Id. at art. 9.
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Party A to a transborder sales contract designates in its
standard terms the law of State X, which is a CISG
Contracting State, as the law applicable to the contract.
Party B designates in its standard terms the law of State
Y, which is also a CISG Contracting State, but
explicitly excludes the CISG. The general contract law
of State Y follows the knock-out rule. The case is
brought before a court in a CISG Contracting State.24
Paragraphs 6.25-6.27 of the Commentary apply Article 6 of the
Principles to this scenario and conclude that the parties have not
agreed on the designation of an applicable law and therefore have not
excluded application of the CISG.25
The analysis in the Commentary is straightforward. The law
designated by each party’s choice-of-law term is examined to
determine how that law would resolve a “battle of forms.” If under
one or both of these laws no term prevails, the parties are deemed not
to have chosen the applicable law. Party A’s designation of the law of
State X leads—in accordance with the general consensus of courts and
commentators—to application of the CISG rather than domestic
contract law. Article 19, the relevant contract formation rule of the
CISG, is then identified. The Commentary accurately notes that there
is no consensus among courts and commentators on whether Article
19 is a “knock out” or “last shot” rule, and the Commentary does not
try to resolve this issue of CISG interpretation. A separate analysis of
Party B’s choice-of-law term is then made, although made simpler
because the scenario itself indicates that State Y’s general contract
law—which is applicable, because Party B’s term expressly excludes
the CISG—follows the knock-out rule. Because no term prevails
under one (or possibly both, depending on interpretation of CISG
Article 19) of the laws designated by the two forms, the alternative set
out in paragraph 1 b) of Article 6 of the Hague Principles provides that
there has been no choice of the applicable law.26
A basic assumption of the Commentary is that no part of the
CISG is relevant when determining whether the parties have agreed to
24
25
26

Hague Principles, supra note 1, Commentary at ¶ 6.24.
Id. at ¶¶ 6.24-6.27.
Id.
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exclude the Convention pursuant to Article 6 of the CISG: “[i]f the
parties enter into a choice of law agreement excluding the CISG, the
CISG will not apply”27 and “[because under the doctrine of
severability] the choice of law agreement is a separate contract that is
distinguished from the main contract (e.g., the sales contract) . . . the
Principles govern the choice of law agreement, whereas the CISG
governs the sales contract . . . .”28
The issue is therefore whether this assumption is correct. In a
separately published analysis, Professor Kadner concedes that his
position—which supports the solution in the Hague Principles—is
contrary to the “currently dominant position.”29 He cites five authors
and one court decision as favoring the view that the contract formation
provisions of the CISG (Part II: Arts. 14-24) apply to the formation of
the choice-of-law agreement.30 He rejects this position on the principal
ground that a choice-of-law agreement is distinct (“severable”) from
the contract of sale.31 For this proposition, he relies on Article 7 of the
Hague Principles, which states the severability principle,32 and Article
4 of the CISG, which states that the Convention “governs only the
formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the
seller and the buyer arising from such a contract.”33 In support of his
interpretation, Professor Kadner suggests several useful consequences.
He notes that looking to general contract law rather than Part II of the
CISG has the advantage of providing more comprehensive contract
formation rules.34 He also points out that, because Article 4(a) of the
CISG excludes coverage of issues of validity, a solution that leads to

Id. at ¶ 6.25.
Id. at ¶ 6.26
29
To be accurate, Professor Kadner addresses the issue in his analysis of
paragraph (1)(b) of Article 1 of the CISG. That paragraph provides that the CISG
governs a contract of sale if rules of private international law lead to the law of a
Contracting State. Professor Kadner’s analysis of Article 1 is equally applicable to
Article 6 of the CISG. Kadner, supra note 7, at 95-98.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Hague Principles, supra note 1, art. 7.
33
CISG, supra note 5, art 4.
34
Kadner, supra note 7, at 97.
27
28
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general contract law provides a single law for issues of both formation
and validity.35
Without necessarily endorsing the dominant position—at least
as it is summarized by Professor Kadner—I find Professor Kadner’s
reliance on Article 4 of the CISG unpersuasive. On its face, the CISG
governs more than contract formation (Part II) and the rights and
obligations of sellers and buyers (Part III). The CISG clearly also
governs the Convention’s sphere of application, not to mention the
Final Provisions in Part IV. There is little reason to think that the
general provisions in Part I (Arts. 7-13) do not apply to interpretation
of the sphere of application provisions (Arts. 1-6) as well as to the
provisions of Parts II and III. Thus, if the policies and rules of
interpretation found in Part I support the proposition that the CISG
determines whether the parties have agreed to exclude the CISG, there
is no need to rely on direct application of Article 19 of the CISG.
Moreover, I think Professor Kadner pays insufficient attention
to the CISG policies and principles of interpretation noted above in
this paper’s preliminary remarks. Although the CISG does not deny a
role for private international law as its predecessor (Uniform Law on
the International Sale of Goods (ULIS)) did,36 the CISG subordinates
the role of private international law to the Convention’s provisions and
the general principles on which the CISG is based. The subordination
of private international law is evident in the basic scope provision of
Article 1(1) of the CISG: if the seller and buyer have their places of
business in different Contracting States, the CISG applies;37 only if that
paragraph is not satisfied does private international law play a role in
making the CISG apply. To argue that private international rules are
the exclusive source of rules when determining whether the parties have
agreed to exclude the CISG pursuant to Article 6 is to upset the agreed
relation between the CISG and private international law. It should not
be forgotten that until it is shown that the parties agreed to exclude the
CISG pursuant to Article 6 of the CISG, the Convention governs. In

Id. at 96-97.
Uniform Law of International Sales, art. 2. The Uniform Law is set
out in the annex to the 1964 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the
International Sale of Goods, 834 U.N.T.S. 107 (1972).
37
CISG, supra note 5, art. 1(1)(a).
35
36
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other words, Article 6 itself is in a sense subordinate to the scope
provisions of Article 1(1).38
One reason for subordinating private international law is that
the CISG endorses the policy of uniformity, and private international
rules do not always lead to uniform outcomes. This is true in the
context of contracts and is especially true when parties use standard
terms, where the rules are uncertain in part because of the failure of
commentators to analyze the issues. There is no assurance that the
Hague Principles will be successful in securing uniformity by their
formula for analyzing the battle of forms. Even if widely implemented,
the Hague Principles allow for potential non-uniform outcomes. For
example, the Principles rely on non-uniform rules of interpretation
unlike the CISG, which, as noted earlier, incorporates uniform
provisions on interpretation of the parties’ statements and on the
binding quality of the parties’ course of dealing and usages of trade.
III.

MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SCENARIO 4

In the scenario set out in the Hague Commentary, the judge
sits in a State party to the CISG.39 The judge is bound by Article 1(1)(a)
to apply the CISG unless it can be shown that Party A and Party B
agreed to exclude the Convention pursuant to Article 6. How the
judge might analyze the issues involved may best be understood by
considering several simpler hypothetical cases.
If Party A and Party B had negotiated a term that expressly
excluded the CISG but did not designate the applicable law, the issue
whether the parties agreed to the term is a matter of interpreting Article
6 of the CISG. The CISG does not provide an explicit answer, so,
before turning to private international law, Article 7(2) directs the
reader to look to the general principles on which the CISG is based.
These principles can be derived from Part II and can be summarized

38
For an analysis of the relation of Article 6 of the CISG and private
international law, see COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, supra note 14, Art. 6, ¶¶ 4-5 (“The formation and
interpretation of the exclusion of the CISG is subject to the rules of the Convention
as the CISG determines its sphere of application autonomously”).
39
Hague Principles, supra note 1, Commentary at ¶ 6.24.
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as requiring clear evidence of actual agreement. Article 19 would not
be directly applicable, but indirectly the insistence on a “mirror-image”
acceptance of an offer is evidence of this principle. If a court should
find that there was an agreement to exclude the CISG, the court would
then apply private international law rules to determine which State’s
law applies when the parties have not chosen the applicable law.
This analysis becomes only slightly more complicated if Party
A and Party B each includes in its standard terms a term excluding the
CISG without designating another law as the law applicable. The
complication arises because each of the exclusion terms must be read
in the light of Article 8 of the CISG (and, when relevant, Article 9 on
binding trade usages and the parties’ course of dealing). If each
exclusion term is unambiguous there would be consensus on exclusion
and again a judge would apply the national law applicable by virtue of
the rules of private international law. If, however, one of the terms is
interpreted as not excluding the CISG, the judge would look to the
general principles on which the CISG is based as directed by Article
7(2). This general principle, I suggest, is to enforce the agreement of
the parties when interpretation of their statements and acts under
Article 8 show that there is consensus. The general principle is derived
from Part II of the CISG and is not bound by any particular
interpretation of Article 19. In a case where one standard term excludes
the CISG and the other does not, a court should find that the seller
and buyer have not agreed to exclude the CISG.
Sellers and buyers will rarely agree to exclude the CISG without
designating the law applicable instead. Somewhat more likely is a
transaction where Party A and Party B negotiate a term excluding the
CISG and a separate term that designates the law of State Z, a nonCISG State, as the applicable law. The judge in this case must answer
two questions: Did the parties agree to exclude the CISG? and, Did
the parties effectively choose the law of State Z? As in the cases
analyzed in the preceding two paragraphs, the judge should analyze the
first of these questions in light of the CISG’s general principles on the
formation of an enforceable agreement. That the parties purport to
choose the law of State Z as the applicable law is some evidence of
their intent to exclude the CISG. Whether or not their choice of State
Z’s law is valid is a separate question. If the judge concludes that the
parties agreed to exclude the CISG, the judge must then determine
162
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whether rules of private international law would give effect to the
parties’ choice of the law of State Z.
These same two questions are posed even if Party A and Party
B include the exclusion and the choice of the law of State Z in a single
term of their agreement—or in substantively-equivalent terms in each
of their standard terms. There is no reason for the judge to analyze the
case differently. Even if the parties use a more likely formula—the
term merely designates the law of State Z as the applicable law—there
are the same two questions and the same analysis. Note, in particular,
that absent an express exclusion of the CISG the choice of the law of
State Z might be intended merely to designate the applicable domestic
law if there are gaps in the CISG.40
Scenario 4 of the Hague Commentary also involves the same
two questions and the same analysis. One standard term designates the
law of State X, which effectively is a choice of the CISG; the other
standard term designates the law of State Y but expressly excludes
application of the CISG, which effectively is a choice of the domestic
law of State Y. Applying the CISG’s general principles on contract
formation to the first question, there is no consensus on exclusion of
the CISG under Article 6 of the CISG. Nor, as it happens, is there an
effective choice of the applicable law by application of the analysis
found in the Commentary to Article 6 of the Hague Principles. The
analysis of the two questions is simpler and more direct than that based
solely on Article 6 of the Principles. It recognizes a role, albeit a
subordinate one, for private international law. In other words, the
analysis is a rational alternative to the reasoning of the Hague
Principles.
IV.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS

Whether one analyzes Scenario 4 using the Hague
Commentary or my alternative analysis the result is the same: Party A
and Party B have not agreed to exclude application of the CISG so the
Convention governs their transaction. Nevertheless, several additional
remarks are in order.

40

CISG, supra note 5, art. 7(2).
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First, the Commentary apparently assumes that there is at all
times an enforceable sales contract. This is apparently based on the
concept of severability: whether or not the parties have a contract of
sale excludes any consideration of choice-of-law terms even if all the
terms are in a single document. It is difficult to imagine that sellers and
buyers think of their “deal” as consisting of two distinct contracts. My
alternate analysis leaves open the question of whether the parties have
formed a contract of sale. If the parties have not agreed to exclude the
CISG, a judge will determine whether the parties concluded a sales
contract by looking to Article 19 and applying it to all terms (including
the choice-of-law term) of the parties’ deal.
Second, the Commentary makes the result appear easy by
simply stating State Y’s contract law rule on battle of forms without
going through the potentially difficult task of ascertaining and
interpreting that rule.41 Having reported that the rule is a “knock-out
rule” the result follows by a simple application of paragraph 1 b) of
Article 6 of the Hague Principles: “if the parties have used standard
terms designating two different laws and . . . [if] under one or both of
these laws no standard terms prevail, there is no choice of law.”42
Under the “knock-out rule” of State Y, no standard term prevails so
there is no choice of law. In practice, however, identifying how a
jurisdiction deals with conflicting standard terms may be contentious
and time-consuming—and in the case of conflicting standard choiceof-law terms the analysis will have to be done for each of the
jurisdictions designated in the conflicting standard terms.43
Third, it follows from the second point that, if Article 19 of
the CISG is interpreted as adopting a “knock-out rule,”44 parties will
never chose the applicable law if one of the parties designates the law

Hague Principles, supra note 1, Commentary ¶ 6.24.
Id. at art. 6 1 b).
43
If the CISG is interpreted as adopting a knock-out rule, there never
will be a choice of law when one of the States is a CISG state. The answer to scenarios
like that of Scenario 4 will always be that there is no choice of law. The Hague
Commentary avoids interpretation of Article 19 because the scenario itself states that
the law of State Y regarding battle of forms applies a knock-out rule.
44
It should be noted that the Hague Commentary quite rightly does not
interpret Article 19, merely calling attention to the several possible interpretations
recognized in case law and the literature.
41
42
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of a CISG state as the applicable law. The answer to scenarios like that
of Scenario 4 will always then be that there is no choice of law
agreement. This would simplify analysis using the Commentary’s
approach because no further analysis is necessary if one party has
designated a CISG state.
Finally, by commenting on the interface between the Principles
and the CISG only with respect to the “battle of forms,” the
Commentary misses an opportunity to provide a more systematic
analysis of that interface. If, for example, the parties are not located in
different Contracting States, what is the relation of the Hague
Principles to CISG Article 1(1)(b)? Even within Article 6 of the
Principles there are questions that might have been addressed.
Consider the following variation on Scenario 4:
Party A’s standard terms designate the law of State Z, a nonCISG State, and Party B’s standard terms neither exclude the CISG
nor choose an applicable law. (All other facts remain the same as in
Scenario 4.)
Paragraph 1 b) of Article 6 is not relevant–the parties’ standard
terms have not chosen two different laws—so paragraph 1 a) is the
relevant rule. As a similar provision in Article 10 of the Rome I
Regulation is interpreted, the law of State Z is the law the two parties
“purportedly agreed to.”45 In such a case, Professor Kadner argues that
the domestic contract law of State Z determines whether the choice is
valid.46 If it is valid, the Principles would conclude that, because the
CISG is not the law in State Z, the parties had excluded the CISG even
though Party A and Party B have their places of business in different
Contracting States. By contrast, an analysis that applies the CISG
principles to determine whether the parties have agreed to exclude the
CISG would look to the statements and acts of both parties rather than
a “purported agreement” derived from only one of them. The silence
of Party B should not be deemed an acceptance of Party A’s term. This
is a general principle found in Article 18(1) of the CISG (“Silence . . .
does not in itself amount to acceptance.”).47 Moreover, given the
Council Regulation 593/2008, The Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6.
46
Kadner, supra note 7, at 94-99.
47
CISG, supra note 5, art. 18(1).
45
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widespread adoption of the CISG, Party B’s silence may reflect a
judgment that there is no need to choose a law when dealing with
businesses located in other Contracting States because the CISG will
apply and Party B thinks its provisions satisfactory. This analysis leads
to the conclusion that Party A and Party B have not agreed to exclude
the CISG.
The Commentary’s relatively straightforward analysis of
Scenario 4 may leave the impression that all applications of the Hague
Principles will be equally straightforward. This is not the case. The
Commentary rightly points to the potential importance of applying the
Principles to CISG transactions. It is unfortunate—but understandable
for reasons of space—that the Commentary addresses only one
scenario. For informed analysis of additional scenarios, the reader
must look to Professor Kadner’s separate publication.48
CONCLUSION
In this paper I analyze the relation of the Hague Principles on
the Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts to the CISG
when a seller and a buyer exchange different choice-of-law terms in
their standard terms. I have done so by studying a scenario (“Scenario
4”) in the Commentary to Article 6 of the Principles. The thesis of the
paper is that the solution offered in the Commentary is not the only
reasonable way to analyze the scenario. In support of my thesis it is
not necessary that I demonstrate that my analysis is the only proper
analysis or even that my analysis is the better one. I merely have to
show that a rational judge or arbitrator might choose my analysis over
that offered by the Commentary. If I am persuasive, adoption of the
Principles should not be read as endorsing the Commentary solution
as definitive.49

Kadner, supra note 7, at 94-99.
The final text of the Commentary adds a final sentence to paragraph
6.23: “The interpretations of the CISG in this Commentary do not purport to be
exclusive or authoritative interpretations of the CISG by the Hague Conference or
its members.” See supra, note 1.
48
49
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AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO THE
CREATION OF INNOVATION
ECOSYSTEMS AND THE ROLE OF LAW
Toshiyuki Kono* and Kazuaki Kagami**
INTRODUCTION
Innovation is considered a source of social development, and
the promotion of innovation has been encouraged all over the world.
The methods for which innovation can be achieved, however, have
not been clearly identified. The concept of an “ecosystem” has recently
emerged as a tool to illustrate the organizational aspects of innovation,
but the conditions and mechanisms necessary to create and manage a
successful innovation ecosystem remain unclear.
Many countries, including Japan, have been trying to create an
ecosystem similar to Silicon Valley by inviting and accumulating
venture companies, research institutions, and universities, and by
providing special measures for tax reduction, new funding schemes,
and opening new facilities. However, one important aspect seems to
have been overlooked: even if each player is innovative, if they do not
create relationships that lead to innovations, the area as a whole cannot
function as an innovation ecosystem. When an ecosystem is
established, the conditions of its autonomous functioning are not
automatically fulfilled. Hence, we are interested in the role of law,
which might contribute to the development of these conditions. In
particular, we will focus on a factor that would lead to the

* Distinguished professor, Graduate School of Law, Kyushu University.
** Professor, Faculty of Economics, Toyo University.
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establishment of innovation ecosystems and functions–we1 call it
“mode,” which we understand as those factors that determine the
direction of the player’s thinking and activities–and analyze the role of
law to facilitate the sharing of modes by relevant players.
To illustrate the goal of this article, let’s have a look at the Ohta
Ward in Tokyo. In Ohta Ward, many diverse small and midsized
companies have gathered and countless innovations are continuously
created. In this area, a number of voluntary interactions among these
companies take place. Furthermore, networks between these
companies, research institutes and governmental agencies are well
established. Importantly, in Ohta Ward, laws and rules have played a
crucial role in establishing these networks and their management. An
innovation ecosystem, along with the supporting infrastructure, is
firmly established in Ohta Ward. The supporting infrastructure
includes not only measures related to tax and finance, but also
measures aimed at development and education of human resources,
the supply of human resources into the ecosystem, support for
matching players, and the reduction of friction related to the
establishment of networks and their management. In short, various
types of support focusing on specificities of the ecosystem are offered
as institutional bases of this well-functioning ecosystem.2
I. INNOVATION ECOSYSTEM AND THE ROLE OF LAW
Many policymakers and other governmental authorities have
focused on innovation. Various policy measures have been introduced
and implemented to achieve innovation. Industrial policies, particularly
centralized industrial policies, are often adopted by developing
countries to “catch up” with developed countries. Such policies are

1

This refers to the authors of the article and is used throughout this

article.
2
Chiiki ni okeru sangyō shūseki no keisei oyobi kaihatsu ni kansuru
hōritsu shinki jigyō ritchi no sokushin o tsūjite,-tō [Act on Formation and
Development of Regional Industrial Clusters through Promotion of Establishment
of New Business Facilities, etc.], Act No. 40 of May 11, 2007 (Japan).
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inadequate to create new technologies or ideas, or to develop new
types of market. Instead, open and decentralized systems have recently
been attracting the attention policymakers. This is the so-called
“ecosystem.”
We share the view that an ecosystem is one of the most
important keys for innovation.3 Although a well-established and widely
shared definition of the concept of an ecosystem does not yet exist,
there is one shared understanding of the ecosystem:4 an organization
or system where continuous and dynamic interactions among various
players take place. Inherent in this definition is the idea that innovative
outcomes cannot be obtained solely by a single “genius” individual or
through a well-controlled and uni-linear evolution process. Rather, it
is presumed that outcomes can be obtained as a result of multi-layered
and voluntary interactions among various players.5
Various policy measures have been implemented to promote
innovations, including education policies to build the capacity of
(potential) players in the ecosystem, cultural policies to promote
innovation-oriented minds, intellectual property (IP) protections and
tax policies to incentivize players, accumulation policies to raise the
degree of players’ density, and subsidization policies. If these policy
measures are successful, we would find a number of successful
innovation ecosystems. The reality, however, is that despite many
countries’ efforts to create a second Silicon Valley, their trials often
yield unsuccessful results. This failure implies that the proper

See infra, note 6.
Ecosystem is defined as “a multi-faceted and continual interaction
among many aspects of our economy and society.” COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS,
INNOVATE AMERICA: NATIONAL INNOVATION INITIATIVE SUMMIT AND REPORT
46 (2005).
5
Regarding the evolution of the innovation concept, see RICHARD S.
ROSENBLOOM & W. J. SPENCER, ENGINES OF INNOVATION: U.S. INDUSTRIAL
RESEARCH AT THE END OF AN ERA (1996); ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL
ADVANTAGE: CULTURES AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128
2-4 (1994) (comparing the independent firm-based system and the regional networkbased system, and asserting that the latter is more suitable).
3
4
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understanding of the conditions and means necessary to create
innovative ecosystems is still lacking.6 Why is that so?
Our view is that policy measures have tended to target
individual players themselves, and have failed to focus on the interaction
between players. Even if excellent inventors, scholars, and entrepreneurs
had populated a particular area, that area would not function well as an
ecosystem if their interactions are ineffective. This idea reflects the
shortcomings of previous research on ecosystems. It is a widely
accepted belief that networking, communication, and collaboration are
crucial, but how to facilitate this remains somewhat unclear. In short,
the conditions of a well-functioning ecosystem has not been a topic of
significant research.
A key factor of a well-functioning ecosystem is the transaction
costs caused by interactions among players.7 If transaction costs are
high, interactions stagnate and the ecosystem remains ineffective.
Further, if transaction costs matter, a law and economics approach
might contribute to a clarification of the conditions. What can law do
to promote interactions among players to create successful
ecosystems?
II. INNOVATION ECOSYSTEM AND MODE
A.

Mode of Thinking and Behavior

1. Generally recognized facts on innovation. – As already mentioned,
innovations are created through interactions among multiple players
under specific conditions. Such interactions can be affected by players’
internal nature and external environment. Players’ internal nature
includes their knowledge, technical strength, passion, financial power,

In this context, see VICTOR W. HWANG & GREG HOROWITT, THE
RAINFOREST: THE SECRET TO BUILDING THE NEXT SILICON VALLEY 304 (2012).
7
For a discussion of transaction costs related to communications, see
KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974); OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975).
6
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way of thinking, and behavior. These elements of a players’ internal
nature might be so player-specific that trying to determine an “average
type” or “typical features” is unhelpful. In addition, these elements are
usually formed within each player and become quasi-inherent.
Therefore, a players’ internal nature is not easily changeable, and any
change would require significant time and costs.
A player’s external environment consists of external factors
that influence his activities and performances, but that cannot be
directly controlled by the player. Such factors include other players’
capabilities, types of players, or the density of players; funding systems;
legal systems to protect contracts and/or property; the quality and
quantity of lawyers; the credibility of the judicial system; macroeconomy and industrial structure; and consciousness on invention or
entrepreneurship in society.
Recognizing the fact that a number of factors affect
innovations, we propose to focus on mode and to clarify the role of
law in relation to mode because mode has been neglected in preceding
scholarly works and has not been integrated into policy measures.
2. The concept of mode and its functions. – In this paper, we
understand mode as those factors that determine the direction of each
player’s thinking and activities. This understanding of mode considers
each player’s internal nature, but excludes purely innate factors such as
IQ. Mode overlaps to some extent with personal character; however,
mode is not identical to individual personality or philosophy, since
personality and philosophy remain individual and internal. Instead,
mode has such aspects that affect performances and outcomes of
collaborative works with other players. Focus should be placed on such
factors that can be acquired after birth and that are to some extent
adjustable, such as language. Even if an individual is honest,
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industrious and has good sense of humor, he cannot contribute to
innovation if he does not have a mode to work with others.
Mode is also closely linked to organizational cultures.8 Schein
defines organizational cultures as:
[A] pattern of shared basic assumptions that was
learned by a group as it solved its problems of external
adaptation and internal integration, that has worked
well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to
be taught to new members as the correct way to
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.9
This definition is very close to our understanding of mode.
However, mode in our view has a larger scope than that of
organizational culture. Analysis of organizational cultures has often
focused only on a single corporation, where the membership is fixed
and has to follow the top-down authority. But mode is not limited to
a single corporation. Mode as specific patterns of thinking and
activities can apply to several organizations. In addition, even if an
organization has a fluctuating membership, it could have its own
mode. In addition, although studies on organizational cultures often
presume that organizations can stand-alone without being affected by
the outer world, this presumption seems unrealistic. Organizations
cannot remain unaffected from interventions from outside, and mode
is a useful tool to explain such situations.
The mode of a community or a region may have similarities to
socio-cultural norms. In preceding discussions on socio-cultural
norms, socio-cultural norms tend to be understood as unilaterally

For a discussion of organizational culture, see TERRENCE DEAL &
ALLAN KENNEDY, CORPORATE CULTURES: THE RITES AND RITUALS OF
CORPORATE LIFE (1982); EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND
LEADERSHIP (4th. ed. 2010). For an analysis from an economics perspective, see
David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE
POLITICAL ECONOMY 90-143 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., 1990).
9
SCHEIN, supra note 10, at 18.
8
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influencing individuals or organizations, while feedback from
individuals or organizations to such norms tends to be neglected. Even
if such feedback would be taken into consideration, the selforganizational nature of society is so emphasized that little attention is
paid to the laws or powers that would intervene from outside of the
society.10 In addition, such focus on the self-organizational nature
might lead to an overlook the fact that societal relationships are more
complex: such relationships include those between one society and
other societies, between a society and a supra-society, or between a
society and a partial society.
The concept of mode helps us to pay due attention not only to
each component of a society, i.e., mode of individuals, modes of
organizations, inter-organizational relationships, and composite
situations with these components,11 but also to relationships between
a society and its outer world.
Each player’s mode can be adapted to his external
environment. Thus, his mode is influenced by the cultures, values,
religions, norms, customs, and fashions of society as a whole.
3. Interactions between different players with different modes result in high
transaction costs. – If each player’s personal mode and the mode of his
organization, community, and region (locale) are different, it is
extremely difficult for such an organization or community to function
as an ecosystem.12 In other words, members of an organization or
community must share a specific mode. However, in order to foster
innovation in an ecosystem, sharing specific modes by members will

10
See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
11
See Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 85 (1989); Jon
Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 99 (1989); H. Peyton
Young, The Economics of Conventions, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 105 (1996); Randal C. Picker,
Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1225 (1997).
12
See JOHN P. KOTTER & JAMES L. HESKETT, CORPORATE CULTURE
AND PERFORMANCE (1992); JIM C. COLLINS & JERRY I. PORRAS, BUILT TO LAST:
SUCCESSFUL HABITS OF VISIONARY COMPANIES (1994).

173

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:1

not suffice. Each member’s mode should be adapted to the external
environment and should be consistent with the purpose of the
community. For example, Toyota has not only been trying to let its
employees share the same modes (organizational modes), irrespective
of the location of subsidiaries, but has also been creating the modes in
their supply chains (community modes). In Silicon Valley, there exists
explicit or implicit modes to conduct business.13 To be noted here is
the fact that a mode in an organization (e.g., Toyota) or in a region
(e.g., Silicon Valley) is usually different from other organizations (e.g.,
General Motors) or regions (e.g., Ohta Ward). In other words, each
ecosystem should have its own mode to function well.
To create an open innovation ecosystem or meta-national
ecosystem beyond one organization or one region, several
communities with different modes or individuals from different
communities must interact, for example, merger and acquisition
between private companies; joint venture; collaboration between
private company and university or private company and government.
Also, with regard to merger and acquisition between private
companies, many unconventional collaborations might occur, such as
collaboration between manufacturer and distributor. This situation,
however, would lead to constant conflicts of modes. Many failed
merger and acquisition cases (e.g., Daimler Chrysler14 and AOL-Time
Warner merger15) imply that, in such conflicted circumstances, no
innovation ecosystems can be created.

13
For a discussion of the history and institutions of Silicon Valley,
especially functions as ecosystem and relations to external environment, see MARTIN
KENNEY, UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY: THE ANATOMY OF AN
ENTREPRENEURIAL REGION (2000).
14
Roberto A. Weber and Colin F. Camerer, Cultural Conflict and Merger
Failure: An Experimental Approach, 49 MGMT. SCI. 400 (2003).
15
Tim Arango, How the AOL-Time Warner Merger Went So Wrong, N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
11,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/11/business/media/11merger.html?pagewante
d=all.
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In a well-functioning innovation ecosystem, innovations are
expected to occur autonomously and continuously. However,
integrating (new) players with different modes into an ecosystem with
its own mode may be difficult, since such integration could inevitably
cause friction between the new players and the mode of the ecosystem.
More difficult is the challenge of adjusting each community’s mode
and non-community-members’ mode, because the mode of a
community is usually so designed that the community functions well
as an autonomous mechanism. Integration of such a mode and the
mode of non-community-members would not occur autonomously.
Hence, we need external interventions, such as law, to facilitate
integration of different modes.
Here, then, is the question we must answer: how should law be
designed as a useful tool to adjust to conflicts of modes? Roughly
speaking, there are two possible directions: (1) to introduce a unified
mode, disregarding players’ different modes; and (2) to select
appropriate modes on a case-by-case basis, maintaining the difference
of modes.
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Interactions in a Community: Hypothesis

We assume that players enter into a community voluntarily
with an aim to do business, but they cannot predict who they will meet
in the community. We will further assume that diverse players belong
to the community. To illustrate this assumption in a simpler form, let
us assume that two players 1, and 2, belong to the community. Players,
1 and 2, encounter each other by coincidence and create a relationship.
The outcome of this relationship will depend on the players’ modes
and external environment, assuming each player chose his mode prior
to the encounter and that his mode cannot be changed.
Innovations occur through players’ voluntary interactions.
Such successful interactions which can bring about innovations
requires that the mode of each player matches with others’ modes. If
players’ modes do not match, their relationships will not function as
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an ecosystem. In such a case, investment would be wasted without any
return. Therefore, in Table 1, we assume a negative outcome if players’
modes do not match. Even if players’ modes match, benefits are
smaller if their modes are not consistent with external circumstances.
In Table 1, it is assumed that modes of two parties are [i] in an
environment [i], benefits 30 could be produced to each player. If such
a match occurs in an environment [j], benefits would be only 5. If their
modes do not match, frictions occur and benefits would be -10.
Equally, if their modes are [j] in an environment [j], benefits would be
30, while benefits would be only 5, if their modes are [i].
Table 1: The pay-off matrixes of Players 1 and 2.
externalcircum stance:i
2

m ode i

m ode j

m ode i

30,30

-10,-10

m ode j

-10,-10

5,5

1

externalcircum stance:j
2

m ode i

m ode j

m ode i

5,5

-10,-10

m ode j

-10,-10

30,30

1

Strictly speaking, differences of modes are more complex. Let’s
assume that mode “i” represents a mode which is innovation oriented.
We use [a] and [b] to illustrate two specific modes as variations of “i”.
For example, mode [a] puts more emphasis on production process,
while marketing is more important in mode [b]; even though both
modes do not hesitate to take risks, mode [a] prefers ex ante
investigation and planning, while in mode [b] ex post risk management
is more important; certain types of conflicts of modes are small and
can be resolved through players’ cooperative negotiations, but other
types of conflicts of modes are so great that they need organizational
reforms. In any case, such complexity is reflected in the size of
transaction costs.
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The Role of Law in Promoting Innovation

1. Traditionally recognized functions of law. – Even in a wellfunctioning ecosystem where relationships among players are
autonomously established, law plays a crucial role as an element of the
external environment.
First, law can be a tool to enhance each player’s individual
capacity. In addition, educational and training schemes can be
introduced from outside of the ecosystem by law. If each player’s
knowledge, technique, and comprehension can be enhanced by these
schemes, outcomes such as the figure 30 in Table 2 can be increased
to fifty or one hundred.
Second, contracts and properties can be protected by law. To
achieve the outcomes in Table 2—either thirty or five—contracts and
property rights must be protected. Some ecosystems can offer
protective functions by its traditional customs or social norms.
However, they have a few shortcomings compared to law: it is more
difficult to enforce these non-law customs and norms than it is to
enforce law; there is no guarantee that such customs and norms would
be appropriately designed and applied; and it is more difficult to amend
or abolish customs and norms than it is to abolish law.
Third, law is necessary to develop and manage infrastructures,
including financial systems, information systems, traffic systems,
distribution systems, production systems, and legal systems, for
innovations. These infrastructures improve the quality of each player’s
activities, and the contents and frequency of innovations, by enlarging
and facilitating players’ interactions.
These functions have traditionally been expected as the roles
of law, and have been integrated into various policy measures. The
important thing is to understand that the roles of law are not limited
to these functions.
2. Autonomous adjustment by ecosystem and its limits. – As stated
above, conflicts of modes are fatal for innovations. If modes of players
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do not match, modes can be adjusted by autonomous mechanisms in
the ecosystem to which they belong.
The simplest autonomous mechanism is named “cheap talk”
in economic theory.16 Let’s take Table 1 again and assume that the
external environment is [i]. If a player adopts mode [i], it is desirable
that another player would also adopt mode [i]. In other words, both
players want to cooperate, i.e., choose the same “mode,” if they know
what the other player’s choice will be, but uncertainty about the other
player’s choice will make such cooperation fail. Under such
circumstances, the appropriate action for one player is to inform the
other player of his choice of mode before the other player chooses his
mode. Since both players wish to collaborate, they can trust that such
notice is correct and the other player will take the same mode.
Therefore, the desirable result, i.e., choice of mode [i] by both players
in the environment [i], would occur through both parties’ voluntary
actions. The problem, however, is that this situation does not often
exist.
Another useful mechanism to adjust modes is an “evolutionary
process.” This mechanism assumes that each player will choose his
“mode,” which might bring about greater benefits. Then the player will
look at his mode or the mode of other players in a close circle. These
players would learn a better mode-to bring about more benefits-and
try to imitate it. Repeating trials to imitate and learn other modes would
lead to a situation in which the more beneficial mode would become
dominant in society. This mechanism does not require players to be
rational or perfect usable information. A number of trials to learn
others’ modes and imitate them would lead to specific modes
becoming dominant in the society.
Conditions of this mechanism, however, are not easy to fulfill.
First, to learn or imitate a more beneficial mode (mode as objective),
players should share the same learning mode or imitation mode (mode

16

See Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap Talk, 10 J. ECON. PERSP.

103 (1996).
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as method). To observe, understand, obtain, and apply other players’
ways of thinking and behavioral patterns (mode) requires complex
interactions between players on both the learning and teaching sides.
If learning or imitation of others’ mode is difficult, the entire to-beevolutionary process may not evolve. Second, during the evolutionary
process, the external environment should be stable. If the external
environment changes, the evolutionary process will lose orientation.
The external environment of innovations, however, often changes.
Therefore, even if the evolutionary process evolves, it may not reach a
desirable goal, i.e., to achieve expected benefits and create an
ecosystem.
We cannot simply assume that an ecosystem would
autonomously function to resolve conflicts of modes among players
and promote innovations. When conflicts of modes occur, an
ecosystem may not function and innovations will not occur. We should
not fully depend on the autonomous adjustment functions of an
ecosystem, and may have to use mechanisms and powers outside the
ecosystem. Here, we see the potential utility of law, although preceding
analysis overlooked this aspect.
C.

Mode and Law

As we saw in Section A, there are three functions for which
law has traditionally been performing in order to support the creation
of an innovation ecosystem. However, we realized that the mode has
been neglected and autonomous adjustment mechanism inherent in an
ecosystem has limits. Here, we see a new role of law, i.e., adjustment
of modes. This includes the following: First, law might encourage each
player to change his mode before their encounter, which will prevent
conflicts of modes in advance. This is unnecessary for players in the
same region or industry; however, when private companies and
authorities cooperate for innovations, or when small- or medium-size
companies want to expand their business in foreign countries,
adjustment of modes assisted by law might be necessary. In addition,
when a special economic zone is created to promote innovations,
modes of players should be adjusted prior to their involvement in the
zone. Law can play a crucial role in facilitating such an adjustment.
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Second, when players’ share the same mode [j], although the
mode of external environment is [i],17 such equilibrium between players
does not bring about an optimal outcome; however a player will not
be incentivized to change his mode [j] as long as other players retain
mode [j], since maintaining mode [j] would be his best choice. To
depart from such equilibrium is more difficult as the number of players
gets larger, but a more appropriate mode will be adopted in order to
achieve more innovations. Law can play a crucial role in facilitating the
change of mode. To identify a more desirable mode might be costly
for players, but if the law can identify the mode at a lower cost or more
effectively, players might be encouraged to change their mode. A good
example which illustrates the change of mode is the Meiji Restoration
in Japan at the end of the nineteenth century. After the feudal system,
begun under Tokugawa Shogunate in the seventeenth century was
collapsed, the new Meiji Government sought a model of a modern
State. After a thorough investigation, the Meiji Government decided
to introduce the system from Prussia, and modeled the Imperial
Constitution of Japan as well as important basic laws after the Prussian
system.
Law can also synchronize the timing as a mode. For example,
today’s academic calendar in Japan begins in April and ends in March
of the following year, which we could describe as the April-March
mode. This was not the case, however, until the early twentieth
century. In 1886, the academic year of elementary schools was changed
to follow the State’s fiscal year, which starts in April. The calendar of
high schools was changed in 1919, and in 1921, when the academic
calendar of universities was changed, all schools adopted the AprilMarch mode. This change affected not only the life style of people, but
also business customs. Thus the April-March mode became the
standard calendar mode of Japan and it affected various investments.

17
This could happen if, due to the change of external environment, the
optimal match between the mode shared by players and modes of the external
environment is lost.
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Third, previous discussions on innovation ecosystem seem to
only focus on success stories. However, as there are few Silicon Valley
ecosystems in the world, it is important to also analyze the many failed
cases. We should look at these cases through the lens of the functions
of law to adjust different modes of players and environment and
facilitate the creation of ecosystems.
D.

Modes Beyond a Community

Adjustment of modes in one community is relatively simple,
and it is easier to understand how to solve conflicts of modes in one
community. However, recent open-innovation and meta-national
innovations imply interactions beyond one organization, one region,
or one state. Today, it is necessary to solve conflicts of modes in a
“beyond-one-community-context.” Law can serve this purpose.
In an ecosystem, innovations can be achieved when the
majority of the ecosystem’s members share the same mode. Within an
ecosystem the unification of modes can be promoted. However, in
order to develop innovations beyond an organization or a State, we
will inevitably face various modes of diverse stakeholders and
environments. Multiple ecosystems with different modes will co-exist.
A key question for us is how to cultivate mutually beneficial
interactions among these ecosystems. It is incorrect to assume that
there is one universal mode to which all ecosystems should be oriented.
Diversity of mode occurs because, first, an ecosystem tends to
internalize modes which are adaptable to regional circumstances, and
support by local policies accelerates this tendency.18 Second, if there
can be several modes with equal desirability for innovations, the choice
of mode to be shared in an ecosystem can be determined by
coincidence. Therefore, two ecosystems facing the same external
environment may choose different “modes,” and there would be plural
equilibria. Third, sharing a mode is either path-dependent or history-

18
This idea was proposed by Charles M. Tiebout. Charles M. Tiebout, A
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
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dependent. When a mode has been shared in an ecosystem at a point
in the past, investments would have been made presuming this mode
would remain shared in the ecosystem. Through these investments,
this mode would fit to innovation better. For example, if this mode is
shared in a community in which individual investors (“angels”)19
provide money to venture companies, various services to improve this
mode would be developed, such as services to match angels and
ventures; services to provide information to angels; services to support
contracts between angels and ventures; and services to solve problems
between angels and ventures. When these services are well-established,
this mode is further strengthened.
Hence, it should be assumed that the mode shared in one
ecosystem is usually different from modes of other ecosystems.
However, as we saw above, how to cope with conflicts of modes is the
key for innovations. Law can play a crucial role in this context. Ex ante
adjustment and ex post adjustment are two possible designs of law to
cope with conflicts of modes.
E.

Legal System for Ex Ante Adjustment

Ex ante adjustment is inspired by the concept of uniform law;
it establishes in advance a widely applicable mode and urges various
players to adopt it. This approach can be further analyzed in detail:
each community can retain its mode for internal interactions of players,
but accept a widely applicable mode (mode [U]) for beyond-onecommunity-interactions among players （Table 2）. Or, each
community can force all players to adopt a universally applicable mode
(mode [U]) （Table 3）.20

Individual investors who provide start-ups with capital for their
business are called as ‘angels’. This term originally stems from those wealthy
individuals who financially supported theatrical productions in Broadway which
would have otherwise been shut down.
20
In Japan, there is a good example of this model, i.e. JIS (Japanese
Industrial Standards) based on Kōgyōhyōjunkahō [Industrial Standardization Law],
Act No. 185 of 1949 (Japan). This law was enacted in 1949 with aims at unification
19
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Table 2, Uniform-Law Approach I.
2

m ode i

m ode j

m ode U

m ode i

30,30

-10,-10

-10,-10

m ode j

-10,-10

5,5

-10,-10

m ode U

-10,-10

-10,-10

12,12

1

Table 3, Uniform-Law Approach II.
2

m ode i/U

m ode j/U

m ode U

m ode i/U

?,?

?,?

-10,-10

m ode j/U

?,?

?,?

-10,-10

m ode U

-10,-10

-10,-10

12,12

1

In Tables 2 and 3, we assume that benefits brought about by
the shared mode [U] [12] are smaller than the biggest benefits in Table
1 [30]. If benefits to be achieved by the mode [U] are bigger than [30],
each community will voluntarily introduce this mode into their
ecosystem, and it would be unnecessary to unify modes. However, if

of industrial products and related technologies, designs, manufactures and
managements in Japan. This law established unified modes on industries in Japan
and facilitated transactions beyond individual organizations or regions and let to the
improvement of the quality of industrial products. If this model is valid in
international context or not, is our concern.
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the mode [U] would bring about less than [5], the introduction of the
mode [U] would be meaningless.
Table 3 illustrates that the modes applicable to intracommunity and inter-community interactions mode are clearly
separable. In reality, however, such clear separation is questionable,
since an ecosystem usually consists of complex interrelationships of
various players that include intra-community and inter-community
interactions.
Unlike Table 2, Table 3 assumes that even if a policymaker
forces an ecosystem to abandon its modes[i] or [j] and to apply the new
mode [U], which does not necessarily match with their external
environment. It is questionable whether a well-functioning ecosystem
can easily abandon its original modes. Hence, applying a mode [U] that
is applicable beyond a community would be difficult to implement.
In addition, although in these Tables we assume that both
players would equally obtain benefits [12] by applying a mode U, in
reality, each player’s benefits are asymmetrical. Designing a mode and
applying it would become a game among various players. Even if there
is a mode [U] which could produce greater benefits as a whole, some
players whose benefits would decrease by the mode [U] would oppose
the mode. Such a power game would result in significant costs to
societies, which could otherwise have been spent pursuing
innovations.
F.

Legal System for Ex Post Adjustment

We support the ex post adjustment system as the more
functional approach. This system would modify modes and external
environment only after conflicts of modes are recognized and the
external environment of concerned interactions is investigated（Table
5）. Whether players’ modes would be modified or there would be an
intervention into the external environment would be decided ex post.
Modification of the external environment could also be made by law.
Different from the ex-ante adjustment system, the ex post
adjustment system does not aim at the ideal solution. Of particular
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importance is that this system is functional and there are less hurdles
to overcome when introducing it. First, the ex post adjustment system
would intervene only in the case of conflicts of modes. If the
interaction of players is well-functioning, no costs would occur.
Second, costs to consider all possible scenarios in advance, to negotiate
with concerned players or communities, to develop a unified desirable
mode and to disseminate it to related players or communities, would
not occur. Finally, the ex post adjustment system does not affect already
shared modes in a relevant ecosystem.

Table 4: Ex-post Adjustment approach.
2

m ode i

m ode j

m ode i

30,30

-10,-10

m ode j

-10,-10

5,5

1

2

m ode i

m ode j

m ode i

30,30

i:10,2
j:2,10

m ode j

i:2,10
j:10,2

5,5

1

→

CONCLUSION
To promote innovation, autonomous ecosystems in which
various players are organically linked are crucial. Such ecosystems
presume that specific mechanisms are shared among its closed
membership. Introducing more open and universal mechanisms would
hamper the original function of the ecosystem due to the conflicts of
modes. Law would play a crucial role to adjust conflicts of modes
between players and the environment, or among players. Under such
conditions, we propose an ex post adjustment system by law. Such a
system would enable both the maintenance of the diversity of the
innovation ecosystem and, at the same time, the adjustment of
interactions beyond one ecosystem.
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LIMITS ON PARTY AUTONOMY IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION
Giuditta Cordero-Moss*
INTRODUCTION
International contracts are often drafted in a rather
standardized manner, making use of so-called boilerplate clauses that
aim at regulating the interpretation and operation of the contract. In
addition, they often contain an arbitration clause that requires the
parties to submit all disputes arising out of or relating to the contract
to arbitration, thus excluding any involvement of national courts.
Standardised contract terms, including a boilerplate legal
framework for the contract and arbitration clauses, are elements that
seem to indicate an intention to render the contract self-sufficient. By
including a detailed and extensive regulation of the legal relationship
between the parties, the contract aims at making national law
dispensable. If national law is not relevant, and the only basis for
regulating the parties’ legal relationship is the contract, it becomes
possible and meaningful to standardise contract terms, even when
contracts are intended to be implemented in a variety of legal systems,
without the need to adapt them to the legal framework of the specific
transaction. The impression of self-sufficiency is enhanced by the
exclusion of national courts and the referral to arbitration instead. A
* Director of the Department of Private Law, Professor of Law at the
University of Oslo. I presented the main lines of this article at the International
Academy of Consumer and Commercial Law in Istanbul, July 2014. The article is
originally published in the Oslo Law Journal 2014 No. 1, and is reproduced here with
the consent of the publisher. The article was based on a paper that I presented at the
Arbitration Forum of the Center for Transnational Litigation, Arbitration and
Commercial Law, New York University, on February 3, 2014.
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closed circuit is created, dominated by the will of the parties: the
relationship is regulated by terms of contract agreed to by the parties,
and disputes are solved by a private body bound by the contractual
terms set forth by the parties. External sources, including national law,
may seem redundant.
Self-sufficiency may seem a realistic goal as long as the legal
relationship remains within the borders of the closed circuit. This
assumes that the legal relationship is, at any time, subject to the terms
and legal framework agreed between the parties.
There are, however, situations in which this assumption may
turn out not to be true. For example, if a difference arises between the
parties, and the parties disagree on what is the legal framework
(notwithstanding that they may have agreed in the past, prior to the
conflict); or if third parties’ interests or public interests are affected,
and mandatory rules or policies override the parties’ agreement; or if
the agreed terms or legal framework may be interpreted in more than
one way or need specification by external sources. In these situations,
the closed circuit is interrupted and recourse to external sources
becomes necessary. To a certain extent, guidance may be sought in
non-national, non-authoritative rules that may permit a uniform,
transnational solution and thus reinstate the closed circuit. Where such
a uniform guidance is not available, the closed circuit is interrupted
again. When a full closed circuit cannot be assumed, party autonomy
may be limited.
To assess the limits of party autonomy, it will be necessary to
analyse the above mentioned situations where interference with the
closed circuit may occur. Section II will briefly discuss to what extent
the legal framework provided by the contract and possibly given effect
to in arbitration may resist control and interference by national law;
Section III will discuss to what extent the terms of the contract are
capable of being interpreted in a uniform manner; Section IV will
discuss to what extent transnational sources may provide a uniform
legal framework capable of replacing national governing law; Section
V will investigate to what extent the principle of faithful interpretation
to the wording of the contract may be a guiding principle for arbitral
tribunals.
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EXTERNAL LIMITS TO PARTY AUTONOMY: COURT CONTROL

The closed circuit described above meets the expectations as
long as the arbitral tribunal gives effect to the will of the parties as
embodied in the contract and the award is complied with by the losing
party or enforced by the courts. The closed circuit fails when an arbitral
award becomes invalid or unenforceable as a consequence of having
given effect to the contract terms.
International arbitration is an alternative method of solving
contractual disputes that is based on the consent of the parties. If the
parties agree to submit their disputes to arbitration, then the ordinary
courts will have to decline jurisdiction on those disputes, and the only
possible mechanism to solve the dispute will be the arbitration that has
been chosen by the parties. If, on the contrary, the parties have not
entered into an arbitration agreement, disputes between them will have
to be solved by the national court that has jurisdiction. An arbitral
tribunal, in other words, bases its existence upon the parties’
agreement. Moreover, the parties determine the composition of the
arbitral tribunal, the procedural rules that have to be followed by the
arbitral tribunal, the scope of the tribunal’s competence and its power.
The arbitral tribunal is bound to follow the instructions of the parties;
otherwise, it exceeds the power that the parties have conferred on it.
If the arbitral tribunal exceeds its power, neither its jurisdiction nor its
award are founded on the parties’ agreement, and there is,
consequently, no legal basis for either of the two. These basic elements
of arbitration are based on the 1958 New York Convention on
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 6,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, ratified by 155 countries1 and
are reflected in most national arbitration laws, as well as in the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
adopted in sixty-nine countries.2

1
For a list of ratifications, see UNCITRAL, Status Convention on the
Recognition
and
Enforcement
of
Foreign
Arbitral
Awards,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_st
atus.html (last visited on June 19, 2015).
2
For a list of Model Law countries, see UNCITRAL, Status
UNCISTRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with
amendments
as
adopted
in
2006,
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Arbitration’s dependence on the parties’ will, which is so
uniformly recognised, is an important factor strengthening the opinion
that arbitration is a private matter between the parties, that the arbitral
tribunal is bound to follow the parties’ instructions, and that national
courts or state laws have no possibility of interfering with the parties’
will. This opinion is certainly confirmed by the observation that the
vast majority of arbitral awards are complied with voluntarily by the
losing party. The parties agree to submit the dispute to arbitration, then
they instruct the arbitral tribunal as to the scope of the dispute, the
rules to be applied, etc., then the losing party recognizes the
arbitration’s result and complies voluntarily with the award. In
situations such as this one, the totality of the arbitration takes place in
the private sphere of the parties. There is no point of contact between
the national courts and the arbitration. Consequently, no national
judge may decide to override the parties’ contract or expectations by
considering an agreement invalid due to violations of E.U. competition
law3 or a contract not binding due to one of the parties not having legal
capacity according to the law to which it is subject.4 The arbitrators
may or may not decide to apply these rules, but, as long as the losing
party accepts the result of the arbitration, there will be no possibility
for any judge to verify the arbitrator’s decision. In these cases,
therefore, limits to party autonomy are relevant only to the extent that
the parties request the arbitral tribunal apply state law or the tribunal
elects to do so on its own motion. When the losing party does not
voluntarily comply with the award, the courts will intervene. In these
cases, the closed circuit is interrupted and limitations to party
autonomy may become relevant.
The formal framework for arbitration grants it a relative
autonomy, which actually gives the appearance of an autonomous
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitr
ation_status.html (last visited June 19, 2015).
3
Violation of E.U. competition law is, according to a controversial ECJ
decision, to be deemed as a violation of ordre public and therefore prevents
enforcement of the award under the New York Convention. Case C-126/97, Eco
Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l NV, 1999 E.C.R. I-03055.
4
That each of the parties’ own law governs their legal capacity, quite
irrespective of which law the parties chose to govern the contract, is regulated by the
New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law and was confirmed by the
Swedish Court of Appeal. Hovrätt (HOVR) (Court of Appeals) 2007-12-17 T310806 (Swed.); see KLUWER ARBITRATION, 6 ITA MONTHLY REPORT, MAY (2008).
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system. The main instrument upon which arbitration is founded, as
previously mentioned, is the New York Convention, that binds the
courts of these countries to recognise arbitration agreements and thus
dismiss claims that are covered by an arbitration agreement, as well as
to recognise and enforce arbitral awards without any review of the
merits or of the application of law – with only a restrictive and
exhaustive list of grounds to refuse recognition and enforcement.
UNCITRAL Model Law is also an important instrument, issued in
1985 and revised in 2006, which has contributed to a considerable
harmonisation of the areas of arbitration law that are not covered by
the New York Convention. The UNCITRAL Model Law is, in turn,
based on the same principles as the New York Convention, which
means that together these instruments create a harmonised legal
framework for arbitration. Both instruments give a central role to the
will of the parties. The power of the arbitral tribunal actually derives
from the agreement of the parties; therefore, the arbitral tribunal is
obliged to follow the parties’ instructions in respect of the scope of the
dispute, the law to be applied, and the remedies to be granted.
All this confirms, to a large extent, the understanding of
arbitration as an autonomous system, based on the will of the parties
and detached from national law. However, both the New York
Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law refer to national, nonharmonised legislation in a number of instances and thus reduce in
few, but significant, respects the detachment of arbitration from
national laws. Thus, national law defines what may be subject to
arbitration, when an award is deemed to conflict with public policy,
what the criteria are for an arbitration agreement to be binding on the
parties, what mandatory rules of procedure apply, and when an award
is valid.5 In these situations, the closed circuit is interrupted.
For example, a contract between a Norwegian and a Ukrainian
party was submitted by the parties to Swedish law; after a dispute arose
and arbitration was initiated, the Ukrainian party maintained that it was
5
For a more extensive analysis, see Luca Radicati di Brozolo, International
Arbitration and Domestic Law, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
DIFFERENT FORMS AND THEIR FEATURES 40, 40-57 (Giuditta Cordero-Moss ed.,
2013); see also Giuditta Cordero-Moss, International Arbitration is Not Only International,
in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, DIFFERENT FORMS AND THEIR
FEATURES 7, 7-39 (2013).

190

2015

Cordero-Moss

4:1

not bound by the contract, because its representatives had signed the
contract in a way that did not meet the formal requirements of
Ukrainian law; the arbitral tribunal followed the choice of Swedish law
contained in the contract, considered the contract validly signed
according to Swedish law and disregarded Ukrainian law as irrelevant.
The arbitral tribunal, therefore, fulfilled the closed circuit; however, the
award was set aside by the courts of the country where it was rendered,
Sweden, because the legal capacity of a party is subject not to the law
chosen by the parties in the contract, but to the law of each of the
parties.6 The closed circuit was interrupted, and party autonomy
restricted.
In another example, the European Court of Justice found that
an award would be invalid and unenforceable for violation of public
policy if it gave effect to a contract that does not comply with
competition law.7 Had the arbitral tribunal been willing to follow the
terms of the contract in full, the award would not be valid or
enforceable; this is, therefore, another limitation to party autonomy.
Another example is a decision by a Russian court, refusing to
enforce an award that had given effect to a shareholders agreement
among the shareholders of a Russian company.8 The shareholders
agreement regulated the parties’ rights and obligations in a manner that
did not comply with Russian company law, and the court found that
enforcing the award would have violated Russian public policy. The
harmonised framework for arbitration is, therefore, subject to national
law in several significant respects, and this may have an impact on the

Hovrätt (HOVR) (Court of Appeals) 2007-12-17 T3108-06 (Swed.); see
Kluwer Arbitration, supra note 4. For a more extensive analysis, see Giuditta CorderoMoss, Legal Capacity, Arbitration and Private International Law, in CONVERGENCE AND
DIVERGENCE IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – LIBER AMICORUM KURT SIEHR
(Katharina Boele-Woelki et al. eds., 2010).
7
Eco Swiss China Time Ltd., 1999 E.C.R. I-03055.
8
[Ruling of the Western-Siberian District Commercial Court on March
31, 2006], No.F04- 2109/2005(14105-А75-11) (Rus.) (regarding an arbitral award on
a shareholder agreement between, among others, OAO Telecominvest, Sonera
Holding BV, Telia International AB, Avenue Ltd, Santel Ltd, Janao Properties Ltd
and IPOC International Growth Fund Ltd.).
6
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enforceability of arbitration agreements and of arbitral awards, which
in turn restricts the effects of party autonomy.9
II.

TERMS OF CONTRACT: ABSOLUTE AND UNIFORM
INTERPRETATION?

With the exceptions seen in Section 1, the liberal framework
for arbitration permits to recognise and enforce awards even if the
award were based on a wrong interpretation of the contract or of the
evidence, it applied the applicable law wrongly, or it applied the wrong
law. If the award gives effect to the regulation contained in the
contract, therefore, it will mostly be recognised and enforced even
though the contract may have disregarded and violated the applicable
law. Arbitration, therefore, to a large extent seems to permit relying on
the assumption of the closed circuit. This, however, does not imply
that party autonomy is absolute. An absolute party autonomy, not at
all affected by external elements, assumes that the terms of the contract
have a uniform meaning flowing from the words, and that they
therefore may be interpreted equally in all legal systems.
It is, however, not uncommon that contract terms need to be
understood in light of assumptions and effects founded on the
applicable legal framework. Even plain words may acquire different
meanings, depending on the culture and tradition of the interpreter.
Take an apparently self-explanatory expression such as “summer
nights.” If read by an Italian, it will create associations with a dark and
warm night, possibly with crickets singing and a sky full of stars. If read
by a Norwegian, it will evoke a bright and chilly night, with the sun as
the only visible star. If the meaning of plain words is affected by the
context, even more so it is for terms of a contract, as they refer not to
a natural phenomenon, but to legal effects that are created and
supported by legal systems, which in turn use words as the most

9
For a more extensive analysis of the matter, see GIUDITTA CORDEROMOSS, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS ch. 5 (2014); see also Giuditta
Cordero Moss, International Arbitration and the Quest for the Applicable Law, 8 GLOBAL
JURIST 1 (2008). A research project at the University of Oslo analyses the limits that
this may impose on party autonomy. See UiO Dep’t of Private Law, The Fac. Of
Law, Arbitration and Party Autonomy (APA), (Nov. 17, 2009),
http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/english/research/projects/choice-of-law/index.html .
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important means to create and define those legal effects. It then
becomes even more difficult to separate the legal effects from the
words used to express them. In this situation, it may be illusionary to
expect that the terms of a contract have an absolute meaning, fully
independent of any legal framework or legal tradition.
National legal systems may differ from each other in many
respects that are relevant to a contract, even when the systems belong
to the same legal tradition, so-called legal family. Even more so there
will be differences across legal families, such as the common law and
the civil law. Modern comparative law research is inclined to consider
this divide as overrated and largely overcome by a common core of
European contract law. The common core reveals a certain synchrony
between the systems on an abstract level, but it does not necessarily
lead to harmonised solutions on a specific level. 10 Awareness about a
common core may show that a certain principle may be recognised and
a certain result may be achieved in a plurality of legal systems, albeit by
employing different legal techniques. In a specific case, however, it is
the particular legal technique employed in the contract that counts, and
not the abstract possibility of achieving the desired result, if only the
right legal technique had been adopted.
A.

The Applicable Law’s Impact on Force Majeure Clauses

An example of term of contract that may have different legal
effects depending on the legal framework, is the so-called Force
Majeure clause. This clause is meant to excuse a party’s nonperformance of its obligation if fulfilment was prevented by an event
beyond that party’s control that was unforeseeable and could not be
reasonably overcome. One question is how the requirement of
“beyond the control” shall be interpreted. Interpretation may be

10
BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
AND THE APPLICABLE LAW (Giuditta Cordero-Moss ed., 2011). This book is based

on a research project that I ran at the University of Oslo from 2004 to 2009, and
shows that the same contract wording may lead to diametrally different legal effects,
depending on the governing law. See, particularly, part 3 in the book, as well as the
Conclusion; see also INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 9, ch.
3.
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influenced by the legal system’s understanding of the assumptions for
liability.
An illustration of this situation is when a producer cannot fulfil
its obligations, because it did not receive raw materials from its
supplier. The question is whether failure by a party’s supplier may be
deemed as an event falling outside of that party’s sphere of control. To
answer this question, it is necessary to understand the purpose of the
Force Majeure clause.
There may be several different goals for regulations on
exemptions from liability for non-performance. In some legal systems,
the aim is to allocate between the parties the risk for supervening
unexpected events according to which one of the two parties is closer
to bear that particular risk. This approach assumes a strict liability,
triggered irrespective of the conduct of the party that was prevented
from performing its obligations.
According to an alternative approach, the risk for unexpected
events should not be borne by a party, as long as that party has acted
diligently and cannot be blamed for the occurrence of the impediment
- even if in an objective allocation of risk that party would be closer to
bear such risk.
The legal systems, that follow the criteria of the strict liability
and the allocation of risk between the parties according to the
respective spheres of control, would consider the choice of supplier to
be an event falling within the sphere of control of the seller. Certainly
this impediment would not fall within the sphere of the buyer and,
since all risks have to be allocated between the parties, it follows that
it must fall within the sphere of the seller. That the producer has been
diligent in selecting its supplier and cannot be blamed for the supplier’s
failure to deliver is not relevant. This is the approach taken by English
law.11
German law has a different approach. According to § 276
BGB, if the prevented party is to be blamed for the impediment or its
consequences, it cannot be excused from liability. If, however, the
EDWIN PEEL, TREITEL ON THE LAW OF CONTRACT, ¶. 17064 (13th ed.
Sweet & Maxwell, 2011).
11
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prevented party can prove that it has not acted negligently, it will be
excused from liability. If the seller has operated with diligence in the
choice of supplier, it would not be considered liable for nonperformance due to failure by the supplier.
The distinction between Common Law and Civil Law in the
context of liability for non-performance can be explained with the
inclination of the English system to privilege predictability, for the sake
of ensuring that business is carried out smoothly, rather than ensuring
that an equitable justice is made in the specific case.12 Common Law
allocates the risk of non-performance between the parties according to
where it is most likely that the risk should be borne. This objective rule
is not to be defeated by subjective criteria such as lack of negligence,
because it would render the system less predictable. Civil Law systems
privilege (in different degrees) the subjective elements of the specific
case, in order to ensure that an equitable solution is reached.
Applied to the example made above, this means that the Force
Majeure clause may be understood differently under the different
governing laws. As a result, in a contract containing the same wording,
a producer who cannot fulfil its supply obligations due to failure by the
raw materials supplier, is not excused under English law,13 whereas he
is excluded under, for example, Norwegian law.14
B.

The Applicable Law’s Impact on Entire Agreement Clauses

Another example of term of contract that may be interpreted
differently depending on the legal framework is the so-called Entire
Agreement clause. This is a recurring clause in contract practice and
states that the document signed by the parties contains the whole
agreement and may not be supplemented by evidence of prior
statements or agreements.
The purpose of the Entire Agreement clause is to isolate the
contract from any source or element that may be external to the
document. This is also often emphasised by referring to the four
For a more extensive discussion and references, see INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 9, ch. 3.
13
PEEL, supra note 11.
14
See infra notes 32-35.
12
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corners of the document as the borderline for the interpretation or
construction of the contract. The parties’ aim is thus to exclude that
the contract is integrated by terms or obligations that do not appear in
the document.
The parties are obviously entitled to regulate their interests and
to specify the sources of their regulation. However, many legal systems
provide for ancillary obligations deriving from the contract type,15 a
general principle of good faith,16 or a principle preventing an abuse of
rights.17 This means that a contract would always have to be
understood not only on the basis of the obligations that are spelled out
in it, but also in combination with the elements that, according to the
applicable law, integrate it. A contract, therefore, risks having different
content depending on the governing law: the Entire Agreement clause
is meant to avoid this uncertainty by barring the possibility of invoking
extrinsic elements. The Entire Agreement clause creates an illusion of
exhaustiveness of the written obligations.
This is, however, only an illusion: first of all, often ancillary
obligations created by the operation of law may not be excluded by the
contract.18 Moreover, some legal systems permit bringing evidence that
For France, see, Xavier Lagarde et al., The Romanistic Tradition:
Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under French Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note
10, § 2. For Italy, see Art. 1347 C.c. [Civil Code] (It.); Giorgio De Nova, The Romanistic
Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under Italian Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note
10, § 1, as well as the general considerations on Art. 1135 of the Civil Code in Section
1. For Denmark, see Peter Møgelvang-Hansen, The Nordic Tradition: Application of
Boilerplate Clauses Under Danish Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 1.
16
See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Jan. 2, 2002, §
242 (Ger.) (for the general principle on good faith in the performance of contracts);
see Gerhard Dannemann, Common Law Based Contracts Under German Law,
BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE
APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, §§ 3.2-3.3 (for examples of its application by the
Courts).
17
See, for Russia, Ivan Zykin, The East European Tradition: Application of
Boilerplate Clauses Under Russian Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 1.
18
See, for France and Italy, supra note 15. For Finnish law, see Gustaf
Möller, The Nordic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under Finnish Law, in
15
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the parties’ agreement creates obligations different from those
contained in the contract.19 Furthermore, many civilian legal systems
openly permit the use of pre-contractual material to interpret the terms
written in the contract.20 Finally, a strict adherence to the clause’s
wording may, under some circumstances, be looked upon as
unsatisfactory even under English law, in spite of the formalistic
interpretation style that English law may employ in respect of other
clauses.21

BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE
APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 2.1.
19
See, for Germany, BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE]
§ 309, no. 12 (Ger.), prohibiting clauses which change the burden of proof to the
disadvantage of the other party; see Ulrich Magnus, The Germanic Tradition: Application
of Boilerplate Clauses Under German Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 5.1.1.a. Italy,
on the contrary, does not allow oral evidence that contradicts a written agreement.
See Giorgio De Nova, The Romanistic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under
Italian Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 1.
20
In addition to Germany, supra note 19, see for France, Xavier Lagarde
et al., The Romanistic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under French Law, in
CORDERO-MOSS (ed.), supra note 10, § 2; for Italy, Giorgio De Nova, supra note
15, § 4; for Denmark, Peter Møgelvang-Hansen, The Nordic Tradition: Application of
Boilerplate Clauses Under Danish Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 2.1; for
Norway, Viggo Hagstrøm, The Nordic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under
Norwegian Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 3.1; for Russia, Ivan Zykin,
The East European Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under Russian Law, in
BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE
APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 2.1. The situation seems to be more uncertain in
Sweden, see Lars Gorton, The Nordic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under
Swedish Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 5.4.2.d, and more restrictive is Finland,
see Gustaf Möller, The Nordic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under Finnish
Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND
THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 2.1.
21
See Edwin Peel, The Common Law Tradition: Application of Boilerplate
Clauses Under English Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 2.1.
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The effect of the clause, therefore, does not flow from its
simple words, but is the result of a combination of the clause and of
the governing law.
III.

TRANSNATIONAL LAW: A UNIFORM LEGAL FRAMEWORK?

We have seen above that contracts’ terms are not capable of
being interpreted without making reference to the applicable legal
framework. Even though arbitral tribunals in many situations are
allowed to consider exclusively the terms of the contract without
running the risk of triggering invalidity or unenforceability of the
award, they may find that the terms of the contract are not a sufficient
basis for the decision and must be integrated by external elements.
Admittedly, arbitration may (to a certain extent, as was seen in Section
1) be capable of giving effect to the regulation agreed to by the parties
in the contract without being obliged to comply with the peculiarities
of the applicable law. However, the terms of the contract are not selfexplanatory and have to be interpreted in light of the applicable legal
framework, as was seen in Section 2. That the arbitral tribunal is free
to interpret the contract and to decide how, if at all, the contract shall
interact with the applicable law, does not give an answer to the
question of how to interpret terms that are not self-explanatory. This
may result in different interpretations of the same contract terms
depending on the arbitrator’s background and inclination, and thus
impacts on party autonomy.
It is worthwhile exploring whether the idea of an absolute party
autonomy may be reinstated by including a uniform legal framework
into the closed circuit. It is often proposed that transnational sources
may give a uniform legal framework for international contracts.
Transnational sources are concerned with giving effect to commercial
practice without abiding by the peculiarities of the various legal
systems; this could be deemed to make national laws redundant.
The differences among the various national legal systems have
prompted various initiatives to formulate trans-national sets of rules,
in part developed spontaneously by business practice and in part
restated and codified by branch organizations, international
organisations, academic fora, etc. This complex of sources goes under
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various names, such as lex mercatoria, transnational law or soft law.22 If
transnational sources gave an exhaustive and harmonised regime, it
would be possible to include these sources as the only applicable legal
framework for the contract and thus reinstate the closed circuit.
As I argue elsewhere, however, transnational sources are not
sufficiently precise and systematic to replace national laws23 - not to
mention the formal circumstance that transnational sources may not,
as a matter of private international law, govern a contract to the
exclusion of any state laws.24 Some of the most recognized
transnational sources – in particular, the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts (UPICC) and the Principles of
European Contract Law (PECL) – are heavily based on a general
principle of good faith.25 Good faith is a legal standard that needs
specification and there does not seem to be any generally
acknowledged legal standard of good faith that is sufficiently precise
to be applied uniformly, irrespective of the governing law.
Moreover, these instruments grant the interpreter much room
for interference regarding the wording of the contract – based on the
central role given to the principle of good faith. This seems to
contradict the very intention of standard contracts. International
contract practice is meant to be exhaustive and self-sufficient, and not
to be influenced by the interpreter’s legal tradition.26 Any correction by
principles such as good faith would run counter to the expectations of
the parties.

Literature on the subject matter is very vast. Among the works most
frequently referred to are FILIP DE LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEX
MERCATORIA (1992); KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF
THE LEX MERCATORIA (2d. ed., 2010), and Ole Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in
International Commercial Arbitration, 34 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 747, 747-768 (1985). For
extensive references see ROY GOODE ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW
– TEXTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 24 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007).
23
For a more extensive discussion, see INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS, supra note 9, §§ 2.4, 4.2.3.
24
For a more extensive discussion, see id. § 4.2.3.
25
For a more extensive discussion, see id. § 2.4.2.
26
For a more extensive discussion of the ambitions of self-sufficiency in
contract practice, id. ch. 1.
22
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The same applies to the instruments developed so far in the
ongoing work on a European contract law. The Academic Draft Frame
of Reference, the Acquis Principles, and the Common European Sales
Law (CESL), all largely based on the PECL, have a double approach
to commercial contracts: they extend rules of consumer protection to
commercial contracts (including an extensive and mandatory principle
of good faith), and then moderate them by reserving for contrary good
commercial practice. Reference to good commercial practice as the
only concretisation of the principle of good faith assumes that the
interpreter is in a position to define good commercial practice and to
assess its content. What constitutes good commercial practice,
however, is not clear. It may be assumed that it coincides with the
above mentioned spontaneous or academic transnational sources that
often are deemed to be particularly apt to govern international
contracts and that go under the name of transnational law or lex
mercatoria: scholarly works on the convergence of legal systems, general
principles, restatements, and trade usages. As will be seen, these
sources are not capable of giving a clear and harmonized picture of the
transnational law of commercial contracts; hence, they do not give a
clear picture of what good commercial practice is. Reference to good
commercial practice, therefore, does not create a concrete standard of
good faith.
Transnational sources, thus, do not always provide a uniform
solution. The arbitrator who is required to interpret contract terms will
not find a definitive and uniform standard of interpretation in these
sources, and will need to make recourse to other sources, thus
interrupting again the closed circuit.
A.

Interpretation of Force Majeure Clauses under Transnational
Law

To test the ability of transnational law to overcome the
disparity of legal traditions, we can look at the examples made in
Section 2 above. We saw that the expression “beyond the control” in
Force Majeure clauses may be interpreted differently depending on the
governing law. Does the transnational law offer a uniform solution?
One of the most successful instruments of harmonization of contract
law is the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG), ratified by over sixty countries and looked
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upon, especially in some academic circles,27 as embodying principles
that are generally recognized and reach well beyond the convention’s
scope of application.
According to Article 79 of the CISG, a party is not liable for
failure to perform its obligations if it proves that the failure was due to
an impediment beyond its control that was unforeseeable and could
not reasonably have been overcome.
The CISG does not contain any reference to the diligence of
the affected party as criterion for exempting it from liability; in another
context, the convention confirms that diligence is not a criterion for
excuse: Articles 45(1)(b) and 61(1)(b) regulate that each party may
exercise contractual remedies for non-performance against the other
party without having to prove any fault or negligence or lack of good
faith on that party, nor do they mention that any evidence of diligence
would relieve the other party from its liability.
The Secretariat Commentary does not address the question of
how the criterion of the sphere of control shall be interpreted, whether
literally, or as a reference to the diligent conduct of the seller.28 Bearing
in mind that the CISG requires it to be interpreted autonomously,
without reference to domestic legal systems, it seems appropriate to
apply the literal interpretation and to see Article 79 as a reference to an
objective division of the landscape into two spheres, that of the seller
and that of the buyer, without reference to specific actual possibilities
to exercise control. This is confirmed by case law and doctrine, which
affirm that procurement risk falls within the sphere of risk of the seller,
and that therefore failure by the seller’s supplier is not deemed to fall
outside of the seller’s sphere of responsibility (unless the relevant good
has disappeared completely from the international market).29 In the
For a thorough analysis of the enormous impact of the CISG on
scholars, see THE CISG AND ITS IMPACT ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 436
(Franco Ferrari, ed., Sellier European Law Publishers, 2008). Ferrari also shows,
however, that the level of awareness about the CISG in the business community and
among practicing lawyers is strikingly low. Id. at 421.
28
Commentary On The Draft Convention On Contracts For The
International Sale Of Goods, Prepared By The Secretariat, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.97/5 (Mar. 1, 1979).
29
See Dionysios Flambouras, The Doctrines of Impossibility of Performance and
clausula rebus sic stantibus in the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
27
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comment to the second paragraph of article 79 on use of subcontractors, the Commentary specifies that this special rule does not
include suppliers of raw material or of goods to the seller.30
However, this is not the only way of understanding the
criterion of “beyond the control.” Article 79 of the CISG may be
interpreted differently, depending on the interpreter’s legal tradition –
something that has been defined as “troubling.”31
Norway implemented the CISG with the Sale of Goods Act.
The Sale of Goods Act, in Section 27, introduced the concept of
impediment beyond the control of the prevented party, with a literal
translation of Article 79 of the CISG.32 By introducing this concept,
the legislator intended to mitigate the then-existing regime, which was
based on strict liability.33
Norwegian legal doctrine interprets the criterion of “beyond
the control” not as having an abstract understanding of each party’s
sphere of control, but on the basis of the actual sphere of control of
each party.34 Only if one party actually has the possibility of influencing
a certain process are the events caused by that process deemed to be
within the sphere of control of that party. That a party has started a
process, in itself, does not mean that any events occurring in the course
of that process are in the sphere of control of that party. The test must
be if that party actually had the possibility of influencing the part of
the process in connection with which those events occurred. Hence,
in the case of procurement risk, the interpretation of what is “beyond
of Goods and the Principles of European Contract Law: A Comparative Analysis, 13 PACE
INT’L L. REV. 261, n.20 (2001). See also COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) art. 79, ¶¶ 11, 18, 37 (Schlechtriem
& Schwenzer, eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2010) (although ¶ 27 seems to embrace the
Germanic tradition).
30
See supra note 28, at 64.
31
Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, eds., supra note 29, art. 79, ¶ 11, at n.30.
32
Sale of Goods Act of 13 May 1988 §27 (Nor.).
33
Ot.prp. nr. 80 (1986–87), pp. 38 et seq. and, extensively on the
preparatory works in this context, Viggo Hagstrøm, Obligasjonsrett, § 19.4.2.
(Universitetsforlaget, 2d. ed., 2011).
34
See Hagstrøm, supra note 33. For a more extensive analysis, see Giuditta
Cordero-Moss, Lectures on comparative law of contracts, 166 Institutt for privatretts
stensilserie bd. 151 et. seq. (2004).
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the control” is opposite to the outcome under the CISG: the producer
chose its supplier, and this choice is certainly within the producer’s
sphere of control (it could have chosen another supplier, and then the
default would not have happened). However, the producer has no
actual possibility of influencing the performance of the supplier,
therefore any impediment in connection therewith is to be deemed
outside of its sphere of control.35
In conclusion, the CISG does not seem to provide a uniform
standard for the interpretation of Force Majeure clauses.
B.

Interpretation of Entire Agreement Clauses under
Transnational Law

The other example of contract term with inconsistent legal
effects made in Section 2 above, is the Entire Agreement clause.
This clause is recognised in Article 2.1.17 of the UPICC and
Article 2:105 of the PECL, with some restrictions: the provisions
specify that prior statements or agreements may be used to interpret
the contract. This is one of the applications of the general principle of
good faith; it is, however, unclear how far the principle of good faith
goes in overriding the clause inserted by the parties. If prior statements
and agreements may be used to interpret the contract, does this mean
that more terms may be added to the contract if, for example, the
parties have discussed certain specifications at length during the
negotiations and this has created in one of the parties the reasonable
35
Viggo Hagstrøm supra note 33, § 5.3. Hagstrøm’s interpretation is based
on a Supreme Court decision rendered in 1970, long before the implementation of
the CISG in the Norwegian system. However, the Supreme Court’s decision is still
referred to as correctly incorporating Norwegian law after the enactment of the Sales
of Goods Act, as the reference made by Hagstrøm confirms. See also Anders
Mikkelsen, HINDRINGSFRITAK 33 (Gyldendal, 2011). A Supreme Court decision
affirmed that liability is strict when the goods to be delivered are generic. See HR2004-00755-A-Rt-2004-675 (Supreme Court, Dom) (Nor.). The test will then be
whether the defects objectively are within the sphere of control of the seller. In this
context, therefore, the Supreme Court has rejected the test of actual control and is
more in line with the regulation contained in the CISG. This approach is consistent
with the German tradition, that distinguishes between generic obligations (where
liability is strict) and specific obligations (where the criterion of diligence applies).
This distinction was abandoned with the 2002 reform of the BGB.
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expectation that the specifications would be implied in the contract
even though they were not included in the final contract text? Article
1.8 of the UPICC would seem to indicate that this would be the
preferred approach under the UPICC. According to this provision, a
party may not act in a way inconsistent with reasonable expectations
that it has created in the other party. This is spelled out in the PECL,
Article 2:105, Paragraph 4, which states that, “[a] party may by its
statements or conduct be precluded from asserting a merger clause36
to the extent that the other party has reasonably relied on them.”
According to this logic, the detailed discussion during the
phase of negotiations of certain characteristics for the products may
create the reasonable expectation that those specifications have
become part of the agreement even if they were not written in the
contract; their subsequent exclusion on the basis of the Entire
Agreement clause may be deemed to be against good faith.
According to the opposite logic, however, the very fact that the
parties have excluded from the text of the contract some specifications
that were discussed during the negotiations, indicates that no
agreement was reached on those matters. Exclusion of those terms
from the contract, combined with the Entire Agreement clause,
strongly indicates the will of the parties not to be bound by those
specifications. Their subsequent inclusion on the basis of the good
faith principle would run counter to the parties’ intention.
The foregoing shows that the application of the UPICC and of
the PECL requires a specification of the principle of good faith. Is it
to be intended as an overriding principle, possibly creating, restricting
or modifying the obligations that flow from the text of the contract?
Or is it meant to take the text of the contract as a starting point,
ensuring that the obligations contained therein are enforced accurately
and precisely as the parties have envisaged them? This represents the
dichotomy between, on the one hand, the understanding of fairness as
a principle ensuring balance between the parties notwithstanding the
regulation on which the parties may have agreed, and, on the other
hand, the understanding of fairness as a principle ensuring
“Merger clause” is another definition of the Entire Agreement clause,
which may also be called the “Integration clause.”
36
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predictability, and leaving it to the parties to evaluate the desirability of
their contract regulation. This dichotomy characterises the different
approaches of the common law and the civilian tradition.37 To enhance
the ability of the UPICC to harmonize contract law, UNIDROIT has
created in 1992 a data base collecting court decisions and arbitral
awards on the various provisions of the UPICC. This is, therefore, the
best source to turn to when inquiring how to interpret the Entire
Agreement clause under the UPICC.
As of 2013, the Unilex database contained five decisions on
Article 2.1.17 of the UPICC. These decisions are not based on a
consistent understanding of the standard according to which the clause
shall be applied.38 The Unilex database shows two approaches to
Article 2.1.17 of the UPICC: one advocating the primacy of the
contract’s language, and the other assuming that the UPICC provides
for the primacy of the real intention of the parties, which in turn may
lead to considerably restricting the effect of the Entire Agreement
clause. Evidently, this is not sufficient to give guidance as to which
approach to choose when addressing the conflict between the
contract’s language and the principle of good faith. This leaves so
much room to the discretion of the interpreter that it seems unlikely
for Article 2.1.17 of the UPICC to give a harmonized regulation of its
subject-matter. The UPICC, therefore, does not contribute
considerably to a harmonized standard of interpretation.
IV.

ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS: FAITHFUL TO THE INTENTION OF THE
PARTIES

Above we have seen that the arbitral tribunal may, to a large
(but not unlimited) extent, disregard the governing law without
consequences for the validity and enforceability of the award; we have
also seen that this is not a sufficient answer to the question of how to
interpret terms of the contract that are not self-explanatory; we have
further seen that it is not always possible to find a uniform standard of
interpretation in translation sources. A principle that is often invoked

For a more extensive discussion, see INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS, supra note 9, ch. 3.
38
Id. § 2.4.2.1.
37
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in these circumstances is that the arbitral tribunal has a duty to be
faithful to the will of the parties.
Does a duty to be faithful to the will of the parties give
sufficient guidelines?
The arbitral tribunal may certainly not be inclined to let the
terms of the contract be overridden by the formalities of the various
national legal systems, but that does not give an answer to the question
of how contract terms shall be interpreted.
We can assume a long-term loan agreement with an Early
Termination clause permitting immediate termination of the contract
and consequently the immediate repayment of the whole principal
upon breach of the obligations contained in a certain clause.
A literal interpretation of the Early Termination clause permits
termination even when the breach is insignificant – for example, when
the borrower has submitted its financial statements to the lender with
one-day delay.39 The breach may have had no consequences on the
borrower’s creditworthiness, on its ability to repay the loan, or on the
lender’s ability to verify these matters; the real reason for the lender to
terminate the loan may have been that the interest rates had increased
since the time of signing the loan, and that the lender considered the
threat of early termination as effective leverage for negotiating a higher
interest rate. This would not be relevant in a literal interpretation: the
clause would be considered applicable without regard to the real
reasons for which it is invoked.
A purposive interpretation of the clause takes into
consideration the purpose of the clause and tries to assess whether the
particular situation may be deemed to fall into the scope of the clause.
This may lead to considering the clause as not applicable in a situation
where the reasons for which it is invoked do not correspond to the
purpose of the clause.

The borrower’s obligation to submit its financial statements is usually
in loan agreements and is generally to be found in the section of the so-called
covenants. It is meant to make it possible for the lender to control the borrower’s
continued creditworthiness.
39
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What is more faithful to the intention of the parties: a literal
implementation of the clauses that may permit speculative or abusive
conduct or an integration of the clauses with considerations of
business purpose, good faith, and trade usages? There seems to be no
absolute answer to the question of what interpretation better meets the
expectations of the parties: a strictly literal interpretation of the terms
of the contract, or an integration of the contract with principles of
good faith and commercial sense based on law, trade usages,
transnational principles or other sources. The former would better
reflect the parties’ expectations if it is assumed that the parties have
consciously intended to achieve specific legal effects with each and
every of the words that they have written in the contract. This,
however, does not reflect the reality of how contracts are drafted and
negotiated, as will be seen below.
A.

The Dynamics of Contract Drafting

Often, some of the clauses in a contract are inserted without
the parties having given any particular consideration to their content
or their effects under the applicable law.40 This practice may be
surprising, considering the importance that the governing law has for
the application and even the effectiveness of contract terms, as was
seen above. However, the practice of negotiating detailed wording
without regard to the governing law, or even of inserting contract
clauses without having negotiated them, is not necessarily always
unreasonable. From a merely legal point of view, it makes little sense,
but from the overall economic perspective, it is more understandable.
The gap between the parties’ reliance on the self-sufficiency of the
contract and the actual legal effects of the contract under the governing
law does not necessarily derive from the parties’ lack of awareness
regarding the legal framework surrounding the contract. More
precisely, the parties may often be aware of the fact that they are
unaware of the legal framework for the contract. The possibility that
the wording of the contract is interpreted and applied differently from

A more extensive analysis of the practice of contract drafting is made
in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 9, ch. 1.
40
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what a literal application would seem to suggest may be accepted by
some parties as a calculated risk.41
Considerations regarding the internal organization of the
parties are also a part of the assessment of risk. In large multinational
companies, risk management may require a certain standardization,
which in turn prevents a high degree of flexibility in drafting the single
contracts. In balancing the conflicting interests of ensuring internal
standardization and permitting local adjustment, large organizations
may prefer to enhance the former.42 It is, in other words, not
necessarily the result of thoughtlessness if a contract is drafted without
having regard for the governing law. Neither is it a symptom of a
refusal of the applicability of national laws. It is the result of a cost–
benefit evaluation, leading to the acceptance of a calculated legal risk.
The sophisticated party, aware of the implications of adopting contract
models that are not adjusted to the governing law and consciously
assessing the connected risk, will identify the clauses that matter the
most, and concentrate its negotiations on those, leaving the other
clauses untouched and accepting the corresponding risk.
A faithful interpretation of the contract assumes an
understanding of this uneven approach to contract drafting.
B.

The Need for Predictability

On the other hand, predictability is extremely important in
commercial contracts. The parties are interested in enforcing their
rights, and, for this purpose, they depend on one or more national legal
systems and their courts. Therefore, once a contract is finalized, parties
are interested in its enforceability and in the predictability of the
parameters according to which enforcement may be achieved.43

41
See more extensively David Echenberg, Negotiating International
Contracts: Does the Process Invite a Review of Standard Contracts from the Point of View of
National Legal Requirements?, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10.
42
See more extensively, Maria Celeste Vettese, Multinational Companies and
National Contracts, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW , supra note 10.
43
See QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON SCHOOL OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 2010 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY:
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Litigation lawyers carefully analyse the specific contract and its
effects under the governing law and try to assess as precisely as possible
the possibility of winning a case in court or in arbitration on the basis
of the contract wording, the applicable law and the degree of factual
background that the governing law allows to bring into the dispute.
Thus, on the one hand, drafting lawyers, while negotiating a contract,
may have willingly disregarded the legal effects of some clauses. On
the other hand, litigation lawyers, while assessing enforceability of the
same contract, will carefully study its legal effects under the governing
law. The varying degree of awareness during negotiations, thus, must
be considered in light of the need for predictability once a dispute
arises.
Furthermore, contracts are often meant to circulate, for
example, because they are assigned to third parties, are used as security,
or serve as a basis for calculating insurance premiums. In these
situations, it is essential that contracts are interpreted strictly in
accordance with their terms: third parties are not aware of and should
not be assumed to take into consideration the relationship between the
original parties to the contract, what the original parties may have
assumed or intended, or any circumstances that relate to the original
parties and that may have had an impact on these parties’ interests. It
is, therefore, expected that a contract is interpreted primarily, if not
exclusively, in light of its terms – without considering things such as
what a fair balance between the parties’ interests would be or what one
party’s expectations might have been.
C.

How to Square the Circle: The Applicable Law

The arbitral tribunal is, therefore, expected to understand the
dynamics of negotiations in order to properly give effect to the
intention of the parties. Blindly applying the wording of the contract
without any regard to the principles of the governing law or, to the
extent that they are determinable and applicable, of transnational law,
would not necessarily reflect the true intention of the parties if the
clause that is being applied literally is one of the boilerplate clauses that
CHOICES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CHOICES IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 13 (2010). See also THE LAW SOCIETY, LAW SOCIETY REPORT: FIRMS’
CROSS-BORDER WORK 1, 8 (2010). For further references, see INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 9, § 2.1.
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the parties did not consider. Integrating or correcting a clause with
national or transnational principles, on the other hand, might not
necessarily reflect the parties’ intention either, if the clause that is being
interpreted is one of the clauses that the parties carefully negotiated.
Leaving broad discretion to the interpreter, however, runs the
risk of undermining predictability, if the criteria for exercising such
discretion are not clearly determinable. As was seen above,
interpretation of the contract should take into consideration the need
for predictability. Overriding the terms of the contract in the name of
principles of good faith or equity, thus, would lead to results that are
not compatible with the expectations of international business
practice, if the standards that are applied are not clearly determinable.
From the overview made in Section 3 above, it seems that the standard
of good faith is not sufficiently determinable on a transnational level.
This seems to speak for the advisability of taking into consideration
the criteria developed in the applicable law.
D.

Variety of Approaches

There is no uniform answer to the question of what
interpretation is the most faithful to the parties’ intentions. A seminar
organised at the University of Oslo in 201144 discussed the arbitrators’
approach to the interpretation of contracts and identified a variety of
approaches.45 The results of this seminar are summarised below.
Contracts are not necessarily always applied in strict
accordance with their terms. There are different degrees of
interference and the sources of the interference also vary quite
considerably. There is a scale moving from a strict application of the
governing law to integrate the contract, via interpretation of the
contract terms in the context of transnational soft law principles such
44
See Arbitration and Party Autonomy (APA), supra note 9. The
programme for the seminar, the list of panel participants and the transcript from the
panel
discussions
are
available
at
http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/english/research/projects/choice-oflaw/events/2011/2011-arbitration-and-the-not-unlimited-party-autonomy.html.
45
See INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 9, ch. 3, §
7; see also Giuditta Cordero-Moss, Interpretation of Contracts in International Commercial
Arbitration: Diversity on More than One Level, 22 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 13, 13-36 (2014).
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as the UPICC and the PECL (which are heavily based on the principle
of good faith and may give rise to a substantial possibility of interfering
with the contract language), to interpretation of the contract on the
basis of its own terms combined with the parties’ interests and trade
usages, to interpretation of the contract solely on the basis of its own
terms. There is also a further approach to interpretation of the
contract, which goes under the label of “splitting the baby.” This
Solomonic approach consists of rendering an award in the middle
range between the claims of each of the parties. This is not necessarily
based on a literal consideration of the contract terms or on an
integration of the contract with other sources, but simply on the desire
to accommodate both parties.46 Interestingly, there does not seem to
be a uniform perception of the frequency of this approach: a recent
empirical study shows that the parties to arbitration perceive that they
got a Solomonic award in 18–20% of the cases, whereas the arbitrators
perceive that they take this kind of equitable decision in only 5% of the
cases.47 This, therefore, adds a new variable to the equation of the
interpretation of contracts. Not only is it uncertain whether the
arbitrators will interpret the contract literally, whether they will use
sources of law, or whether they will apply transnational principles to
give a more purposive interpretation, but it is also possible that the
decision will be influenced by equitable considerations that are not
based on the contract or on other legal sources.
CONCLUSION
Party autonomy is limited in international arbitration, in spite
of the widespread opinion that contracts are self-sufficient and that,
together with arbitration, they create a closed circuit that manages to
leave national law out.
First of all, the legal framework for arbitration ensures that
arbitration enjoys a significant autonomy, but this autonomy is not
unlimited. If the losing party decides not to comply with the arbitral
This appears in the 2012 Survey of the School of International
Arbitration of Queen Mary University of London. QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF
LONDON AND WHITE & CASE, 2012 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY:
CURRENT AND PREFERRED PRACTICES IN THE ARBITRAL PROCESS § 7 (2012).
47
Queen Mary University, supra note 46, at 38.
46
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award, courts of law may exercise judicial control. Judicial control on
arbitration is restricted, but there is room for overriding party
autonomy in several respects.
Furthermore, even within the area where no judicial control
may be exercised and arbitration is autonomous, the necessity may
arise to integrate contract terms with external sources. Contract terms
do not always have an absolute meaning with legal effects flowing
directly from the words, and recourse to a legal framework may be
required to interpret the terms and to define their legal effects. To the
extent that transnational sources provide a uniform legal framework,
they may integrate the contract and reinstate self-sufficiency. Where
transnational sources are not sufficient, however, the arbitral tribunal
will have to integrate the contract with external principles and rules,
primarily stemming from the governing law.
All the above constitutes limitations to party autonomy in
arbitration.
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THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY
IN DISTRIBUTION CONTRACTS:
LIMITATION OF PARTY AUTONOMY IN
ARBITRATION?
Pilar Perales Viscasillas
INTRODUCTION, CONCEPTS AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Distribution contracts might respond to different kinds of
modalities in practice. In fact, under some domestic laws, the name
“distribution contract” is considered a generic category that includes
specific contracts, such as: agency, franchise, concession, or
distribution contracts, the latter being a specific kind of contract. The
aforementioned contract types are considered to be cooperation or
collaboration commercial contracts since they imply cooperation
between two businessmen. Depending on the type of contract,
cooperation may be more or less intense.1
From a legal perspective, it is clear that distributors and
franchisees are independent businesspersons who invest and risk their

 Pilar Perales Viscasillas is a Commercial Law Professor at the Carlos III
University of Madrid. She serves as Counsel at Baker & McKenzie. This paper was
written under a research project for the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad.
(DER2013-48401-P).
1
On the basis of such cooperation the contracts are classified under the
STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN LAW:
COMMERCIAL AGENCY, FRANCHISE AND DISTRIBUTION CONTRACTS (PEL
CAFDC) (2006). See also Eleanor Cashin Ritane, The Common Frame of Reference
(CFR) and the Principles of European Law on Commercial Agency, Franchise and
Distribution Contracts, ERA Forum, Dec. 2007 at 563.
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own funds.2 Agents are also legally independent from their principal
but their status under domestic law might vary and there are some legal
systems that provide them special treatment under their own labor
laws.3
As far as arbitration is concerned, the object of this paper is to
explore the limitations imposed by certain countries on the freedom
of the parties to submit their contracts to arbitration and whether this
approach should be rejected considering that other countries follow
policies in favor of arbitration.
A.

Substantive Regulation of Distribution Contracts

The substantive regulation of these contracts varies depending
on the kind of contract and the binding force of the instrument at an
international level. This section sets forth an overview of the three
major types of contracts.
1. Agency Contracts - UNIDROIT approved a Convention on
Agency in the International Sale of Goods4, which defines an agency
contract as a contract “where one person, the agent, has authority or
purports to have authority on behalf of another person, the principal,
to conclude a contract of sale of goods with a third party.”5

2
See UNIDROIT, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL MASTER FRANCHISE
AGREEMENTS (2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter UNIDROIT GUIDE], available at
http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/franchising/guide/second-edition-2007.
3
Spain, for example, treats agents differently and affords them special
treatment. Besides the 1992 Law on Agency Contracts, the so-called “economic
dependent agents” are considered to be autonomous workers and thus partially
regulated under a special Labor Law. See Ley del Estatuto del Trabajador Autónomo
(LETA) (B.O.E. 2007, 20) (Spain).
4 UNIDROIT, Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods, 22 I.L.M.
249 (opened for signature Feb. 17, 1983).
5
It has not entered into force yet, as ten ratification instruments are
required. So far, it has been ratified by: France, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, and South
Africa. See UNIDROIT, Status of the Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods
- Signatures, Ratifications, http://www.unidroit.org/status-agency (last visited Nov. 30,
2015).
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European Union law6 has a similar definition, but it is more
precise as it considers the power to negotiate or to negotiate and
conclude the contract by the agent. It defines a ‘commercial agent’ as
one who is a self-employed intermediary who has continuing authority
to negotiate the sale or the purchase of goods on behalf of another
person, hereinafter called the ‘principal’, or to negotiate and conclude
such transactions on behalf of and in the name of that principal.7
In terms of soft law instruments, there is also the possibility
for the parties to agree on the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts8 (UPICC, 2010). Furthermore, there is also a
model contract offered by the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC).9
2. Distribution or Concession Contracts - In many legal systems,
distribution or concession contracts are atypical contracts, or are only
partially regulated.10 At an international level, there is no uniform legal
instrument such as the CISG for distribution contracts, although the
CISG might apply to specific distribution contracts.11 It is also possible
that the parties could agree on the application of The UNIDROIT

Council Directive 86/653, On Self-Employed Commercial Agents,
1986 O.J. (L 382) 17 (EC).
7
Id. art. 1.2. The common law concept of “agent” is in fact to all intents
and purposes the same as that of the general agent under the civil law systems,
according to the UNIDROIT Guide. UNIDROIT GUIDE, supra note 2, at 9.
8
See UNIDROIT, Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts, at
Preamble, (2010). As explained by Comment 2 to the Preamble: “The Principles do
not provide any express definition, but the assumption is that the concept of
“commercial” contracts should be understood in the broadest possible sense, so as
to include not only trade transactions for the supply or exchange of goods or services,
but also other types of economic transactions, such as investment and/or concession
agreements, contracts for professional services, etc.” See id. cmt. 2.
9
See generally INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC MODEL
CONTRACT: COMMERCIAL AGENCY (2d ed. 2002).
10
For example, in Spain, although sometimes the Courts have applied by
analogy some of the substantive provisions of the Agency Law.
11
See generally María del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, International Distribution
Contracts and CISG, in ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO MERCANTIL (2013).
6
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Principles or the ICC, which also offers a model contract for the
parties.12
There is no universal definition of an international distribution
contract, but a good example to illustrate this type of contract and its
modalities is found in the Draft Common Frame of Reference
(DCFR): IV. E. – 5:101 (Scope and definitions), which follows The
Principles on Agency, Franchise and Distribution Contracts (PEL
CAFDC)13::
(1) This Chapter applies to contracts (distribution
contracts) under which one party, the supplier, agrees
to supply the other party, the distributor, with products
on a continuing basis and the distributor agrees to
purchase them, or to take and pay for them, and to
supply them to others in the distributor’s name and on
the distributor’s behalf.
(2) An exclusive distribution contract is a distribution
contract under which the supplier agrees to supply
products to only one distributor within a certain
territory or to a certain group of customers.
(3) A selective distribution contract is a distribution
contract under which the supplier agrees to supply
products, either directly or indirectly, only to
distributors selected on the basis of specified criteria.
(4) An exclusive purchasing contract is a distribution
contract under which the distributor agrees to
purchase, or to take and pay for, products only from
the supplier or from a party designated by the supplier.

12
See generally INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC MODEL
DISTRIBUTORSHIP DISTRIBUTION CONTRACT (2002).
13 PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE
LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE 2435 (Christian von Bar et al. eds.,
2009), avalible at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/european-privatelaw_en.pdf
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A more succinct example, the UNIDROIT Guide provides:
The distributor is wholly independently owned and
financed and buys the products from the supplier by
whom it has been granted the distribution rights. In
some jurisdictions these distribution rights may be
granted also for the supplying of services. In others,
the distribution agreement is considered to incorporate
the distributor into the manufacturer’s or supplier’s
sales organization.14
3. Franchising Contracts- In many legal systems, franchising
contracts are also atypical contracts and therefore there is no special
regulation for these contracts. UNIDROIT has, however, developed
partial regulation guides for these contracts.15
According to Article 2 of The UNIDROIT Model Franchise
Disclosure Law (2002):
[F]ranchise means the rights granted by a party (the
franchisor) authorizing and requiring another party
(the franchisee), in exchange for direct or indirect
financial compensation, to engage in the business of
selling goods or services on its own behalf under a
system designated by the franchisor which includes
know-how and assistance, prescribes in substantial part
the manner in which the franchised business is to be
operated, includes significant and continuing
operational control by the franchisor, and is
substantially associated with a trademark, service mark,
trade name or logotype designated by the franchisor. It
includes:
(A) the rights granted by a franchisor to a subfranchisor under a master franchise agreement;

See UNIDROIT Guide, supra at 2.
See UNIDROIT, A MODEL LAW ON PRECONTRACTUAL INFORMATION
(2002); see also UNIDROIT, A GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL MASTER FRANCHISE
ARRANGEMENTS (2d ed. 2007).
14
15
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(B) the rights granted by a sub-franchisor to a subfranchisee under a sub-franchise agreement;
(C) the rights granted by a franchisor to a party
under a development agreement.16
As considered by the UNIDROIT Guide, in most franchise
agreements there is an exclusivity clause that provides that the
franchisee is allowed to market only the products of the franchisor.
The vendor-purchaser relationship may also be present in a franchise
relationship, but will typically be a mere feature of the broader
franchise arrangement, which will also include the licensing of the
trademark, system of the franchisor, and the providing of certain
services by the franchisor to the franchisee, such as training and
continued assistance.17
B.

International Commercial Arbitration

As previously mentioned, distribution contracts are based
upon the cooperation between two parties: the supplier and the
distributor. In order to minimize transaction costs, the supplier has a
priority interest to base his relationship with the distributors on the
same model contract containing the same arbitration clause and
providing for the same forum.18 Therefore, it is not unusual to find
arbitration clauses in these contracts because the advantages of
arbitration in commercial contracts, particularly international
contracts, also applies to distribution contracts.
Generally speaking, arbitration laws do not contain specific
regulations as to distribution contracts and thus general arbitration
rules apply. In fact, the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration (MAL) does not contain any specific rules for
distribution contracts. Yet, within the general definition of what is

UNIDROIT, MODEL FRANCHISE DISCLOSURE LAW art. 2 (2002).
See UNIDROIT Guide, supra note 2, at 10.
18
See generally Stefan Kröll, The “Arbitrability of Disputes Arising from
Commercial Representation, in ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES
317
(2009).
16
17
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considered to be commercial distribution contracts are included, as
well as agency and other forms of industrial or business cooperation.19
Some countries do provide specific legislation on this area,
adopting certain restrictions on arbitration or the applicable law and
thus limiting party autonomy in arbitration.
The reasons for adopting such limitations are based upon the
idea that there is a weaker party and thus an unequal bargaining power
whereby the principal imposes arbitration clauses on the agent,
distributor, or franchisee. Such a clause might have the effect of
depriving the weaker party of the rights afforded by the domestic
statutes, and shows that there is a need to protect the essential
conditions of a given market.
As will be developed in this paper, these limitations primarily
affect the arbitrability of the dispute (see infra section I). On the other
hand, other legal regimes have adopted a more liberal approach
towards arbitration in the area of distribution contracts as a way to
attract investment and trade (see infra section II).
There are also other issues in arbitration and distribution
contracts that are shared by other commercial contracts, which
includes the extension of the arbitration clause to third parties that
might have an impact in networking distribution contracts or in
franchising contracts, particularly if there is a master franchise
19
United Nations Committee on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration art. 1 ¶ 1, U.N.
Sales No. E.95.V.18 (1985). This provides:

The term “commercial” should be given a wide interpretation so
as to cover matters arising from all relationships of a commercial
nature, whether contractual or not. Relationships of a commercial
nature include, but are not limited to, the following transactions:
any trade transaction for the supply or exchange of goods or
services; distribution agreement; commercial representation or
agency; factoring; leasing; construction of works; consulting;
engineering; licensing; investment; financing; banking; insurance;
exploitation agreement or concession; joint venture and other
forms of industrial or business cooperation; carriage of goods or
passengers
by
air,
sea,
rail
or
road.
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contract;20 the incorporation of arbitration clauses in general terms and
conditions;21 the delimitation between the mediator, the expert and the
arbitrator in distribution contracts which might be problematic in the
automotive sector;22 the power of arbitrators in long-term contracts;23
the consent to arbitration when an agent is concluding the contract on
behalf of the principal;24 the impact upon distribution contracts of
issues where arbitrability might be contentious, for example, when
intellectual rights or competition issues are linked to the distribution
contract;25 and the application of the standards of independence and
impartiality to arbitrators.26
I.

LIMITATION OF PARTY AUTONOMY IN ARBITRATION

BERNARD HANOTIAU, COMPLEX ARBITRATIONS: MULTIPARTY,
MULTICONTRACT, MULTI-ISSUE AND CLASS ACTIONS 1 (Kluwer International Law,
2005); Stephen R. Bond, Multi-party Arbitration — The Experience of the ICC International
Court of Arbitration, in MULTI-PARTY ARBITRATION 39 (INT’L CHAMBER COM., 1991);
Carmine R. Zarlenga, Defending Against Litigation by Third Parties in the Franchise Context,
11 FRANCHISE L.J. 1, 19-24 (1991) (examining franchising contracts).
21
Vera Van Houtte, Consent to Arbitration through Agreement to Printed
Contracts: The Continental Experience, 16 ARB. INT’L. 1, 1–18 (2000).
22
LAURENT DU JARDIN ET AL., ARBITRAGE V. EXPERTISE EN DROIT DE
LA DISTRIBUTION (2006); JOHAN ERAUW ET AL., L’ARBITRAGE ET LA
DISTRIBUTION COMMERCIALE 159-170 (2005).
23
Didier Matray, Françoise Vidts, & Baudouin Roels, L’Arbitrage et le
caractere evolutif des contrats de distribution, in L’ARBITRAGE ET LA DISTRIBUTION
COMMERCIAL 109 (2005); ERAUW ET AL., supra note 22, at 111-55.
24
See Stefan Kröll, El desarrollo del arbitraje en los años 2007-2008, 9
REVISTA DEL CLUB ESPAÑOL DEL ARBITRAJE 15 (2010). For an overview of German
Domestic Law and the lack of power by commercial agents to conclude arbitration
agreements, see HANDELGESETZBUCH [HGB] [COMMERCIAL CODE], May 10, 1987,
REICHGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 219, art. 53.2 (Ger.), see also Oberlandesgericht
München [OLG] [Munich Appellate Court], Aug. 19, 2008, 34 SchH 007/07 (Ger.).
25 Hans Van Houtte, Distribution Arbitration and European Competition Law,
in JOHAN ERAUW ET AL., L’ARBITRAGE ET LA DISTRIBUTION COMMERCIALE 97-107
(Bruylant, 1st ed. 2005); Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Arbitrabilidad de los Derechos de la
industrial Propiedad Industrial y de la Competencia, 6 ANUARIO DE JUSTICIA
ALTERNATIVA: DERECHO ARBITRAL 4-43 (2005).
26
Doak Bishop & Lucy Reed, Practical Guidelines for Interviewing, Selecting
and Challenging Party-Appointed Arbitrators in International Commercial Distribution, 14 ARB.
INT’L. 28-32 (1998).
20
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THROUGH ARBITRABILITY

Distribution contracts are commercial contracts. Traditionally,
commercial contracts might be subject to arbitration without the need
to impose limitations. The rationale behind this general rule is that in
commercial contracts, both parties share equal contracting power and
thus there is no need to impose limitations, like, for example, in
consumer arbitration.27

Jan Kleinheisterkamp, The Impact of Internationally Mandatory Law on the
Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements 1-2 (LSE LAW, SOC’Y AND ENCON. WORKING
PAPERS No. 22 2009), available at, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1496923 (See for all
with special reference to distribution contracts).
See also Directive 2013/11, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May
2013, On Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes, 2013 O.J. (L
165/63) (EU). For a further discussion, see Norbert Reich, Party Autonomy and
Consumer Arbitration in conflict -A “Trojan Horse” in the Access to Justice in the EU ADRDirective 2013/11?, 4 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 290 (2015).
27

Following art. 10 of Directive 2013/11, Spanish Consumer Arbitration has been
recently changed by Modificación del texto refundido de la Ley General para la
Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios y otras leyes complementarias (B.O.E.
2014, 3) [hereinafter Law 3/2014], art. 57.4 (B.O.E. 2007, 1) [hereinafter Ley
1/2007]. According to the old system, pre-disputed arbitration clauses in Law 1/2007
(art. 57.4), as well as agreements to arbitrate contained in general conditions governed
by Law 1/2007 (art. 90), were binding on consumers if the arbitration system
provided for was the special consumer arbitration system created by the State and
regulated under the consumer arbitral system (Sistema Arbitral de Consumo (B.O.E.
2008, 231) [hereinafter Royal Decree 231/2008]). Now, under the new art. 57.4 as
modified by Law 3/2014, any arbitration agreement concluded before the dispute
does not bind the consumer, but it binds the merchant if the consumer later accepts
it, and when a further condition is met: the arbitration agreement should met the
conditions required by the applicable laws. Presently, Article 57.4 Law 1/2007 as
amended by Ley 3/2014 states that:
No serán vinculantes para los consumidores los convenios
arbitrales suscritos con un empresario antes de surgir el conflicto.
La suscripción de dicho convenio, tendrá para el empresario la
consideración de aceptación del arbitraje para la solución de las
controversias derivadas de la relación jurídica a la que se refiera,
siempre que el acuerdo de sometimiento reúna los requisitos
exigidos por las normas aplicables.
For further details, see Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Los convenios arbitrales con los
consumidores (La modificación del art. 57.4 TRLGDCU por la Ley 3/2014 de 27 de
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Scholars studying arbitrability typically distinguish between
objective arbitrability (arbitrability rationae materiae, i.e. matters that are
capable of settlement by arbitration) and subjective arbitrability28
(authority and capacity of the parties). Objective arbitrability is an issue
to be decided in accordance with domestic laws on arbitration, which
defines arbitrability as including both the subject matter of arbitration
and the need for a dispute to exist. The issue of arbitrability goes beyond
the scope of an arbitration agreement. It is inherent to the power of States
to decide what issues are capable of being resolved through arbitration,
and it is outside the will of the parties. On the other hand, the object of
an arbitration clause is an issue to be decided by the will of the parties,
who within the scope of issues that are arbitrable, might exclude some of
them. The parties cannot, however, agree to submit to arbitration
disputes that are not arbitrable.
Generally, domestic laws consider arbitrability under general
rather than exhaustive provisions. Some national laws provide that all
rights or matters that the parties “may freely dispose”29 or “property
issues”30 might be subject to arbitration. Also, many statutes link
arbitrability with the transaction, and thus the matters that are the object
of a transaction might be also subject to arbitration.31 These general
marzo),

7

La

Ley

Mercantil

22

(2014).

See JULIAN D. M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN MICHAEL
KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION Ch. 9 (Kluwer
Law International, 2003); see also Kresimir Sajko, Arbitration Agreement and Arbitrability.
Solutions and Open Issues in Croatian and Comparative Law, 3 CROAT. ARB. Y.B. 43, 44
(1996) (some authors also refer to arbitrability ratione jurisdictionis); Alan Uzelac, New
Boundaries of Arbitrability under the Croatian Law on Arbitration, 9 CROAT. ARB. Y.B. 139,
140, 152, 155 (2002) (referring also to arbitrability ratione institutionis).
29
Ley de Arbitraje art. 2.1 (B.O.E. 2003, 60) (Spain); Code Civil [C. CIV.]
art. 2059 (Fr.); Codice di Procedura Civile [C.p.c.] art. 808, art. 1966.2 (It.); Peru
Arbitration Act, art. 1 (2008); ORGANIZATION FOR THE HARMONIZATION OF
BUSINESS LAW IN AFRICA (OHADA), UNIFORM ACT OF ARBITRATION (1999).
30
LOI FÉDÉRALE SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ [LDIP] [PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW] Dec. 18, 1987, RO 1776, art. 177.1 (Switz.);
ZIVILPROZESSSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] Jan. 30, 1877,
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] art. 1030.1 (Ger.); Lei No. 9.307, de 23 de Setembro
de 1996, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] (t. 1): de 24.9.1996 (Braz.).
31
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CIVIL PROCEDURE STATUTE]
REICHGESETZBLATT [RGBL] No. 113/1895 (Austria); Finnish Arbitration Law, art. 2,
(Oct. 23 1992); Chūsai-hō [Arbitration Law], Law No. 138 of 2003, art. 13.1 (Japan);
28
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clauses require significant specification and interpretation in order to
assess which of the specific issues related to distribution contracts are
arbitrable.
Arbitrability will vary from country to country, and even within
a given country it will vary since it is a concept that has changed with
time. Despite this, however, one clear principle applies to arbitrability,
particularly in international commercial arbitration: the principle of
favour arbitris. The application of this principle to arbitrability means,
first, there is a general presumption in favour of the arbitrability of
commercial disputes (policy favouring arbitrability);32 and second, there
is a tendency to expand the scope of the subject-matter of arbitration.
Despite this modern approach to arbitrability, some countries
adopt limitations to party autonomy by restricting objective arbitrability
of the dispute, either by excluding arbitration before the dispute has
arisen (see infra section I.A) or by excluding it through the imposition of
the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Courts (see infra I.B).
A.

Invalidity of the Pre-Disputed Arbitration Clauses: United
States

The idea of the protecting the weaker party in distribution
contracts, i.e., the agent, distributor or franchisee, as if they were
consumers is the impetus for certain laws. These laws are intended to
restrict arbitration from hindering an agreement before a dispute has
arisen.
An example of this is The Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract
Arbitration Fairness Act (2002) (United States).33 This act would have
1a § LAG OM SKILJEFÖRFARANDE (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 1999:116)
(Swed.).
32
María Fernanda Vasquez Palma, 2 IUS ET PRAXIS 407-410 (2012)
(reviewing MARTA DE GONZALO QUIROGA, ORDEN PÚBLICO Y ARBITRAJE
INTERNACIONAL ARBITRAJE INTERNACIONAL EN EL MARCO DE LA GLOBALIZACIÓN
COMERCIAL GLOBALIZACIÓN COMERCIAL ARBITRABILIDAD Y DERECHO APLICABLE
DERECHO APLICABLE AL FONDO DE LA CONTROVERSIA INTERNACIONAL (2003)).
33
S. REP. NO. 107-266, at 2 (2002):
This legislation would allow motor vehicle dealers the option of
either going to arbitration or utilizing procedures and remedies
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applied to Business to Business transactions, i.e., to contracts whereby
“a motor vehicle manufacturer, importer or distributor sells motor
vehicles to any other person for resale to an ultimate purchaser and
authorizes such other person to repair and authorizes such other
person to repair and service manufacturer´s motor vehicles.”34 Leaving
aside the confusion between distribution and franchise contracts, this
act would have considered arbitration valid only if agreed to by the
parties after the controversy arises.35

available under State law such as those involving State-established
administrative boards specifically created and uniquely equipped
to resolve disputes between motor vehicle dealers and
manufacturers. This legislation is intended to ensure that motor
vehicle dealers are not required to forfeit important rights and
remedies afforded by State law as a condition of obtaining or
renewing a motor vehicle franchise contract.
The report of the Senate refers also extensively to the unequal
bargaining power between the parties and the fact that arbitration
agreements are included in standard terms or conditions on a
“take it or leave it” basis, which converts those clauses in
“mandatory binding arbitration” with the effect of making null or
void the substantive protective rights afforded by the Statute.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 17 (2002) (discussing motor vehicle franchise contracts):
(a) For purposes of this section, the term (2) ‘‘motor vehicle
franchise contract’’ means a contract under which a motor vehicle
manufacturer, importer, or distributor sells motor vehicles to any
other person for resale to an ultimate purchaser and authorizes
such other person to repair and service the manufacturer’s motor
vehicles.
(b) Whenever a motor vehicle franchise contract provides for the
use of arbitration to resolve a controversy arising out of or relating
to the contract, arbitration may be used to settle such controversy
only if after such controversy arises both parties consent in writing
to use arbitration to settle such controversy.
(c) Whenever arbitration is elected to settle a dispute under a
motor vehicle franchise contract, the arbitrator shall provide the
parties to the contract with a written explanation of the factual
and legal basis for the award.
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An identical solution is found in the Draft Arbitration Fairness
Act (2013) in relation to consumer, labor and competition issues.
Franchising contracts were included in previous drafts.36
B.

Exclusive Jurisdiction of State Courts: Panama

A more restrictive view towards arbitration has been adopted by
certain legal systems that consider both pre and post-dispute arbitration
clauses to be invalid, because in these jurisdictions only the state courts
are considered competent to hear a dispute. Therefore, arbitration as a
means to solve disputes is preempted by imposing the exclusive
jurisdiction of state courts. An example is the recent Code of Private
International Law of the Republic of Panama.37
According to this Code, commercial contracts follow a
presumption that contracts are concluded among equal parties.38
However, a special regulation is provided for distribution contracts when
the commissioner is rendering the services in Panama. According to the
Law, these contracts are considered to be unequal contracts or adhesive
contracts39 and are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts in

36
37

See Kröll, supra note 18 § 16-30, 16-32.
Code of Private International Law of the Republic of Panama (May 8,

2014).
Id. art. 88.
Id. art. 89. (Unequal contracts are also considered those whereby the
weaker party has not capacity to negotiate the essential elements of the contract;
those are considered to be: price, clauses for the performance of the contract, and
the settlement of disputes).
38
39
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Panama if the contract is performed within Panamanian borders.40 The
same limitation applies to labor and consumer contracts.41
At the same time, when the contract is an international
commercial representation or franchising contract, the Code establishes
certain limitations to the general principle of freedom of contract in
relation to the applicable law to the indemnification for breach of the
contract or unilateral termination. . In this situation, the commissioner or
the franchisee has the only option to choose between the application of
the law applicable to the performance of the contract or the law that
provides the highest standard of protection.
Belgium is another example of a jurisdiction where legislation
provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of the state courts, as well as for
the mandatory application of state law for certain distribution contracts
and agency contracts. Belgian case law tends to apply Article II(3) of the
1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards and, thus, Belgian courts have found that
arbitration agreements are null and void because of the exclusive
competence of state courts.42

Id. art 90, 91. (These limitations both in regard to arbitration and to the
choice of law do not encompass some other well advanced provisions. To this regard,
Panama has an arbitration Law that follows very closely The United Nations
Committee on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.4 (2008) as modified
in 2006. See Arbitration Law of Panama (Dec. 31, 2013). Arbitrability of the subject
matter of the dispute is seen under the general rule of the free disposition of the
parties in art. 4, and in terms of applicable law, due regard is to be given by the
arbitrators to the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts,
since in all cases the arbitrators will have to take into account the provisions of the
contract, the usages of trade as well as the UNIDROIT Principles when the contract
is international, as required by art. 56.3.
Identical conclusions in regard to the Code of Private International Law of the
Republic of Panama, supra note 37, that recognizes the principle of pacta sunt servanda
in art.72, and also recognizes the agreement of the parties to apply the UNIDROIT
Principles as a secondary source to the applicable Law or as a mean to interpret an
international commercial contract by the judge or the arbitrator in art.86.
41
Code of Private International Law of the Republic of Panama, supra
note 37, art. 90.
42
See Kleinheisterkamp, supra note 27, at 1 et seq.; Kröll, supra note 17, at
16-33 et seq.; Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Contratos de internacional Distribución Internacional
40

226

2015

Perales Viscasillas

4:1

The overriding effect of domestic laws upon arbitration, even
with regard to other substantive laws, including those that are based
upon European Union (EU) Law, is seen when analyzing the Unamar
case, ECJ 17 October 2013.43 In Unamar, the court states the
important consequences for agency contracts within the EU, but does
not consider arbitration in its analysis.
In Unamar, the parties were an agent from Belgium and a
principal from Bulgaria, the applicable law in the contract was
Bulgarian Law, and there was also an arbitration clause that provided
for an arbitral seat and institution in Bulgaria (Bulgaria Chamber of
Commerce). Article 27 of the Belgium Law on commercial agency
contracts provides that:
Without prejudice to the application of international
conventions to which Belgium is a party, any activity
of a commercial agent whose principal place of
business is in Belgium shall be governed by Belgian law
and shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Belgian
courts.
The Hof van Cassatie (Court of Cassation), considering art.
II(3) NYC, held that it had jurisdiction,44 thereby considering the lex
fori in its analysis,45 but submitted the question of the applicable law to
a preliminary ruling. The ECJ in the UNAMAR Case had to consider

y Arbitraje, in DISTRIBUCIÓN COMERCIAL Y DERECHO DE LA COMPETENCIA 45-102
(Jorge Viera González & Joseba Aitor Echevarría Sáenz eds., 2011).
43
C-184/12, United Antwerp Martime Agencies (Unamar) NV v.
Navigation Maritime Bulgare, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX Lexis 4306 (Oct. 17, 2013).
See also Hilda Grieder Aguilar, La Intervención de las “Leyes De Policía” Como Límite al
Principio de la Autonomía de la Voluntad de las Partes en los Contratos de Agencia Comercial:
Un Nuevo Paso en la Comprensión del Sistema, DIARIO LA LEY No. 8234 (2014).
44
See Hof van Cassatie [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], May 4, 2012, N20120405-2, http://www.cass.be (Belg.) (where the parties agree to arbitration in
Quebec (Canada) and the arbitration clause was considered to be null and void; as
usual in Belgian Law a comparison is drawn between the applicable law chosen by
the parties and Belgian Law, being the one agreed less protective to the agent.).
45
Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Contratos de Distribucion Internacional 77 et seq.,
in DISTRIBUCION COMERCIAL Y DERECHO DE LA COMPETENCIA (La Ley Grupo
Wolters Kluwer, 2011) (an analysis that has been very much subject to criticism
because it ought to have been in accordance to the lex contractus, see further details).
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whether the Agency Law of Belgium was or was not part of the
international public policy, within the meaning of Article 7 of the
Rome Convention.46
According to the facts of the case, Bulgaria correctly
implemented the Agency Directive into its domestic law, which is a
minimum harmonization directive. However, it did so in less
protective terms when compared to Belgium Agency Law. Therefore,
the question was whether Articles 3 and 7(2) of the Rome Convention
might authorize the Belgium courts (law of the forum) to disregard the
application of the law chosen by the parties (Bulgarian Law) in favor
of the mandatory laws of the forum (Belgium Law on Agency
Contracts), despite the fact that the law chosen (Bulgarian Law) meets
the requirement of Directive 86/653.
The answer to this question was that Bulgarian Law could be
disregarded by the Belgian Court owing to the mandatory nature, in
the legal order of Belgium, of the rules governing the situation of selfemployed commercial agents.
These rules are mandatory only when the court before
which the case has been brought finds, on the basis of
a detailed assessment, that, in the course of that
transposition, the legislature of the forum state (Belgium)
found it to be crucial, in the legal order concerned, to grant the
commercial agent protection going beyond that
provided for by the directive. In that regard, the
46
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, art. 7
1980 OJ (L 266) (EC) [hereinafter Rome Convention]:
1. When applying under this Convention the law of a country,
effect may be given to the mandatory rules of the law of another
country with which the situation has a close connection, if and in
so far as, under the law of the latter country, those rules must be
applied whatever the law applicable to the contract. In considering
whether to give effect to these mandatory rules, regard shall be
had to their nature and purpose and to the consequences of their
application or non-application
2. Nothing in this Regulation shall restrict the application of the
provisions of the law of the forum in a situation where they are
mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the noncontractual obligation.
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legislature of the forum state must also take into
account the nature and of the objective of such
mandatory provisions.47
Therefore:
it is thus for the national court, in the course of its
assessment of whether the national law which it
proposes to substitute for that expressly chosen by the
parties to the contract is a ‘mandatory rule’, to take
account not only of the exact terms of that law, but
also of its general structure and of all the circumstances
in which that law was adopted in order to determine
whether it is mandatory in nature in so far as it appears
that the legislature adopted it in order to protect an
interest judged to be essential by the Member State
concerned. As the Commission pointed out, such a
case might be one where the transposition in the
Member State of the forum, by extending the scope of
a directive or by choosing to make wider use of the
discretion afforded by that directive, offers greater
protection to commercial agents by virtue of the
particular interest which the Member State pays to that
category of nationals” (pfo.50).
C.

The Mandatory Character of Substantive Rules for the
Protection of the Weaker Party and its Impact on Arbitration:
Agency Contracts in Europe

As we have considered in the two previous sections, arbitration
agreements might be totally or partially affected by an express rule
limiting arbitrability of the dispute. A third approach to limit the
freedom of the parties to submit disputes to arbitration is somewhat
indirect because it is derived from the idea that there is a fraud of law
by one of the parties (the party with more contracting power) when
imposing arbitration with a foreign seat and with a foreign law. This
implies that the principal is trying to escape from the mandatory laws
protecting the agent, distributor, or franchisee. In fact, this
47

See Unamar, supra note 43.
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consideration is also behind those laws that expressly prohibit
arbitration.48
A typical example of forum shopping in this area is found in
real cases: a Californian principal, with a commercial agent in Europe,
elects for arbitration proceedings in California, under Californian law.
Interestingly, California law does not recognize a possible
indemnification to the commercial agent after the termination of the
contract, contrary to the 1986 Agency Directive49. In this regard, art.
17 of the Agency Directive is considered a mandatory rule within the
European Union that cannot be evaded by the simple expedient of a
choice of law clause50 and/or arbitration clause.51 Hence, the disputes
are non-arbitrable if the applicable law is the law of a non-European
country.52
II.

A POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION IN THE AREA OF
DISTRIBUTION CONTRACTS

Contrary to the approach undertaken by several countries, other
legal systems do not constrain the principle of freedom of the parties to
submit their disputes to arbitration in the framework of distribution
contracts; on the contrary they have followed a policy in favor of
arbitration.

See supra Sections I.1, I.2.
Council Directive 86/653, On Self-Employed Commercial Agents, art.
17 1986 O.J. (L 382) 17 (EC).
50
C-381/98, Ingmar v. Eaton, 2000 E.C.R. I-09305 (in the case, the agent
had his place of business in the United Kingdom, and there was no forum or
arbitration clause agreed. In terms of applicable law, as we have mentioned, it is not
only that the law of the third country might be disregarded but also, as the UNAMAR
Case shows, the law of EU country in favor of the mandatory law of the forum).
51
As interpreted by German Courts when facing art. 89b HGB
(HANDELSGESETZBUCH, CCo), i.e., Art.17 of the Agency Directive. See Kröll, supra,
note 18, at 16-55.
52
For further details, see Kröll, supra note 17, at 16-55 et seq; see also
Kleinheisterkamp, supra note 26, at 10. This doctrine does not extend to distribution
contracts. See Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Jan. 27, 2010, docket
No. 7 Ob 255/09i (Austria) (principal in USA, arbitration in California, distributor
in Austria).
48
49
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Agency Contracts under Spanish Law

Spanish law bases its agency contract law on the EU Directive
of 1986.53 This law establishes that the competence to hear disputes
related to agency contracts belongs to the judge of the agent´s domicile,
making null any contrary agreement of the parties.54 This imperative
provision55 could have been interpreted as a rule that provides for the
exclusion of arbitration. However, the majority of scholars and the case
law agree that this provision does not provide for an exclusive
jurisdiction of State Courts,56 but only a territorial competence among
State Courts,57 and thus it does not exclude arbitration even if it has a seat
in a foreign country.58

53
Ley Sobre Contrato de Agencia (B.O.E. 1992, 12) (Spain). See also
Council Directive 86/653, On Self-Employed Commercial Agents, 1986 O.J. (L 382)
17 (EC).
54
Id. “La competencia para el conocimiento de las acciones derivadas del
contrato de agencia corresponderá al Juez del domicilio del agente, siendo nulo cualquier
pacto en contrario
55
Id. In general, most of the rules contained in the Agency Contract Law
are imperative, see Article 3.1.
56
Pilar Jiménez Blanco, Nota al Auto AP Barcelona (sección 17ª) 28 mayo
2009, 1 ARBITRAJE: REVISTA DE ARBITRAJE COMERCIAL Y DE INVERSIONES 270
(2010); Alejandro López Ortiz, Interferencias y desajustes entre competencia judicial internacional
y competencia territorial en los tribunales civiles españoles: la disposición adicional de lay Desajustes
Entre Competencia Judicial Internacional y Competencia Territorial en los Tribunales Civiles
Españoles: La Disposición Adicional de la Ley 12/1992, del contrato de agencia del Contrato de
Agencia, 14/157 DERECHO DE NEGOCIOS 17 (2003); Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Algunos
Problemas en Torno a la Arbitrabilidad: Insolvencia y Contrato de Agencia, 5 FORO DE
DERECHO MERCANTIL 7-29 (2004).
57
See S.T.S.J. Murcia, Apr. 16, 2014 (R.O.J., 1035/2014) for a recent
domestic agency contract (decision of The High Superior Court of Justice of Murcia).
58
See Pilar Jimenez Blanco, Nota al Auto AP Barcelona (sección 17ª) 28 mayo
2009, 1 ARBITRAJE: REVISTA DE ARBITRAJE COMERCIAL Y DE INVERSIONES 266-272
(2010) (in relation with an international agency contract (Arbitration in Finland,
Finnish principal, Spanish agent)); see also S.A.P. Barcelona, June 1, 2004 (R.O.J.,
7108/2004); S.A.P. Barcelona, Feb. 7, 2006 (R.O.J., 14828/2006), S.A.P., Nov. 6,
2000 (R.O.J., 13153/2000) and S.A.P. Barcelona, Nov. 19, 2002 (R.O.J.
11552/2002); see also S.A.A.P. Lleida 28 Jan. 2009 (R.O.J. 98/2009).
Impliedly also, S.T.S., July 3, 2002 (R.O.J. 4928/2002); S.A.P. Barcelona, Nov. 6,
2000 (R.O.J. 13153/2000) considering the second look doctrine; and S.A.P.
Córdoba, July 23, 2001 (R.O.J. 1013/2001). But see contrary stating that the arbitral
agreement is null: Auto AP Alicante, May 28, 2008 (R.O.J. 76/2008).

231

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:1

In this regard, Spanish arbitration legislation follows a policy that
favors arbitration and arbitrability of the disputes.59 An example of this
is that arbitration is provided for by the legislator even when the agent
has a special protection as a special worker.60
B.

Distribution Contracts under DR-CAFTA

The Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade
Agreement (DR-CAFTA) is the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between
the United States and Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. As with other FTAs, such as
NAFTA (United States, Canada and Mexico), the idea is to facilitate

Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Arbitration in Spain, in WORLD ARBITRATION
REPORTER (WAR) 1-53 (Loukas A. Mistelis, Laurence Shore & Hans Smite eds., 2d ed.,
2012). In regard to international distribution contracts, see considering enforceable
arbitration agreements with a foreign seat, see S.A.P. Barcelona, Feb. 27, 2012 (R.O.J.
709/2012); see also ICC Arbitration in Düsseldorf. Also an international distribution
contract with an exclusive licensing agreement: arbitration in a foreign country with an
applicable foreign law (California) and included into the general terms and conditions
was considered a valid agreement during the exequatur proceedings, see S.T.S.J.
Cataluña, Mar. 25, 2013 (R.O.J. 184/2013). See also considering the equal bargaining
power in international distribution contracts and the agreement to arbitrate included
in general terms and conditions: S.T.S.J. Cataluña, Nov. 17, 2011 (R.O.J. 525/2011)
also examining this question during the enforcement proceedings under The New
York Convention. For a valid agreement in international distribution contracts of the
option for arbitration or state Courts, Juz. de lo Mercantil, nº11 of Madrid, May 4,
2011 (R.O.J. 3738/2014), confirmed by S.A.P. Madrid, Oct. 18, 2013 (R.O.J.
1988/2011).
Also considering that franchising contracts are negotiated contracts between the
parties as derived from the mandatory pre-contractual information and thus
considering the arbitration valid as no proof of the non-negotiated agreement was
duly provided: S.A.P. Zaragoza, Dec. 19, 2011 (R.O.J. 3211/2011). Contrary
considering the arbitration clause null as was included in general terms and
conditions: S.A.P. Barcelona, Sep. 28, 2012 (R.O.J. 7296/2012), that it is however a
wrong decision based upon art. 63 Code of Civil Procedure that does not apply to
arbitration.
60
Ley del Estatuto del Trabajador Autónomo (LETA) (B.O.E. 20/2007)
(Spain) (applies to commercial agents when they are considered economically
dependant from the principal. Art.17 LETA establishes the competence of Labor
courts but also in accordance with Art.18.4 LETA parties may submit their disputes
to arbitration.).
59
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and

DR-CAFTA is different than other FTAs in that it deals,
among other issues, with distribution contracts (substantive rules), as
well as arbitration in relation to these contracts. The more recent FTAs
focus on arbitration as the ideal, efficient and fair method for resolving
commercial disputes, and they are considered the best way to promote
investment and trade.62

David A., Gantz, Symposium: CAFTA and Commercial Law Reform in the
Americas: International Legal Development: The Complex Problem of Customs Law and
Administrative Reform in Central America, 12 Americas, SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 215, 220
(2006) (U.S.) (The agreement entered into force for the United States and El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua during 2006. For the Dominican
Republic on Mar. 1, 2007, and for Costa Rica on Jan. 1, 2009.) (U.S.).
62
José A. Muñoz, Symposium: CAFTA and Commercial Law Reform in the
Americas: Dealing with Shadow Economy: Comments and Reflections, Southwestern, 12 SW. J.L.
& TRADE AM. 373, 378 (2006); Omar García Bolivar, Symposium: CAFTA and
Commercial Law Reform in the Americas: Dispute Resolution Process and Enforcing the Rule of
Law: Is Arbitration a Viable Alternative to Solving Disputes in Central America, 12 SW. J.L.
& TRADE AM. 380, 381 et seq. (2006); Jeffrey Talpis, Symposium: CAFTA and
Commercial Law Reform in the Americas: Comments on Dispute Resolution Process and Enforcing
the Rule of Law, 12 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 409 et seq. (2006); Pilar Perales Viscasillas
et al., Derecho Uniforme del Comercio Internacional y Tratados de Libre Comercio en América,
in EL DERECHO MERCANTIL EN EL UMBRAL DEL SIGLO XXI: LIBRO HOMENAJE AL
PROF. DR. CARLOS FERNÁNDEZ-NÓVOA EN SU OCTOGÉSIMO CUMPLEAÑOS 63-76
(J. A. Gómez Segade and A. García, Marcial Pons eds., 2010).
See also for example, Agreement between the United States of America and the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Trade Relations, U.S.-Viet., art. 7, July 13, 2000,
Hein’s
No.
KAV
5968,
available
at
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/vietnam/8621/pdf-forms/bta.pdf (commercial
Disputes, which means a dispute between parties to a commercial transaction which
arises out of that transaction):
2. The parties encourage the adoption of arbitration for the
settlement of disputes arising out of commercial transactions
concluded between nationals or companies of the United States
of America and nationals or companies of the Socialist Republic
of Vietnam. Such arbitration may be provided for by agreements
in contracts between such nationals and companies, or in a
separate written agreement between them.
3. The parties to such transactions may provide for arbitration
under any internationally recognized arbitration rules, including
the UNCITRAL Rules of December 15, 1976, and any
61
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Before DR-CAFTA, legislation in Central-American countries
was imperative and very protective of the distributor, agent and
franchisee.63 Furthermore, arbitration was prohibited because the
legislation provided for the exclusive jurisdiction of State courts to
resolve disputes in the area of distribution contracts. However, those
barriers to the principle of freedom of contract and arbitration were

modifications thereto, in which case the parties should designate
an Appointing Authority under said rules in a country other than
USA or Vietnam.
4. The parties to the dispute, unless otherwise agreed between
them, should specify as the place of arbitration a country other
than USA or Vietnam that is a party to the New York Convention.
5. Nothing in this Article shall be construed to prevent, and the
parties shall not prohibit, the parties from agreeing upon any other
form of arbitration or on the law to be applied in such arbitration,
or other form of dispute settlement which they mutually prefer
and agree best suits their particular needs.
6. Each party shall ensure that an effective means exists within its
territory for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.”
63
See the Preamble to the Law No. 173, the Protection of the Importers
Agents of Goods and Products of 6th April 1966 (Dominican Republic) that was
considered a Public Order Law (art. 8):
CONSIDERANDO que el Estado Dominicano no puede
permanecer indiferente al creciente número de casos en que
personas físicas o morales del exterior, sin causas justificada,
eliminen sus concesionarios agentes tan pronto como estos han
creado un mercado favorable en la República, y sin tener en cuenta
sus intereses legítimos.
CONSIDERANDO que se hace necesaria la adecuada protección
de las personas físicas o morales que se dediquen en la República
Dominicana a promover y gestionar la importación, la
distribución, la venta, el alquiler o cualquier otra forma de
explotación de mercaderías o productos procedentes del
extranjero o cuando los mismos sean fabricados en el país,
actuando como agentes, o bajo cualquiera otra denominación
contra los perjuicios que puedan irrogarles la resolución injusta de
las relaciones en virtud de las cuales ejerzan tales actividades, por
la acción unilateral de las personas o entidades a quienes
representan o por cuya cuenta o interés actúan, a fin de asegurarles
la reparación equitativa y completa de todas las pérdidas que hayan
sufrido, así como de las ganancias legítimas percibibles de que
sean privados.
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considered by the contracting parties as contrary to the objectives of
DR-CAFTA, i.e., among others, to:
CONTRIBUTE to the harmonious development and
expansion of world trade and provide a catalyst to
broader international cooperation;
CREATE an expanded and secure market for the
goods and services produced in their territories while
recognizing the differences in their levels of
development and the size of their economies;
AVOID distortions to their reciprocal trade;
ESTABLISH clear and mutually advantageous rules
governing their trade;
ENSURE a predictable commercial framework for
business planning and investment;
FOSTER creativity and innovation, and promote trade
in goods and services that are the subject of
intellectual property rights (. . .).
As a consequence, the Central American countries (and the
Dominican Republic) needed to assume several specific commitments
in order to reduce the impact of mandatory rules,64 as well as, to
promote arbitration both in general terms65 and particularly in relation
64
For the main characteristic of this legislation, see Cecilia Barrero,
Distribution Contracts in the Dominican Republic, 2001 COMP. LAW Y.B. INT’L BUS. 27-32;
Salvador Juncadella, Agency, Distribution and Representation Contracts in Central America
and Panama, 6 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 35, 36(1974) (with references to
Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama).
65
Central American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-D.R., art. 20.22, Aug. 5,
2004, 43 I.L.M. 514:
1. Each Party shall, to the maximum extent possible, encourage
and facilitate the use of arbitration and other means of alternative
dispute resolution for the settlement of international commercial
disputes between private parties in the free trade area. 2. To this
end, each Party shall provide appropriate procedures to ensure
observance of agreements to arbitrate and for the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards in such disputes. 3. A Party shall
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to distribution contracts by eliminating the exclusive jurisdiction of
State Courts. Taking the example of Costa Rica, which assumed the
following commitments in Annex 11.3 revolved around the principle
of party autonomy and promotion of arbitration:
“1. Costa Rica shall repeal articles 2 and 9 of Law No.
6209, entitled Ley de Protección al Representante de
Casas Extranjeras , dated 9 March 1978, and its
regulation, and item b) of article 361 of the Código de
Comercio, Law No. 3284 of 24 April 1964, effective
on the date of entry into force of this Agreement.
2. Subject to paragraph 1, Costa Rica shall enact a new
legal regime that shall become applicable to contracts
of representation, distribution, or production, and:
(a) Shall apply principles of general contract law to
such contracts;
(b) Shall be consistent with the obligations of this
Agreement and the principle of Freedom of
contract;
(c) Shall treat such contracts as establishing an
exclusive relationship only if the Contract explicitly
states that the relationship is exclusive;
(d) shall provide that the termination of such
contracts either on their termination dates or in
the circumstances described in subparagraph (e) is
just cause for a goods or service supplier of
another Party to terminate the contract or allow
the contract to expire without renewal; and

be deemed to be in compliance with paragraph 2 if it is a party to
and is in compliance with the 1958 United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
or the 1975 Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration [. . .].
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(e) Will allow contracts with no termination date to
be terminated by any of the parties by giving ten
months advance termination notice.
3. The absence of an express provision for settlement
of disputes in a contract of representation, distribution,
or production shall give rise to a presumption that the
parties intended to settle any disputes through binding
arbitration. Such arbitration may take place in Costa
Rica. However, the presumption of an intent to submit
to arbitration shall not apply where any of the parties
objects to arbitration.
4. The United States and Costa Rica shall encourage
parties to existing contracts of representation,
distribution, or production to renegotiate such
contracts so as to make them subject to the new legal
regime enacted in accordance with paragraph 2.
5. In any case, the repeal of articles 2 and 9 of Law No.
6209 shall not impair any vested right, when applicable,
derived from that legislation and recognized under
Article 34 of the Constitución Política de la República
de Costa Rica.
6. Costa Rica shall, to the maximum extent possible,
encourage and facilitate the use of arbitration for the
settlement of disputes in contracts of representation,
distribution, or production. To this end, Costa Rica
shall endeavor to facilitate the operation of arbitration
centers and other effective means of alternative
resolution of claims arising pursuant to Law No. 6209
or the new legal regime enacted in accordance with
paragraph 2, and shall encourage the development of
rules for such arbitrations that provide, to the greatest
extent possible, for the prompt, low-cost, and fair
resolution of such claims.
7. For purposes of this Section:
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(a) Contract of representation, distribution, or
production has the same meaning as under Law
No. 6209; and
(b) Termination date means the date provided in
the contract for the contract to end, or the end of
a contract extension period agreed upon by the
parties to the contract.
Costa Rica fulfilled those commitments by modifying Art.7 of
Law nº6209 de Protección al Representante de Casas Extranjeras.66 In
the old Art.7, the exclusive competence of Costa Rican courts was
established in addition to the imperative character of the substantive
rules relating to distribution contracts. According to the new provision,
arbitration is allowed despite the fact that the substantive rules that
govern distribution contracts are imperative. Thereby recognizing an
important principle in arbitration: the imperative character of the rules
is not an obstacle for the settlement of disputes through arbitration.67
CONCLUSION: NO NEED TO LIMIT PARTY AUTONOMY IN

The modification took place by Modificación De La Ley De Protección
Al Representante De Casas Extranjeras, Nº 6209, Y Derogación Del Inciso B) Del
Artículo 361 Del Código De Comercio, Ley Nº 3284, Ley No. 8629, Nov. 11, 2007
(Costa Rica), available at http://www.crecex.com/asesoria-juridica/legislacionconsulta/repre-casas-ext/Ley8629.pdf.
67
Modificación De La Ley De Protección Al Representante De Casas
Extranjeras, Nº 6209, Y Derogación Del Inciso B) Del Artículo 361 Del Código De
Comercio, Ley Nº 3284, Ley No. 8629, Art.7 Law nº6209 Nov. 11, 2007 (Costa Rica)
states that:
Los derechos del representante, distribuidor o fabricante, por
virtud de esta Ley, serán irrenunciables. La ausencia de una
disposición expresa en un contrato de representación,
distribución o fabricación para la solución de disputas, presumirá
que las partes tuvieron la intención de dirimir cualquier disputa
por medio de arbitraje vinculante. Dicho arbitraje podrá
desarrollarse en Costa Rica. No obstante, la presunción de la
intención de someter una disputa a arbitraje no se aplicará cuando
una de las partes objete el arbitraje.
66
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ARBITRATION
The comparison of the different approaches to deal with
arbitration in relation to distribution contracts shows that the
protection of a weaker party is the basis for limiting party autonomy in
arbitration. However, such a general principle ought to be scrutinized
against the different types of distribution contracts and even against
each and any of the individual contracts since it is clear that not all, or
even many, of the distribution contracts show an unequal bargaining
power. Furthermore, if one were to consider that the principle of
protection of the weaker party is the basis for limiting party autonomy
in arbitration, then such a justification ought to be applied to any
commercial contract in which such a disparity is to be observed.
However, such an unbearable extension of this principle would raise
more problems than it would tend to solve, among others, the need to
specify the scope of its application.
It is true that certain pathologies might exist in few cases by
the abuse of one of the contracting parties, but general rules on
arbitration and contract law are enough to solve this problem without
the need to adopt excessive rules prohibiting arbitration or limiting
arbitrability of the dispute.
On the contrary, arbitration is considered an important factor
in the development of investment and trade. The more the restrictions
to party autonomy, the less attractive a country is for trade and
investment.
The application of international mandatory rules is not enough
to exclude arbitrability as shown by Spanish or Costa Rican Laws. In
fact, even if the contract is silent, Costa Rica, when assuming an
implied arbitration agreement, reinforces the value of arbitration as
being contractual in nature and the normal way to solve commercial
disputes.68

See Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Contratos de distribución internacional y arbitraje,
in DISTRIBUCIÓN COMERCIAL Y DERECHO DE LA COMPETENCIA 70 et seq. (Jorge
Viera González & Joseba Aitor Echevarría Sáenz eds., 2011); Pilar Perales Viscasillas,
La presunción legal de sometimiento al arbitraje, in TRATADO DE DERECHO ARBITRAL,
TOMO II EL CONVENIO ARBITRAL 145-164 (Carlos Alberto Soto ed., 2011);Pilar
68

239

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:1

Traditionally, it was held that matters subject to national
mandatory rules of law were non-arbitrable. Unlike the field of
commercial contracts where the will of the parties prevails as a general
rule, in the area of distribution contracts certain rules are considered to
be mandatory. This traditional position has been rejected in favour of a
modern view of arbitrability. In modern arbitration practice, it is clear
that even if a matter is subject to mandatory rules, it might be subject to
arbitration.
As far as public policy and its relation to arbitrability is
concerned, some arbitration laws consider that public policy issues
cannot be subject to arbitration.69 But even in those systems, new trends
are also applicable: public order is no longer considered a limitation to
arbitrability, but rules of that character have to be respected by the
arbitrators in order to have an enforceable award.70 Public policy,
however, in certain situations can operate as a limit to arbitrability.
Whether the public order impedes the submission of a dispute to
arbitration is usually a question to be decided by the law.
The well-known second look doctrine in arbitration will
provide for the appropriate remedy: the arbitrators should respect
mandatory provisions of the relevant country –when they are to be
considered as relevant and truly international71 and not extravagant

Perales Viscasillas & David Ramos Muñoz, CISG & Arbitration, 10 SPANISH ARB.
REV. 63-84 (2011); PRIVATE LAW: NATIONAL - GLOBAL - COMPARATIVE:
FESTSCHRIFT FOR INGEBORG SCHWENZER ON THE OCCASION OF HER 60TH
BIRTHDAY 1355-1374. (Andrea Büchler; Markus Müller-Chen ed., 2011).
69
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2059, 2060 (Fr.).
70
See, e.g., Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Arbitrabilidad de los Derechos de la
Propiedad Industrial y de la Competencia, 6 ANUARIO DE JUSTICIA ALTERNATIVA,
DERECHO ARBITRAL 11-76 (2005) (for further references in the area of competition
law).
71
See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATONAL LAW (HCCH),
THE DRAFT HAGUE PRINCIPLES ON CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL
art.
11
(2014),
available
at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap2014pd06rev_en.pdf
(Overriding
mandatory rules and public policy (ordre public)):
1. These Principles shall not prevent a court from applying
overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the forum which
apply irrespective of the law chosen by the parties.
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rules72 and thus the Courts will assess at the post-award stage if
mandatory rules were respected by the arbitrators.73

2. The law of the forum determines when a court may or must
apply or take into account overriding mandatory provisions of
another law.
3. A court may exclude application of a provision of the law
chosen by the parties only if and to the extent that the result of
such application would be manifestly incompatible with
fundamental notions of public policy (ordre public) of the forum.
4. The law of the forum determines when a court may or must
apply or take into account the public policy (ordre public) of a
State the law of which would be applicable in the absence of a
choice of law.
5. These Principles shall not prevent an arbitral tribunal from
applying or taking into account public policy (ordre public), or
from applying or taking into account overriding mandatory
provisions of a law other than the law chosen by the parties, if the
arbitral tribunal is required or entitled to do so.
72
See Kleinheisterkamp, supra note 26, at 11 et seq.; see also Kröll, supra
note 18, at 16-63, 16-63, 16-77, 16-79.
73
Peter Schlosser, Arbitration and the European Public Policy, in L’ARBITRAGE
ET LE DROIT EUROPÉEN 87, (Bruylant, 1997); Fabio Bortolotti, International Commercial
Agency Agreements and ICC Arbitration, 10 INT’L COURT ARB. BULLETIN 48, 53-55, 59
(2001); Patrick M. Baron & Stefan Liniger, A Second Look at Arbitrability, 19 ARB.
INT’L. 27–54 (2003); Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss v. Benetton, 1999 E.C.R I-1.
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LESSONS AND BEST PRACTICES FOR
DESIGNERS OF FAST TRACK, LOW
VALUE, HIGH VOLUME GLOBAL ECOMMERCE ODR SYSTEMS*
Louis F. Del Duca†, Colin Rule, and Brian Cressman**
ABSTRACT
The momentum behind development of global online fast track low value high volume dispute
resolution (hereafter ODR) continues to accelerate. Consumer and business groups around the
world are promoting fair, proportionate, effective, online, fast track redress for low value high
volume cross border e-commerce disputes. As a result, there will continue to be increasing demand
for a variety of effective ODR systems design and procedural rules. Best practices developed by
entities like eBay and lessons learned from the work of UNCITRAL Working Group III can

* The beginning of this article addressing “Low Value Parameters” and
“Limiting Types of Claims” was presented as a paper, authored by Louis F. Del
Duca, Colin Rule, and Kathryn Rimpfel, entitled eBay’s De Facto Low Value High
Volume Fast Track Resolution Process: Lessons and Best Practices for ODR Systems Designers,6
Y.B.Arb. & Mediation 204 (2014) at the 17th Biennial Meeting of the International
Academy of Commercial and Consumer Law held 16-19th July 2014 at the Istanbul
Bilgi University in Turkey. We expand and update the earlier version with a
discussion of eBay’s Automated Trustmark Evaluation/Feedback system and Private
Enforcement of Settled Claims and Rulings of Neutrals system.
† Before this article could be published, Professor Del Duca passed away
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** Louis Del Duca is the Edward N. Polisher Distinguished Faculty Scholar
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State Dickinson School of Law, J.D. candidate 2016; Philip Reinhart, The Penn State
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be helpful in developing framework models for fast track low value high volume e-commerce ODR
systems.

E-commerce ODR systems like eBay’s provide a marketplace for e-commerce as well as an
electronic system for fast track resolution of disputes which arise on their e-commerce marketplace.
Ordinary ODR systems do not provide an e-commerce marketplace but only provide for
resolution of disputes. Accordingly, best practices developed by eBay’s e-commerce ODR system
discussed in this article are generally applicable and needed by e-commerce ODR systems, but
generally inapplicable and not needed by ordinary ODR systems. This article addresses
development by eBay of its highly successful fast track low value high volume e-commerce ODR
system by application of the following four best practices:

(i) Low Value Parameters:
Adoption of a generally applicable de facto low value workable monetary “standard” (for
example, the Purchase Price “Money Back Guarantee” discussed infra) rather than a “numeric”
(i.e. $15,000) monetary description for disputes which are eligible for resolution on the providers’
platforms facilitates global development of fast track low value high volume ODR systems. A
$15,000, $10,000 or $5,000 monetary ceiling for low value disputes might constitute low value
in a developed economy. It will not in an underdeveloped economy. Hence the need for a

low value workable monetary “standard” rather than an unworkable
“numeric” monetary description. As indicated, the eBay Purchase Price “Money Back
Guarantee” cap on the amount of a permissible claim provides a workable standard in developed
and underdeveloped economies. ***

(ii) Limitation of Types of Claims:
Leaving resolution of disputes involving high value and complicated legal issues to other forums,

*** The eBay system combines general use of a “monetary standard” with a “numeric
description” of low value for specific categories of goods. This article also notes the flexibility of
eBay’s system in responding to market developments by creating actual numeric ceilings for disputes
pertaining to equipment and vehicle categories of purchases which also are deemed to be suitable and
therefore eligible for resolution on eBay’s ODR platform. Adjusting to market developments
since the launch of its original dispute resolution system, eBay has added resolution
platforms specifically dedicated to categories of purchases, including the (Vehicle
Purchase Protection [hereinafter VPP] and Business Equipment Purchases
Protection [hereinafter BEPP] programs which require vehicle claims to be more
than $100 and less than $50,000 and equipment claims to be more than $1000 and
less than $20,000. Based on the eBay Fast Track Low Value experience, therefore,
an ODR Best Practice is to build the basic low value system (i.e, “Money Back
Guarantee”) as needed, and as market conditions mandate, customize resolution and
protection programs specifically designed to address individual categories of
disputes. For more on eBay’s VPP and BEPP programs, see Purchase Protection
Systems For Specific Categories of Goods – Maximum and Minimum Purchase Price
Limits on the Amount in Controversy (discussion at Section II.3, infra).
General Electric’s Oil and Gas Division has experimented with online resolutions
for commercial conflicts, as detailed in Vanessa O’Connoll, At GE, Robo-Lawyers,
WALL
ST.
J.,
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eBay’s fast track ODR eligibility requirements also limit the complexity and scope of permissible
claims (i.e. claims eligible for resolution on its platform) by giving buyers a “Money Back
Guarantee,” which, as noted supra, caps the amount a buyer may claim to recovery of purchase
price paid, and also limits the types of claims to “Items not received” or “Items not as described.”
These limitations on the amount and types of claims permitted facilitate fast track and fair
resolution of disputes and enables eBay to handle 60,000,000 e-commerce disputes annually
averaging $70-$100 in value.

(iii) Buyers’ On-Demand Access to Automated Trustmark
Evaluation/Feedback Information Needed to Identify Reliable Sellers:
Vital to facilitating e-commerce between buyers and sellers, often in different parts of the world
and speaking different languages, is developing trust between buyers and sellers to give them the
confidence they need to enter into electronic transactions. eBay’s solution to developing this trust
between buyers and sellers is the Automated Trustmark Evaluation/Feedback System. This
system enables buyers involved in electronically purchasing low value high-volume items to quickly
identify on demand a reliable seller without doing extensive research. Buyers seeking to make
purchases using the eBay platform are able to assess the reliability of sellers with whom they
anticipate doing business based on ratings and feedback derived from performance data supplied
electronically by previous buyers after each transaction they completed on the eBay platform.

(iv) Private Enforcement
After discussing (i) Low Value Parameters, (ii) Limitation of Types of Claims,
and (iii) Buyers’ On Demand Access to Automated Trustmark
Evaluation/Feedback Information Needed to Identify Reliable Sellers, we
address (iv) Private Enforcement measures available to enforce settled claims and rulings
of neutrals to successfully implement fast track low value high volume e-commerce systems.

http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203633104576620902874155940
. This program focuses on disputes for less than 50,000 Euros.
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ACHIEVING “LOW VALUE” PARAMATERS

eBay’s De Facto “Low Value”

Among privately created online dispute resolution systems, the
eBay Resolution Center stands alone. EBay’s process has resolved
more disputes over a longer period of time than any other online
dispute resolution process in the world. Launched in 1995, eBay was
designed to be the largest global online marketplace, evolving from its
roots in consumer-to-consumer (C2C) auctions into Business-toBusiness and Business-to-Consumer (B2C) verticals. After it acquired
PayPal in 2002, eBay set about building a robust, end-to-end Trust and
Safety infrastructure. A core tenet of that infrastructure is the
Resolution Center, an online redress process provided to every eBay
and PayPal user in the world, customized to address most of the
dispute volume that arises between buyers and sellers that utilize eBay’s
services around the world.1
eBay is an e-commerce company which has developed a robust
online marketplace facilitating low value high volume consumer to
consumer, business to consumer, and business to business electronic
commerce2, and also providing a fast-track low value high volume
ODR system for resolving disputes arising from e-commerce
transactions on its market place. The low value requirement for
disputes eligible for resolution on its platform is needed for ODR
systems like eBay which provide an online marketplace coupled with
an ODR system for resolution of disputes which arise from ecommerce on its marketplace. The low value requirement generally is
not needed for systems that only provide an ODR system for resolving
disputes but do not provide an electronic market place, unless the
provider is resolving low value high volume disputes arising from
transactions conducted outside of its platform.

See ARNO R. LODDER & JOHN ZELEZNIKOW, ENHANCED DISPUTE
RESOLUTION THROUGH THE USE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 8 (2010).
2
See
We
are
one
company;
EBAY
INC.,
http://www.ebayinc.com/who_we_are/one_company (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
1
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Since its creation in 1995, eBay has expanded internationally at
an increasing rate.3 EBay’s international growth continues with
increased revenues and expansion into new countries abroad.4
Currently, eBay has 149 million active buyers worldwide and 700
million total listings.5 In 2013, eBay’s worldwide revenues were $8.3
billion and its Gross Merchandise Volume was $77 billion.6
eBay’s Resolution Center was created with the aim of
addressing the typical disputes arising out of purchases within eBay’s
marketplaces, which usually average about $70-$100 in value.7 The
eBay platform currently handles over 60 million e-commerce disputes
annually through a process that enables parties to resolve their
problems amicably through direct communication. The number of
disputes being resolved through eBay’s online platform is expanding
steadily as the transaction volume on the site increases at about 13%
per year.8
Since the launch of its original dispute resolution system, which
focused only on letting buyers report “fraud alerts,” eBay has expanded
to support dispute resolution in a variety of other problem types, such
as “item not received,” and “item not as described” disputes (where
the buyer is the complainant), or “unpaid item”9 disputes (where the
Trefis Team, eBay: The Year 2013 in Review, FORBES (Dec. 26, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2013/12/26/ebay-the-year-2013in-review/.
4 Id.; see Corporate Fact Sheet: Q4 2010, EBAY INC., (2010) (on file with
author) (eBay.com identifies the following countries and Hong Kong as countries
for which it has a website: Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Vietnam).
5
Q2
Fast
Facts,
EBAY,
INC.,
http://www.ebayinc.com/sites/default/files/ebay-q2-fast-facts.pdf (on file with
Journal).
6
Id.
7
See Corporate Fact Sheet: Q4 2010, supra note 4.
8
Id.
9
In the eBay system, buyers are required to pay for the item before the
seller ships it. In cases of direct sales rather than auction sales, sellers are required to
be paid prior to the shipment of the item. The seller is therefore unpaid only in the
auction sale cases where a buyer who is the successful bidder does not forward the
3
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seller is the complainant).10 EBay has also added resolution platforms
dedicated specifically to several categories of purchases, including the
Vehicle Purchase Protection (VPP) and Business Equipment Purchase
Protection (BEPP) programs, each with specific minimum and
maximum price limitations.11 These developments have enhanced
eBay’s initial programs focused on low value, high volume, B2C
transactions, with more in-depth specialized claims processes relating
to higher dollar value purchases.12
The eBay ODR system, from the outset, has had a de facto
low-value framework because it has been packaged as a kind of moneyback guarantee – recovery is limited to the purchase price for the buyer, and
reimbursement for the seller.13 This necessarily excludes an award of
consequential damages. Higher dollar value purchases, however,
require different kinds of protection and resolution. EBay’s
specialized procedures for vehicles and equipment disputes, for
instance, require equipment claims to involve more than $1,000 and
less than $20,000, and vehicle claims to be more than $100 and less
than $50,000.14 Only disputes involving vehicles or equipment that fall
within the minimum and maximum requirements are eligible to be
handled by these special ODR processes.
For example, in a traditional sale conducted through eBay’s
platform for a cell phone, Buyer pays through one of eBay’s approved
payment methods (such as PayPal), and Seller ships the phone and it
bid amount to the seller. In this situation eBay allows the seller to recover for the
“unpaid item” fee (This is a “Final Value Fee,” usually 1 to 2% of the purchase price)
paid by the seller to eBay for the use of the eBay platform. See discussion infra note
24.
10 eBay
Money
Back
Guarantee,
EBAY
INC.,http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/money-back-guarantee.html (last visited
Jan. 15, 2015) [hereinafter “eBay Money Back Guarantee Policy”].
11 eBay
Vehicle
Purchase
Protection,
EBAY
INC.,
http://pages.motors.ebay.com/buy/purchase-protection/index.html (last visited
Jan. 15, 2015) [hereinafter VPP Policy]; Business Equipment Purchase Protection, EBAY
INC., http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/business-protection.html (last visited Jan.
15, 2015) [hereinafter BEPP Policy].
12
See id.
13
For more information on limitations on the amount recoverable by the
seller to the “Final Value Fee,” see are discussion infra note 24.
14
See VPP Policy, supra note 11; BEPP Policy, supra note 11.
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arrives in the stated amount of time. However, due to a malfunction
stemming from a defect in the cell phone battery, the phone causes a
fire in Buyer’s home and also results in serious burns to Buyer, his wife,
and two children. Though this damage directly results from the
deficiency of the item exchanged in the eBay sale, Buyer will have no
recourse through the eBay ODR platform for consequential damages.
Though Buyer can claim that the phone did not arrive as described –
i.e. fully functional - the eBay Money Back Guarantee inherently limits
recovery to the price of the item. Thus, although Buyer may seek to
recover the consequential damages in a judicial proceeding or other
fora, recovery of consequential damages is excluded from the ODR
process. EBay has learned from extensive experience that this level of
protection is adequate to reassure most eBay buyers that they will be
protected.
The eBay system can serve as an example of best practices in
limiting the types of claims and amount of recovery to place
parameters to create a low-value framework to facilitate fast-track, fair,
and low-cost ODR. We include in our discussion infra the differences
in procedural details of resolving disputes of different types of
products covered by the basic, equipment and vehicle protection
programs.
II.

LIMITING TYPES OF CLAIMS15

In the basic eBay resolution system, administered in
conjunction with PayPal, eBay provides both buyers and sellers a
guided process for resolving disputes over purchases made through its
site. In the initial step, eBay asks buyers to diagnose the specifics of
their complaint, and to suggest a preferred resolution. EBay then
encourages the buyers and sellers to negotiate directly through its
messaging platform. If the matter cannot be resolved through
negotiation, the dispute then can be escalated to the Resolution
Services team within Customer Support. Unless a settlement
This section describes the ODR system from the perspective of both
the buyer and the seller. This description is based on the information provided for
the benefit of customers on the eBay website. See eBay Money Back Guarantee Policy,
supra note 10. This section is citing to that source of authority, unless indicated
otherwise.
15
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agreement is reached, Resolution Services will evaluate the buyer’s
claim and make a ruling about who is right and who is wrong. While
this ruling does not have res judicata effect,16 the parties will generally
voluntarily satisfy the Resolution Services ruling, and, in the absence
of such voluntary compliance, the ruling is enforceable by use of
applicable private enforcement procedures including chargeback on
credit cards, deprivation of trustmarks, and access to escrow accounts.
The eBay Money Back Guarantee is outlined in a policy found
on the eBay website that lists the types of claims that are and are not
covered.17 This policy again confines claims to situations where the
item never arrived or the item was not as described in the seller’s
listing. Then, the policy places certain procedural restrictions on
claims, such as: (1) the case must be opened no later than thirty days
after the actual or latest estimated delivery date; (2) the purchase must
have been made with the “Pay Now” option or an eBay invoice; (3)
the buyer must have used one of the five designated payment
methods18; and (4) the item must have been paid for in a single
payment. The Money Back Guarantee specifically does not cover
certain categories of sales and sales through eBay’s affiliate sites, such
16
As a practical matter, once the eBay neutral decides the dispute, the
buyer can proceed to seek private enforcement remedies. Alternatively, either the
buyer or the seller can go to court to prove their case or contest the private remedy.
However, in most cases it is not economically feasible to seek a judicial remedy. As
discussed supra in the defective cell phone example, an eBay ruling also has no res
judicata effect on other claims arising out of a transaction.
17
See eBay Money Back Guarantee Policy, supra note 10.
18
These five payment methods are those available to the buyer through
the eBay platform They include 1) PayPal; 2) ProPay; 3) Skrill; 4) Credit or debit card;
and 5) Bill Me Later. PayPal, ProPay and Skrill are digital payment services that allow
users to send and receive money without revealing personal financial details. See
About Skrill, SKRILL, https://www.skrill.com/en-us/about-us/ (last visited Apr. 29,
2014);
Company
History,
PROPAY,
http://www.propay.com/propaycompany/company-history/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2014); About PayPal, PAYPAL,
https://www.paypal-media.com/about (last visited Apr. 29, 2014). Bill Me Later, a
PayPal subsidiary, is also a digital payment option, however, it is a service that extends
the user a line of credit. See About Bill Me Later, BILL ME LATER,
https://www.billmelater.com/about/index.xhtml (last visited, Apr. 29, 2014).
PayPal is owned by eBay, and Bill Me Later is a service provided by PayPal. ProPay
and Skrill are third party, private online payment services. Credit or debit cards (such
as Visa, MasterCard, and American Express) are payment systems administered by
banks.
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as half.com.19 In addition, this guarantee prohibits duplication of
claims through other dispute resolution methods, such as the PayPal
Purchase Protection programs or requesting a chargeback from the
payment provider.
A.

Buyers’ Claims – “Item Not Received,” “Item Not as
Described”

The current Resolution Center web page leads buyers and
sellers through the process via a series of questions that: (i) set different
claims on different tracks, and (ii) prevent the furtherance of claims
that are outside the coverage of eBay’s policy. The initial screening still
adheres to the two primary bases for buyer claims: that the item did
not arrive, or that the item did not match seller’s description. The
website then presents options for how to proceed, after the claimant
has been funneled into a particular category of claims. Throughout the
process, there are links to eBay’s general policy, which outlines what
claims are and are not qualified.
The Money Back Guarantee also limits the applicable disputes
through specific exclusions from coverage, as listed in its policy:


“Buyer’s remorse or any reason other than not receiving an
item or receiving an item that isn’t as described in the
listing.”



“Duplicate claims through other resolution methods.”



“Items shipped to another address after original delivery.”



Vehicles (instead, must be pursued through the eBay
Vehicle Protection Program)



Real Estate, Business & Websites for Sale, Classified Ads,
services

An eBay subsidiary, half.com, specializes in the sale of books,
textbooks, music, movies and games for fixed prices set by sellers, as opposed to
eBay’s bidding system.
19
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Some business equipment categories (instead, must be
pursued through the eBay Business Equipment Purchase
Protection Program)



“Items purchased on half.com, eBay Wholesale Deals, or
eBay Classifieds”20

Buyers have thirty days from the actual or estimated delivery
date to make direct contact with the seller through the eBay platform.21
If this direct contact does not resolve the problem within three
business days of the buyer’s initial communication to the seller, the
buyer can choose to escalate the case to eBay.22 If the buyer escalates
the case to the Resolution Center, eBay will review the case and contact
20
These parameters for applicable disputes under the basic eBay ODR
policy have evolved as eBay gained experience with using the process. Previously,
eBay provided more examples to guide the interpretation of “item not delivered” or
“item not matching seller’s description in the listing.” In a version of the policy dating
back to approximately 2010, the restrictions were phrased in checklist form as
follows:
1. The buyer did not receive the items within the estimated delivery date; or
2. The item received was wrong, damaged, or different from the seller’s
description. For example:
i. Buyer received a completely different item;
ii. The condition of the item is not as described;
iii. The item is missing parts or components;
iv. The item is defective during the first use;
v. The item is a different version or edition from the one displayed
in the listing;
vi. The item was described as authentic but is not;
vii. The item is missing major parts or features, and this was not
described in the listing;
viii. The item was damaged during shipment, or;
ix. The buyer received the incorrect amount of items.
This version of the policy was addressed in Louis Del Duca, Colin Rule, & Zbynek
Loebl, Facilitating Expansion of Cross-Border E-Commerce – Developing a Global Online
Dispute Resolution System (Lessons Derived from Existing ODR Systems – Work of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law), 1 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFFAIRS 59, 65
(2012)
(citing
Unpaid
Item
Policy, EBAY
INC., http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/unpaid-item.html (last visited Mar. 9,
2015)).
21
eBay Money-back Guarantee, How to Help, EBAY INC.,
http://pages.ebay.com/ebay-money-back-guarantee/how-to-help.html (last visited
Mar. 9, 2015).
22
Id.
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the buyer within 48 hours with a determination of whether the case
qualifies for a refund of the full purchase price plus original shipping.23
B.

Sellers’ Claims – “Final Value Fee”

Sellers’ claims are handled somewhat differently than buyers’
claims. Like the buyer resolution process, new disputes are reported
through the Resolution Center. However, pre-transaction exposure is
significantly smaller for sellers than for buyers. If a buyer has a dispute,
they have likely already paid the seller the full purchase price for the
item, which averages around $75 for non-receipt cases and $100 for
not-as-described cases.24 The buyer is concerned that they will not get
their purchase price back, so their exposure is significant.
Sellers, on the other hand, are clearly instructed to not ship the
item in question before payment is received from the buyer. So if a
buyer wins an auction and does not follow through with payment, the
seller is only out the “Final Value Fee” paid to eBay as part of the sale
(usually less than 1-2% of the purchase price). For sellers, disputes are
part of doing business on eBay (Unpaid auction bids are not
uncommon), but they are more of a nuisance than a source of major
risk exposure.
Once an auction bid is reported as unpaid, Buyer is contacted
and given several response options:
1) pay for the auction bid
2) prove the auction bid is already paid for, or
3) request that the transaction be cancelled.
Once the buyer responds, the seller and buyer can
communicate to attempt to resolve the issue through mutual
agreement. However, if the buyer does not respond, or the seller is not
satisfied, the seller has the unilateral right to give the buyer an “Unpaid

23
24

Id.
See eBay Money Back Guarantee, supra note 10.
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Item Strike.”25 If a buyer receives too many Unpaid Item Strikes in too
short a period of time, the buyer’s account on eBay will be suspended.
This process, which handles tens of millions of disputes every
year, is entirely automated through technology, with no human
involvement. The only human involvement that enters into the Unpaid
Item resolution process is when the buyer decides to appeal an Unpaid
Item (i.e. auction bid) Strike they have received. If it is the buyer’s first
appeal of an Unpaid Item Strike, the appeal is automatically granted
(and the vast majority of appeals are first appeals). However, if the
appeal is for a second or later strike, an eBay Customer Service
Representative will manually review the case to make a determination.
In this fashion, an ODR system delivering tens of millions of
resolutions per year requires only tens of thousands of human
interventions to keep operating in a trusted and effective fashion.
C.

Maximum and Minimum Purchase Price Limits for Certain
Categories of Goods

As eBay’s Basic Money Back Guarantee program specifically
prohibits claims relating to sales of certain categories of products –
usually either intangibles or higher-cost items such as vehicles, real
estate, and business equipment – this form of online dispute resolution
is somewhat incomplete, or at least does not match the breadth of sales
transactions taking place on eBay’s platform. In addition to the more
25
EBay provides information through its feedback system to facilitate
identification of reliable sellers and buyers and keep market participants honest. EBay
assigns parties a “star” based on how many positive reviews they have received. The
feedback system, like the dispute resolution system, treats buyers and sellers
differently. Buyers can leave positive, neutral or negative ratings, while sellers can
only leave short comments and positive ratings. EBay is very clear that feedback
extortion and manipulation is not allowed. Sellers can report buyers in violation of
the buying practices policy, especially when successful auction bids are not paid by
the buyer. This report can result in a “strike” against the buyer. See Del Duca, Rule,
& Loebl, supra note 20, at 64-65 (citing How do I leave Feedback?, EBAY INC.,,
http://pages/ebay.com/help/feedback/questions/leave.html (last visited Apr. 4,
2012). EBay’s “Unpaid Item Policy,” detailing Unpaid Item Strikes (sometimes called
“unpaid item violations” or “excessive unpaid items”) is detailed
at http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/unpaid-item.html. As the policy page
states, “eBay may record the unpaid item on the buyer’s account . . . excessive unpaid
items on a buyer’s account may result in a range of consequences, including limits on
or loss of buying privileges.”
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basic ODR system provided as part of the Money Back Guarantee,
eBay has developed two category-specific ODR systems to expand
dispute resolution options for those using its services. These new
systems include the Vehicle Purchase Protection (VPP) and the
Business Equipment Purchase Protection (BEPP) programs. The VPP
serves as the dispute resolution forum for the sale of vehicles priced at
more than $100 and less than $50,000, and purchased through certain
designated categories within eBay’s site. The BEPP applies to sales
with a final price of at least $1,000 but no more than $20,000, again
through certain designated categories (such as Business and Industrial)
within eBay’s website.
Just as with the traditional eBay Money Back Guarantee, the
VPP and BEPP both limit the types of claims that are covered – i.e.
the claims that can be pursued through their ODR process. However,
due to the higher price of the items involved, eBay’s policies defining
those claims are much more detailed than the simple choice between
an item never being delivered or not being as described in the seller’s
listing. The following chart details the limitation of claims in both the
VPP and BEPP systems:
EBay’s Vehicle Purchase Protection (VPP) and Business Equipment
Purchase Protection (BEPP) Programs Chart
Vehicle Purchase Protection26
Situations
Covered






You pay for a vehicle and
never receive it.
You send a refundable
deposit for a vehicle and
never receive it.
You pay for a vehicle and
receive it but suffer losses
because:

Business Equipment Purchase
Protection27
 Paying for an eligible
item and never receiving
it.
 Sending a deposit for an
eligible item and never
receiving the item.
 Paying for and receiving
an eligible item the buyer

26

The information in this column was quoted from the VPP Policy, supra

27

The information in this column was quoted from the BEPP Policy,

note 11.
supra note 11.
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o

o

o

o

o

The vehicle was
determined by a law
enforcement agency
to have been stolen at
the time of the end of
the listing.
The vehicle has an
undisclosed or
unknown lien against
its title.
The vehicle make,
model or year is
different than what
was described in the
seller’s listing at the
time you placed your
bid or offer.
A title is required for
the vehicle by your
state and the seller’s
state but you did not
receive a title from
the seller and it is not
possible to obtain a
title from the
appropriate DMV.
The vehicle has a title
with an undisclosed
salvage,
rebuilt/rebuildable,
unrebuildable,
reconstructed,
scrapped/destroyed,
junk, lemon,
manufacturer
buyback, or water
damage brand at the
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Business Equipment Purchase
Protection27
can’t legally own because:
o It’s stolen property
o It’s subject to an
undisclosed or
unknown lien
 Paying for and receiving
an eligible item that’s a
different type, make, or
model than what was
described in the listing,
provided the amount of
devaluation to the item
due to the
misrepresentation
exceeds $1,500.
 Paying for and receiving
an eligible item with
undisclosed damage,
provided the cost of
necessary repairs exceeds
$1,500 and the item was
advertised as being less
than 10 years old. The
program covers only
defects and damages that
prevent the equipment
from functioning, not
defects or damage that
are cosmetic or not
critical to operate the
equipment.
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o

o

time of the end of the
listing. (This
protection is not
available for vehicles
listed in the Dune
Buggies, Race Cars or
Trailers categories.)
The vehicle is less
than 20 years old and
has more than a 5,000
mile odometer
discrepancy from the
mileage as stated in
the seller’s listing.
(This protection is
only available for
vehicles listed in the
Cars & Trucks and
RVs & Campers
categories.)
In addition, the VPP
also provides
protection against
certain undisclosed
damage for vehicles
that are less than 10
years old (10 year
threshold is based on
model year): The
vehicle had
undisclosed engine,
body, transmission,
and/or frame damage
at the time of
purchase that will cost
more than $1,000 to
repair. The cost of
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Situations
Not
Covered

repair to any one of
those components
must exceed $1,000.
For vehicles in the
Boats (engine and hull
only), Buses,
Commercial Trucks,
and RVs & Campers
categories, the cost of
the undisclosed
engine, body,
transmission, or
frame damage must
exceed $1,500. Race
Cars are not eligible
for this protection.
Vehicles that are
subject to a recall for
this type of damage
are not eligible for
VPP.
Vehicle Condition
 Any damage on vehicles
10 years old or older (10
year threshold is based
on model year)
 Regular maintenance and
fluid levels.
 Normal wear and tear,
including but not limited
to belts, hoses, tires,
brakes, bushings, joints,
spark plugs and wires,
interior features, minor
dents, paint chips and
scratches.
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Any damage on an item
that’s more than 10 years
old. If the model year is
not specified in the eBay
listing, then the item isn’t
eligible for any
undisclosed damage.
Regular maintenance
Normal wear and tear,
including but not limited
to rust, dents, and
scratches, or cosmetic
damage that doesn’t
impair the item
Sending a non-refundable
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Certain components Damage to any
component other than
the engine, transmission,
frame or body, including
but not limited to the
vehicle’s interior, exhaust,
air conditioner, electrical,
suspension, cooling
system, turbo charger,
fuel system, differential,
clutch/torque converter,
and/or pollution control
devices.
 Damage threshold Damage to an eligible
component that does not
exceed $1,000 (or $1,500
for boats, buses,
commercial trucks, RVs
and campers).
 Damage after purchaseDamage or loss arising
during shipping or
otherwise after purchase.
 Cosmetic damage, such
as paint or external
surface rust.
 Unverifiable damage.
Deposit issues
Sending a non-refundable
deposit for a vehicle and not
receiving the vehicle, or a
refund, because you chose to
not complete the transaction
or pay the remaining balance
for any reason.
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Business Equipment Purchase
Protection27
deposit and not receiving
the item or a refund,
because the buyer
chooses to not complete
the transaction or to not
pay the remaining
balance
 Any damage or defect
that was explained to or
noticed by the buyer
prior to purchase, or (if
the buyer picked up the
item from the seller in
person) that could have
been noticed upon
reasonable inspection by
the buyer
 Items not listed on eBay
Business in one of the
capital equipment
categories
 Items purchased for less
than $1,000
 Items damaged or lost in
shipping
 Inspection costs,
warranty fees, and other
related expenses
 Buyer’s remorse
 Any repairs or alterations
made to the item after
the listing end date, that
were not authorized by
the third-party provider
of the Business
Equipment Purchase
Protection program
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Ancillary losses
Punitive claims, lost profits,
loss of work, travel expenses,
or restocking costs.
Title / ownership issues
 Failure to disclose a title
brand if another title
brand was disclosed in
the listing, or if the title
was described in the
listing as anything but
“clear”.
 Failure to receive a
certificate of title for a
vehicle that was listed
with a title brand or with
the title being described
as anything but “clear”.
 Receiving a title that is
not signed, is improperly
assigned, or receiving a
title but not being able to
register the vehicle.
 Any damage on a vehicle
that was listed with a title
brand or with the title
being described as
anything but “clear.”
 Losses based on a vehicle
classified as “theft
recovery” or “previously
stolen” but recovered by
a law enforcement agency
prior to being listed on
eBay.
Other
 Differences in sub-
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model, trim packages,
special editions, or
options if you have
received the year, make,
and model described in
the listing.
Buyer’s remorse.
Any damage or listing
discrepancies that were
disclosed to you prior to
acceptance of the vehicle.
Any damage that could
have been discovered
upon a reasonable
inspection before you
paid for and picked up
the vehicle in person.
Any damage that does
not impact the safety or
operability of the vehicle.
Repairs or alterations
made by you to the
vehicle without the
consent of the VPP
Administrator.
Inspection costs,
warranty fees, taxes paid,
or any other fees or
expenses that are not
expressly covered under
these Terms and
Conditions.
Transactions occurring
directly between the
parties (i.e. phone, email,
mail, in person, by
overnight messenger, etc
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. . .) and/or on another
website rather than
through the eBay website.

This extensive detailed list of types of permissible claims
actually limits the types of claims that eBay will handle under these two
new programs. In addition, for these Vehicle (VPP) and Equipment
(BEPP) programs, only claims that are within the specified minimal
and maximum permissible amounts are handled by eBay. While both
the VPP and BEPP place limits on the permissible amount of a claim
($50,000 maximum and $100 minimum for the VPP, and $20,000
maximum and $1,000 minimal for the BEPP), the “Money Back
Guarantee” further limits the amount of the permissible claim to the
amount of the purchase price of the item(s) involved.
For example, a dispute involving a vehicle sold for $30,000 falls
within the $50,000 maximum/$100 minimum requirement and,
therefore, would be handled by eBay, with application of the “Money
Back Guarantee” policy limiting the amount of the claim actually
recoverable to the $30,000 purchase price. A dispute involving a
vehicle sold for $150,000 would not be handled by eBay because the
vehicle’s price exceeds the $50,000 maximum.
In a BEPP case, a dispute involving sale of equipment for
$10,000 would fall within the $20,000 maximum and $1,000 minimum
requirement and would be handled by eBay. A dispute involving
equipment which was sold for $40,000 would not be handled by eBay
because it exceeded the $20,000 maximum.
The eBay money-back guarantee, i.e. purchase money return
guarantee, effectively limits the amount in controversy. The BEPP and
VPP programs are in recognition by eBay, as the platform
administrator, that the marketing practices within the dollar limits
provided for the vehicle and equipment categories can be effectively
administered by the eBay ODR low-value high volume system. EBay
also concludes that disputed involving purchase prices not within the
indicated parameters cannot be effectively and efficiently handled
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within the fast-track low-value high volume ODR system. The
decision as to the practicability and desirability of creating such special
platforms, which can successfully operate within the framework of its
low-value high volume ODR system, is a judgment which the platform
administrator is best able to make.
III.

A.

FACILITATING FAST TRACK RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES –
COMBINING USE OF LOW VALUE PARAMETERS & LIMITING
TYPES OF CLAIMS.
Lists of “Item Not Received” and “Item Not as Described”
Claims

1. EBay Explicit Limitation of Types of Claims and List of Specific
Claims – Consequential Damages Excluded by “Money Back Guarantee” –
While eBay’s explicit limitation of types of claims has already been
addressed, the “Money Back Guarantee” is discussed further here..28
The “Money Back Guarantee” purchase price limited remedy, with its
built-in exclusion of consequential damages, produces a de facto low
value framework for all three eBay dispute resolution programs. This
approach facilitates fast track, fair, and low-cost online dispute
resolution of low value claims across the board for ODR systems
generally, including the “negotiation—facilitated negotiation” and the
“negotiation—facilitated negotiation—mandatory arbitration” twotrack model considered by the UNCITRAL ODR Working Group
III.29
EBay’s VPP program achieves the equivalent of this “Money
Back Guarantee” by its explicit exclusion of claims relating to

See discussion supra note 20.
At the twenty-sixth session, November 5-9, 2012, Working Group III
identified the need for a two-track system to accommodate differences in the
substantive law of jurisdictions in which pre-dispute arbitration agreements are valid
and binding in business to consumer (B2C) contracts, and the substantive law of
jurisdictions in which pre-dispute arbitration agreements in business to consumer
(B2C) contracts are invalid and not binding.Under the two-track system, Track I
provided an online negotiation stage between the parties, followed by a facilitated
negotiation stage in which a neutral is added to the deliberations, and a third
arbitration phase if the dispute is not resolved in phase one or two.
28
29
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“ancillary losses,” such as “punitive claims, lost profits, loss of work,
travel expenses, or restocking costs.”30 The equivalent of the “Money
Back Guarantee” is achieved in eBay’s BEPP eBay program by
explicitly permitting recovery “only up to the devaluation or repair
amount of the item or the final purchase price, whichever is lower.”31
The “Money Back Guarantee” purchase price limited remedy
and its VPP and BEPP equivalents also will self-adjust with the
fluctuation in the value of currencies in the marketplace over time, as
well as between developed, developing, and underdeveloped
economies at any single point in time. EBay sets the coverage
thresholds specifically in policies so that all buyers and sellers
understand the coverage eligibility guidelines and maximum refunds
prior to engaging in any purchase in the first place. There are slight
differences in the coverage and eligibility levels by broad geographic
region, but the levels change very rarely and are intended to cover 95%
of transactions within a given geography and category.
B.

Comparison of Selected eBay Best Practices and the
UNCITRAL Draft

The UNCITRAL Draft Rules explicitly limited types of
permissible claims by providing that:
“These rules shall only (emphasis applied) apply to
claims:
[“(a) that goods sold or services rendered were not
delivered, not timely delivered, not properly charged or
debited, and/or not provided in conformity with the
agreement made at the time of the transaction; or

The proposed Track II involved comparable negotiation and facilitated
negotiation phases, but did not require arbitration in the event the dispute did not
resolve in the negotiation or facilitated negotiation phases. UNCITRAL, Mar. 24-28,
2014, Online Dispute Resolution for Cross-Border Electronic Commerce Transactions: Draft
Procedural Rules: Note by the Secretariat, 2 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.127 (Jan.
17, 2014) [hereinafter Secretariat Note].
30
VPP Policy, supra note 11.
31
BEPP Policy, supra note 11.
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“(b) that full payment was not received for goods or
services provided.]”32
This language in Article 1(2) incorporated the eBay basic ‘item
not received’ and ‘item received but not as described’ types of claims
for buyers and a full payment remedy for sellers, and also allows, unlike
eBay for recovery for services. While this is not the forum to discuss
in detail the similarities and differences between the eBay and
UNCITRAL Draft types of claims covered, we note in passing that the
UNCITRAL Draft, in addition to permitting claims arising from the
sale of goods types of claims permitted by eBay, also permitted claims
pertaining to rendition of services.33 Service related disputes are much
more complicated to resolve, because (i) a return of the goods in
question is not an option, and (ii) the evaluation of item condition or
service quality is often opinion based and difficult to evaluate. The
eBay platform does not provide for sale of services, consequently,
services are not a type of transaction included in its ODR system.
Unlike the eBay program, which at the outset clearly limits
recovery to the Money Back Guarantee for buyers, the UNCITRAL
Draft did not clearly set forth this limited remedy.34

See Secretariat Note, supra note 29, at 7. EBay’s specific “seller unpaid”
and “unpaid item fee” remedy is not incorporated into the UNCITRAL draft. See
discussion of eBay “unpaid item” supra at note 24. The UNCITRAL draft also did
not incorporate and auction type of transaction into its program.
33
Secretariat Note, supra note 29, art. 1 ¶ 2.
34
Under the eBay policies, as described above and infra, consequential
damages are not specifically excluded or included, but are clearly excluded by the
limited Money Back Guarantee. Similarly, for example, the Mexican Consumer
Protection Code provides: “At their choice, consumers shall be entitled to the
substitution of the product or the return of the amount paid against the delivery of
the product acquired . . .” Ley Federal de Protección al Consumidor [LFPC] [Federal
Consumer Protection Act], Diario Oficial de la Federación el 24 de diciembre de
1992
(Mex.),
available
at
http://www.profeco.gob.mx/juridico/pdf/l_lfpc_06062006_ingles.pdf (English
translation).
The Mexican platform Concilianet, which is the Mexican agency
handling its ODR system also advises the public that no recovery is possible for
consequential damages and informs the public of the consumer’s right to recover
such
damages
in
court.
What
is
it?,
CONCILIANET,
32
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The detailed list of specific claims of ‘item not received’ or
‘items received but not as described by seller,’ comparable to detailed
eBay lists discussed supra35 had not been developed and incorporated
into the Drafts or elsewhere, perhaps in the document on Substantive
Legal Principles36 envisaged by the text of the Preamble.
The Preamble to the Draft Rules reads as follows:
“1. The UNCITRAL online dispute resolution rules
(“the Rules”) are intended for use in the context of
disputes arising out of cross-border, low-value
transactions conducted by means of electronic
communication.
“2. The Rules are intended for use in conjunction with
an online dispute resolution framework that consists of
the following documents [which are attached to the
Rules as an Appendix]:
[“(a) Guidelines and minimum requirements for
online
dispute
resolution
providers/platforms/administrators;]
[“(b) Guidelines and minimum requirements for
neutrals;]
[“(c) Substantive legal principles for resolving
disputes;]
[“(d) Cross-border enforcement mechanism;]
[“. . .];”37

http://concilianet.profeco.gob.mx/concilianet/faces/que_es.jsp (last visited Sept.
19, 2011).
35
See eBay lists, supra note 20, for vehicles see note 26, supra and
accompanying text, for equipment see note 27, supra and accompanying text.
36
See Secretariat Note, supra note 29, at 6.
37
Secretariat Note, supra note 29, at 5-6
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These four documents envisaged by the Preamble38 had not
been drafted by the Working Group at the time UNCITRAL
instructed the Working Group to prepare a non-binding descriptive
document on elements of the ODR process on which the Working
Group had reached consensus.
Documents one and two were to provided “guidelines and
minimum
requirements”
for
(a)
dispute
resolution
39
providers/platforms/administrators and (b) neutrals. Documents
three and four were to provide (c) substantive legal principles for
resolving disputes and (d) cross-border enforcement mechanisms
(presumably private and public).40 Whether these documents would be
merely persuasive in implementing the Draft, or annexed as legally part
of the Draft, had also not yet been determined by the Working
Group.41

In earlier drafts, the “documents” were referred to as annexes. See
UNCITRAL, Mar. 24-8, 2014, Online Dispute Resolution For Cross-Border Electronic
Commerce Transactions: Draft Procedural Rules: Note by the Secretariat, 2 U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.128, (Jan. 22, 2014).
39
At its March 24 – 28, 2014 New York meeting, UNCITRAL ODR
Working Group III agreed that the term “ODR provider” and all references thereto
would be deleted from its Rules. The following definitions of “ODR Administrator
“ and “ODR Platform” would replace earlier definitions in the Rules:
“ODR ‘Administrator’ means the entity that administers and
coordinates ODR proceedings under these Rules, including where
appropriate, by administrating an ODR platform, and which is
specified in the dispute resolution clause.”
38

“ODR ‘Platform’ means a system for generating, sending,
receiving, storing, exchanging or otherwise processing
communications under these Rules.”
The Secretariat’s official report of this meeting is pending at the time this article is
printed.
40
Secretariat Note, supra note 29.
41
The Secretariat recently indicated that it might be advisable not to
annex guidelines to the Rules. The Secretariat had suggested to the working group
that it might wish to consider “(i) the purpose of guidelines that address various
stakeholders in the online dispute resolution process, and bearing in mind that
purpose, (ii) the relationship of the guidelines with the Rules.” He further noted the
suggestion in Document A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.114 that guidelines ought to set out
best practices for ODR providers and neutrals, while the Rules aim to establish a
procedure for online dispute resolution. He also might be advised not to annex
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LESSONS AND BEST PRACTICES REGARDING DE FACTO
PURCHASE PRICE “MONEY BACK GUARANTEE” LOW VALUE
& LIMITATION OF TYPES OF CLAIMS PERMITTED.

The momentum behind global ODR continues to increase.
Consumer and business groups around the world are unanimous in
promoting fair, proportionate, effective, online, cross-border redress
for low value cross-border disputes. As a result, there will continue to
be increasing demand for effective ODR systems design and
procedural rules.
It is vital for the continued expansion of e-commerce that
consumers and small-to-medium size businesses have access to fast
and fair resolution processes. Because of this commercial imperative,
the private sector is stepping in to provide manifold solutions to this
problem. On balance, market-based approaches facilitate the
development of optional solutions for the problem of online redress.
This was the experience in the eBay marketplace. Market-based
approaches require a lot of experimentation and evolution to get right,
and eBay was always tweaking and evolving their ODR systems to
account for lessons learned. As such, any ODR systems design should
not be too prescriptive, because this may hinder the innovation
required to effectively solve this problem over the longer term.
EBay has generally managed to limit the complexity and scope
of claims through categorization of claims limiting the types of
permissible claims and providing a list of specific claims, coupled with
its purchase price “Money Back Guarantee.” However, as previously
noted, for “vehicle” (VPP) and “equipment” (BEPP) sales, it also
imposes the additional condition that the dispute will not be handled
by the eBay ODR system if the purchase price of the vehicle is more
than $50,000 or less than $100, or in the case of equipment if the
purchase prices is more than $20,000 or less than $1000. This
maximum and minimum purchase price limitation on “vehicle” and
“equipment” cases handled by the eBay system ensures its efficient
operation as a low-value dispute resolution process. It allows eBay, in
guideline to the Rules, as the legal nature and addressees of Rules and guidelines
differ. See UNCITRAL, May 21-25, 2012, Proposal on Principles Applicable to Online
Dispute Resolution Providers and Neutrals, ¶ 28 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.111/WP.127.
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responding to market conditions, to design specific resolution
processes and rules for special categories of such goods. It also permits
eBay to exclude from the special categories the sales of such goods
involving a high value purchase price, which it deems inappropriate for
resolution in the fast-track low-cost high-volume eBay system.
In both the basic and specialized “Money Back Guarantee”
cases, purchase price will adjust as changes in currency values occur
from time to time and adjust around the world to differences in the
value of currencies in advanced, advancing, and underdeveloped
economies at any given time. It also removes a major source of
complexity and controversy in the eventual deliberative resolution
process, because the law and jurisdiction to which the parties have
agreed is specifically addressed and resolved in the governing policy
adopted by the parties in their agreement to utilize the procedural rules.
ODR administrators, marketplaces, and payment providers
need the flexibility to design, build, and deploy both non-binding and
binding ODR systems. EBay learned this lesson through extensive
interactions with the global community of millions of sellers and
merchants: each seller must have the flexibility to design their own
resolution processes and policies, which are backed up by a
standardized escalation process. This is the only way to enable ODR
designs to adjust to the many different types of potential disputes and
resolutions around the world, while also providing final, definitive
resolutions in all cases.
The eBay experience makes very clear that ODR systems
designs should avoid specific requirements that constrain the flexibility
of disputants and administrators to evolve ODR systems that best
meet the needs of various dispute types, marketplaces, and consumer
communities. Where possible, ODR rules should articulate higherlevel process requirements and values (e.g. due process, transparency,
impartiality) as opposed to detailed procedural requirements (e.g. three
neutrals per case, seven days to respond).
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BUYERS’ ON DEMAND ACCESS TO INFORMATION NEEDED
TO IDENTIFY RELIABLE SELLERS
Evaluation of Sellers and Ratings – Building Trust

A buyer conducting a search for a product to purchase on eBay
can obtain information about the reliability of a seller from the Best
Match search results page. If a seller has achieved a Top Rated Seller
Status (discussed infra), under the Evaluation System hereafter
discussed, this is displayed in its listing on the Best Match search results
page. A lesser trustmark, the PowerSeller status (discussed infra), is also
available on eBay, however it is not visible from the Best Match search
results page. In this way the eBay system provides a reward for the
most reputable sellers, the Top Rated Sellers.
A buyer who selects Best Match search results for an item is
taken to a page listing that. On this page, a seller’s information is
conspicuously gathered in the upper right hand corner of the listing
page for buyers to consult. From here, a buyer can clearly determine
whether a Top Rated Seller badge or PowerSeller insignia is displayed.
Additionally, eBay provides two feedback performance metrics on the
listing page, the seller’s Feedback Score (discussed infra) and Feedback
Percentage (discussed infra). From the listing page a buyer can begin to
determine the reputation of sellers that do not qualify for Top Rated
Seller status.
Additionally, from the listing page, a buyer can click on the
Feedback Score and is hyperlinked to the seller’s feedback profile. The
seller’s feedback profile lists both eBay’s feedback performance
metrics, including the Feedback Score, feedback percentage, detailed
seller ratings, Top Rated Seller status, and also subjective ratings in the
form of comments left by former buyers of products offered by the
seller. Feedback Comments are listed in reverse chronological order,
thus a buyer is prompted to read the most recent Feedback Comments
first.
Finally, the seller’s feedback profile also lists the number of
revised feedbacks the seller has been given. A revised feedback occurs
when a buyer first left a negative or neutral feedback and then, after
having the issues remedied by the seller, revises the feedback left to
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positive. Thus, the buyer can get a feeling for the customer service a
seller provides if a buyer is unhappy with a transaction.
After a buyer successfully wins an auction or purchases an item
they must pay for the item on eBay.42 Payment under the eBay system
is usually by credit card. However, payment may also be made through
the eBay approved escrow service (www.Escrow.com). Under this
procedure, the parties may agree that the buyer place the price in the
escrow fund by either wire transfers or through credit card payments
(i.e. American Express, MasterCard, Visa, PayPal), United States
drawn money orders, United States drawn personal or company
checks, or United States drawn cashier’s checks. The buyer controls
the time of payment from the escrow fund to the seller and will not
release the payment from the escrow fund to the seller until he is
satisfied that the goods “have been delivered and are as described.”43
Thereafter, the item is required to be shipped in accordance with the
listing details by the seller. Under a non-escrow transaction, once the
item is received, the transaction is complete. After a transaction, a
buyer or seller may voluntarily leave feedback; however, a seller may
only leave positive feedback for a buyer. A buyer, on the other hand
may leave negative, neutral, or positive feedback for a seller. If a buyer
hasn’t left timely feedback, the seller is permitted to e-mail the buyer a
limited number of times to request that the buyer do so.
VI.

A.

THE EBAY AUTOMATED TRUSTMARK
EVALUATION/FEEDBACK SYSTEM

Importance of Making Seller Evaluations and Ratings
Available to Foster Trust Between Buyers and Sellers and

Alibaba has a similar escrow system. For example, Alibaba Secure
Payment, a service offered by Alibaba akin to eBay’s Paypal, is an escrow
service. The steps are as follows: 1) a buyer places an order online; 2) a buyer makes
payment to Alibaba Secure Payment; 3) supplier ships the order; 4) buyer receives
the order and confirms the order online (matches description, not damaged, etc.);
and then 5) Alibaba Secure Payment releases payment to the supplier. Secure Payment,
ALIBABA.COM,
http://activities.alibaba.com/alibaba/securepayment.php?tracelog=beacon_payment_150114 (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
43
See Escrow Services for Vehicle Purchases, EBAY INC.,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/pay/escrow.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
42
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Facilitate Private Enforcement
The eBay evaluation system is limited to transactions on the
eBay site between a buyer and seller. In other words, the eBay
evaluation system is tied to the eBay site, and a buyer can only rate a
seller, or vice versa, regarding a specific transaction between the two
users. Following a transaction on eBay, buyers and sellers can choose
to leave feedback about the transaction.44 As previously indicated,
whereas buyers can leave positive, neutral, or negative feedback, or no
feedback at all, sellers can only leave positive feedback or opt to not
leave feedback.45
By allowing buyers to choose between positive, neutral, or
negative evaluation, eBay transforms a qualitative judgment into one
of three specified categories. In doing so, eBay can now easily quantify
an inherently qualitative judgment: whether a user’s experience was
good, indifferent, or bad. The effect of quantifying a buyer’s
experience is to create an objective metric with which a future buyer
can evaluate a prospective seller. Thus, evaluations are transformed
into numerical data, easily interpreted by a buyer regardless of the
language they speak.
EBay additionally provides for a user to leave comments along
with an evaluation. By allowing a user to leave a detailed comment, a
future buyer has access to a purely qualitative evaluation component
regarding a seller’s prior transactions. Therefore, the qualitative aspect
of a positive, neutral, or negative experience is preserved.
Through a combination of analytical data and express
comments provided by former buyers, a current buyer can verify the
trustworthiness of a seller that they have never met, and perhaps
couldn’t communicate with, or have any other way to facilitate the trust
a buyer needs to transact with the seller. We next discuss the eBay
trustmark system in detail, with an eye to a best practices model in
facilitating trust in international commercial transactions.

How
it
works,
EBAY
INC.,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/howitworks.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
45
Id.
44
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“Percentage”, “Score”, and “Comment Feedback”

As indicated supra, a seller’s Feedback Rating can be positive,
neutral, or negative. A user’s Feedback Percentage is the ratio of
positive Feedback Ratings received out of all of the ratings received, in
other words the percentage of positive ratings. The higher a user’s
feedback percentage, generally speaking, the more trustworthy an eBay
member is.46 However, it is important to note that a high feedback
percentage does not dictate that a user has a significant track record on
eBay. For example, User A may have had ten transactions all with
positive feedback, therefore resulting in a feedback percentage of
100%. Now consider a second user, User B may have had 1,000
transactions with 980 positive feedbacks given, thereby having a
feedback percentage of 98%. As you can see, User A has a higher
feedback percentage, but User B is a much more experienced seller.
Whereas eBay’s other feedback system components require a number
of transactions, the feedback percentage system applies to initial users.
The feedback percentage, therefore is an important representation of
trustworthiness for a user that has not yet had enough transactions to
achieve a Feedback Score warranting a star rating, or other trustmarks,
discussed below.
A user’s Feedback Score is measured by subtracting the total
number of negative ratings from unique trading partners from the total
number of positive ratings from unique trading partners.47 For
example, if Seller A had ten transactions with ten different buyers that
resulted in seven positive and three negative feedbacks being left than
Seller A’s Feedback Score would be four (7-3=4). Now consider if
Seller A had ten transactions, again with seven positive ratings and
three negative, however three of the positive ratings were left by the
same buyer. In this case, the duplicative positive ratings left by the

46
The feedback system is linked only to transactions where users actually
leave feedback. Many completed transactions result in a buyer simply not leaving
feedback for a seller. These transactions are not encompassed in the feedback
evaluation system.
47 eBay
Buying
Feedback
Quick
Guide,
EBAY
INC.,
http://ebay.about.com/od/buyingeffectivel1/a/be_feedquick.htm (last visited Jan.
14, 2015).
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buyer would be excluded from Seller A’s Feedback Score. Thus, Seller
A’s Feedback Score would be two (5-3=2).
By limiting the Feedback Score to ratings from unique trading
partners the eBay system has a built-in safeguard against
disproportionate Feedback Ratings on the basis of repeat buyers,48
both positive and negative, skewing a user’s score. Besides
trustworthiness, a user’s Feedback Score measures their experience.
The higher a seller’s score, the more transactions with unique trading
partners that seller has had. A user’s Feedback Score is displayed in
parenthesis whenever a member ID or member name is displayed in
the eBay site. The score is also accompanied by a corresponding star
rating, giving a buyer a visual representation matching the score.49

EBay additionally has specific policies against Feedback Extortion, a
buyer threatening poor feedback to extort something that wasn’t part of the listing
or a seller demanding positive feedback from buyers; Feedback Manipulation,
exchanging feedback for the purpose of inflating Feedback Scores, gaining eBay
privileges, or enhancing reputation, or trying to damage a seller’s feedback through a
series of repeat purchases; and Feedback in Seller Terms and Conditions, a seller
cannot include terms and conditions limiting a buyer’s right to leave feedback.
Feedback Policies, EBAY INC., http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/feedbackov.html#basics (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
49
Below is an example of a user profile with Feedback Score and star
rating, followed by an infographic description of the star ratings.
48
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Buyers are more likely to transact with established sellers. The
Feedback Score performance metric provides buyers with a statistic
speaking to a seller’s track record as a merchant. Since the rating is
numerically based, many linguistic issues arising from transacting with
buyers and sellers worldwide are avoided.
As part of the eBay feedback system, every Feedback Rating
must be accompanied by a user comment.50 A comment is required
regardless of whether the feedback left is positive, neutral, or
negative.51 A Feedback Comment is the first instance where a buyer
can leave a qualitative evaluation of a transaction with a seller. As a
result, a Feedback Comment is often where a seller can learn a buyer’s
dissatisfaction with a transaction. If sellers receive a negative feedback
eBay allows the seller an opportunity to remedy the buyer’s grievance.52
If a seller resolves an issue they can also request a feedback revision
from the formerly aggrieved buyer.53
C.

“Description”, “Communication”, and “Shipment”, Detailed Seller Ratings

EBay allows buyers to rate specific aspects of their transaction
experience via a detailed seller rating.54 Detailed Seller Ratings are only
viewable by buyers for sellers with ten or more detailed seller ratings
by buyers within the last year. Buyers rate sellers according to four

eBay Feedback Points, EBAY INC., http://www.ebay.com/gds/eBay-Feedback-Points/10000000176715987/g.html (last visited Mar. 9 2015). It is unclear to me how
effective the star rating is as a quick-look reference to a user’s Feedback Score. The
effectiveness of the star rating is directly tied to a user’s understanding of what each
star means. Without the above chart, or an understanding thereof, I suspect the starsystem is of minimal import in garnering the trust of a user to facilitate a transaction.
50 Feedback,
EBAY
INC.,
http://pages.ebay.com/services/forum/feedback.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
51
Id.
52 Revising
Feedback,
EBAY.COM,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/revise-feedback.html (last visited Jan. 14,
2015).
53
Id.
54 Detailed
Seller
Ratings,
EBAY.COM,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/detailed-seller-ratings.html (last visited Mar.
9, 2015).
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categories55 as follows, from a rating of five stars (highest) to one star
(lowest):


Accuracy of item description;



Satisfaction with communication;



Expediency of shipping; and



Reasonableness of shipping and handling charges.

Buyers are requested to evaluate the sellers for the adherence
to the four categories through a series of specific tips for rating as
indicated in the chart that follows.
What you rate
How accurate was the
item description?
How satisfied were
you with the seller’s
communication?

How quickly did the
seller ship the item?

Tips for rating
 Review the item title, description, and
condition to see if they match the
item you received.
 Recall whether the seller addressed
any questions or concerns that you
had, and did so in a professional
manner.
 Consider only business days when
evaluating the timeliness of the seller’s
communication (sellers might not
check email on weekends and
holidays).
 If the seller meets specific
requirements, we give the seller a 5star communication detailed seller
rating automatically, and you won’t be
able to change the rating.
 Rate the seller only on the time it
took to mail the item, not the time it
took you to receive the item.

Id. Certain transactions aren’t rated according to all four categories.
For example, Motor Vehicle transactions are not rated on shipping time and shipping
and handling charges.
55
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How reasonable were
the shipping and
handling charges?









56
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Don’t hold sellers responsible for
delays in mail services, international
custom delays, or for the time it takes
for your payment to clear. If you
picked up the item locally, you won’t
be able to provide a rating for this
category.
If the seller met specific shipping time
requirements, we give the seller a 5star shipping time detailed seller
rating automatically, and you won’t be
able to change the rating.
If we determine at a later date that the
seller met the requirements for an
automatic 5-star shipping time rating,
we may adjust the rating to 5 stars.
Remember that sellers can charge for
the cost of the actual packaging
materials, along with a reasonable
handling fee to cover their time and
direct costs associated with shipping.
If the seller provided free shipping,
we give the seller a 5-star shipping
and handling charges detailed seller
rating automatically, and you won’t be
able to change the rating.
For international transactions, you as
a buyer are expected to pay duties,
taxes, and customs clearance fees as
required by country laws.
If you picked up the item locally, you
won’t be able to provide a rating for
this category.56

Detailed Seller Ratings, supra note 47.
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Transaction Defect Rate

Starting with the August 20, 2014 monthly seller evaluation,
eBay instituted an additional metric to evaluate seller performance.57
The new metric, the transaction defect rate (hereinafter “defect rate”)
is measured as a percentage of a seller’s successful transactions that
have one of a specified number of defects.58 These defects, according
to eBay, are the top predictors that a buyer will either leave eBay all
together or buy less on the marketplace.59 The specified defects are as
follows:


Detailed seller rating of 1, 2, or 3 for item as described;



Detailed seller rating of 1 for shipping time;



Negative or neutral feedback;



Return initiated for a reason that indicates the item was not
as described;



eBay Money Back Guarantee or PayPal Purchase
Protection case opened for an item not received or an item
not as described; and



Seller-cancelled transactions.60

The new defect rate policy mandated changes in the eBay Seller
Ratings system. Following the update, to qualify as a Top Rated Seller
a defect rate of up to 2% is tolerated.61 For purposes of Seller Ratings,
however, only transactions with US buyers count towards the defect

57 Seller
Standards,
EBAY
INC.,
http://pages.ebay.com/sellerinformation/news/springupdate2014/sellerstandards.
html (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.

279

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:1

rate.62 Buyers cannot see a seller’s defect rate, however a seller with a
high defect rate will not show favorably in Best Match search results. 63
VII.

AWARDING OF EBAY’S AUTOMATED TRUSTMARKS USING
THE EVALUATION/FEEDBACK SYSTEM

As indicated, supra, eBay employs a Top Rated Seller
automated Trustmark, granted only for highest-level performances,
and a PowerSeller Trustmark granted for quality performance but not
of the top level. We first discuss the PowerSeller Trustmark and
subsequently the Top Rated Seller.
A.

PowerSeller Designation - Requirements and Benefits

The PowerSeller designation is handed out on the basis of
volume of sales and customer service requirements. As a PowerSeller,
the seller must:


be registered with eBay for at least 90 days and have an
account in good standing;64



follow all eBay policies;65



may have no more than three tenths of one percent of
transactions result in Money Back Guarantee or PayPal
Purchase Protection cases closed without seller
resolution;66 and



have a minimum of 100 transactions and $3,000 in sales
with US buyers over the past 12 months.67

Id.
Id.
64 Powersellers,
EBAY.COM,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/sellpowersellers.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
62
63
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Further, the PowerSeller System is linked to Detailed Seller
Ratings in two ways, as follows:


the seller must have an average of at least 4.60 from US
buyers across all four detailed seller rating categories;68 and



a seller must have no more than 1% of their transactions
with low DSRs (1 or 2 ratings) on the category “item as
described,” and no more than 2% of transactions with low
DSRs in the “communication,” “shipping time,” and
“shipping and handling cost” categories.69

The above listed requirements qualifies a seller as a “Bronze”
level PowerSeller.70 Depending on the volume of sales, in either
number of items or in dollar amount, a seller may improve their
PowerSeller level above Bronze to either Silver, Gold, Platinum or
Titanium levels.71 EBay has a designated insignia for PowerSellers
across the various levels. Pictured below, the insignia only changes by
reference to the appropriate PowerSeller level.

Notably, a user may advertise their PowerSeller status,
however, whether a user is a PowerSeller or not is not apparent from
search results, whereas a Top Ratedseller status is visible in a search
listing.72 If a user looks at a particular seller’s eBay store they can find

68 Id.; seeeBay Buying Feedback Guide, supra note 47, eBay Feedback Policies,
supra note 48, ebay Feedback Points, supra note 49, and eBay Feedback, supra note 50.
69 Powersellers, supra note 64.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
For example, search any major product, such as an iPad, on eBay.com.
iPad,
EBAY.COM,
http://www.ebay.com/sch/i.html?_from=R40&_trksid=p2050601.m570.l1313.TR
0.TRC0.H0.Xipad&_nkw=ipad&_sacat=0 (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). .
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a seller’s PowerSeller insignia located there.73 From a practical
perspective, the PowerSeller status requires more search time from a
buyer and, thus, is less accessible than the Top Rated insignia. For this
reason, a PowerSeller insignia is a less efficient trustmark than the Top
Rated insignia.
Similar to the Top Rated Seller system, the PowerSeller rating
includes discounted shipping, including United States Postal Service
Savings Program and United Parcel Service rate discounts. 74 A
PowerSeller also gains access to eBay protection for unpaid items,75
receives promotional offers and opportunities to participate in
research,76 and gains access to resources from eBay that regular
members cannot access.77 These resources include a separate, more
easily accessible customer service team for PowerSellers and access to
marketing and sales tools directly from eBay.78 Finally, the PowerSeller
status is a step toward Top RatedTop Rated Seller status and the
benefits discussed infra associated with the Top RatedTop Rated Seller
status.79
B.

Top-Rated Seller Badge Designation - Requirements and
Benefits

A Top-Rated Seller is a PowerSeller that has maintained high
performance and customer service standards.80 The PowerSeller
designation then is a precursor to a Top-Rated Seller designation.
Thus, the Top-Rated Seller badge can be viewed as a more significant
trustmark than the PowerSeller status. In order to qualify as a TopRated Seller, an eBay user must meet several requirements related to
customer service. For example, if a seller offers one-day or same day
handling, the seller must upload tracking information in at least 90%
For example, see Titanium Powerseller Status, EBAY.COM,
http://stores.ebay.com/irecrafts/Titanium-PowerSeller-Status.html (last visited
Mar. 9, 2015).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Powersellers, supra note 64.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80 Glossary
of
Terms
–
Top
Rated
Seller,
EBAY
INC.,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/account/glossary.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
73
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of their transactions in the prescribed time according to the relevant
eBay policies.81 Additionally, a seller must meet the eBay Money Back
Guarantee promise and PayPal Purchase Protection requirements. 82
The case requirements under these programs state that at most three
tenths of a percent of cases brought by a buyer may be closed without
seller resolution.83 In terms of feedback requirements, to meet Top
Rated Seller requirements, a seller can only have a transaction defect
rate of 2% at most.84
EBay offers a second status of Top Rated Seller seals, the Top
Rated Plus Seal.85 In order to garner a Top Rated Plus Seal, a Top Rated
Seller must offer listings that provide a 14-day or longer money-back
return policy and provide same-day or one business day handling
time.86 Further, listings meeting the Top Rated Plus requirements must
include extended holiday returns on listings.87
Currently, a user can become a Top Rated Seller in the United
States, United Kingdom, and Germany.88 The U.S. Top Rated Seller
system, discussed infra, is based only on sales through eBay.com.89 A
seller can become a Top Rated Seller in the United Kingdom or
Germany through their associated eBay sites, http://www.ebay.co.uk/
and http://www.ebay.de/, respectively.90 The Top Rated Seller
designation in those countries is based only on transactions with
buyers in those countries.91 A seller need not be from the United
States, United Kingdom, or Germany to qualify as a Top Rated Seller
in that country. For example, a United States seller may become a Top
Rated Seller in the United Kingdom if they meet the requirements of

Top Rated Seller, EBAY INC., http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/toprated.html#what (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
81
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the U.K. Top Rated Seller Program.92 For associated eBay sites in
countries other than the U.K. and Germany, a U.S. seller can become
a Top Rated Seller in that country based on the eBay global seller
performance standards.93 Unlike the United States, United Kingdom
and Germany Top Rated Seller systems, the Top Rated Seller
designation in all other countries is based on transactions with buyers
in all countries and not just native buyers.94
Once a seller qualifies as a Top Rated Seller they receive a 20%
discount on final value fees charged by eBay and access to United
States Postal Service Commercial Plus Pricing on shipping.95 As soon
as a seller qualifies, sometimes immediately but at most in a matter of
hours,96 a seal is displayed on any of the seller’s listings which offer
same-day or 1-day handling and extended holiday returns identifying
them as a Top Rated Seller.97 Additionally, a seller receives preferential
search results, or in eBay’s terms, improved search standing in eBay’s
Best Match search results.98 The Top Rated Seller and Top Rated Plus
seal, pictured below, appear both in eBay search results and in an
individual item’s listing page.99

Id.; For the United Kingdom requirements, see Top Rated Seller,
http://pages.ebay.co.uk/help/sell/top-rated.html (Mar. 9, 2015).
93
Top Rated Seller, supra note 81; for global seller performance standards,
see
Global
Seller
Performance,
EBAY.COM,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/global-seller-performance.html (last visited
Mar. 9, 2015). Even though a U.S. buyer can become a Top Rated Seller in the
United Kingdom and Germany they do not qualify for discounts through those sites.
Likewise, only U.S. and Canadian sellers are eligible for the 20% final value fee
discount on eBay.com.
94
Top Rated Seller, supra note 81.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97 Build
your
Business,
EBAY.COM,
http://pages.ebay.com/sellerinformation/build-your-business-online/statusstandards/top-rated-seller.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
98
Id.
99
For an example of search results, see eBay “iPad” search, supra note 72;
for an example of a listing page, see: Apple iPad Mini, EBAY
http://www.ebay.com/itm/NEW-Apple-iPad-Mini-16GB-Wi-Fi-7-9-TabletWhite-MD531LL-A-or-Gray-MF432LL-A/181511708378?pt=US_Tablets&var=&hash=item2a42f0deda (last visited Mar. 9,
2015).
92

EBAY.UK
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Comparison of eBay Evaluation System with Other
Evaluation Systems

There are two important observations to be made regarding
the exclusivity of the eBay system. First, the eBay feedback system is
a closed system, that is, the system is tied only to transactions
conducted on the eBay website. Second, a trustmark earned through
transactions on eBay cannot be used by a merchant outside of the eBay
website. Each of these observations has important implications
regarding the practical use of such a system universally for
international transactions.
Since its inception, eBay has developed and refined its
feedback system. Thereby engendering trust in transactions on its
platform and facilitating trade. In doing so, eBay has gained a
reputation as a safe and secure global marketplace. There are clear
incentives for eBay to protect their investment in the feedback system.
It comes as no surprise then that eBay’s system remains closed. Thus,
eBay does not allow their feedback system to be outsourced to
transactions occurring off the eBay site. As an added level of
protection, ensuring sellers continue using eBay, the trustmarks earned
through the eBay feedback system cannot be utilized by a seller on
another platform. Thus, an eBay seller may not advertise their
reputation on eBay elsewhere.
As an e-commerce site, the eBay feedback system provides
evaluations of buyers and sellers for transactions on its platform. Each
feedback left is tied to a particular transaction, for a particular item,
between a particular buyer and seller. EBay’s system then provides
objective scores, based on observable and quantifiable elements as
provided by the parties to a transaction to evaluate buyers and sellers
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in the aggregate of all of their transactions.100 From a perspective of
reliability in collecting data and enforcement of the rules and
regulations related to the feedback system, a closed system, that is a
system tied to a particular platform, is the only practical option.
Under the open system model, in comparison to the closed
system model the seller conducts transactions on more than one
platform rather than a single platform. However, the evaluation system
and its feedback and ratings are, hosted on a single platform. Another
difference is that the open system model has to rely on subjective
feedback as opposed to the quantitative feedback of the eBay closed
system.
There are relatively few open systems on the market. However
earlier research uncovered iKarma, which regrettably is no longer in
operation and its website is no longer in existence. However, we can
nevertheless use the iKarma system to illustrate the open system
model. An iKarma user first created an iKarma account, and then they
were awarded an iKarma seal. The user placed this seal on their
website, in emails, etc. that linked to their iKarma profile. The user’s
iKarma profile contained ratings and comments from previous buyers
of their goods or services. At its core, the iKarma site was more or less
just a place to host reviews. This stands in stark contrast to eBay’s
platform driven, empirical evaluation and trustmark system. IKarma
was essentially a place to evaluate a seller’s reputation, the seal acted
less as a trustmark than as an access point to see what, if anything,
other people had said about a seller. A seller could advertise their
iKarma profile and ratings, but again the site acted more as a place to
host reviews and less as a trustmark.Because sites like iKarma are not
tied to specific platforms or even to specific types of transactions, i.e.
a lawyer and a company selling electronics can both have an iKarma
type profile, the open system does not lend itself to objective
evaluations. Thus, because evaluations are based largely on subjective,
qualitative comments, there is not objective data to base metrics off or

EBay’s use of numerical rather than verbal ratings reduces
misunderstandings and improves communication regarding ratings, particularly in
cross-border transactions involving use of different languages by parties to the
transaction.
100
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to base an automated trustmark on. The automation and efficiency of
the eBay closed system is therefore lost in the iKarma open system.
The SquareTrade seal provides evaluation and feedback of past
transactions and also gives guarantees as to performance obligations
regarding a current listing. The SquareTrade system also verifies a
seller’s identity, requires the seller to commit to the SquareTrade
dispute resolution process, and generates info pages to provide a buyer
with information regarding a seller’s past transactions.101 Therefore, the
SquareTrade seal provides a retrospective trustmark, similar to the
eBay system. SquareTrade centrally monitors a user’s compliance with
its trustmark and can remove the trustmark from a seller’s site or
auction listings.102 The SquareTrade seal is not linked to one site or
platform, and seems to be a middle ground from the eBay completely
closed system to the open systems such as iKarma.
VIII.

A.

LESSONS & BEST PRACTICES REGARDING EBAY’S
AUTOMATED TRUSTMARK SYSTEM & PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT

eBay’s Automated Trustmark System and Private
Enforcement of Settled Claims and Rulings of Neutrals
Through Voluntary Compliance, Termination of Trustmark
Status, Use of Chargebacks, and Access to Escrow Accounts

The eBay “Automated Electronic Trustmark System” enables
buyers on demand to obtain evaluations and performance ratings of
sellers from whom they anticipate making purchases. These ratings are
obtained electronically and cumulatively from the reports supplied by
prior buyers after each purchase they made on the eBay platform.103
SquareTrade Criteria for Trusted Business Seal Membership,
SQUARETRADE, https://www.squaretrade.com/htm/pop/popup_busCriteria.html
(last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
102 SquareTrade
Standards,
SQUARETRADE,
https://www.squaretrade.com/htm/pop/popup_ST_standards.html (last visited
Mar. 9, 2015).
103
EBay’s use of numerical rather than verbal ratings reduces
misunderstandings and improves communication regarding ratings, particularly in
cross-border transactions involving use of different languages by parties to the
transaction.
101
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The eBay automated system is efficient and cost-effective and does not
depend on cumbersome and costly third-party evaluations to
determine who is or is not entitled to trustmark status.
Under the eBay Trustmark Evaluation/Feedback System
sellers’ desire to obtain favorable performance evaluations in order to
establish their reputation and reliability, and increase their sales,
motivates them to perform their contract obligations well, facilitate fair
resolution of disputes, and voluntarily satisfy the rulings of neutrals
following unsuccessful negotiations and facilitated negotiations. In
most cases voluntary private satisfaction and enforcement of settled
claims and rulings of neutrals will occur. In the absence of such
voluntary compliance, use of private enforcement procedures
including chargebacks on credit card payment, access to escrow
accounts, and termination of trustmark status are available to achieve
private enforcement of rulings. As noted the rulings of neutrals do not
have res judicata effect but are enforceable by use of applicable private
enforcement procedures.104
CONCLUSION
Development of fast-track low-value high-volume ODR
systems which provide a marketplace for e-commerce, as well as an
ODR system for fast-track resolution of disputes arising from ecommerce on its electronic marketplace is facilitated by application of
the following four best practices used by eBay in creating its highly
successful system:

Much discussion has occurred in UNCITRAL Working Group III
sessions on the subject of whether the ruling made by the neutral at the end of the
facilitated negotiation second stage of the resolution process should be termed a
“recommendation,” “decision,” “ruling” or some other yet to be discovered term.
Proponents of the “recommendation” term are concerned that the neutral’s ruling
does not have res judicata effect and therefore are not comfortable with using the
term “decision.” Proponents of the term “decision” are concerned that the term
“recommendation” could be interpreted to mean that the ruling has no legal effect.
These concerns can be addressed by clarifying the definition of whatever term is used
in the definition section of the Preliminary Rules by specifying that the “[term] does
not have res judicata effect, but is enforceable by use of applicable private
enforcement procedures.”
104
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1) Using a de facto purchase price “Money Back Guarantee”
definition of low value to limit the amount of each
permitted claim;105
2) Limiting the Types of Permitted Claims to “item not
received” and “item not as described”;106
3) Making Available to Buyers’ On-Demand Access to
Automated Trustmark Evaluation/Feedback Information
Needed to Identify Reliable Sellers;107 and
4) Providing For Private Enforcement of Settled Claims and
Rulings of Neutrals through facilitation of voluntary
compliance, termination of trustmark status, and using
charge backs on credit card payments and access to escrow
funds to satisfy claims and rulings of neutrals in the
absence of voluntary compliance.108

105
106
107
108

See discussion at supra note 10.
See discussion at supra note 15.
See discussion at supra note 43, 41 (read in stated order).
See text at note 103, supra.

289

Penn State
Journal of Law & International Affairs
2015

VOLUME 4 NO. 1

PARTY AUTONOMY AND CONSUMER
ARBITRATION IN CONFLICT: A “TROJAN
HORSE” IN THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN
THE E.U. ADR-DIRECTIVE 2013/11?
Norbert Reich†
ABSTRACT
Arbitration clauses in consumer contracts have been subject to controversy in many jurisdictions;
recent U.S. and Canadian Supreme Court case law have been used as examples. European
Union (E.U.) law, which originally excluded arbitration in general from the Brussels/Rome
regimes, has recently taken a mixed, and to some extent limited, approach by including
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) entities “imposing” a solution in its recent ADR
Directive 2013/11. There seems to be an indirect encouragement to develop consumer arbitration
schemes in E.U. Member States as a second route to justice. It is too early to evaluate this new
and somewhat clandestine policy of the E.U. The paper insists on some additional procedural
guarantees should consumer arbitration schemes become more popular among Member countries,
even though Dir. 2013/11 already contains some “minimum protection” provisions on “specific
acceptance” and applicable law. The basic reference for such additional protection is in Article 47
of the E.U. Charter of Fundamental Rights, viewed together with Article 19(1) para. 2 of the
Treaty on the European Union (TEU) whereby “Member States shall “provide remedies
sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law”. At the time of
writing, the implementation measures of Member States concerning Dir. 2013/11 have to be
awaited before making any final judgment as to their conformity with E.U. law and efficiency.
The paper seeks to provide some guidelines for this coming debate.

Before this article could be published, Prof. Dr. Norbert Reich passed
away. This publication has been dedicated to his memory by his colleagues and this
Journal.
 Dr. Dr. H.C. Mult., Emeritus Professor of Law, University of Bremen;
Visiting Professor, University of Groningen/NL (2013/2014). This paper was
presented at the 17th Biennial Meeting of the International Academy of Commercial
and Consumer Law, July 16-19, Istanbul Bilgi University. This paper was finalized
with the help of Professor Hans-W. Micklitz.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses an important new development in conflict
regulation between consumers and businesses in the E.U.—a subject
matter which has kept me busy for some time. This paper will address
the question of how a regime of extra-legal conflict management by
ADR mechanisms, which are based on voluntary cooperation between
consumers and traders, supplements, but does not replace, judicial
court proceedings. This paper argues that a more intrusive regime to
solve consumer complaints by binding arbitration will become
increasingly popular. Justice will be more or less privatized under an
efficiency rhetoric, which criticizes lengthy, costly, and highly
discretionary court proceedings that exist in many Member States to
the detriment of consumers and the working of justice in general. For
many legal scholars, binding arbitration based on contractual
agreements is regarded as an alternative; however, it is not always clear
what the legal and consumer policy costs of an extension of ADR
mechanisms are, and whether there is a fair balance between the
supposed efficiency gains on the one hand and the requirements of
effective legal protection on the other.
The paper will proceed as follows. First, it will give an overview
of liberal and mixed regimes concerning the promotion of binding
consumer arbitration, namely in the United States (Section I) and
Canada (Section II) where the legitimacy and limits of consumer
arbitration have been subject to controversial Supreme Court
judgments. These judgments show the complexity of this issue and
provide insight into future E.U. developments of ADR mechanisms in
E.U. countries. Section III will analyze new trends in E.U. law
provoked by the recently adopted ADR Directive 2013/11/EU,1

1
Directive 2013/11, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
21 May 2013 on Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes 2013, 2014
O.J. (L 165/63) [hereinafter Directive 2013/11]. See Horst Eidenmüller & Martin
Engel, Die Schlichtungsfalle: Verbraucherrechtsdurchsetzung nach der ADR-Richtlinie und
ODR-Verordnung der EU, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 1704 (2013) for a
critical appreciation of those who are not concerned with consumer arbitration
specifically, but who fear not without justification a de facto denial of justice to
consumers even if they take proceedings with a non-binding outcome; it is unrealistic
to expect consumers to pursue their claim if rejected by the ADR-entity before courts
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where consumer arbitration has found a place of its own in regulating
ADR-entities “imposing solutions” on consumers. Section IV
concerns the scope of application of Dir. 2013/11. Section V examines
prior E.U. law in the form of two important, and in the opinion of this
author, still valid precedents set by the Court of Justice of the E.U.
(CJEU, then called ECJ), namely Claro2 and Asturcom.3 Sections VI
through X propose some standards on valid consumer arbitration by
reference to Dir. 2013/11 and other E.U. law instruments. These
standards are then measured under a fundamental rights perspective
contained in Article 47 of the E.U. Charter and Article 19(1)(a) Treaty
of the European Union (TEU), namely the principle of effective
judicial protection of rights granted to consumers under E.U. law.4
Then, Section XI argues that these standards limit party-autonomy
with regard to binding arbitration clauses in consumer contracts and
require the adoption of additional mechanisms to curb an eventual
abuse of arbitration clauses by traders or trade associations. Finally,
Sections XII through XVII examine E.U. countries that must adapt
their arbitration legislation to new E.U. standards. Some preliminary
conclusions will follow.

of law. The authors also question the legal basis of Article 114 of the Directive,
although such discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.
2
Case C-168/05, E.M.M. Claro v. Centro Movil Milenium, 2006 E.C.R.
I-10421; see also Reich, More clarity after “Claro”?, supra note 1, at 41.
3
Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecommunicaciones v. Rodrígues Noguera,
2009 E.C.R. I-9579 ¶ 54-55. See Jules Stuyck, Note to Pannon and Asturcom, 47
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 879 (2010); Christopher Hodges, Consumer Protection and
Procedural Justice, in LANDMARK CASES OF EU CONSUMER LAW: IN HONOUR OF
JULES STUYCK 615 (Evelyn Terryn et al. ed. 2013); Chantal Mak, Judgment of the Court
(First Chamber) of 6 October 2009, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina Rodríguez
Nogueira, Case C-40/08, Commentary, 6 EUR. REV. CONTRACT L. 437 (2010); Martin
Ebers, ECJ (First Chamber) 6 October 2009, Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones
SL v. Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira – From Océano to Asturcom: Mandatory Consumer Law,
Ex Officio Application of European Union Law and Res Judicata 18 EUR. REV. PRIVATE. L.
823 (2010). See also ALEXANDER J. BĚLOHLÁVEK, B2C ARBITRATION: CONSUMER
PROTECTION IN ARBITRATION 7, 117, 133 (2012).
4
See NORBERT REICH, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU CIVIL LAW ch. IV
(2014).
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A LIBERAL APPROACH: ADR IN THE UNITED STATES

In the words of the Supreme Court in Southland Corp. v. Keating,
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)5 “declared a national policy favoring
arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial
forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed
to resolve by arbitration.”6 U.S. law generally takes a very liberal view
toward arbitration clauses without making a distinction between
commercial and consumer arbitration.7 This view was confirmed in the
Court’s controversial decision of Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph.8
In Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, Larketta Randolph signed a
financing agreement for the purchase of a mobile home with Green
Tree Financial. The agreement bound any disputes arising from the
agreement to arbitration. When Randolf sued Green Tree for violating
the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the district court compelled
arbitration. However, on appeal the Eleventh Circuit overturned the
district court’s decision, finding that the arbitration agreement was
unenforceable because the steep arbitration costs would negatively
affect Randolph’s ability to vindicate her statutory rights. The Supreme
Court disagreed and held that consumers bear the burden to prove that
the arbitral forum is financially inaccessible to them.9 This opinion was
challenged by a strong dissent by Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter,
and Breyer (in part), who argued that, “as a repeat player in the
arbitration required by its form contract, Green Tree has superior
information about the costs to consumers of pursuing arbitration.”10
This approach by the Supreme Court means that ADR mechanisms in
favor of consumers can easily be avoided by arbitration clauses entered
into by standard form contracts with consumers as in Green Tree.
Recent state court cases, however, show a somewhat more
nuanced approach toward arbitration clauses. For example, Comb v.
The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2014) [hereinafter FAA].
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
7
LARS WEIHE, DER SCHUTZ DER VERBRAUCHER IM RECHT DER
SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT 116, 205-06 (2005) (for a critique from a consumer
policy point of view with regard to “informed consent”).
8
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
9
Id. at 92.
10
Id. at 96.
5
6
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Paypal11 concerned a class action against an electronic disbursement
service alleging illegal removal of funds.12 The defendant, Paypal,
argued that the case should have been submitted to arbitration because
the contract contained an arbitration clause.13 The District Court held
that, despite its wide use and recognition in relevant California law, the
arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable for several
reasons.14 First, there was a lack of mutuality whereby arbitration was
imposed on the weaker party while the stronger party was allowed the
choice of forum.15 Second, the clause contained a prohibition against
consolidation of claims.16 Third, the costs of arbitration and venue
were unconscionable because the “place or manner” in which
arbitration was to occur unreasonably took into account “the
respective circumstances of the parties.”17
Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems18 concerned an action for false
advertising and deceptive business practices of the defendant
PacifiCare for inducing persons to subscribe to health plans. 19
PacifiCare claimed that the plaintiff, who obtained health coverage
through his employer, was required to arbitrate his claim because of
the subscriber agreement between PacifiCare and the plaintiff’s
employer.20 The California Supreme Court held that the arbitration
clause was unenforceable.21 The Court’s reasoning was similar to the
decision in Comb, at least insofar as injunctive relief is concerned, but
not with regard to restitution and unjust enrichment. Therefore, in
California, claims for unjust enrichment are arbitrable, while claims for
injunctions against deceptive advertising practices are not arbitrable
because they are undertaken “in the public benefit.”

Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
Id. at 1166.
13
Id. at 1169-70.
14
Id. at 1172.
15
Id. at 1173-75.
16
Id. at 1175-76.
17
Id. at 1177 (quoting Bolter v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888,
894-95 (Ct. App. 2001)).
18
Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157 (Cal. 2003).
19
Id. at 1159.
20
Id. at 1160.
21
See generally id.
11
12
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The Supreme Court in Buckeye Check Cashing Corp. v. Cardegna
seemed unconcerned by attempts to limit the effects of arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts.22 The litigation in Cardegna concerned a
class action suit brought against usurious terms in a consumer credit
agreement containing a broad arbitration clause.23 The case was an
appeal from a decision by the Florida Supreme Court, which set aside
the arbitration clause.24 The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that to
enforce an agreement to arbitrate in a contract challenged as unlawful
“could breathe life into a contract that not only violates state law, but
is criminal in nature . . .”25 The U.S. Supreme Court, per Justice Scalia,
reversed the Florida Supreme Court and distinguished two causes in
which arbitration clauses can be challenged in court:
1) The arbitration clause is unlawful as such; and
2) The entire contract from which the arbitration
clause cannot be severed is invalid, which was not
the case in a usurious credit agreement.
The Supreme Court held that, “regardless of whether the challenge is
brought in federal or state court, a challenge to the validity of the
contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must
go to the arbitrator.”26
Consumer protection depends on the willingness of arbitrators
to apply and enforce consumer protection provisions in particular of
state law. Arbitration awards, however, are not published, and
therefore are not subject to critical public and academic debate. It
seems that there is no remedy under U.S. law against an arbitration
award disregarding mandatory consumer protection provisions, unless
the consumer can prove the existence of the narrow defenses

22

See generally Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440

23

Id. at 442-43.
Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860, 862 (Fla.

(2006).
24

2005).
Id. (quoting Party Yards, Inc. v. Templeton, 751 So. 2d 121, 123 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
26
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 546 U.S. at 449.
25
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enumerated in the 1958 New York Convention.27 Arbitration clauses
have become a prominent and popular instrument to avoid the
application of consumer protection provisions, at least in contract
litigation between business and consumers, and particularly in class
action suits.
An arbitration clause may be considered “substantially
unconscionable,” as in the Pennsylvania case of Bragg v. Linden
Research,28 if an arbitration clause is either one-sided or nontransparent, or if there are additional costs to the consumer to
arbitrate.
In AT&T v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court addressed the
relationship between arbitration clauses in cellular telephone contracts
between respondents (the Concepcions) and petitioner (AT&T) and
the prohibition of classwide arbitration.29 After the Concepcions were
charged sales taxes on the retail value of phones provided free under
their service contract, they sued AT&T in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of California. Their suit was
consolidated with a class action alleging, inter alia, that AT&T had
engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax on “free
phones”. The Supreme Court in rejecting the consolidation claim took
the opposite view of the California Supreme Court,30 which had ruled
that consumers must have the right to proceed with a class action and
shall not be forced into arbitration. Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, framed AT&T as a clash of two policies, namely, the policy
27
Defenses under the convention include: lack of proper notice,
arbitration decision contrary to public policy of the forum country, manifest
disregard of the law. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330
U.N.T.S.
3
[hereinafter
New
York
Convention],
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.ht
ml.
28
Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
See GREG LASTOWKA, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE NEW LAWS OF THE ONLINE WORLDS
95 (2010) for a discussion of U.S. practice on enforcing contractual provisions
containing an arbitration clause where the Bragg decision was found to be “rather
surprising (to many legal commentators) and presume that other courts looking at
the contracts of other virtual words will be more likely to find them enforceable.”.
29
See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
30
Discover Bank v Superior Ct., 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
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of California courts favoring consumers’ decision to opt for class
actions, and the policy of the FAA favoring arbitration. The Supreme
Court held that the FAA preempts the state court class action rule, so
the dispute must be submitted to arbitration and shall not proceed as
a class action.31 In his dissent, Justice Breyer insisted that, due to the
small amount of the individual claim ($30.22), a denial of class actions
practically means a denial of justice. This argument was rejected by the
majority, who reasoned that class actions in arbitration proceedings are
not useful and manageable remedies. As Justice Scalia said: “Requiring
the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental
attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with
the FAA.”
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors, decided by the Supreme
Court on June 20, 2013, concerned an arbitration clause that
disallowed anti-trust claims to be brought by a class.32 Again, the
Court’s majority reiterated its liberal view favoring arbitration as a
“matter of contract,” even against mandatory provisions of federal
anti-trust laws. Justice Kagan’s dissent, in my opinion, correctly insists
on the “effective vindication” rule established in prior case law, which
limits arbitration clauses where they effectively prevent enforcement
of “congressionally created rights.”33 This is accomplished by
arbitration clauses that de facto prevent compensation of anti-trust
claims and undermine the deterrent effect of compensation for antitrust infringements.
The case law of the Supreme Court limits effective consumer
protection as provided by federal (anti-trust) and state law (the
California Discover Bank rule34). The Court also seems to contradict
the plain meaning of section 2 of the FAA, which reads:
[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable and

31
32
33
34

Id. at 1750-51.
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013).
Id. at 2313.
Discover Bank, 113 P.3d 1100.
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enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
equity for the revocation of any contract.35
Therefore, the FAA would seem to allow limits to arbitration
in consumer (and commercial) matters based on defenses such as
fraud, duress, unconscionability, and mandatory (federal and/or state)
law, which was in part developed by state courts but had been regarded
with hostility by the Supreme Court majority. This practice creates, as
the dissent in American Express pointed out, areas of de facto
immunity from law: “[the FAA] reflects a federal policy favoring actual
arbitration—that is, arbitration as a streamlined ‘method of revolving
disputes,’ not as a foolproof way of killing off valid claims.”36 However,
the Supreme Court’s message in American Express is unequivocal:
courts are required to enforce arbitration agreements, including class
action waivers, in accordance with their terms.
Legal practitioners and scholars have criticized the Supreme
Court’s liberal view on arbitration as an “excessive use” of arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts.37 The disadvantages of excessive use of
arbitration for consumers seem to outweigh the advantages of
arbitration for service and goods providers, namely:


no possibility of a rational decision for or against
arbitration before the dispute arises;

FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2014).
Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2315.
37
See WEIHE, supra note 8, at 43-45; Richard M. Alderman, The Future of
Consumer Law in the United States – Hello Arbitration, Bye-Bye Courts, So-Long Consumer
Protection (Univ. Hous. L. Ctr., Working Paper No. 2008-A-09, 2007); Richard M.
Alderman, Consumer Arbitration: The Destruction of the Common Law, 2 J. AM. ARB. 1
(2003); Gerhard Wagner, Dispute Resolution as a Product: Competition between Civil Justice
Systems, in REGULATORY COMPETITION IN CONTRACT LAW AND DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 347, 394 (Horst Eidenmüller ed. 2013). With regard to then existing
smalls claims procedures, see NORBERT REICH, STAATLICHE REGULIERUNG
ZWISCHEN MARKTVERSAGEN UND POLITIKVERSAGEN 129 (1988). See also GRALFPETER CALLIESS, GRENZÜBERSCHREITENDE VERBRAUCHERVERTRÄGE 308-14
(2006) (providing a critical view (without citing the harsh case law of the U.S.
Supreme Court)).
35
36
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the trader can always amend the arbitration clause
unilaterally;



no legal representation, no class actions, limited
possibilities for bringing evidence, no legal dispute
insurance;



arbitrators cannot be formally obliged to apply
state consumer protection legislation;38



only limited access to documents (which are
usually in the hand of the trader), no pre-trial
discovery procedure;



no jury, only limited appeal possibilities;



frequently excessive costs, compared with existing
small claims procedures; and



the place of arbitration may be geographically
distant from residence of consumer.
II.

4:1

A MIXED APPROACH: ADR IN CANADA

In terms of Canadian law on arbitration, a lively discussion
existed among scholars in Canada on whether pre-contractual
arbitration clauses could be enforced in consumer contracts, and
whether they could eventually be used to avoid class actions similar to
the United States.39

The American Arbitration Association (AAA) Consumer Due Process
Protocol contains such an obligation, while the rules of the ICC (International
Chamber of Commerce) are silent on that point. CALLIESS, supra note 39, at 359.
39
See Shelley McGill, The Conflict between Consumer Class Actions and
Contractual Arbitration Clauses, 43 CAN. BUS. L.J. 359 (2006); Jonnette Watson
Hamilton, Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbitration Clauses: Denying Access to Justice?, 51 MCGILL
L.J. 693 (2006). But see David T. Neave & Jennifer M. Spencer, Class Proceedings: The
New Way to Trump Mandatory Arbitration Clauses?, 63 THE ADVOCATE 495 (2005)
(favoring of the use of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, according to the
U.S. model which is said to strike the “right balance”).
38
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In Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs, the Canadian
Supreme Court held that arbitration clauses in an electronic consumer
contract for the purchase of computers from a U.S. company by a
citizen of Quebec were also enforceable40 against a class action brought
by the Quebec “Union des consommateurs”. The Court reasoned that
the consumer had access to the arbitration clause via a hyperlink on
the website of the company, and that he agreed to be bound by the
clause when he clicked on the link.41 The Court also reasoned that “the
clause was no more difficult for the consumer to access than would
have been the case had he or she been given a paper copy of the entire
contract on which the terms and conditions of sale appeared on the
back of the first page.”42 Further, the Court stated that any challenge
to the arbitration agreement must be resolved first by the arbitrator
who has Kompetenz-Kompetenz under international agreements and
Canadian law.43 This doctrine is a traditional doctrine in (commercial)
arbitration under which the arbitrator, and not a court of law, has the
“competence-competence,” or the final say over the legality of
arbitration proceedings, including the choice of the arbitrator.44
The dissenting judges disagreed with the majority, arguing that
the arbitration and jurisdiction clauses, which are, according the
Quebec law, forbidden, are similar if they refer the consumer case to a
non-Quebec authority. This is the case with the reference to the U.S.
arbitrator as foreseen in the contract clause; the arbitration clause is
therefore unenforceable.
A more recent case decided by the Canadian Supreme Court,
Seidel v. TELUS, seems to take a more critical view on arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts aimed at excluding class action
proceedings against the supplier of cellular telephone services.45 In
40

Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs, [2007] 2 S.C.R.

801 (Can.).
Id.
Id.
43
Id.
44 Case C-190/89, Marc Rich & Co. AG v. Societa Italiana Impianti PA,
1991 E.C.R. I-3855 (expressly finding that the arbitrator had this authority); see
Norbert Reich, Zur Wirksamkeit von Schiedsklauseln in Grenzüberschreitenden
Börsentermingeschäften, 12 Z. Eur. Pro. 981 (1996).
45 Seidel v. TELUS Commc'ns Inc., [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531 (Can.); Shelley
McGill, Consumer Arbitration After Seidel v. TELUS, 51(2) CAN. BUS. L.J. 187 (2011).
41
42
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Seidel, the contract contained a clause with the supplier referring
disputes to “private and confidential arbitration,” as well as a waiver
by the consumer of the right to pursue a class action claim.46 Among
the questions before the Supreme Court were whether this clause was
unconscionable under the British Columbia Business Practices and
Consumer Protection Act (BPCPA), and whether the waiver was in
conformity with section 3 of the BPCPA, which provides: “Any waiver
or release by a person of the person’s rights, benefits or protections
under this Act is void except to the extent that the waiver or release is
expressly permitted by this Act.”47
One of the questions before the Court was whether this
prohibition had to be enforced by the arbitrator under the Canadian
(and U.S.) Kompetenz-Kompetenz rule, or whether it could also be
enforced by a court of law. The majority relied on section 172 of the
BPCPA, which allows any person without “a special interest” to bring
a class action for injunctive and declaratory relief.48 The plaintiff in
Seidel relied on this provision for her action against TELUS to avoid
the arbitration clause and class action waiver. In interpreting the scope
of section 172, the majority—against a strong dissenting opinion
defending traditional principles of arbitration law—relied on the
objective of the BPCPA, which is to confer consumer protection and
enhance consumers’ access to justice.49 This objective implicitly limits
the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle at least with regard to declaratory and
injunctive relief. Therefore, the Court held that the class action waiver
was dependent on the (annulled) arbitration clause; it could not be
separated from it and could not exist without a valid arbitration
clause.50 The decision, however, made no reference to compensation
or restitution where section 172 (3) is applicable only to a much more
limited extent.

46
47

Id. ¶ 44.
Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 2

(Can.).
Id. § 172. The BPCPA also seems to contain broad standing provisions
not dependent on the violated rights.
49
Seidel, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531.
50
Id. ¶ 46.
48
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III. TO “PROPOSE” OR “IMPOSE” A SOLUTION: THE QUESTION OF
E.U. LAW
EU Dir. 2013/11 provides for a two-tier mechanism for the
out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes, which are described in
Art. 2(1):
This Directive shall apply to procedures for the out-ofcourt resolution of domestic and cross-border disputes
concerning contractual obligations stemming from
sales contracts and service contracts between a trader
established in the Union and a consumer resident in
the Union through the intervention of an ADR-entity
which proposes or imposes a solution or brings the
parties together with the aim of facilitating an amicable
solution.51
“Propose” and “impose” are nearly identical terms, so they
likely went nearly unnoticed in the (scant) debate of the Commission
proposal of 20 November 2011 on the Directive,52 which was adopted
in the record time of little more than one and a half years. Both
elements of the proposal and the final Directive were based on the
internal market provision of Article 11453 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The question of the
correct legal basis will be further discussed in Section XII.
However, to “propose” a solution is quite different than to
“impose” a solution. “Proposing” a solution is in line with the earlier
initiatives by the Commission, which were based on
Recommendations 98/257/EC of 30 March 1998 and 2001/310/EC

Directive 2013/11, art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
Commission Proposal for a Directive on Alternative Dispute
Resolution for Consumer Disputes, COM (2011) 793 final (Nov. 20, 2011).
53
Art. 114 (1) TFEU gives the European Union jurisdiction “to adopt
measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment
or functioning of the internal market.” Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union art. 114 (1), May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47
[hereinafter TFEU].
51
52
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of 4 April 2001.54 These Recommendations were not applicable to
entities who tried to “impose” a solution on consumers, e.g., binding
consumer arbitration. In contrast, arbitration, including consumer
arbitration, was expressly excluded from the scope of E.U. instruments
concerning jurisdiction (Art. 1(2)(d) Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 and
now Art. 1(2)(d) of Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012.55 and applicable
law (Art. 1(2)(e) of the Rome I-Regulation (EU) No. 593/2008).56
These Regulations, however, were not based on the internal market
competence of the E.U., but on its provisions of judicial cooperation
in civil matters, which are limited to cross-border disputes under now
Art. 81(2) of the TFEU.57 The same is true of the Regulation (EC) No.
861/2007 of 11 July 2007 on a European Small Claims Procedure.58
Why this sudden extension of ADR procedures to consumer
arbitration? How does this extension relate to the seemingly
contradictory statement in Article 2(4) of Directive 2013/11, which
reads: “This Directive acknowledges the competence of Member
States to determine whether ADR entities established on their
territories are to have power to impose a solution.”?59 An additional
reservation is made in Recital (20) whereby an “out-of-court procedure
which is created on an ad hoc basis for a single dispute between a
consumer and a trader should not be considered as an ADR
procedure.”60 This excludes the commercial practice of setting up

54
Commission Recommendation 98/257, of 30 March 1998 on the
Principles Applicable to the Bodies Responsible for Out-of-Court Settlement of
Consumer Disputes 1998 O.J. (L 115) 31; Reich, supra note 1, ¶ 8.19, 8.22.
55
Commission Regulation 1215/2012, of the European Parliament and
the Council of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1;
Council Regulation 44/2001, of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001
O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC).
56
Regulation 593/2008, of the European Parliament and the Council of
17 June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (“Rome I”), 2008
O.J. (L 176) 6.
57
TFEU art. 81(2).
58
Council Regulation 861/2007, of 11 July 2007 on a European Small
Claims Procedure, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 1.
59
Directive 2013/11, art. 2(4).
60
Id. at Preamble Directive 20.
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special arbitration panels for more complex individual disputes as an
option for consumer arbitration falling under Directive 2013/11.
IV.
A FIRST ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THE CONUNDRUM ON
CONSUMER ARBITRATION CREATED BY DIRECTIVE 2013/11
Dir. 2013/11 shows a certain contradiction concerning
consumer arbitration: Member States are free to set it up, to continue
existing instruments, or to completely abstain from doing so. If,
however, Member States take an active view toward consumer
arbitration, they are bound by the requirements of Directive 2013/11
in general, and Articles 10 and 11 in particular, which will be discussed
in greater detail later in Sections VII and IX.
Article 10 and 11 only apply in cases where the plaintiff
consumer is bound by an arbitration agreement, not if the trader
himself initiates a claim in arbitration.61 According to Article 2(1) and
(2)(c) it is limited to actions in contract (with the exception of noneconomic services of general interest), and excludes actions in tort and
restitution with some doubts concerning borderline cases not to be
discussed here. Injunctions against illegal behavior of traders sought
by consumer associations are also excluded; they come under other
E.U. law instruments, in particular Directive 2009/22/EU on
injunctions.62
The principles contained in Directive 2013/11 are obviously
minimum requirements under Art. 2(3). Within these limits, Member
States are free to regulate consumer arbitration, e.g., regarding
competence, costs, choice of arbitrators, etc. This is part of Member
States’ so-called “procedural autonomy,” which has been recognized
by the CJEU as a general principle of E.U. law.63 On the other hand,
61
If the trader initiates a claim in arbitration, Directive 2013/11 is not
applicable. See Directive 2013/11, art. 2(2)(g).
62
Directive 2009/22, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
23 April 2009 on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers’ Interests (recast),
2009 O.J. (L 110) 30.
63
For an overview see REICH, supra note 5, ¶ 4.4; Norbert Reich, HansW. Micklitz, Peter Rott and Klaus Tonner, Negotiation and Adjudication – Class Actions
and Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts, in EUROPEAN CONSUMER LAW ¶ 8.3 (2d
ed. 2014).
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Member States must respect the principles of effectiveness and
equivalence, which are now part of Article 47 of the E.U. Charter of
Fundamental Rights—a subject matter to be discussed in Section XI.
V.

THE LIMITS OF CONSUMER ARBITRATION: CLARO AND
ASTURCOM

In Claro,64 the CJEU goes quite far in the degree to which the
national court of an E.U. Member State must engage in investigations
on its own motion in arbitration proceedings.65 When the consumer
has agreed to an arbitration clause—the unfairness of which must be
determined by national law, as could be seen from clause 1(q) of the
Annex of the Unfair Terms Directive 93/1366—the consumer still
cannot be drawn into arbitration against his will if this clause may be
regarded as unfair. Annex 1 reads:
Terms that may be regarded as unfair . . .
(q) excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take
legal action or exercise any other legal remedy,
particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes
exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal
provisions, unduly restricting the evidence available to
him or imposing on him a burden of proof which,
according to the applicable law, should lie with another
party to the contract.67
The unfairness may also be invoked against traditional principle of the
law of arbitration on the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the arbitrator and not
the national court having jurisdiction to determine the unfairness.

64

Case C-168/05, E.M.M. Claro v. Centro Movil Milenium, 2006 E.C.R.

I-10421.
65
Hans-W. Micklitz & Norbert Reich, The Court and the Sleeping Beauty –
The Revival of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD), 51 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 771
(2014).
66
Council Directive 93/13, of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29 (EC).
67
Id.
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In Asturcom, the CJEU quite adroitly used the principle of
“equivalence” to guarantee a sort of “last resort” protection to the
consumer: if national law allows the reopening of arbitration
proceedings on the basis of public policy, the judge must consider the
defenses available under E.U. consumer protection provisions which
take the place of public policy.68 Advocate General Trstenjak, who is
in line with the Hungarian and the Spanish Governments69 as well as
the European Commission,70 went even further in arguing that
effective consumer protection requires the removal of res judicata in
execution proceedings.71
The facts in Claro and Asturcom are somewhat different, as the
consumer was drawn into arbitration proceedings by the trader that
contained arbitration clauses. Directive 2013/11 expressly excludes
this situation where the trader, not the consumer, takes his case to an
entity that administers ADR. However, it seems that the principles
developed in Claro and Asturcom can be generalized, especially
concerning their challenges to the Kompetenz-Kompetenz doctrine.
Such a situation could arise under Directive 2013/11 where the
consumer takes his complaint to a court of law, and the trader invokes
the arbitration clause as a defense72 to compel arbitration, provided the
arbitration clause meets the requirements of Article 10 after the
implementation of the Directive. The situation in Asturcom where a
final arbitration award against a consumer can be challenged only
under the limited requirements of the public policy (ordre public)
68
Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecommunicaciones v. Rodrígues Noguera,
2009 E.C.R. I-9579. The extension of the public policy concept to “mere” mandatory
law has remained controversial in doctrine. See the skeptical remarks by Vanessa
Mak, Harmonisation through “Directive Related” Case Law: the Role of the ECJ in the
Development of European Consumer Law 136-37 (Tilburg Inst. of Comparative &
Transnational Law, Working Paper No. 2008/8, 2008); Mak, supra note 4, at 446. See
also BĚLOHLÁVEK, supra note 4, at 32 (insisting on the difference between “public
policy” and “public interest”: “consumer protection is associated with public interest;
it is not subject to public policy). This distinction between public interest and public
policy seems artificial and cannot be maintained under E.U. law autonomous
interpretation principles.
69
See Hungarian and Spanish Gov’t. Br. in Asturcom (on file with author).
70
See European Com. Br. in Asturcom (on file with author).
71
Advocate Gen. Trstenjak in Asturcom, supra note 4, at 58 et seq.
72
“Schiedseinrede” in German. See Section XII, infra.
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provision must be reshaped under the effectiveness test and not merely
under the equivalence principle. This discussion illustrates that
Directive 2013/11 does not address the real problems of consumer
arbitration, and that the gaps left by E.U.-legislation must therefore be
amended by recourse to general principles of E.U. law, namely the
principle of effective legal protection.73
VI.

WHAT ABOUT CONSUMER PROTECTION UNDER THE
BRUSSELS MECHANISM OF JURISDICTION?

A consumer who wishes to have his claim against a trader
located in another E.U. country arbitrated cannot rely on the
jurisdiction of his home country, as would be the case under the
Brussels regime. Directive 2013/11 does not contain rules on
jurisdiction in cross-border conflicts, nor does it refer to the Brussels
regime in a similar way as Art. 11 to the consumer protective
provisions of Art. 6 of the Rome I-Regulation 593/2008 (see Section
IX, infra).
Art. 7(1)(a) only requires ADR-entities to “make publicly
available on their websites . . . clear and easily understandable
information on . . . their contact details, including postal address and
e-mail address.”74 This provision—including the submission of claims
online75—may be acceptable for optional complaint handling, but not
for arbitration which may “impose solutions” to consumers. The
impact of the risk to the consumer to lose his case is much more farreaching because of the binding nature of the (non-)award by the
arbitrator.
Article 15(1) lit c) of Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 (Article
17(1) lit c) Regulation 1215/2012) provides that the consumer may sue
the trader either at the trader’s place of domicile or at the business seat
if “the contract has been concluded with a person who pursues
commercial or professional activities in the Member State of the
consumer’s domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to that
For further discussion of the principle of effective legal protection, see
Section XI, infra.
74
Council Directive 2013/11, art. 7(1)(a).
75
Council Directive 2013/11, art. 5(2)(a).
73
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Member State or several States including that Member State.”76 There
has been intense debate concerning this provision due to the issues
raised by e-commerce, since the provision may be interpreted in such
a way that the mere accessibility of the website of a company situated
in one Member State by a consumer domiciled in another Member
State may give such consumer the right to sue the company in the
consumer’s domicile—a result which makes marketing by e-commerce
subject to different and divergent jurisdictions. Therefore, the CJEU
in Pammer distinguished between the mere accessibility of a website,
which does not qualify as “directing activities,” and a non-exclusive list
of criteria for determining “directing activities” where such a
qualification is possible and must be established by competent national
courts.77 The trader may avoid being subject to multiple jurisdictions
by making clear his intention to market his product or service only in
certain countries to the exclusion of others, or by not making available
his website in those excluded countries.
Jurisdiction clauses are regulated by Article 17 of Regulation
44/2001 resp. Article 19 of Regulation 1215/2012.78 The rationale
behind this provision is that such clauses in consumer contracts cannot
be enforced before the litigation has commenced. A consumer does
not lose privileged access to courts under Articles 15 and 16 by the
jurisdiction clause.79 This is in contrast to the general rule in Article 23
(Article 25 of Regulation 1215/2012), which allows jurisdiction clauses
to be enforced if entered into in writing or by electronic means.80
However, Article 23 is not applicable to consumer arbitration.

Council Regulation 44/2001, of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
art. 15(1)(c), 2000 O.J. (L 012) 1 (EC).
77
Joined Cases C-585/08 and C-144/09, Peter Pammer et al. v. Reederei
Karl Schlüter et al., 2010 E.C.R. I-12527; Eva-Maria Kieninger, Grenzenloser
Verbraucherschutz?, in LIBER AMICORUM U. MAGNUS 449, 455 (2014) (interpreting
“direct activities” as “activity directed at a certain objective” (“Zielgerichtete Tätigkeit”)).
78
Council Regulation 44/2001, of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
art. 17, 2001 O.J. (L 012) 1 (EC).
79
Id. art. 15-16.
80
Id. art. 23; see also Case C-322/14, Jaouad El Majdoub v
CarsOntheWeb.Deutschland GmbH, [2015] W.L.R.(D) 222.
76
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The gap left by the—insufficient—provisions on consumer
arbitration in Directive 2013/11 must be filled by reference to the
general fairness standards as developed under Directive 93/13, which
will be discussed in Section IX. In my opinion, no difference should
be made whether the action is brought by the consumer or the trader,
or whether the two are joined in a single case.
VII.

THE “SPECIFIC ACCEPTANCE” OF THE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT BY THE CONSUMER

The most important provision for consumer protection in
Directive 2013/11 follows the classical paradigm of the “informed EU
consumer.”81 Article 10 explicitly requires specific acceptance by the
consumer for arbitration clauses in consumer to business (C2B)
disputes, which may be extended by Member States both horizontally
to a business to consumer (B2C) conflict and vertically by imposing
additional requirements on this specific acceptance. Article 10 reads:
(1) Member States shall ensure that an agreement
between a consumer and a trader to submit complaints
to an ADR entity is not binding on the consumer if it
was concluded before the dispute has materialised and
if it has the effect of depriving the consumer of his
right to bring an action before the courts for the
settlement of the dispute.
Member States shall ensure that in ADR procedures
which aim at resolving a dispute by imposing a solution
the solution imposed may be binding on the parties
only if they were informed of its binding nature in
advance and specifically accepted this. Specific
acceptance by the trader is not required if national rules
provide that solution are binding on traders.82

See STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EU CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY 92 (2d
ed. 2013); HANS W. MICKLITZ ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EU CONSUMER LAW ¶ 1.35
(2d ed. 2013).
82
Directive 2013/11, art. 10.
81
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It seems as though the intention of the E.U.-legislator was to
exclude pre-dispute arbitration clauses, which are common in the
U.S.83 The wording of Art. 10(1) refers to a “dispute” having
“materialised.”84 Before that event, the clause would not be binding on
the consumer. Can the same strict interpretation of this concept of
non-binding be applied similar to Article 6 of the Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts Directive (UTCC) 93/13 where, according to
case law of the CJEU, the court must ex officio disapply the unfair
contract term?85 This will have to be decided by the CJEU, but such
analogy seems reasonable given the similarity of the formulation in
Article 6 of the UTCC and Directive 2013/11.
Under a strict literal construction of Article 10, there is no
“dispute” to be resolved before the conclusion of a contract. This is
only the case once consumer complaints arise during contract
execution. Consumer arbitration clauses therefore only operate once a
specific dispute has arisen between the trader and the consumer. Both
parties may have good reasons to take their conflict to arbitration, e.g.,
because of the speed or lower costs of getting a (binding) decision, but
the consumer should not be forced to do so before a “dispute has
materialised.”86
What does “specific acceptance” mean? Recital 4387 does not
provide an answer. A similar provision, however, is contained in
Article 8(2) of the Draft Regulation of a Common European Sales Law
(CESL), which requires an “explicit statement which is separate from
the statement indicating the agreement to conclude a contract.”88 This
statement may be concluded in electronic form, but the trader must
notify the consumer of its binding nature on a durable medium, e.g., a

According to BĚLOHLÁVEK, supra note 4, at 385, this was not the case
with EU law before Dir. 2013/11.
84
Directive 2013/11, art. 10(1).
85
See Micklitz & Reich, supra note 66 at 780.
86
Directive 2013/11, art. 10(1).
87
Recital 43 of the Preamble to Directive 2013/11.
88
Comission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
mof the Council on a Common European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final, art. 8(2),
(Oct. 22, 2011); Hans-W. Micklitz & Norbert Reich, The Commission Proposal for a
Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (CESL) – Too Broad or not Broad Enough? 29
(LAW, EUI Working Papers No. 4, 2012).
83
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mere hyperlink would not be enough.89 On the other hand, the
statement must be clearly separated from the contract terms, even if it
is contained in a “term not . . . individually negotiated” according to
Article 3(2) of Directive 93/13.90 A mere button solution, or so called
“click-wrap clauses,”91 which are popular in U.S. licensing agreements,
are not acceptable in E.U. law, which in Article 10(2) of Directive
2013/11 has set a minimum standard not to be undermined by
Member States’ law.
“Specific acceptance” has imposed an E.U. standard, subject
to CJEU’s interpretation. However, under Guy Denuit, an arbitration
panel or ADR-entity authorized to “impose” solutions cannot make
reference to the CJEU under Article 267 of the TFEU.92 This
paradoxical result warrants a critical assessment of the traditional rule
of (commercial) arbitration that the arbitrator, not the court, has
Kompetenz-Kompetenz concerning the validity of the arbitration
agreement, at least in consumer matters, to be scrutinized under
fundamental rights aspects later discussed in Section XII.
Since the requirements for “specific acceptance” in Article 3(2)
of Directive 2013/11 are minimal, Member States can increase these
requirements, e.g., by requiring written form or signature requirements,
or can limit the scope of arbitration clauses, e.g., by prohibiting them
for certain risky financial transactions93 or imposing a financial cap on

89
Case C-49/11, Content Services Ltd. v. Bundesarbeitskammer, 2011
EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 660 (Feb. 3, 2011).
90
Council Directive 93/13, of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts, art. 3(2) 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29 (EC).
91
Click-wrap clauses are defined as “another form of creating an
electronic agreement, except that the license is included on the computer screen
before installation rather than on the box. By clicking on a button that says “I agree”
or “I accept,” the licensee agrees to the terms of use of the contract. An important
difference between click-wrap agreements and shrink-wrap agreements is the fact
that the user actually has an opportunity to read the contract before using or installing
the program.” See Reich, A ‘Trojan Horse’ in the access to Justice? – Party Autonomy and
cOnusmer Arbitration in Conflict in the ADR-Directive 2013/11/EU? supra note 1, and
now Case C-322/14 Jaoud El Majdoub v CarsOntheWeb.Deutschland GmbH,
[2015] W.L.R.(D) 222..
92
Case C-125/04, Guy Denuit et al v. Transorient voyages et Culture SA
2005 E.C.R. I-925.
93
This was done in Germany. See the discussion infra Section XII.
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their use.94 Member States can also introduce rules on territorial or
local jurisdiction, which are not precluded by the Brussels regime not
applicable to arbitration.
VIII.

E.U. STANDARDS BEYOND “SPECIFIC ACCEPTANCE”

The above-mentioned Claro and Asturcom cases did not
concern the validity of the arbitration agreement, but left this issue to
applicable Member States. This will change once Directive 2013/11 is
implemented by Member States into their national law, which should
occur by July 9, 2015. Can E.U. unfair terms legislation be applied
beyond the mere information model95 of Directive 2013/11? Would a
national court be required to control ex officio under the unfairness test
arbitration clauses, which impose substantial inconveniences on the
consumer since arbitration is likely to result in excessive costs or will
force the consumer to take the case to an ADR-entity far away from
his residence (similar to the Bragg case)? It is well-known that E.U. law
is strict in banning jurisdiction clauses which force the consumer to
take his case to a court away from his habitual residence resulting in a
de facto denial of access to justice.96 On the other hand, the trader may
have an efficiency interest to concentrate arbitration proceedings at his
place of business.
Article 3(1)97 is not clear on how a possible relationship
between Directive 2013/11 and Directive 93/13 can be reconciled.
The provision is only concerned with “conflicts,” not with additional
requirements imposed by national law under the minimum protection
clause,98 even if based on CJEU practice obliging Member States’
courts to control ex officio the fairness of pre-formulated contract terms.
If the “specific acceptance” is contained in such a pre-formulated (yet
separate) term, it is therefore subject to the ex officio control doctrine of
the CJEU. Much will depend on the circumstances of the arbitration
This was done by the U.K. See the discussion infra Section XV.
See Reich et al, supra note 65, ¶ 1.11.
96 See Case C-137/08, VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. V. Ferenc Schneider 2010
E.C.R. I-847; Wulf-Henning Roth, Case 137/08 VB Pénzügyi Lizing Zrt v Ferenc
Schneider,7 Eur. Rev. Contract L. 425 (2011); Micklitz & Reich, supra note 66, at 789.
97
See Directive 2013/11.
98 Council Directive 93/13, of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts, art. 8 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29 (EC).
94
95
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agreement. The main issue will always be whether the agreement makes
the enforcement of consumer rights easier and less burdensome, which
is the very objective of Directive 2013/11 under Article 1. In other
words, the issue is whether such agreement puts additional constraints
on the consumer’s enforcement of his rights under E.U. and national
law that contradict the fairness criteria of Article 3 of Directive 93/13.
It cannot be presumed that Article 3(1) Directive 2013/11 intended to
preclude the unfairness test as a general standard of E.U. civil law.
An open question remains as to how cross-border arbitration
clauses can be controlled under the unfairness concept. As a general
rule, arbitration is exempted from the applicability of Regulation
44/2001, Article 1(2) lit d). On the other hand, the effect of jurisdiction
clauses in consumer contracts has been severely limited by the
Regulation. Should these principles be applied per analogiam under the
unfairness standard to arbitration clauses, which may have a similar
effect on the consumer’s right to have his case heard in his home
jurisdiction if the conditions of Article 17 of Regulation 44/2001(in
the future: Article 19 Regulation 1215/2012) are met? There is indeed
no reason to argue against such analogy because, for the consumer, it
does not make any difference whether the denial of his home
jurisdiction before litigation is effected through a jurisdiction or
arbitration clause.99 The exemption of arbitration from the scope of
application of the Brussels instruments is intended to privilege
commercial arbitration, but not to deprive the consumer of his right
to a defense and a fair hearing. This reasoning limits the use of
arbitration clauses in cross-border contracting.
IX.

APPLICABLE LAW: (LIMITED) FREE CHOICE BY ARBITRATORS
OR RESERVATION OF MANDATORY PROVISIONS?

Under traditional arbitration law, in particular in commercial
matters, the parties are free to determine the applicable law, including
commercial usages or principles of equity. Article 7(1)(i) of the
Directive 2013/11 put this problem under the heading of
“transparency” for all ADR entities, including consumer arbitration:

99

Reich, More clarity after “Claro”?, supra note 1, at 45.
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Member States shall ensure that ADR entities make
publicly available on their websites, on a durable
medium . . ., and by any other means they consider
appropriate, clear and easily understandable
information on . . . the types of rules the ADR entity
may use as a basis for the dispute resolution (for
example legal provisions, considerations of equity,
codes of conduct).100
In addition, Article 6(1)(a) provides that the arbitrator need not
be a lawyer or a person trained in law, but should at least have a
“general understanding of law.”101 These are minimum standards,
which can be enhanced by Member State laws on consumer
arbitration, e.g., by restricting the reference to equity or codes of
conduct or by demanding that arbitrators have legal training. The
application of mandatory provisions of consumer law is regulated by
provisions on “legality” in Article 11. Article 11 concerns two
situations: (a) purely internal situations where mandatory consumer
law provisions must be applied, even if parties expressly opted out in
the contract; and (b) cross-border disputes where the rules on
applicable law in Regulation 593/2008102 are normally excluded for
arbitration agreements. Article 11 (1)(a)-(b) provides:
Member States shall ensure that in ADR procedures
which aim at resolving the dispute by imposing a
solution on the consumer: (a) in a situation where there
is no conflict of laws, the solution imposed shall not
result in the consumer being deprived of the protection
afforded to him by the provisions that cannot be
derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law of
the Member State where the consumer and the trader
are habitually resident, (b) in a situation involving
conflict of laws, where the law applicable to the sales
or service contract is determined in accordance with
Article 6(1) and (2) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008,
the solution imposed by the ADR entity shall not result
Directive 2013/11, art. 7(1)(i).
Id. art. 6(1)(a).
102
Commission Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (providing
regulations on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I)).
100
101
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in the consumer being deprived of the protection
afforded to him by the provisions that cannot be
derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law of
the Member State in which he is habitually resident.103
This provision will be welcomed by E.U. lawyers if compared
with the traditional arbitration principles contained in U.S. law where
the arbitrator can be exempted from applying mandatory provisions,
and where legality control is only possible in final recognition
proceedings under a narrow ordre public and related concepts.104
Although the CJEU has tried to extend this concept to mandatory E.U.
law both in commercial105 and consumer106 disputes, case law has
remained unsettled and may not cover the entire scope of mandatory
E.U. consumer law. It also comes late after the entire arbitration
proceedings have been terminated, and it requires additional activity
(and costs!) by the consumer.
In my opinion, the legality requirement of consumer
arbitration can only be fulfilled if Member States grant a remedy to the
consumer to challenge an incorrect application of mandatory
provisions by the arbitrator. The following situations may arise:
 The consumer (or a group of consumers) brings a claim
against the trader before a court of law, but the trader
falsely invokes the arbitration agreement (the so-called
Schiedseinrede).
 The claim of the consumer is rejected (or reduced) by the
arbitrator based on a false application of mandatory
consumer law against Article 11 of Directive 2013/11; the
consumer wants to challenge this rejection before a court
of law, which may be impossible under existing arbitration
legislation.

Citation to the quoted provision.
See discussion of U.S. law supra Section I.
105
See Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l N.V.,
1999 E.C.R. I-3055.
106
See Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomm. v. Rodrígues Noguera, 2009
E.C.R. I-9579.
103
104
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In practice, the most frequent situation is concerned with the
trader—particularly in a long-term contract—using the arbitration
mechanism to adjudicate his claims, as in Claro and Asturcom. These
situations, however, are not covered by Directive 2013/11.
A fundamental rights analysis will help to resolve these
situations to avoid the fact that arbitration clauses are sometimes
abused, as in the U.S., by traders to restrict consumers’ access to class
claims for their individual claims. Section XI will provide a further
discussion of the fundamental rights analysis.
X.

“SOFT” LEGAL PROTECTION

Article 8 of Directive 2013/11 also contains some protective
provisions. However, Article 8 does not have the force of law, and
instead provides standards for good ADR practice subject to the
monitoring and reporting requirements in Article 20:
the ADR procedure is free of charge or available at a
nominal fee for consumers, lit (c); and
the outcome of the ADR procedure is made available
within a period of ninety calendar days from the date
of which the ADR entity received the complete
complaint file. In the case of highly complex disputes,
the ADR entity in charge may, at its own discretion,
extend the ninety calendar day time period. The parties
shall be informed of any extension of that period and
of the expected length of time that will be needed for
the conclusion of the dispute.107
These standards are standards flexible formulations applicable
to consumer arbitration. Member States have discretion as to whether
and how they implement them. Article 20 contains basic rules for
sound ADR systems as an alternative to going to court and provide for
inexpensive and quick adjudication. If practice in one Member State
shows that this objective cannot be obtained by the existing consumer
arbitration mechanism, it would be unfair to force the consumer to
107

Directive 2013/11, art. 20.
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refer his claims to such arbitration even if the standards of “specific
acceptance” under Article 10(2) of Directive 2013/11 are met. Of
course, the requirements in Article 20 can be used as recommendations
on how to interpret Member State law implementing E.U. law under
the Grimaldi doctrine.108
XI.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION: DIRECTIVE 2013/11
ARTICLE 47 CHARTER

The constitutional dimension of ADR proceedings has been
expressly included in Recital 61 of Directive 2013/11, which reads:
“[t]his Directive respects fundamental rights and observes the
principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union and specifically Articles 7, 8, 38 and 47
thereof.”
Recital 45 refers to Article 47 concerning access to courts of
law—a principle reiterated in Article 12(1) of Directive 2013/11.109
This conforms to Alassini, which concerns a requirement in Italian law
for consumer complaints against telecommunication operators to first
make use of ADR/ODR proceedings, as foreseen in Directive
2002/22,110 before going to court.111 The Court discussed this
requirement, considering both the equivalence and the effectiveness
principle, but did not find a violation of either principle. At the same
time, the CJEU insisted on the consumer’s right to take his case to
court:
Nor do the principles of equivalence and effectiveness or the
principle of effective judicial protection preclude national legislation
which imposes, in respect of such disputes, prior implementation of
an out-of-court settlement procedure, provided that that procedure
does not result in a decision which is binding on the parties, that it
does not cause a substantial delay for the purposes of bringing legal
108 Case C-322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladies Professionnelles, 1989
E.C.R. I-4497. This case involves the indirect relevance of Commission
recommendations in interpreting E.U. or national law.
109
Id. at recital 45, art. 12(1).
110 Directive 2002/22, Universal Service Directive, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 51
(EC).
111
Case C-317/08, Alassini v. Telecom Italia, 2009 E.C.R. I-2214.
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proceedings, that it suspends the period for the time-barring of claims
and that it does not give rise to costs – or gives rise to very low costs
– for the parties, and only if electronic means is not the only means by
which the settlement procedure may be accessed and interim measures
are possible in exceptional cases where the urgency of the situation so
requires.112
Alassini concerned ADR proceedings, which could only
“propose,” not “impose,” solutions on the consumer. The wording of
the decision, however, certainly shows hostility against ADR
proceedings resulting in unreviewable and binding decisions. This
wording—even though not discussed in detail in the judgment itself—
is inconsistent with the traditional principles of arbitration under the
New York Convention, namely that the arbitrator has the KompetenzKompetenz to decide whether he has adjudicatory authority over the
case, and that an award can usually only be refused recognition on the
very narrow ground of “public policy (ordre public),” excluding the nonobservance of mandatory rules of procedure or substantive consumer
protection.
Can these traditional principles of arbitration law be upheld
under the rules of consumer arbitration as provided by Directive
2013/11, particularly Articles 10 and 11? I do not think so. This
directive is also concerned with a specific aspect of the
constitutionalization of civil law, namely, the principle of effectiveness
of Article 47 of the E.U. Charter, which provides: “[e]veryone whose
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated
has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance
with the conditions laid down in this Article.”113
Article 19(1) of the TEU puts the responsibility for “providing
remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields
covered by Union law” on Member States through the status of their
courts of law as “Union courts.”114 The agreement to arbitrate, as a
private matter decided by parties, cannot waive the constitutional
Id. ¶ 67.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 47, Dec.
18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1.
114
Treaty on the European Union, Dec. 7, 2007, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1
[hereinafter TEU].
112
113
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requirements of effective legal protection by access to national courts
of law. The remedies, which are provided indirectly by arbitration
concerning the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the arbitrator, do not suffice to
fulfill these constitutional requirements of E.U. law. The consumer
must always have the possibility to challenge a decision of the
arbitrator even if he has in principle agreed to the arbitration
proceedings by respecting Article 10(2) of Directive 2013/11 or an
equivalent national provision. Agreement by “specific acceptance”
does not mean a total preclusion of the right to effective legal
protection, which the national judge must guarantee under the ex-officio
doctrine. Under the “remedial function” of Article 47 of the E.U.
Charter and Article 19(1)(2) of the TEU,115 Member States must
establish remedies protecting the legitimate interests of the consumer
that ensure that the mandatory requirements of consumer arbitration
are met.116 The freedom of Member States to regulate consumer
arbitration under Article 2(4) of Directive 2013/11 should be limited
by the fundamental rights protected by E.U. law. Therefore, it is
reasonable to conclude that:
 The validity of an arbitration agreement both from a formal
and a substantive view is ultimately a matter to be decided
by courts, not the arbitrator.
 In consumer arbitration, the Kompetenz-Kompetenz belongs to
the competent court, not the arbitrator.
 Decisions of the arbitrator to reject or limit a claim of the
consumer under Directive 2013/11 can be challenged
before courts of law, in particular in case of breach or nonobservance of mandatory provisions.
 The national judge hearing a case involving consumer
arbitration must ex officio apply the mandatory provisions of
E.U. and national law, even if not raised by the consumer.

See REICH, supra note 5, at 4-10.
Id. (this seems to be recognized by the Court in Claro and Asturcom,
even though not based on Article 47 of the E.U. Charter or Article 19 of the TEU,
which were not in force at the time of decisions, but rather the traditional principles
of effectiveness and equivalence).
115
116
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 The scope of Article 47 of the E.U. Charter and Article
19(1)(2) of the TEU is not limited to arbitration under
Directive 2013/11, but can be extended to any consumer
arbitration, in particular in cases brought by the trader
against the consumer before an arbitrator (B2C—the
Claro/Asturcom situations).
XII.

IMPACT OF DIRECTIVE 2013/11 ON MEMBER STATE LAW ON
CONSUMER ARBITRATION IN GERMANY

The German law on arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts117 begins with a “form model” of consumer protection.118
Sections 1029 and 1031 of the Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO, Code on Civil
Procedure), as amended in 1997, allow arbitration clauses if they have
been documented sufficiently well. Arbitration agreements which
involve consumers “must be contained in a document signed by the
parties themselves.”119 The signature of an agent is not enough.120 The
written form can be substituted by the electronic form according to
Section 126a of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB, Civil Code), as
amended.121 The written or electronic document may not contain any
other contractual clauses. Germany has not made any reservation
under the New York Convention of 1958 to exclude consumer
contracts. Therefore, the legal regime for arbitration in Germany is the

117
See generally CHRISTOPHER HODGES, IRIS BENÖHR & NAOMI
CREUTZFELDT-BANDA, CONSUMER ADR IN EUROPE: CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 73
(2012) (explaining the German “arbitration” system, but is more concerned with
conciliation and mediation (Schlichtung in German), not with binding arbitration as
understood here); Norbert Reich, Consumer ADR in Europe: Civil Justice Systems, 50
Common Mkt. L. Rev. 913 (2013) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER HODGES, IRIS BENÖHR,
& NAOMI CREUTZFELDT-BANDA, CONSUMER ADR IN EUROPE: CIVIL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS (2012)).
118
WEIHE, supra note 8, at 155-58.
119
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Jan.
30, 1877, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 83, as amended, § 1031(5) (Ger.)
[hereinafter ZPO].
120
Id.
121
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896,
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 195, as amended, § 126a (Ger.).

321

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:1

same whether or not a consumer is part of an arbitration agreement
meeting the form requirements.122
The provision in Section 1031(5) of the ZPO is similar to
Article 10(2) of Directive 2013/11,123 although the latter does not
require signature or an electronic equivalent. However, Article 2(3) of
Directive 2013/11 allows Member States to impose more stringent
provisions on consumer arbitration,124 including a requirement that the
document should only contain clauses concerning the arbitration
agreement as such. German law does not use the term “specific
acceptance,” but it seems that this is exactly what is meant by the
German legislature in an E.U.-conforming interpretation. It is obvious
that the arbitration agreement must be separated from other contract
clauses; however, there is no prior notification requirement which
must be included in the arbitration document.
Concerning the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the arbitrator, German
law contains a compromise solution somewhat different from
Directive 2013/11. Under Section 1032(1) of the ZPO, the arbitration
agreement precludes any action before a court of law (Schiedseinrede in
German), unless it is “void, ineffective or inoperative” (nichtig,
unwirksam oder undurchführbar).125 However, this “Schiedseinrede” must
be expressly raised by the defendant before oral proceedings in court.
This provision is not in line with the case law of the CJEU, which
requires an ex officio intervention of the court who does not have to
wait for an action of the consumer.126
On the other hand, Section 37h of the WpHG
(Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, law on securities transactions), as amended,
restricts arbitration clauses concluded before litigation to persons
acting in commerce (“Kaufleute”) and legal persons of public law, thus
excluding consumer transactions in investment services from

122
Jürgen Samtleben, Zur Wirksamkeit von Schiedsklauseln bei
grenzüberschreitenden Börsentermingeschäften, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES
PRIVATRECHT [ZEUP] 974, 975 (1999) (Ger.).
123
ZPO, § 1031(5).
124
Directive 2013/11, art. 2(3).
125
ZPO, ¶ 1032(1).
126
REICH, supra note 5, ¶¶ 4, 16.
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arbitration clauses.127 Its legislative rationale is controversial128 and
beyond the scope of this paper. According to an earlier opinion of
Samtleben,129 the WpHG’s international sphere of application is
determined by the normal place of residence of the private investor. If
the place of residence is Germany, the arbitration clause is not
effective, and the consumer will be able to take his claim to the courts
of his country of residence according to Articles 15 and 16 of
Regulation 44/2001 (Article 17 and 18 of Regulation 1215/2012). The
arbitration clause prohibition contained in Section 37h of the WpHG
is consistent with the general power of Member States to regulate
consumer arbitration in Article 2(4) of Directive 2013/11, including
prohibiting it with regard to certain transactions (investment services).
This prohibition is also enforceable against a foreign arbitration
agreement, which need not be respected by the German judex a quo
under the provision concerning the application of “overriding
mandatory provisions” under Article 9 of Rome I-Reg.130
This rather liberal and generous approach to arbitration clauses
in consumer contracts (with the exception of investment services)
taken by the ZPO was confirmed by the German Bundesgerichtshof
(BGH) with regard to the admissibility arbitration clauses under the
special legislation on unfair contract terms, now included in the
Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [WpHG] [Law on Securities Transactions],
Sep. 9, 1998, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 1842, as amended, § 37h (Ger.).
128
For different views on German legal literature, see Rolf Sethe, § 37h
WpHG (Schiedsabreden), in WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ (WPHG) ¶ 7, (Heinz-Dieter
Assmann & Uwe H.Schneider eds., 6th ed. 2012) (examining “excessive investor
protection”); Rainer Hausmann, Schiedsvereinbaraungen, in INTERNATIONALES
VERTRAGSRECHT ¶ 3469 (Christoph Reithmann & Dieter Martiny eds., 7th Ed.
2014); Jürgen Samtleben, Das Börsentermingeschäft ist tot – es lebe das Finanztermingeschäft?,
15 Zeitschrift für Bank- und Börsenrecht 69, 76 (2003) (taking a more neutral
approach). Compare WEIHE, supra note 8, at 141 (arguing that § 37h WpHG expresses
a general principle of consumer protection), with Klaus Peter Berger,
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und Finanztermingeschäfte – Der “Schutz” der Anleger vor der
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit durch § 37h WpHG, 15 Zeitschrift für Bank- und Börsenrecht 77,
85 (2003) (taking a more liberal approach). The author agrees with Weihe because of
the particular risks of transactions for the consumer covered by this provision, which
may not be adequately addressed by the arbitrator.
129
WEIHE, supra note 8, at 77.
130
See generally Case C-184/12, United Antwerp Martime Agencies
(Unamar) NV v. Navigation Maritime Bulgare, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX Lexis 4306
(Oct. 17, 2013) (interpreting Rome I-Reg).
127
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BGB.131 According to the BGH, an arbitration clause cannot impose
an unfair disadvantage on the consumer.132 The consumer is protected
by the form requirement of Section 1031(5) of the ZPO, which should
warn him against the risk of an arbitration clause.133 It is, in the opinion
of the BGH, not necessary that the user of the arbitration clause shows
a special interest in it. Unlike jurisdiction clauses, arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts may be concluded before the dispute arises. The
BGH also refers to Point 1(q) of the indicative list of the Annex of
Directive 93/13,134 where arbitration clauses are only condemned if
they concern disputes taken to arbitration “not covered by legal
provisions;” the rules of the ZPO, in the opinion of the BGH, must
be regarded as such provisions.135 The BGH also insists that the
arbitration clause regulates access to arbitration in a fair and impartial
manner.136
Even if in the case before the BGH the arbitration clause may
not have been unfair (the litigation concerned disputes involving losses
out of a speculative investment scheme of about 125.000 euro), the
judgment should not be generalized as allowing arbitration clauses in
any type of consumer dispute if the mere form requirements of Section
1031(5) of the ZPO are met. This is particularly true if the costs of
arbitration are substantial in relation to the sum in litigation and
amount to a de facto denial of justice. The same is true with regard to
the choice of the arbitrator, which gives an unfair advantage to one
party against the consumer.137 These questions will now have to be
measured against the requirements set up in Articles 10 and 11 of
Directive 2013/11 in the interpretation advanced in this paper (supra
VII/VIII). The BGH may have to reconsider its liberal opinion
towards arbitration clauses in future cases.

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Jan. 10, 2005,
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSHRIFT [NJW] 1125, 2005 (Ger.); WEIHE, supra note 8,
at 278.
132
See id.
133
WEIHE, supra note 8, at 187 (regarding existing German practices).
134
Id. at 1127.
135
Id. at 1127.
136
Id.
137
Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (OLGDü) [Higher Regional Court of
Düsseldorf] June 1, 1995, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSHRIFT [NJW] 400, 1996
(Ger.).
131
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THE SPANISH APPROACH

As Claro shows, arbitration clauses in consumer contracts may
be declared void by Member States according to the so-called
indicative list,138 even though there is no formal obligation to do so.139
This has been done in Spain. However, arbitration clauses in preformulated consumer contracts are always possible where the dispute
is referred to “arbitration bodies established by statutory provision in
respect of a specific sector or circumstances.”140 Spanish Law has
established a “Sistema Arbitral de Consumo” in Article 31 of the
Consumer Protection Law of 1984, implemented by the Real Decreto
636/1993, modified by Decreto 60/2003.141 It provides for arbitration
panels (colegio arbitral) to be established by national and regional
“Juntas Arbitrales de Consumo.”142 These panels are composed of a
President (representing the competent administration), a consumer
representative, and a business association representative. Hence,
Spanish law prioritizes certain recognized consumer arbitration
bodies143 to which the arbitrator “agreed to” by Ms. Claro in her
dispute with a mobile telephone company did not belong.
The Spanish system was modified by Real Decreto 231/2008,
which defines the functions, composition, competences, and
procedures of consumer arbitration boards.144 The use of the
arbitration system is voluntary for the parties. First, an arbitration
138
Council Directive 93/13, of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts, Annex 1 lit. q, 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29 (EC).
139
See Case C-478/99, Comm’n v. Sweden 2002 E.C.R. I-4147 ¶ 20.
140
See Case C-184/12, United Antwerp Martime Agencies (Unamar) NV
v. Navigation Maritime Bulgare, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 4306 (Oct. 17,
2013).
141
See MANUEL-ANGEL LOPEZ SANCHEZ ET AL., SERVICIOS
FINANCIEROS, PROTECCION DEL CONSUMIDOR Y SISTEMAS EXTRAJUDICIALES DE
RESOLUCION DE CONFLICTOS IN ESPAÑA 119-170 (1995); see also WEIHE, supra note
8, at 119; Cavier Favre-Bulle, Arbitrage et règlement alternatif des litiges (ADR): une autre
justice pour les consommateurs?, in DROIT DE LA CONSOMMATION, LIBER AMICORUM
BERND STAUDER 95, 113 (2006).
142
LOPEZ-SANCHEZ, supra note 142, at 142-48.
143
See Ewoud Hondius, Towards a European Small Claims Procedure?, in
LIBER AMICORUM BERND STAUDER, 135 fn 36 (Luc Thévenoz & Norbert Reich,
eds. 2006).
144
HODGES ET AL., supra note 118, at 213.
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request form must be filled out by a consumer, his lawyer, or a
consumer association. This form requirement conforms to Article
10(2) of Directive 2013/11. Usually the arbitration board correlates to
the consumer’s residence. The use of arbitration is free of charge for
both consumers and businesses, with the exception of discovery, and
procedures usually do not take longer than six months. As with a court
judgment, the parties can appeal an arbitration decision within two
months. In addition, appeals can be brought based on decisions by the
Junta Arbitral del Consumo to accept or reject requests for arbitration
of consumer disputes. As an overall principle, Spanish law does not
recognize the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the arbitrator, and therefore is
consistent with the approach advanced in this paper based on Article
47 of the E.U. Charter and Article 19 of the TEU.
The Spanish consumer arbitration system has created a second
tier of legal protection for consumers and is similar to a court system,
including the necessary guarantees of legality and effective legal
protection. It could serve as a model for other E.U. countries wanting
to implement the consumer arbitration provisions of Directive
2013/11 in a way suggested in this paper.
XIV.

A REGULATED APPROACH: FRANCE

According to French law, an arbitration clause (clause
compromissoire) in a consumer contract is invalid and cannot be enforced
against the consumer. This is derived from Article 2061 of the French
Civil Code, modified by Law of 15.5.2001, whereby “la clause
compromissoire est valable dans les contrats conclus à raison d’une
activité professionelle.”145 However, in cross-border transactions
Article 2061 is not applicable, so the French Cour de Cassation146 has
taken a more liberal approach. French scholars criticize this approach
as “paradoxale” because the consumer enjoys less protection in crossborder relations even though such relations are more dangerous.
French scholars also refer to legislation on unfair contract terms,
HENRI TEMPLE & JEAN CALAIS-AULOY, DROIT DE LA
¶ 497 (9th ed., 2015) (“the arbitration clause is valid in a contract
concluded because of a professional activity”).
146
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ.,
Jan. 5, 1999, Bull. Civ. I, no. 31 (Fr.).
145

CONSOMMATION
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namely to the above mentioned Point 1(q) of the indicative list of the
Annex of Directive 93/13; this is interpreted as a blacklist, even though
the French legislature formally did not go so far.147 This argument,
however, was not considered by the ECJ in Claro.148
It unclear whether and how French law will be modified in
implementing Directive 2013/11. However, the prohibition of the
arbitration clause in B2C contracts can be maintained according to
Article 2(4) of Directive. 2013/11 since “[t]his Directive acknowledges
the competence of Member States to determine whether ADR entities
established on their territories are to have the power to impose a
solution.”
XV.

A COMPROMISE: U.K. LAW

U.K. law takes a nuanced approach to arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts. The Arbitration Acts of 1996 permit only a
limited right of appeal from an arbitrator’s decision to courts of law.149
In particular, clauses binding consumers in advance to arbitration for
sums less than £5,000 are not allowed.150 The original provision under
the Consumer Arbitration Agreements Act of 1988 exempted “non
domestic arbitration agreements” from the requirements of this rule;
however, the Court of Appeal extended it to consumers from other
E.C. countries to avoid a discrimination based on nationality.151
Arbitration has been frequently included in Codes of Practice
as a low cost dispute resolution scheme, but abuses of arbitration led
to the 1996 Spanish arbitration law amendments, which imposed a cap
on pre-formulated arbitration clauses. Therefore, ombudsmen

TEMPLE & CALAIS-AULOY, supra note 146, at 72.
See generally Reich, More clarity after “Claro”?, supra note 1.
149
GERAINT G. HOWELLS & STEPHEN WEATHERILL, CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAW ¶ 14.7.1 (2d ed. 2005).
150 Id. ¶ 13.9.5.2. (iv).
151 Norbert Reich, Zur Wirksamkeit von Schiedsklauseln bei grenzüberschreitenden
Börsentermingeschäften, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT [ZEUP] 981, ¶
14.6 (1998) (Ger.).
147
148
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schemes152 are preferred because they are binding only on businesses
and not on consumers.153
The Association of British Travel Agents (ABTA) has initiated
a separate arbitration scheme,154 which is administered by CEDRsolve.155 The arbitrator’s award is issued in writing and provides a
summary of the facts, conclusions, and reasons for the decision. The
arbitrator’s decision is legally binding on both parties and is
enforceable directly through the courts. Any party can ask for a review
of the arbitrator’s decision, on paying a non-reimbursable £ 350 review
fee, although there are limited grounds on which this can be
challenged.156
XVI.

STATE MONITORED ADR SYSTEMS WITHOUT BINDING
ARBITRATION: SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

Most Scandinavian countries have taken a specific approach
concerning the handling of consumer disputes, namely, by instituting
state complaint boards in which business and consumer associations
participate. This makes arbitration an out-of-court instrument of
dispute settlement more or less superfluous.
The institution of the Danish consumer complaint boards157
may serve as a model. Article 8(3) of the Danish Lov om
Forbrugerklagenoevnet of 1974/1988158 provides for a priority of
proceedings before the complaint board—even if the matter is already
in arbitration—if the consumer wants to take his complaint before the
board. The consumer can take his complaint before the board at any
An ombudsman scheme is a voluntary ADR system set up by the
industry and approved by the government.
153
Howells & Weatherill, supra note 150, ¶ 14.6.
154
See HODGES ET AL., supra note 118, at 328.
155
Dispute
Resolution
Services,
CEDR,
http://www.cedr.com/solve/dispute-resolution-services/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2015).
156
HODGES ET AL., supra note 118, at 331.
157 Danish consumer complaint boards have been analyzed in detail by
Jens M. Scherpe, Außergerichtliche Streitbeilegung, in VERBRAUCHERSACHEN (2002); the
German translation of the law is at pages 285-289.
158 Art. 8(3) Lov om Forbrugerklagenævnet (Lovebehendtgoerelse Nr. 282
of 10.5.1988) (Den.).
152
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time during the complaint proceedings; there is no time limit or other
formal requirement. In this case, the arbitration proceedings will be
staid until the board has handled the matter. This rule implies that
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are not void as such, but also
do not preempt proceedings before the complaint board and thus
avoid the limited remedies for the consumer against arbitration clauses
in the above-mentioned “Einredesituation” under Article II(3) of the
New York Convention of 1958 as a defense against an arbitration
clause.
A similar situation in Sweden concerning the Allmänna
Reklamtionsnämnden (ARM) has been described in some detail in a study
by this author on financial regulation in the E.U.159 As a result of the
procedure, the ARM issues a written proposal for the settlement
(beslut), which in most cases will be accepted by the parties. If the
parties do not agree, they can take the case to court.
The Scandinavian system is said to work well both in the
interests of consumers and of business. It avoids lengthy court
proceedings and reaches a high rate of successful settlements.
XVII.

A SEEMINGLY UNKNOWN EXPERIENCE: POLAND

Poland has established—mostly before becoming member of
the E.U. in 2004—a detailed arbitration system. Nevertheless, if we
consider a recent paper of Polish scholar Kinga Flaga-Gieruszynska,
“the awareness of [the arbitration system’s] existence still reaches very
few consumers.”160 There is a general scheme that “imposes” solutions
upon traders and consumers alike. This scheme, which is administered
by the State Trade Inspection, which has general jurisdiction in all
consumer matters except those which are specifically excluded and
must be submitted to specialized institutions. These excluded
consumer matters are:

INSTITUTIONELLE
FINANZMARKTAUFSICHT
UND
VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ (INSTITUTIONAL SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION) 165 (Keßler, Micklitz, Reich eds. 2010).
160
Kinga Flaga-Gieruszynska, The Model of Consumer Arbitration Courts in
Poland, INT. J. ON CONSUMER L. & PRAC., 28, 39 (2013).
159
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 Permanent arbitration courts with the President of the
Office of Electronic Communications concerning claims
against telecom and postal operators.
 The Arbitration Court at the Insurance Ombudsman
handling disputes concerning insurance contracts and
occupational pension schemes.
 Consumer Banking Arbitration at the Polish Banking
Association (the Banking Arbitrator) whose decisions are
binding on banks, but not on consumers.
There is no obligation for consumers to take their disputes to
arbitration, unless a binding agreement has been concluded. This is
determined by the general provisions of the Polish Civil Code (Article
385(1), which has implemented the E.U. Directive 93/13 on Unfair
Terms in Consumer Contracts.161 As Flaga-Gieruszynska writes:
Thus, the status of consumer arbitration courts is
determined on the one hand by the decision making
act of a public authority . . . which is a unique situation
with regard to arbitration, and on the other hand—the
act of will of the parties, which is the foundation of the
creation of arbitration courts (the arbitration clause).
Without the latter, it is impossible to speak of the
existence of forms of dispute resolution of a voluntary
nature.162
CONCLUSIONS
Arbitration clauses in consumer contracts have been subject to
controversy in many jurisdictions. U.S. law has strongly favored
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. Even among law and
economics scholars there is no disagreement that “indeed arbitration
restricts access to lawsuits and recovery”. This is justified by law and
economics scholarship because “it removes the disproportionate
benefit (to the ‘sophisticated elite’) and thus eliminates a regressive
161
162

Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.

330

2015

Reich

4:1

cross-subsidy.”163 It remains however an open question whether this
supposed redistributive effect suffices to impose binding arbitration
clauses on consumers. In my opinion this is not the case because denial
of individual access to justice cannot be justified be overall efficiency
arguments.
As the overview of the law on consumer arbitration clauses in
some (not all!) E.U. Member countries has shown, the situation is quite
different; one may call it even rather “chaotic”. It ranges from a simple
prohibition of such clauses (France) to their permission under certain
procedural (Germany, Spain, Poland) or substantive limitations (UK),
to state monitored ADR systems (Scandinavian countries) which are
not formally binding on the consumer but have similar effects in
practice.
Directive 2013/11, if implemented by Member State legislation
before 9 July 2015 (which does not seem to be the case anyhow!), has
not brought about any consistent E.U. practice, unlike the U.S. Federal
Arbitration Act. Following a more “access to justice” approach, E.U.
law has taken a mixed and to some extent limited approach in including
ADR entities that “impose” a solution in its recent ADR Directive
2013/11. There seems to be an indirect encouragement to develop
consumer arbitration schemes in Member States as a second route of
access to justice. It is too early to evaluate this new and somewhat
clandestine policy of the E.U.
This paper therefore has insisted on some additional
procedural guarantees should consumer arbitration schemes become
more popular among E.U. Member countries, even though Directive
2013/11 already contains some “minimum protection” provisions on
“specific acceptance” and applicable law. The basic reference for such
additional protection seems to be Article 47 of the E.U. Charter of
Fundamental Rights in conjunction with Article 19(1) paragraph 2 of
the TEU whereby Member States must “provide remedies sufficient
to ensure effective legal protection” of E.U. consumers.164 At the time
of writing, Member States must wait to implement measures
Omri Ben-Shahar, Arbitration and Access to Court: Economic Analysis, in
REGULATORY COMPETITION IN CONTRACT LAW AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 447,
458 (Horst Eidenmüller ed., 2013).
164
TEU, art. 19(1) ¶ 2.
163
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concerning Directive 2013/11 and to make any final judgments as to
their E.U.-law conformity and efficiency. This paper sought to provide
some guidelines for this upcoming debate.
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THE ROLE OF PARTY AUTONOMY IN
THE ENFORCEMENT OF SECURED
CREDITOR’S RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENTS
Anna Veneziano
INTRODUCTION
The need to provide sound and clear rules regarding the
enforcement of a secured creditor’s rights upon the debtor’s default is
expressly recognized in the most recent international instruments
dealing with secured transactions. Such instruments all contain a welldeveloped and specific regulation of enforcement measures, applicable
(also) outside insolvency proceedings. While additional steps may be
required to exercise said rights when qualified third parties are involved
(e.g., perfection requirements), or other rules may have to be applied
to determine the outcome of conflicts among holders of conflicting
proprietary interests on the same collateral, the existence of a security
agreement is generally sufficient to trigger the application of the rules
on enforcement.
In this paper, I will look at uniform law texts regarding this
topic, with a view to assess whether it is possible to detect common
directions and to understand the reasons for any divergent approach.
The term ‘uniform law’ is used here to refer to a variety of instruments,
be they hard law or soft law as well as global or regional. In particular,
I will focus on three well-known examples that are representative of
 The Author is Professor of Comparative Law at the University of Teramo
(Italy) and Professor of European Property Law at the University of Amsterdam. She
is currently serving as Deputy Secretary-General of the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT). The opinions expressed in the present
paper do not purport to reflect an official position of UNIDROIT.
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such a variety: (a) the Cape Town Convention on International
Interests in Mobile Equipment1 and its Aircraft Protocol2 (as an
example of a highly successful3 hard law text with global application
but in a very specialized sector,4 which creates an autonomous
international interest recognized and enforceable in contracting
States);5 (b) the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured

Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16,
2001, 2307 U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter Cape Town Convention]. The text of the
Convention
in
English
is
available
at
http://
http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/security-interests/cape-town-convention.
2 Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment (Nov. 16, 2001), available in
English at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-main.htm [hereinafter
Aircraft Protocol]
3
Until now as many as sixty-nine States around the world have ratified
or otherwise acceded to the Cape Town Convention, while sixty-one States have
adhered to the Aircraft Protocol (the Protocol entered into force in 2006).
UNIDROIT, Status - Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (Cape Town,
2001) (December 3, 2015), http://www.unidroit.org/status-2001capetown;
UNIDROIT, Status – Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment (December 3, 2015),
http://www.unidroit.org/status-2001capetown-aircraft. The European Union has
also acceded to the Convention and the Aircraft Protocol as a Regional Economic
Integration Organization, thus permitting (but not imposing) ratification by Member
States. See ROY GOODE, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN MOBILE
EQUIPMENT AND PROTOCOL THERETO ON MATTERS SPECIFIC TO AIRCRAFT
EQUIPMENT, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY 142 et seq. (3d ed. UNIDROIT, 2013).
Furthermore, the International Registry for Aircraft Equipment (operated under the
supervision of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) by Aviareto has
reached more than 500,000 entries since its establishment in 2006. SITA, Aircraft
Equipment Registry Passes Half Million Milestone (Oct. 9, 2014),
http://www.sita.aero/content/Aircraft-equiment-registry-passes-half-millionmilestone.
4
Two additional Protocols to the Cape Town Convention, the 2007
Luxembourg Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment on Matters Specific to Railway Rolling Stock (Rail Protocol) and the 2012
Protocol on Matters Specific to Space Assets (Space Protocol) were approved but
have not yet entered into force.
5
The Cape Town Convention and the Aircraft Protocol were jointly
approved by UNIDROIT and ICAO on the basis of a project drafted within
UNIDROIT. See GOODE, supra note 3, at 13 et seq. (describing the nature and purpose
of the Convention system).
1
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Transactions6 (as an example of a policy-oriented soft law instrument
with global scope of application, primarily addressed to national
legislators considering a reform of their general domestic secured
transaction laws);7 (c) Book IX of the Draft Common Frame of
Reference on a European Private Law (DCFR)8 (as an example of a
regional soft law instrument on secured transactions in general,
developed within the DCFR European academic project, which
creates an autonomous European security right with cross-border
enforceability).9
There are other examples of uniform law texts concerning
secured transactions that emphasize the importance of enforcement
measures, but they will not be specifically analyzed here.10
I.

COMMON TRENDS IN THE RULES ON ENFORCEMENT OF

U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE
SECURED TRANSACTIONS, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.12 (2010) [hereinafter
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide].
7
On the nature and purpose of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, see
Spiradon V. Bazinas, The utility and efficacy of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured
Transactions, in AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN A TIME
OF CRISIS 133 et seq. (Orkun Akseli ed., 2012).
8
Book IX - Proprietary Security in Movable Assets, in PRINCIPLES,
DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON
FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR), 5389 et seq. (Christian von Bar et al., eds. 2009)
[hereinafter Book IX DCFR]. Book IX DCFR was prepared by a team led by U.
Drobnig and was subsequently approved within the DCFR project by the Study
Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law
(Acquis Group).
9
On the nature and purpose of the DCFR, see Introduction, in PRINCIPLES,
DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, DRAFT COMMON
FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR), 1 et seq. (Christian von Bar et al., eds. 2009).
10
For an additional example, see the Model Law on Secured Transactions
(1994 and 2004) of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD), which provides a basic framework for domestic legal reform tailored to
transition economies: “The Model allows the person taking security to enforce the
charge immediately after a failure to pay the secured debt. . . It is vital that
appropriate provisions on enforcement be included. Without a clear right to enforce,
the charge-holder is deprived of his remedy and a charge becomes valueless.”
MODEL LAW ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS: PART IV – ENFORCEMENT AND
TERMINATION, EBRD, at art. 22-30 (1994, 2004) [hereinafter EBRD Model Law].
6
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SECURED CREDITORS’ RIGHTS
Not surprisingly, due to the different nature, purpose, and
particularly the different scope of application of the international
instruments that are considered, the legal regime of enforcement that
they provide cannot be the same. I believe, however, that it is possible
to find a number of elements that are common and point to a
convergence in the international approach to the topic. In line with the
general theme of the International Academy of Commercial and
Consumer Law (IACCL) conference, the analysis will center on the
role played by party autonomy and the mechanisms used to control it.
Thus, I will not offer a systematic description of the respective legal
regimes of enforcement, but will specifically focus on examples of
common trends (and any divergences) that relate to the scope of
parties’ self-regulation and its limitations.
By way of a more general observation, each of the abovementioned texts begins with the assumption that clear and predictable
rules regarding secured creditors’ enforcement rights are advantageous
for all parties involved, and that an easy, less costly, and speedy
implementation of such rights is a key element for a well-functioning
secured transactions system.11 It may facilitate (cross-border) financing
with better conditions, since the likelihood of obtaining recovery in
case of default may well be one of the factors influencing creditor’s
decisions in this respect. Furthermore, the backdrop of an efficient,
rapid, and cost-effective system of recovery will also be important to
shape parties’ willingness to avoid formal insolvency proceedings
through cooperation by entering into out-of-court arrangements

“The availability of adequate and readily enforceable default remedies
is of crucial importance to the creditor, who must be able to predict with confidence
its ability to exercise a default remedy expeditiously.” GOODE, supra note 3, at 58.
Similarly, the efficient enforcement of secured creditors’ rights is listed among the
key objectives of a modern secured transactions regime in the UNCITRAL
Legislative Guide: “A security right will . . . have little value to a secured creditor
unless it can be enforced effectively and efficiently. A modern secured transactions
regime will include procedures that precisely describe the rights and obligations of
grantors and secured creditors upon enforcement.” UNCITRAL Legislative Guide,
supra note 6, at § 56. The need for speedy and cost-effective enforcement is also the
underpinning principle of Chapter 7 of Book IX DCFR and its preference towards
extra-judicial enforcement. Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at 5618.
11
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(which are often considered an advantageous alternative, especially in
the case of cross-border transactions).
The enhancement of parties’ self-regulation is one of the
mechanisms that is put into place to achieve the result of ensuring a
rapid and less costly enforcement of creditors’ rights. Strengthening
the role of parties’ autonomy is indeed one of the most evident traits
in all three instruments that are considered here. At the same time,
there is still the need to find a good balance between party autonomy
on the one hand, and the protection of various interests, those of the
debtor but also of third parties, on the other hand. It is in the balance
of such different interests that the three instruments diverge, which in
my view (at least partly) is justified in light of the difference in their
respective scope of application.
A.

The Enhancement of Party Autonomy and its Role(s)

Parties’ self-regulation is reinforced by limiting the impact of
mandatory formal proceedings (such as the need for a court decision
before enforcement or the imposition of a formal procedure like a
public sale). Thus, all three instruments favor extra-judicial
enforcement, which is considered an option that should always be
available to the creditor12 if agreed upon in the contract or at some
other point in time,13 or unless otherwise provided by the parties.14
Moreover, the creditor, if all required conditions are met, can exercise
a wide array of out-of-court measures, including using the value of the
collateral other than by selling it and being satisfied with the proceeds
(e.g., lease the collateral or collect or receive any income of profits
See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 283-84,
recommendation 142. “[I]n order to maximize flexibility in enforcement and thereby
to obtain the highest possible price upon disposition, creditors should have the
option of proceeding either judicially or extra judicially when enforcing their security
rights.”
13 See Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, at art. 8(1); GOODE, supra note
3, at 278. For the additional layers of complexity of the Cape Town Convention
system that derive from the interplay between main Convention, asset-specific
Protocols, States’ power to issue declarations, and market incentives; see infra p. 10.
14 See Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at Art. IX-7:103(1). “Unless otherwise
agreed, the secured creditor may carry out extra-judicial enforcement of the security
right”. Chapter 7:217 makes it clear that the creditor retains the option to make
recourse to judicial enforcement.
12
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arising from the management of the encumbered asset).15
Furthermore, even within court proceedings there is a preference for
speedy relief measures,16 though this point is not emphasized in the
same way in each text due to their different nature and scope of
application.17 Therefore, there is a degree of uniformity at least in the
general approach chosen by all three instruments.
If we turn from the general to the particular, however, we must
take a series of additional factors into account. We will focus here on
some factors that show that the role played by party autonomy is more
complex than may appear at first sight.
The first important element to be considered is that a decision
on the default rule (i.e., the rule applicable “unless otherwise agreed”)
may change the purpose of allowing a contrary agreement between the
parties. Book IX DCFR can be used as a good example in this respect,
since party autonomy is present in several provisions but does not
always play the same role. The principle underlying the whole Chapter
on enforcement is that its rules are mandatory, unless otherwise
provided within the text.18 Several provisions allow for an express
derogation by the parties, but said derogation fulfills different
purposes. For instance, as mentioned above, the commercial creditor
may generally exercise extra-judicial enforcement, unless exclusive
Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, at art. 8(1); UNCITRAL
Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 312, recommendation 141; Book IX DCFR, supra
note 8, at Art. IX-7:207.
16
See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 311,
recommendation 138. The possibility to obtain, in particular, advance speedy relief by
courts pending final determination of a dispute is one of the cornerstones of the
Cape Town Convention and Aircraft Protocol’s enforcement system, as provided in
Art. 13 Convention and Art. X Protocol. See supra, Cape Town Convention, note 1,
and Aircraft Protocol, supra note 2.
17
In particular, Chapter 7 of Book IX DCFR expressly focuses on extrajudicial enforcement, leaving court enforcement proceedings to national law. See Book
IX DCFR, supra note 8, at Cmt. A to Art.IX-7:101. Thus, Book IX does not attempt
to lay down rules for judicial enforcement. It does, however, stress the need for an
expeditious court decision on a recourse against an enforcement measure or against
resistance to an enforcement measure. Id. at 7:104. The same approach regarding
judicial supervision of enforcement when a conflict arises is found in the
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 280,
§ 19, and recommendation 137.
18
Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at Art.IX-7:102.
15
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recourse to a court or other competent authority is agreed in the
contract.19 On the other hand, a private sale by the creditor is only
admitted if parties stipulate otherwise (or if a published market price
for the collateral exists).20
In these two examples, party autonomy serves divergent
purposes. In the first case, a higher degree of formality in the
proceedings may be imposed by modifying the default rule; in the
second instance, the contrary agreement allows the creditor to exercise
an additional remedy.21 Failing such an agreement, the default rule does
not allow that particular remedy (or it does so only if specific
requirements are met). It must be pointed out that bargaining to
exclude a default rule presupposes that the debtor be in a position to
accept, or reject, the contrary agreement. The situation is clearly
different where the instrument applies in a highly specialized and
professionalized market (as in the case of aircraft financing, for
example) or more generally (thus, in Book IX DCFR consumers are
always entitled to court proceedings, unless they agree to extra-judicial
enforcement after default, and are subject to additional safeguards, see
Section III, infra).
Another element that should be mentioned is the degree of
formality that is required of the “contrary agreement” between the
parties. For example, parties’ agreement on the exercise of extrajudicial remedies under the Cape Town Convention need not be in
writing, nor should it refer specifically to the Convention’s provisions
or specific remedies.22 On the other hand, a pre-default agreement on
appropriation of encumbered assets by the creditor under Article IX.7:105 DCFR will need to be more formal since parties are obliged to
indicate a method which allows for a ready determination of a
reasonable market price. Failing such an indication, the agreement is

Id. at Art.IX-7:103(1).
See id. at Art.IX-7:211(2).
21
In particular, when a published market price for the collateral exists, see
id. at Art. IX-7:211(2).
22
GOODE, supra note 3, at 280 (“an agreement in general terms, for
example, ‘all remedies under the Convention,’ suffices. . . . [S]uch terms would cover
remedies under the Protocol as well as under the Convention.”).
19
20
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void, unless the collateral is a fungible asset that is traded on a
recognized market with published prices.23
The different nature of the instrument gives rise to interesting
additional layers of complexity in the case of the Cape Town
Convention system, that is, a multilateral treaty approved in a
diplomatic Conference24 with participation of States’ representatives
and later subject to ratification by States. Following a widely used
technique, in order to reach international consensus within the formal
setting of the diplomatic Conference, the possibility for contracting
States to opt out of specified provisions through a declaration25 was
introduced. With particular regard to enforcement, according to the
main Convention contracting States must make a declaration for or
against extra-judicial enforcement as default rule,26 and may make
additional declarations in relation to the applicability of specific
enforcement measures.27
This balance was already modified by the Aircraft Protocol 28
where some of the Convention rules on enforcement were displaced,
Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at Art.IX.-7:105(1) and (2).
Or better said, diplomatic Conferences, since the Aircraft Protocol was
approved together with the main Convention in Cape Town in 2001 whilst the other
two Protocols, Rail and Space, were separately approved, respectively, in
Luxembourg in 2007 and in Berlin in 2012.
25
The Cape Town Convention does not contain the classical
“reservations,” but introduced “declarations” that allow for more flexibility and
choices regarding their content. See generally ROY GOODE, HERBERT KRONKE, EWAN
MCKENDRICK, TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW 418-419 (2d ed. 2015).
26
Article 54(2) requires a contracting State to declare whether or not any
remedy, which under the Convention does not require application to the court, is to
be exercisable only with leave of the court. It is a mandatory declaration.. Cape Town
Convention, supra note 1, at art. 54(2).
27
For example, lease of collateral is permitted unless a contracting State
declared that the charge (debtor) shall not grant a lease of the object while it is
situated within or controlled from that State’s territory. Id. at art. 8(1)(b), 54(1).
28
For the enforcement provisions in the Rail and Space Protocols, see
ROY GOODE, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN MOBILE
EQUIPMENT AND LUXEMBOURG PROTOCOL THERETO ON MATTERS SPECIFIC TO
RAILWAY ROLLING STOCK, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY 71 et seq. (2d ed., UNIDROIT,
2014); ROY GOODE, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN MOBILE
EQUIPMENT AND PROTOCOL THERETO ON MATTERS SPECIFIC TO SPACE ASSETS,
OFFICIAL COMMENTARY 189 et seq. (UNIDROIT, 2013).
23
24
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additional specific remedies were introduced (in particular,
deregistration and export and physical transfer of the aircraft object
from the territory where it is situated) and a mechanism of opting in
specific provisions was chosen.29 The modification went in the
direction of allowing increased predictability and a greater scope for
parties’ self-regulation both outside and within court proceedings.
The evolution of the system, however, did not stop with the
approval of the treaties but was further influenced by the relevant
credit market. Under the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) Aircraft Sector Understanding,30 a reduced
fee or interest rate for export credit may be applied if a contracting
State to both the Convention and the Aircraft Protocol has made socalled “qualifying declarations,” among which the declarations with
respect to enforcement measures are counted. In particular, a State
may qualify if it either adheres to the default provision on extra-judicial
enforcement or it opts in to the Aircraft Protocol rules regarding
advance relief measures during court proceedings. This development
shows that, when a uniform law text applies to a specialized, highly
sophisticated, and integrated market and has the potential to trigger
economic benefits for both creditors and debtors, subsequent market
incentives may indirectly influence contracting States’ decisions and as
a consequence the international regulation in the field.
B.

A Shift from Traditional Control Mechanisms to Ex-Post
Evaluation and Transparency Rules

As noted earlier, while all three instruments considered give
more weight to party autonomy, rules protecting the debtor and/or
other parties are not abandoned. The tendency, however, is to reduce
the impact of certain traditional remedies that are perceived to be
inefficient or unnecessary. The shift towards out-of-court enforcement
as opposed to mandatory formal proceedings was already mentioned.
Additionally, control mechanisms that work ex ante through the
29
For a detailed overview of the enforcement provisions in the Aircraft
Protocol and their relation to the main Convention, see GOODE, supra note 3, at 447
et seq.
30
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
Aircraft Sector Understanding on Export Credits for Civil Aircraft,
TAD/ASU(2011)1 (Aug. 31, 2011).
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sanction of invalidity of parties’ agreement are restricted in their
application. This is true, for example, if we look at the well-known
prohibition of pactum commissorium (typically found in civil law
jurisdictions).31 Such a development is hardly surprising in light of the
fact that even the most traditionally oriented national laws in this
respect show a clear tendency to move away from a strict interpretation
of this requirement, and this appears not only in very specialized areas,
such as financial collateral,32 but even generally.33
It is probably more relevant to see how the need to balance
competing interests (with particular regard to interests of third parties)
is pursued through alternative and more modern means. The
mechanisms that can be found in all three instruments are fourfold: (1)
reliance on parties’ agreement (as noted above, the exercise of specific
remedies may be subject to the contract expressly allowing them and
sometimes to additional limitations and conditions); (2) use of ex-post
evaluation of the exercise of all enforcement rights; (3) transparency
provisions introducing information duties; and (4) upholding of the
traditional principle of avoiding creditor’s enrichment.
As to the shift to ex-post evaluation, all three instruments
expressly refer to the parameter of ‘commercial reasonableness’ (or
other general standard) to achieve a fair realization value when selfhelp measures are executed. The Cape Town Convention states that
See Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at Art. IX.-7:105, according to which
a pre-default agreement on appropriation of encumbered assets is void, unless the
encumbered asset is a fungible asset that has a published price or parties agree in
advance on some method to ensure objectivity of evaluation. For a brief justification
of this rule, see Book IX, supra note 8, at 5622. According to the Cape Town
Convention, however, an agreement whereby ownership is vested in the creditor
cannot be made in advance of default, but only after default and at the conditions set
forth in Article 9 Convention. GOODE, supra note 3, at 283. Article 11 Convention,
however, leaves the parties free to determine what constitutes “default” under their
agreement. Those rules do not apply to retention of title devices. See infra at section
II(C).
32
For E.U. member States, this results from the implementation of the
Financial Collateral Directive. See Council Directive 2002/47, 2002 OJ (L 168) 43
(EC) as amended by Council Directive 2009/44, art. 4, 2009 OJ (L 146) 37 (EC).
33
See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2348 (Fr.) as modified by the 2006 French
secured transactions’ law reform, which considers such agreements valid. For
commentary, see LAURENT AYNES & PIERRE CROCQ, DROIT CIVIL: LES SURETES, LA
PUBLICITE FONCIERE 239 et seq. (4th ed. 2009).
31
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any out-of-court remedy of a secured creditor “shall be exercised in a
commercially reasonable manner.”34 The UNCITRAL Legislative
Guide recommends that national legislators “provide that a person
must enforce its rights and perform its obligations under the
provisions on enforcement in good faith and in a commercially
reasonable manner.”35 According to Article IX.–7:103(4) DCFR,
“enforcement must be undertaken by the secured creditor in a
commercially reasonable way.” Once again, however, the different role
played by party autonomy bears an influence on how the same
principle is concretely applied. Thus, according to the Cape Town
Convention, a remedy exercised in conformity with the security
agreement will be deemed commercially reasonable unless the
contractual provision is “manifestly unreasonable.” The benchmark
for the standard of conduct is therefore parties’ self-regulation,
interpreted against the background of international practice.36 On the
other hand, according to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, the
recommended general standard of conduct should be mandatory and
not subject to unilateral waiver or contrary agreement at any time,37
while Book IX DCFR puts more emphasis on good faith by requiring
that creditors exercise enforcement measures, as far as possible, in
cooperation with the security provider and any third party.
With regard to transparency, there is a tendency to introduce
information duties of the secured creditor toward the debtor and
specific third parties (particularly, other secured creditors).38 It should
Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, at art. 8(3).
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 310.
36
“The phrase ‘manifestly unreasonable’ is a signal to courts that they
should not lightly disturb the bargain made by the parties. Established commercial
practice is relevant to whether a provision in a security agreement is ‘manifestly
unreasonable’. A provision that is in line with accepted international practice will
normally be regarded as not manifestly unreasonable”: GOODE, supra note 3, at 280.
37
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 311.
38
See e.g., Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, at art. 8(4) (reasonable
prior notice in writing to specified interested persons); UNCITRAL Legislative
Guide, supra note 6, at recommendation 149 (on the creditor’s duty to give notice of
its intention to exercise extra-judicial sale, granting of lease or license or other
disposal of the collateral); Book IX DCFR, supra note 8 at Arts. IX.–7:208 to 7:210
(notices of extra-judicial disposition). A brief overview of the rules on notices in
Book IX is provided in Comment A to Art. IX.–7:107. Book IX DCFR, supra note
8, cmt. A to Art. IX.-7:107.
34
35

343

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:1

be noted that the cost-effectiveness of such rules will depend on the
degree of the formalities that are imposed for the notice.39 In this
respect, the Cape Town Convention’s language (“reasonable prior
notice in writing”) is less exacting than the regime suggested in the
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide or envisaged in Book IX DCFR, both
of which impose more precise time, content, and language
constraints.40
Another element worth considering is that the functionality of
the notice system is strictly related to the existence of a public
electronic registry based on a notice-filing approach (according to
which a statement containing select information as to creditor, debtor
and collateral should be filed in a publicly accessible registry for the
purpose of ensuring that the security right is effective as against other
secured creditors, execution creditors, and the administrator of
debtor’s insolvency). Such a general policy choice is made in all three
instruments41 and permits a clearer identification of the most relevant
third parties to which the notice should be given.42
Another protection mechanism is the avoidance of
enrichment. The question is whether, should there be any surplus from
the sale or alternative use of the value of the collateral, it should return
to (other lower ranking creditors and finally to) the debtor. All three
instruments clearly retain this solution.43 A different regime is
introduced, however, for those transactions that are based on retention
39
“The law should provide rules ensuring that the notice . . . can be given
in an efficient, timely and reliable way so as to protect the grantor or other interested
parties, while, at the same time, avoiding having a negative effect on the secured
creditor’s remedies and the potential net realization value of the encumbered assets.”
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at recommendation 150.
40
See id. at recommendation 151(b); Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at Art.
IX.–7:210.
41
Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, at Chapter IV; UNCITRAL
Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 110 et seq.; Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at ch. 3.
42
Interestingly, the EBRD Model Law provides that the enforcement
notice to the debtor (which has to contain specific information) must be registered
in the Charges Registry as supplementary information to be effective. See EBRD
Model Law, supra note 10, at arts. 22.2, 22.4, and 33.
43
See Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 8(5) and (6);
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at recommendation 152 (distribution of
proceeds of disposition of an encumbered asset); Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at
Art. IX.–7:215 (distribution of proceeds of extra-judicial enforcement).
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of title instead of consisting in the creation of a limited security right
or the transfer of collateral by way of security, which topic will be now
discussed.
C.

A Differentiated Regime for Enforcement of Retention of
Title Devices

In all the international instruments considered, the policy
decision was taken to include within their general scope of application
not only security rights on movables granted by the debtor to the
creditor, but also transactions where title to the collateral is retained by
the financier (e.g., a conditional sale or a leasing agreement). In
principle, such transactions are subject to the same basic legal
framework that governs the more traditional limited rights in rem.44 In
relation to a few specific issues, however, different rules (may) apply.
An exception shared by all three instruments is found in
enforcement. The creditor (seller or lessor) is not accountable for any
surplus and may terminate the agreement upon debtor’s default and
take possession or control of the collateral as a full owner, without
being subject to all conditions and limits that are envisaged for a
secured creditor in general45

For the Cape Town Convention, see GOODE, supra note 3, at 267
(“Most of the . . . provisions of the Convention apply to all three forms of agreement
[security agreement, conditional sale and lease].”). The UNCITRAL Legislative
Guide recommends an integrated scheme, giving national legislators the option
between a unitary and non-unitary approach to acquisition financing. UNCITRAL
Legislative Guide, supra note 6, 57 et seq., § 111 et seq. Even under the latter
approach, however, most of the rules applicable to security rights are extended to
retention of title devices. Finally, see Art. IX. – 1:104 DCFR and Comment A, Book
IX DCFR, supra note 8, at 5401 (“the regime of retention of ownership devices, while
partly autonomous, is in most respects identical with that for security rights.”).
45
See Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, at art. 10; See also Art. IX.7:301 DCFR. Concerning the Cape Town Convention, it must be noted that the
qualification of an agreement as “retention of title” or “lease” for the purposes of
Article 10 is left to the applicable domestic law, so that in those legal systems where
such devices (or specific types of such devices) are qualified as security rights Article
10 would not apply. GOODE, supra note 3, at 267 et seq. The UNCITRAL Legislative
Guide, on the other hand, suggests that acquisition finance devices (a functional
category including retention of title devices) be subject to the same regime that is
applied to non-acquisition finance devices, but allows for deviations “to the extent
44
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It is interesting to note that this specific derogation from the
general rules is not justified on the basis of the economic function of
the device as acquisition financing tool (otherwise it would apply to all
agreements pursuing the same function regardless of which party holds
title in the collateral).46 It expressly relies on the formal structure of the
agreement.47 While this solution may have had the purpose of making
the inclusion of retention of title less objectionable in the eyes of
European jurists and/or governmental representatives, it raises doubts
as to whether the justification for a different treatment based on the
formal structure of the transaction only is sufficiently well founded.
This all the more so because recent reforms in national secured
transaction laws opted for the application of a functional approach in
this respect.48
II.

CONSUMER PROTECTION AND PARTY AUTONOMY

Another interesting issue with regard to the role of party
autonomy in the enforcement of creditor’s rights arises when one of
necessary to preserve the coherence of the regime applicable to sale and lease”
(UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, 380-381, recommendation 200).
46
Which is what is envisaged for another important exception to the
general rules contained in both the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide and in Book IX
DCFR is the special priority (so-called “super-priority”) as against previously
registered security rights on the same collateral, granted to all acquisition finance
devices regardless of their formal structure. See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra
note 6, at 377, recommendations 187-188; Art. IX. – 4:102 DCFR.
47
For the Cape Town Convention, see GOODE, supra note 3, at 66 (“The
provisions are much simpler because in contrast with the chargee, who has merely a
security interest, the conditional seller or lessor retains full rights in the equipment.”).
See also Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at 5664, cmt. A to Art. IX. – 7:301 DCFR
(“The chief reason why the special features of retention of ownership become
relevant in this area is that, since the seller, supplier or lessor as secured creditor had
retained ownership, it had remained the owner of the supplied assets.”). A more
thorough treatment of this issue is found in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra
note 6, at 367 et seq., §§ 188-196, where the respective merits of a unitary and nonunitary approach to retention of title devices , as well as the need to preserve a
functionally integrated approach whichever choice is made are discussed with
specific regard to enforcement.
48
For the 2013 reform in Belgium, see ERIC DIRIX, LA RÉFORME DES
SÛRETÉS RÉELLES MOBILIÈRES 11 et seq. (2013) (in relation to both sales with
retention of title and leasing). See also CODE CIVIL [C. CIV] art. 2371(2) (Fr.); AYNÈS
& CROCQ, supra note 31, at 375 et seq.
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the parties is a consumer, or is more generally qualified as a “weaker”
party entitled to a stronger protection. The question is here to what
extent general rules favorable to a wider application of parties’ selfregulation should be modified to take this situation into account. It
must be pointed out that for two of the instruments that we considered
this question is either irrelevant or has only marginal importance. It
goes without saying that the scope of application of the Cape Town
Convention implies a high level of sophistication of all professional
parties involved. As to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, although it
includes many forms of consumer transaction, it is not intended to
override consumer-protection laws or to elaborate consumerprotection policies, and defers to national law on this matter.49
On the other hand, the scope of application of Book IX DCFR
is not limited to professional parties but extends to consumers. In this
regard, however, the drafters expressly downplayed the importance of
specific consumer protection in the field of secured transactions as
opposed to that of personal security. In fact, there are only a few
special rules on consumers in the whole Book.50 If we look at
enforcement, the most interesting aspect is that parties’ autonomy is
not entirely excluded but still plays a relevant role. Thus, a security right
over an asset of a consumer can only be enforced by a court or another
competent authority, but after default the consumer security provider
can agree to extra-judicial enforcement.51 Further, a pre-default
agreement on appropriation would be void even if the parties agreed
in advance on an objective evaluation method, but it is still possible
when the encumbered asset is a fungible asset traded on a recognized
market with published prices.52 All other rules of the Chapter apply to

“To the extent that a rule of the regime envisaged in the Guide conflicts
with consumer protection law, the Guide defers to consumer protection law. States
that do not have a body of law for the protection of consumers may wish to consider
whether the enactment of a law based on the recommendations of the Guide would
affect the rights of consumers and would thus require the introduction of consumer
protection legislation.” UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 34, § 11. See
also id. at recommendation 2(b).
50
See Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, Comments to Art. IX.–2:107.
51
Id. at Art. IX.–7:103(2).
52
Id. at Art. IX.–7:105 (1)-(3).
49
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consumers with no differentiation, except for a more stringent
provision on advance notice of enforcement.53
CONCLUSIONS
When looking at the above-mentioned general common
tendencies in uniform law as regards enforcement measures, one
should consider that the rules on enforcement contained in
international instruments are embedded in a more general unitary
architecture that simplifies and rationalizes the entire regulation of
secured transactions. In other words, in each of the three examples
such rules form part of a coherent reform strategy that strives towards
both greater clarity and efficiency. The trend towards a simplification
and rationalization of enforcement proceedings for security rights is,
however, convincing in its own right, also independently of a more
general reform of secured transactions law, and should be welcomed.
A look at the most recent legislative interventions in Europe seems to
confirm that the availability of a more predictable system, and less
costly and swifter extra-judicial enforcement measures as well as of
alternative mechanisms for the creditor to realize the value of the
collateral is perceived as an important element of any well-functioning
secured transactions regime, however structured.
But consider that the effectiveness on any enforcement
measure in a given jurisdiction should be strongly linked to the rules
of general procedural law and the administration of justice. It may also
be connected to the role played by, and the effect given to, extrajudicial settlements and/or alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
It would not be realistic, nor even appropriate, to try to reach full
harmonization through an instrument concerning secured
transactions. I would surmise that the more specialized and
circumscribed the regulation, the easier it is to accept rules that
introduce changes not only to enforcement proceedings in general, but
also to judicial proceedings (such as advance relief remedies for the
creditor) in particular, provided that a cost-benefit analysis gives a
positive result. In devising a general regime with wider application, the
approach should be more cautious (as shown by the different solutions
that are found in the examples of Cape Town Convention and Aircraft
53

Id. at Art. IX.–7:107.
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Protocol on the one hand, and the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide and
Book IX DCFR on the other hand).
Furthermore, I believe that more thought should be given to
the question of how to treat retention of title devices in enforcement,
and especially as to whether a differentiated regime would be
appropriate. If retention of title devices were to be included in an
instrument on secured transactions, a differentiated treatment solely
on the basis of the formal structure of the agreement would not, in my
opinion, be sufficiently justified.
I would finally suggest that the question of whether, and to
what extent, consumer transactions should be subject to a special
regime, as regards enforcement, deserves thorough consideration.
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JUSTIFICATIONS FOR UCC ARTICLE 9’S
TREATMENT OF DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS: A
COMPARATIVE NOTE
Catherine Walsh*
INTRODUCTION
Debtor-creditor and insolvency laws in western legal traditions
generally treat a defaulting debtor’s assets as subject to liquidation by
its creditors or their insolvency representative, with the proceeds then
distributed among them in proportion to their claims. Secured
creditors seek to escape this baseline principle by bargaining in advance
for the right to have assets of their debtors in which they have
contracted for security preferentially appropriated to the payment of
their debts. Thus, a contract for security has been described as a private
bargain “between A and B that C take nothing”1 with C representing
the collectivity of the collateral-giver’s other creditors.
In view of the distributional consequences, legal systems
traditionally have found it necessary to impose certain limitations on
party autonomy in security agreements. In recent decades, these
constraints have been increasingly dismantled for creditors who take
security in what is popularly referred to as “cash collateral” — meaning
not just cash in the strict sense of hard currency but also intangible
rights that are highly liquid in the sense that the secured creditor can
almost immediately acquire their cash value.
This article focuses on cash collateral in the form of a right to
payment of money credited to an account with a bank or other
Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill University.
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Politics of Article 9: The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80
VA. L. REV. 1887, 1899 (1994).
*
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financial institution (deposit account). Secured transactions regimes in
effect in the Canadian provinces and territories traditionally have
subjected deposit accounts to the same public notice and temporal
priority rules that apply to security agreements covering other
intangible assets in the form of a monetary obligation owed to the
debtor. In contrast, deposit accounts under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code in the United States are governed by a special set of
rules organized around the concept of “control.”
The Article 9 deposit account regime is increasingly promoted
internationally. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured
Transactions is particularly notable.2 It represents the first attempt at
the international law level to articulate a comprehensive regime of
security for movable assets. The close affinity between U.C.C. Article
9 and the Guide’s recommendations is such that, in the words of
Tomáš Richter, it “could be called the ‘New York/ Vienna
consensus.’”3 Certainly, with respect to the treatment of deposit
accounts,4 the recommendations of the Guide replicate almost
completely the Article 9 rules.5
Reforms aimed at aligning the treatment of deposit accounts
in Canadian secured transactions law with the Article 9 (and
UNCITRAL) control approach have recently been proposed. As will
See UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS,
U.N.
Sales
No.
E.09.V.12
(2010),
available
at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/09-82670_EbookGuide_09-04-10English.pdf (hereinafter UNICITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE). For
ease of reference, the terminology and recommendations of the Guide are published
in a separate publication: UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED
TRANSACTIONS: TERMINOLOGY AND RECOMMENDATIONS, U.N. Sales No.
E.09.V.13 (2010), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/Terminology-andRecs.18-1-10.pdf
(hereinafter
UNCITRAL
TERMINOLOGY
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS).
3
Tomáš Richter, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Credit: A
Minskian Sequel 4 (Oct. 1, 2013) (unpublished article), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2390013.
4
Instead of “deposit account,” the UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE
uses the conceptually more accurate, but also more cumbersome, term “right to
payment of funds credited to a deposit account.” For an explanation of this term, see
UNCITRAL TERMINOLOGY AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2.
5
Id. at 49, 103-04, 125-26, 173-75.
2
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be seen, adoption of the control approach will in effect exempt secured
creditors who obtain control of a deposit account from the public
notice and temporal priority rules that until now have applied to
security rights in all types of monetary obligations. It will also result in
a departure from the basic premise of secured creditor equality implicit
in the traditional temporal priority rule by privileging the depository
bank over other secured credit providers.
The principal aim of this article is to explore the justification
for the exceptional treatment of deposit accounts under the Article 9
control approach. Parts I and II summarize the current Canadian rules
and compares them with the Article 9 regime. Part III reviews the
official justifications for the Article 9 approach and finds them less
than persuasive. Part IV explores the relatively recent push to import
the Article 9 treatment of deposit accounts into Canadian secured
transactions law and locates the reform pressure in the desire to
facilitate the use of cash collateral in the form of deposit accounts by
financial actors, notably in the derivatives and securities lending
markets. In light of that finding, Part V concludes by asking whether
privileging the extension of credit to the financial sector represents
wise policy if it comes at the potential expense of reducing the
availability of and increasing the cost of credit to the real economy.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL CANADIAN APPROACH TO THE
TREATMENT OF DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS IN SECURED
TRANSACTIONS LAW

Funds deposited to a bank account are not set aside as
belonging to the customer. Rather, they become the property of the
bank and are replaced by the obligation of the bank to pay the
equivalent amount to the customer. Thus, in general property law, a
deposit account has come to be characterized simply as a debt owed
by the bank to its customer. It constitutes a sub-species of pure
intangible property since its value is not reified in any tangible
document capable of being negotiated, such as a cheque or a
certificated investment security.6

See, e.g., Benjamin Geva, Rights in Bank Deposits and Account Balances in
Common Law Canada, 28 BANKING FIN. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2012); Clayton Bangsund, The
6
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Consistent with this general conceptualization, the secured
transactions regimes in effect in the Canadian provinces and territories7
traditionally have subjected deposit accounts to the same general rules
that apply to other intangible assets that take the form of a monetary
obligation owed to the grantor. Thus, a security right in a deposit
account must be “perfected” by public registration of a notice of the
security right to take effect against third parties8 and priority among
secured creditors is ordered temporally according to the order of
registration. 9 On the debtor’s default, the secured creditor is entitled
to collect payment of the value of the deposit account directly from
the bank with whom the deposit account is held and may then apply
the proceeds of collection in satisfaction of the obligation secured by
its security interest.10
If the bank with whom the deposit account is held wishes to
take a security interest in its customer’s account to secure an obligation
owing to it by the customer, it does not enjoy any special exemption
from these rules. Thus, the bank must register notice of its security
right and its priority against outside secured creditors who have
previously acquired a perfected security interest in the deposit account
generally will be subject to the first-to-register priority rule. The
application of that rule is subject, however, to the bank’s right, in its
capacity as the debtor on the deposit account, to set-off any obligations
owing to it by its customer that arise before it receives notice of a

Deposit Account & Chose in Action at Common Law & Under the PPSA: A Historical Review,
30 BANKING FIN. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (2014); Bruce A. Markell, From Property to Contract
and Back: An Examination of Deposit Accounts and Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 963, 966-67 (1999).
7
In the province of Quebec where the civil law tradition prevails, secured
transactions law is primarily found in the Civil Code rules governing hypothecary
security. See Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, bk. 6 (Can.). While the common
law tradition prevails in the other nine provinces and the three territories, secured
transactions law is primarily found in the Personal Property Security Acts (PPSAs)
proclaimed in force between 1976 and 2001.See, e.g., Ontario Personal Property
Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10 (Can.) [hereinafter Ontario PPSA]. See generally
R.C.C. CUMING, CATHERINE WALSH & RODERICK WOOD, PERSONAL PROPERTY
SECURITY LAW (2d ed. 2012).
8 See, e.g., Ontario PPSA, supra note 7, at §§ 19, 20, 23.
9 Id. at § 30(1)(1).
10 Id. at § 61(1).

353

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:1

security right that otherwise would have priority.11 The bank’s set-off
right, whether arising by operation of law or contractually, may be
exercised regardless of whether or not it concurrently holds a security
interest in the deposit account.12
II.

THE ARTICLE 9 “CONTROL” REGIME

Under Article 9, the concept of control by a secured creditor
plays a key role in the rules governing the perfection and priority of a
security right in a deposit account. Control is not a unitary concept—
its meaning varies according to whether the secured creditor is the
bank with whom the grantor maintains the deposit account or an
outside creditor.13 If the bank is the secured creditor, it automatically
has control upon its customer’s grant of security to it.14 If the secured
creditor is an outside creditor, it can obtain control either by becoming
the bank’s customer with respect to its debtor’s deposit account or by
entering into a control agreement with the bank and the debtor under
which the bank agrees that it will comply with instructions originated
by the secured creditor directing disposition of the funds in the deposit
account without further consent by the debtor.15
Obtaining control is an alternative to registration as a mode of
perfecting a security interest in deposit accounts. This is so even
though control does not give public notice of the potential existence
of the security right to creditors and other potential competing
claimants. The secured creditor’s control need not be exclusive: a
secured creditor has control even if the debtor retains the right to
direct the disposition of funds from the deposit account as if it were
unencumbered.16 Outside parties cannot require the bank to disclose
whether a security right exists in the deposit account: a bank that has
entered into a control agreement is not required to confirm the
existence of the agreement to another person unless requested to do
CUMING, WALSH & WOOD, supra note 7, at 664.
Id. at 666-67. And see infra, Section IV, for the distinction between a
mere set-off right and a set-off right that, when combined with other terms, amounts
to a security interest in substance.
13
U.C.C. § 9-104(a) (2014).
14
Id. at § 9-104(a)(1).
15
Id. at § 9-104(a)(2)-(3).
16
Id. at § 9-104(b).
11
12
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so by its customer.17 The result is a “secret lien,” the very mischief that
the general requirement for perfection was intended to alleviate.18
A secured creditor who obtains control of a deposit account
has priority over a secured creditor who perfects its security right by
registration even if registration preceded the obtaining of control.19
The privileged status accorded to security rights perfected by control
at the level of priority carries over to enforcement on default. If the
secured creditor has control by virtue of its status as the depository
bank, it may simply apply the funds credited to the deposit account to
the obligation secured by the deposit account.20 If the secured creditor
is an outside creditor who has obtained control by virtue of a control
agreement or because it has become the bank’s customer on the
account, it may instruct the bank to pay the balance on deposit.21 If,
however, the secured creditor is relying on perfection by registration
as opposed to control, it may enforce its security right only by
obtaining a court order under other law compelling the bank to pay
the funds to it.22 The secured creditor has no right to demand payment
simply on notification to the bank. In contrast, the depository bank, in
its capacity as secured creditor with automatic control, is entitled to
simply pay itself out of the funds in the account, and outside secured

Id. at § 9-342.
Lynn M. LoPucki, Arvin I. Abraham & Bernd P. Delahaye, Optimizing
English and American Security Interests, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1785, 1800 (2013);
Jonathan C. Lipson, Secrets and Liens: The End of Notice in Commercial Finance Law, 21
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 421, 426 (2005).
19
Under Article 9, control is the only method available for perfecting a
security right in a deposit account as original collateral: U.C.C. § 9-312(b)(1) (2014).
However, a security right in a deposit account perfected by control may come into
conflict with one perfected by registration where the deposit account is claimed as
proceeds of collateral perfected by public registration pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-315(c)
and (d). In that event, the security interest perfected by control has priority under
U.C.C. § 9-327(1). Under the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, while a security right
in a deposit account may be made effective against third parties by registration even
when the deposit account is original collateral (recommendation 49), the secured
creditor who has obtained control has priority even against a prior registered secured
creditor (recommendation 103). See UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2.
20
U.C.C. § 9-607(a)(4) (2014).
21
Id. at § 9-607(a)(5).
22
Id. at § 9-607, cmt. 7.
17
18
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creditors who have obtained control are likewise entitled to self-help
collection rights without the need for judicial intervention.
As between the depository bank and outside secured creditors
who seek to perfect a security right in a deposit account by control, the
control regime privileges the depository bank. The depository bank is
not obligated to enter into a control agreement with an outside secured
creditor, even if its customer so requests, and even if it does not itself
hold a security right in the account.23 If the bank does agree to enter
into a control agreement, any security right the bank obtains in the
deposit account has priority even if the control agreement was
concluded before the bank acquired its security right.24 So in practice
the outside secured creditor will also need to obtain the agreement of
the depository bank to waive its priority.
In theory, an outside secured creditor can be assured of priority
over the depository bank by relying on the alternative method of
control: becoming the bank’s customer with respect to the deposit
account.25 This method of control gives it priority over any security
interest acquired by the bank26 and terminates the bank’s set-off right
for any claims it has against the debtor.27 However, this method of
control requires the cooperation of the bank, so in practice the bank’s
consent to waive its priority is needed.28 Nor is this method of control
a feasible one for operating accounts to which the debtor needs regular
access.29
III.

OFFICIAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SPECIAL CONTROL RULES

The official justifications for the Article 9 control rules are not
particularly convincing. With respect to the priority enjoyed by control
secured creditors over those who have perfected by registration, the
Id. at § 9-342.
Id. at § 9-327(3).
25
Id. at § 9-104(a)(3).
26
Id. at § 9-327(4).
27
Id. at § 9-340(c).
28
See, e.g., Willa E. Gibson, Banks Reign Supreme Under Revised Article 9
Deposit Account Rules, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 844 (2005).
29
Markell, supra note 6, at 987; see also G.R. Warner, Deposit Accounts as
Collateral under Revised Article 9, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18 (Aug. 2000).
23
24
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Official Comment states that secured creditors “for whom the deposit
account is an integral part of the credit decision will, at a minimum,
insist upon the right to immediate access to the deposit account upon
the debtor’s default (i.e., control)” whereas those “for whom the
deposit account is less essential will not take control.”30 The
implication here seems to be that a secured creditor who demonstrates
special reliance by taking the extra steps needed to obtain control
should be rewarded for its efforts by a special priority.31 But this
justification is predicated on circular reasoning, since a secured creditor
would not have to take these extra steps if priority were instead
predicated on the basis of the order of registration of the security
rights.
With respect to the priority generally enjoyed by the bank over
outside secured creditors, the Official Comment explains that a “rule
of this kind enables banks to extend credit to their depositors without
the need to examine either the public record or their own records to
determine whether another party might have a security interest in the
deposit account.”32 But this is a conclusory statement, not a
justification. After all, all secured creditors would wish to be assured
of receiving an automatic super-priority over prior-perfected secured
creditors. Why privilege depository banks over other suppliers of
secured credit?
With respect to the automatic control enjoyed by the
depository bank by virtue of its status, the official comment states that
public notice is unnecessary since all actual and potential creditors are
always on notice that the bank may assert a claim by virtue of its setoff rights against the deposit account.33 The implication here is that
awarding automatic control and a special priority to a depository
bank’s security right does not put third parties in a more
U.C.C. § 9-327, cmt. 3 (2014).
For an argument suggesting that this is the justification for control
super-priority, see Randal C. Picker, Perfection Hierarchies and Nontemporal Priority Rules
74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1157 (1999).
32
U.C.C. § 9-327, cmt. 4 (2014).
33
Id. at § 9‐ 104, cmt. 3 (“No other form of public notice is necessary;
all actual and potential creditors of the debtor are always on notice that the bank with
which the debtor’s deposit account is maintained may assert a claim against the
deposit account.”).
30
31
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disadvantageous position than they already occupy. It is true that setoff is not a security interest and as such is not subject to any public
registration or other public notice requirement. However, a bank can
only set-off obligations already owing to it by its customer at the time
it receives notice of a competing claim.34 The concept of automatic
control, combined with the special priority accorded to the depository
bank’s security right, dispenses with the need for the bank to first
ascertain whether notice has been received before extending credit and
eliminates the potential for litigation concerning the relative timing of
the receipt of notice and the extension of credit.35 It follows that the
concept of automatic control without the need for public notice
cannot be explained simply as a neutral and logical application of the
consequences of set off. Rather, it enhances the bank’s position
relative to the set-off rights of other obligors.
With respect to the right of the bank to refuse to disclose
whether control has been obtained by an outside secured creditor, the
Official Comment explains that this protects banks “from the need to
respond to inquiries from persons other than their customers.”36 But
requiring outside secured creditors to register notice of their security
rights would equally relieve the bank from that burden while also
serving to ensure public notice to competing creditors and other
claimants.
IV.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR IMPORTING THE ARTICLE 9 CONTROL
REGIME INTO CANADIAN LAW

Writing in 2000, some Canadian commentators concluded that
there was no justification for importing the Article 9 regime for deposit
accounts into Canadian law.37 Why, they asked, should depository
institutions be exempt from the general registration requirements and
first-to-register priority rules applicable to the holders of security rights
in other intangible obligations? And why should they enjoy what
See, e.g., CUMING, WALSH & WOOD, supra note 7, at 664.
See UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 139, ¶ 144.
36
U.C.C. § 9‐ 342, cmt 2 (2014).
37
Ronald C.C. Cuming & Catherine Walsh, Revised Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: Implications for the Canadian Personal Property Security Acts, 16 BANKING
FIN. L. REV. 339, 364-68 (2001).
34
35

358

2015

Walsh

4:1

amounts in effect to a veto over the ability of a debtor to give an
effective security interest in its deposit account to an outside creditor
when the existing law, including the depository bank’s rights of set-off,
would seem to offer it adequate protection against interference with
ordinary banking practices?
In recent years, the tide of opinion in Canada has swung
heavily in favor of adoption of the Article 9 control approach.38
Indeed, the province of Quebec already has introduced legislation to
that end, and reforms are pending in the other provinces and
territories.39
A significant catalyst for the pending reforms was the 2009
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Caisse populaire Desjardins
de l’Est de Drummond v. Canada.40 In that case, a customer had deposited
$200,000 with a credit union subject to contractual terms that
prevented the customer from withdrawing the deposit before the
expiry of a five-year term and entitled the credit union to set-off any
obligations owing under the line of credit it had extended to the
customer and to refuse repayment of the deposit for the duration of
the line of credit agreement.41
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that, while a mere
contractual set-off right without more is not a security interest, the
arrangement must be characterized as a security agreement in
substance when a contractual set-off right is combined with other
contractual terms designed to prevent the customer from withdrawing
or otherwise dealing with the funds in its account until its own
See Ontario Bar Association, Perfecting Security Interests in Cash Collateral
(Feb. 6, 2012), available at
https://www.oba.org/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=c020380c-6c0a-496f-b4b1b44d6ac07eb5.
39 See Michel Deschamps, Mathieu Dubord & Mary Jeanne Phelan, New
Regime in Quebec for Security on Bank Deposits and Other Monetary Claims, MCCARTHY
TETRAULT
(May
15,
2015),
http://
http://www.mccarthy.ca/article_detail.aspx?id=7105. See also ONTARIO MINISTRY
OF GOVERNMENT AND CONSUMER SERVICES, BUSINESS LAW AGENDA: PRIORITY
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REPORT 9 (2015).
40
Caisse populaire Desjardins de l’Est de Drummond v. Canada, [2009]
2 S.C.R. 94 (Can.).
41
Id.
38
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obligations to the bank are satisfied.42 Although the decision related to
the concept of security for the purposes of income tax legislation, it
was widely seen as jeopardizing the use of “cash collateral” in the form
of a customer’s right to the payment of money credited to a deposit
account in the context of derivatives and securities lending
transactions.43 Participants in these markets had thought they might
protect their priority in “cash collateral” transactions by relying on
“flawed asset” contractual arrangements under which the customer
agrees that money deposited by the customer is not repayable until the
occurrence of specified events. If these arrangements, as the Drummond
case correctly implied,44 are characterized as giving rise to a security
right in substance, it follows that they are required to be perfected by
registration, and will be subordinated to any prior-registered
competing security right unless the secured creditor obtains a
subordination agreement.45 In contrast, adoption of an Article 9
control approach would enable secured creditors and particularly
banks to obtain a first ranking security right to deposit accounts in cash
collateral transactions without the need to register and without any risk
of subordination to prior-registered secured creditors. Consequently,
in the wake of the Drummond decision, the financial industry stepped
up its lobbying efforts to import the Article 9 treatment of deposit
accounts into Canadian law46 with success now imminent.

Id.
See, e.g., Anthony Duggan, The Australian PPSA From a Canadian
Perspective: Some Comparative Reflections 11-13 (U. Toronto Law, Working Paper No.
2014-03, 2014), available at
http://www.law.utoronto.ca/utfl_file/count/documents/Duggan/WPS%2020143.pdf.
44
CUMING, WALSH & WOOD, supra note 7, at 667, 143-46.
45
Duggan, supra note 43, at 12.
46
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION
(ISDA), ISDA LETTER TO ALBERTA AND ONTARIO GOVERNMENTS RE PROPOSAL
FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE TREATMENT OF DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS UNDER THE PPSA
(Apr. 13, 2010), available at http://www2.isda.org/regions/canada/page/3.
42
43
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CONCLUSION
Whatever the official explanation for the Article 9 control
approach, the recent Canadian experience suggests that its primary
purpose is to facilitate the use of deposit accounts in cash collateral
transactions in derivatives and other financial markets. Dispensing
with the public registration requirements and registration based
temporal priority rules that traditionally have informed Canadian
secured transactions law will come at a cost to creditors in the real
economy. For example, secured creditors who finance a commercial
debtor’s operating costs, including its acquisition of inventory, will no
longer be able to rely on registration to give them an enforceable
security right in the debtor’s deposit account. They will need to
undergo the additional expense and effort of obtaining control,
including negotiating the agreement of the bank with which the
account is maintained to waive its own priority. Unsecured creditors
are also disadvantaged. At present, they can determine whether it is
worth their time and expense to obtain a judgment and garnish their
debtors’ deposit accounts by searching the registry to verify whether
any security rights have been granted in those accounts. While these
creditors still would be subject to any set off rights enjoyed by the
bank, they would at least know that those set off rights would be
limited to the credit extended to the bank at the time of enforcement
against the bank.
Recent scholarship argues that, while facilitating the extension
of secured credit has a positive impact on economic growth when it is
directed to the real economy, its effect when channeled to the financial
economy may be destructive, generating price bubbles and subsequent
debt deflation.47 If that argument is correct, we may yet come to regret
dismantling the general requirements of secured transactions law in
order to facilitate the extension of credit based on deposit account
collateral in financial markets48 while increasing the cost of and thereby

For an analysis of the scholarship, see Richter, supra note 3.
Id. at 10-11 (discussing the Financial Collateral Directive in the
European Union, which, in a similar vein to the Article 9 control regime, seeks to
exempt financial collateral from most of the formal requirements traditionally
imposed on security arrangements).
47
48
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diminishing the extension of credit to financers of real economy
services and products.49

49 This is not to reject altogether the proposition that some protection of
the finality of ‘cash collateral’ transactions in financial markets may be justified to
contain systemic risk. Rather, it is a plea for a more nuanced and targeted modality.
In this respect, consider, for example, the amendments effected to the Canadian
Payment Clearing and Settlement Act (S.C. 1996, c. 6, Sch.) in 2012 to add a provision (s.
8(1)(c)) to protect the finality of payments made or property delivered or transferred
“in accordance with the settlement rules of designated clearing and settlement
systems” notwithstanding anything in any Canadian or provincial statute (including
provincial secured transactions statutes).
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INTRODUCTION
In order to ease the study of the science of commercial law,
the subject has been classified in four large universes: (1) persons, (2)
objects of commerce, (3) legal instruments derived from business
relations, and (4) administrative and jurisdictional procedures. The
administrative procedures are held in front of administrative courts
and the jurisdictional procedures in front of judicial courts.
Within the universe of commercial relations, where persons
and objects converge, all legal instruments are, and operate as, a
support for commercial exchanges. An example of this is commercial
contracts, which due to their nature are known in this universe as
atypical contracts1.
In the large world of business transactions, the central aspect
that stands out is the commercial enterprise, that is, the “juridical
person.” To ensure that enterprises may conduct their activity they
require a “juridical personality,” which allows for the exercise of rights
and fulfillment of obligations that lead us to the study of legitimation.
The legal instruments most widely used by corporations are the
atypical contracts. These legal instruments lead us to analyze the
juridical person, taking into consideration that it implies another
extensive field of study known as the “delimitation of competence of
the parties” who participate in the contract, as generating entities of
rights and duties, that revolves around legitimation of personality,
which, at the same time, could be a point of dispute in business
transactions.
The problem about the legitimation of personality,
notwithstanding that apparently accepted the terms juridical person
and juridical personality, the scope of legal consequences for both,
provoke incalculable and diverse conflicts (the lack of legitimation for
act in name of a company, when the legal representative acts without
authorization of the part involved) not only at domestic level, but also

Atypical contracts are those whose content has no control or the
discipline does not exist in the legislation regarding to the relationship in private law
between individuals who contract
1
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at regional and global levels. This can be positive, in that it can enrich
the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce and improve
model laws that provide cross-border judicial support. However, this
can also have a negative impact, giving rise to large and spiraling
expenses, when one of the parties must ask for consultant support
because they do not know the language (procedural rules and
regulations of the proceedings), in the administrative or judicial
proceedings.
To analyze the subject matter of this study, the “juridical
person,” which has been a topic for discussion since the 19th century
up to the 21st century, a consultation among authors including
Bonnecase, Carnelutti, Savigny, Hans Kelsen, Nicolai Hartman,
Ferrara, De Benito, Garcia Maynez, Rudolph Von Ihering, has been a
strict scientific commitment, concluding with the personal
contribution provided by Arcelia Quintana, has been updated.
I.

PERSON

A person is juridically classified in two groups: natural persons
and juridical persons.2 The first group refers to a human being, who is
an individual being capable of assuming obligations and capable of
holding rights. The second group refers to those entities endowed with
juridical personality who are usually known as a collective person,3
social person,4 or legal entity. In this paper, the term “entity” will be
often used when referring to this second group.
II.

GENERAL CONCEPT

ARCELIA QUINTANA, COMMERCIAL LAW SCIENCE 270 (2d ed. 2004).
The term collective legal entity is used by Francisco Carnelutti and it
has been the subject of studies in various areas of general law. See FRANCISCO
CARNELUTTI, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW 153 (1955).
4
See JOSE L. DE BENITO, THE LEGAL PERSONHOOD OF COMPANIES
AND 32 (1955).
2
3
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Etymology.

Beginning with an etymological understanding of “person,” we
must reconcile the juridical fiction with what the law defines as a
juridical person.
The word “person” has multiple meanings.5 From an
etymological sense this word is derived from personare,6 a term that
denotes larva histrionalis, meaning “mask.” In this manner, the person
acted as the mask covering the face of an actor who recited verses
during a scene in a play because the purpose of the mask was to make
the actor’s voice resonant and loud. Later, people used the term
“person” in reference to the masked actor himself. In view of the
above, it is quite understandable to associate the person as a natural
being of the human species.7
B.

Doctrine.

The term “person” has been an important concept in the
general scope of law, in civil matters.
In order to determine what should be understood by “person,”
diverse legal scholars have created varied studies attempting to clarify
its origin.
These studies described below express and analyze diverse
positions developed by different legal scholars8 whose ideas have
served as a model to identify the different trends of thought explaining
the juridical person. In the intelligence that we exclusively expect to
establish for science of commercial law effect, the relevant items that
5

See EDUARDO G. MAYNEZ, INTRODUCTION TO LAW 273 (Porrúa 31st

ed. 1980).
6
See id. (Aulo Gelio quoted by Garcia Maynez, determined through their
glossological research that the origins of the word “person” are unclear but most
likely derives from the word “pesonare”).
7
ROYAL SPANISH ACADEMY, DICTIONARY OF SPANISH LANGUAGE,
voice, person (Espasa, 1593).
8
Among the authors who have devoted themselves to the study of the
“person” are Francisco Ferrara, Hans Kelsen, Francisco Carnelutti, M.F.C. de
Savigny, Joseph L. Benito, and Eduardo Garcia Maynez, whose works are reviewed
in this paper.

367

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:1

allow us to specify on the commercial matter what we should
understand by “legal entity” or “juridical person” as an entity capable
of having obligations and rights.
Francisco Carnelutti9 understands “person” in a triangular
sense. He views the subject as the vertex in which the personal interest
(economic element) and the subjective right (legal element) coincide in
a legal relationship.
Legal subject
(person)

Personal Interest
(economic element)

Substantive Law
(legal element)

For Carnelutti, the person is the “meeting point of these two
elements, that is, the crux of the matter where both converge.”10
Carnelutti clarifies that the juridical person is not only the man
considered in his individuality. Instead, Carnelutti affirms that where
collective interest exists, i.e. leading several men as one, unity is allowed
to emerge, and personality as a unit will be acquired.
The collective juridical person, as Carnelutti expresses, is
created when the economic element and the juridical element of the
relationship is the meeting point of more than one man, which is the
fundamental principle of this unification of the collective interest.
For Carnelutti, a juridical person is a natural or individual
person as well as a collective or compound person,11 and both hold a
common characteristic: they are the meeting point of the economic
and juridical element. The latter differs from the fact that it is not a
single individual in that position, instead it is two or more individuals
who are united by a collective interest.

9
10
11

See FRANCISCO CARNELUTTI, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW 149 (1955).
Id.
Id. at 143.
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Julien Bonnecase12 on the other hand, defines the juridical
personality law as a set of rules and institutions that apply to the person
itself, in its individuation and its power of action. For him, the
personality law is classified in three parts:
1. The existence and individuation of persons, which means
the set of elements that allow on one hand social
distinction of the person, and on the other hand, a
determination of juridical effect. The elements that allow
for further distinction are its name, its legal status, and its
address.
2. The legal capacity of natural persons and their variations:
on one hand the guidelines of the organization in regard to
capacity of natural persons and their variations (capacity to
enjoy and exercise capacity with their limits), and on the
other hand the study of the legal bodies which substitute
for the incapacity of natural persons.
3. The existence, individuation, and capacity of legal entities
or juridical persons, which is the subject matter of this
paper.
M.F.C. de Savigny13 is the strongest proponent of the
traditional theory, better known as the theory of fiction.
From the analysis of Savigny’s proposed theories, it is
understood that the legal entity is an artificially-created being, capable
of having a patrimony, but distinguished by its lack of will. Savigny
concludes that a “person” is any entity capable of having obligations
and rights because the juridical persons are legal fictions, therefore they
do not have free will and are not subjects of law. According to this
trend of thought, the term “person” applies only to the human being

12
See 1 JULIEN BONNECASE, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL LAW 281 (Jose M.
Cajica trans., 1945).
13
His book, Modern Roman Law System, elaborated on the foundations of
his theory of fiction, which dominated from the mid-nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. See M.F.C. SAVIGNY, MODERN ROMAN LAW SYSTEM 304 (Jacinto Mesía
& Manuel Poley trans., 2009).
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because it holds the will to acquire rights and duties, and for the same
reason, becomes a subject of law.
Hans Kelsen14 argues that according to the traditional theory,
a “subject of law” refers to the object of a legal obligation or subjective
right. This is known as the juridical power to claim an action for the
enforcement of an obligation. In view of this juridical power, the
subject participates in the production of the court judgement
considered as an individual norm that will rule on the enforcement of
the penalty derived from that default.
In sum, for Kelsen15 the natural person and the juridical person
are merely a set of rights and obligations which, when taken together,
are metaphorically expressed as the concept of “person.” In this way,
the natural or juridical person as a holder has legal obligations and
subjective rights which are metaphorically expressed in the concept of
person, which is nothing more than the personification of that unity.
Garcia Maynez16 defines a “person” as “any being capable of
having powers and duties.” He maintains that juridical persons are
classified as either natural persons or legal entities. While the first
group refers to human beings as a subject of rights and obligations, the
second group focuses on those associations endowed with personality
such as unions or commercial corporations. Maynez prefers to
distinguish between the two groups by using the terms “individual
juridical person” and “collective juridical person”17 with the purpose
of distinguish them.” In a moral or ethical sense, a “person” is a subject
endowed with free will and reason, capable of establishing its own
purposes freely as well as finding means to complete them.
Maynez affirms from an ethical point of view, and in
accordance with the thesis of the German philosopher Nicolai
Hartmann,18 that a “person” is the subject whose conduct is able to
14

See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 178 (Robert J. Vernengo

trans., 2000).
15
16

Id. at 183.
See EDUARDO G. MAYNEZ, INTRODUCTION TO LAW 21 (31st ed.,

1980).
17
18

Id.
Id. at 274-275.
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express moral values. He clarifies that those values do not necessarily
determine its conduct, in such a manner that ethically speaking, free
will is one of the essential attributions of personality.
The juridical meaning of a natural person is related with
determination if the juridical personality is the necessary consequence
of its quality as a human being; in a sense that the juridical personality
of the individual does not derive from his human existence.
In respect to the concept of legal entity, Maynez states that it
should be viewed through the “theories of juridical personality of
collective beings.”19


Theory of Fiction (Savigny). Savigny sustains that a person
is any being capable of obligations and rights, and rights
are only for beings who are endowed with will, therefore,
the juridical subjectivity of collective persons is a result of
this fiction, since such beings do not have a free will.20



Theory of Rights without Subject (Brinz). Brinz classifies
the patrimony in two categories: personal and nonpersonal, also known as patrimonies attached to a
destination or purpose. In the first category they belong to
a subject, while in the second category they do not have an
owner, but their destination is addressed by a particular
purpose and enjoys special legal guarantees. Here, although
the rights exist, they do not belong to anyone but to
something.21



Realist Theories. The realist theories affirm that private
and public juridical persons are realities, therefore, the
concept of subject of law is not limited to man, and does

Id. at 278-94.
Id. at 278.
21
Id. at 282–83 (stating that, “[t]he rights and obligations of collective
persons are not, according to the Brinz thesis, the obligations and rights of a subject,
but of its assets. The acts carried out by the former’s agents are not exactly those of
the legal person but rather those of the agents that carry out the objectives and reach
the goal toward which the assets are dedicated. Despite this, all rights are, a fortiori,
the legal power of someone and any obligation necessarily implies the existence of
an obligee.”).
19
20
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not exclusively refer to beings endowed with will. These
theories also include the “organicism,”22 the collective soul
theory,23 and the thesis of the social organism.24


Theory of Francisco Ferrara. For this author, the word
“person” has three meanings: a biological sense, which is
equal to a man; a philosophical sense, which is identified
with a rational being capable of proposing and carrying out
purposes; and the juridical sense which understands the
person as a subject with rights and obligations.25
Specifically for this juridical sense Ferrara states that it is a
way things are, because behind the person there is not any
other thing but associations and corporate organizations.26

Maynez27 expressed a critique to Ferrara’s ideas, stating that the
recognition of juridical personality by the substantive law does not
have constitutive effectiveness. That is to say, the juridical person is
not born at the discretion of the legislator, the only thing the legislator
does is to recognize its existence.
The diversity of the approaches around the concept of person
make it necessary to contemplate the following comparative table to
clearly understand the concept:

22
Id. at 287 (organicism is based on the notion that “collective entities
are real entities compared to the human individual.”).
23
According to this school of thought, in every society there exists a soul
or collective spirit that is different than the individual souls of those who make up
the group, which is why it is not problematic that collective legal entities coexist
alongside physical persons.
24
Id. at 287 (The chief proponent of the theory of social organism is Otto
Gierke, who says that “the collective person is not like a third party compared to its
members, it is the organic link that binds them together, from which stems the
possibility of connecting the rights of the unit and the whole. The corporative person
is undoubtedly above, but not separate from, the collective group of persons who
make it up; . . . it is an entity that is both unique and collective.”).
25
Id. at 288.
26
See FRANCISCO FERRARA, THEORY OF LEGAL PERSONS 342 (Eduardo
Shepherd & Maury trans., 1929).
27
See EDUARDO G. MAYNEZ, INTRODUCTION TO LAW 294 (31st ed.
1980).
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Person

Doctrinal Concept

FRANCISCO
CARNELUTTI

Is the meeting point between the economic
element and the juridical element.

M.F.C. DE
SAVIGNY

Person is any being capable of obligations
and rights, who is endowed with will.

HANS KELSEN

The object of a legal obligation or
subjective right.

EDUARDO
GARCÍA
MÁYNEZ

Any being capable of having powers and
duties.

EDUARDO
GARCÍA
MÁYNEZ

As a subject with rights and obligations.

In this study, the first authors are from the classical theory and
the last authors are from modern theory, demonstrating that the theory
itself has not changed. Thus, the comparative analysis of classical
theory and modern theory becomes more explicit.
III.

ELEMENTS THAT SHAPE THE LEGAL ENTITY

As the concept of “person” has been analyzed in its
etymological sense and by the main exponents of the doctrine, it is
now necessary to study the elements that contribute to the juridical
person.
A.

Doctrine

As mentioned, for Kelsen both natural persons and legal
entities hold physical rights and obligations. In principle, only the
human being is considered a person, because it is exactly its conduct
that may infer a right, comply with or fail an obligation. Both natural
and juridical persons express conduct which is understood as the
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content of juridical obligations and subjective rights that conform to
this unity.
In reference to the duties of the juridical person, its bylaws, as
internal regulations, determine or constrain the conduct of the
individual who-as a body of the same-fulfills or violates the obligation.
This circumstance of non-fulfilment in the juridical person is known
as the “fictitious attribution”28 which allows for the consideration of
the legal entity as capable of being bound by obligations.
As to the subjective rights of the juridical person, Kelsen
believes that they are exercised by a body of administration contained
in the bylaws, and shall be conferred to the legal entity according to
the bylaws.29 According to this author, the bylaws acquire validity by
means of a juridical transaction determined by state order.
Finally, Kelsen30 defines the juridical personality of the legal
entity, which means that the legal order provides obligations and rights
and their content is the conduct of human beings who are the bodies
or members of the corporation organized by its bylaws and may be
described with advantages by means of a personification of the
corporation´s charter.
The elements of the legal entity deduced from the theory of
Kelsen are the following:


The being or artificial person;



Conduct;



Legal capacity;



Subjective rights;



Obligations;

28

See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 196 (Robert J. Vernengo

trans., 2000).
29
30

Id. at 191.
Id. at 199.
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The will; and



Juridical personality.
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José L. De Benito,31 from his point of view, sets forth the
following as “conditions” for the existence of a juridical or corporate
person:


Plurality of individuals;



Cooperation;



Organization;



Exclusive patrimonial capacity; and



Corporate purpose.

The elements of a juridical person defined by Carnelutti are as
follows:

B.



Legal capacity;



Juridical personality;



Economic element; and



Juridical element.

Personal opinion of the author


The elements that contribute to the formation of a legal
person are the following:



Existence of a being or subject: A subject of law is any
being capable to act as holder of powers, or liable with

Professor of the National Academy of Legislation and Jurisprudence
of the National Association of Historians of the Spanish Science. De Benito refers
to the personality not as an element of the legal person, but as the result of a
combination of the five elements. For him, that personality is the recognition the
person expresses in front of the public.
31
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obligations in a juridical relationship. The term subject of
law or juridical being alludes to an unspecified person in
terms of strict law.

C.



Will of the subject or being. The action of a subject with
the intention of producing certain legal effects, and should
be highlighted its importance for the law, since this will
should be also expressed in an appropriate manner to
produce legal consequences.



Subjective rights. This refers to the power of the juridical
norms which is granted to express or omit certain conduct
that ensures the judicial protection.



Juridical personality. This section requires a study to be
discussed separately.



Obligations. The obligation is understood as the existing
juridical bond between the demand of a subjective right by
its holder and the duty to fulfill the conduct based on the
norm that is imposed on the other subject who belongs to
the relationship.



Economic interests.

Juridical personality.

In the juridical field, the word personality has several meanings.
It is often used to indicate the quality of a person to be considered as
a center of juridical norms or as a subject of rights and obligations.
For the purpose of taking part of juridical relationships, the
legal entity needs the so-called personality as an element that
individualizes the entity. It is helpful to distinguish the legal entity from
a different subject of law with a will that may be found in a similar
factual circumstance.
1. Theories of personality - This study analyzes the most
emblematic theories of personality that intended to explain personality
in relation to business corporations, such as the patrimony
appropriation theory, the theory of the apparent subject, the atomistic
376
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theory of the state, the theory of fiction, the theory of the legal act, and
the controversial theory of veil.
We have mentioned that, except for the theory of the legal act
which establishes the difference between “person” and “personality,”
none of these theories explains what personality is, but analyze the
juridical person in general. Even so, these theories have been described
by authors such as Garcia Maynez32 and Cervantes Ahumad, among
others, as “theories of personality” even when considering the juridical
person itself rather than its personality.
Finally, we should emphasize the exposure of the reference
theories can be viewed through Franciscos Ferrara33 in his work
“Theory of Legal Persons.” This author developed, in an objective and
systematic way, the study of the doctrinal ideas now discussed, which
in turn have been studied by several authors such as Garcia Maynez34,
Mantilla Molina35 and Antonio Brunetti.36
(1) The patrimony appropriation theory. - This theory
considers that there exists the same legal protection to one good and
one person in a legal relationship than such created between patrimony
and purpose. In this manner, the purpose receives rights and
obligations, that is to say, a patrimony appropriated or earmarked for
certain purpose.
In this theory there are no elements to identify what personality
is, even when intending to put on the same level one subject of law
with a “purpose” with rights, understood as patrimony that is able to
generate rights and obligations; however, an inert patrimony is not
susceptible of creating de jure relationships. For such effects, a volitive
being or person is required, whether it is natural or juridical, because
juridical relationships presuppose the expression of a conduct that
produces consequences of law. At the time one subject expresses or
EDUARDO G. MAYNEZ, INTRODUCTION TO LAW 278 (31st ed. 1980).
It is worth mentioning that Ferrara is located, by temporality, very close
to the time that such doctrinal positions were exposed. See FRANCISCO FERRARA,
THEORY OF LEGAL PERSONS 122 (Eduardo Shepherd & Maury trans., 1929).
34
MAYNEZ, supra note 32, at 274, 280, 293.
35
ROBERTO L. MANTILLA MOLINA, COMMERCIAL LAW 207 (29th ed.
2002)
36
ANTONIO BRUNETTI, JOINT STOCK COMPANY 45 (1960).
32
33
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personifies himself juridically, it is required that this subject has will
because only in that way is it possible to produce consequences of law,
which also allows individualization of the volitive subject in respect to
other persons who intervene in those relationships.
(2) Theory of the apparent subject. - The theory of the
apparent subject was developed by Rudolph Von Ihering,37 who argues
that the law consists of two elements. One element is substantial,
which resides in the practical end that produces utility or enjoyment of
the things that have economic or moral value, and, the other element,
formal, is only related to this aim as a means of enjoyment protection;
so this author asserts: “the rights are interests juridically protected; the
law is the legal certainty of enjoyment.”38
For Ihering, only the natural person has personality because it
is the sole recipient of the protected interests (the above mentioned),
contrary to juridical persons who do not enjoy said prerogative. The
juridical personality of legal entities is something that is not inherent
to the quality of man because personality does not derive from the will
of natural persons.
Although the legal entity has its own legal interests, this does
not mean that personality resides essentially in norms. This is because
even when law is effectively “a set of substantive and adjective
norms”39 used to regulate the life of man; these norms by themselves
do not create personality, in contrast, they only recognize a situation
can be useful as a factor of individualization for the volitive subject,
even when this subject suffers a reduction in its capacity.
(3) Atomistic theory of the state. - This theory stems from
the idea that the creation of the State is grounded in the conception of
Rudolf Von Ihering was born in Aurich, Germany in 1818. His legal
training took place at the universities of Heidelberg, Munich, Göttingen, and Berlin.
He served as a teacher in Basel, Rostok, Kiel, Gissen, Vienna, and Göttingen, where
he died in 1892. His methodological points of view had a great impact on the field
of historical legal research and the science of law in general.
38
RUDOLF VON IHERING, THE SPIRIT OF ROMAN LAW 1033, 1040
(1998).
39
ARCELIA QUINTANA, COMMERCIAL LAW SCIENCE 6 (2d ed. 2004) (the
law is “a set of substantive and procedural rules issued by the state and that govern,
during the time in which they are in effect, members of a society in a given
territory.”).
37
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Ihering. This means that only men are a reality and are able to act,
therefore, personality is an attribution for individuals only, not for the
State.
The juridical person in private law is conceived as a fact ruled
by the legal order. A personality, then, is when the law recognizes the
pursuit of a common purpose by a collection of individuals, as if the
pursuit was done by a single person. This emerges when personality is
linked with a situation of fact40 recognized by the juridical norm, as a
factor of individualization of the volitive being, and it does not imply
that a sole statement defines the personality, because the recognition
of the norm is a requirement as well as the will of the being whose
norm should be individualized.
(4) Theory of fiction. - Friedrich Karl Savigny41 supported
the theory of fiction, which is considered the most disseminated and
the oldest since it prevailed until the first half of the 19th century in
Germany, and the middle of the 20th century in Italy and France42.In
conformity with this stance, only man has capacity to be a holder of
rights and obligations.
The theory of fiction sets forth the idea that the juridical
person or legal entity represents an exception to the principle that only
the natural person has capacity to act as holder of rights and
obligations. This is a result of a legal fiction that recognizes the artificial
capacity for possession or ownership of property43 by a fictitious being.
Savigny defines the juridical person as a subject of goods who
was created artificially, by virtue of the fact that said being only
develops his capacity or juridical personality within the limit of the
domain of goods, which are the only means to reach the purposes it
was created for.

40
The expression “situation of fact” is used in strict law way, understood
as factual circumstance which necessarily produce legal consequences.
41
Karl Friedrich Savigny (1779-1861) was born in Frankfurt, Germany.
He studied at the University of Gitinga and University of Merburg, and was a
professor of law in Universitu of Merburg, University of Landshut and at University
of Berlin. He was a leader in the field of legal history.
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The theory of fiction confuses personality with the capacity to
act; likewise, this theory puts in the same level the natural persons, who
are incapable juridically, with collective juridical persons. When
considering that fictitious subjects of law and those affected by a capitis
deminutio, are not able to personify themselves or express their will in
juridical relationships by themselves, in consequence, they require a
representative to exercise the personality – capacity to act – that law
provides them in a fictitious manner.
(5) Theory of the legal act. - Ferrara,44 when referring to the
juridical personality of the legal entity, argues that juridical personality
is not a thing, but instead a way things are. The juridical personality is
the organic vestment used by certain groups of men or establishments
to introduce themselves in the life of law, it is the legal configuration
certain groups of men assume in order to participate in commerce. The
personality is a juridical seal that comes from the outside to
superimpose on these phenomena of association and social order,
which may facilitate, vary, or change the substratum of the substance
subject to this juridical seal which is always a collectivity or a social
organization. For this reason, there is not a substantial difference
between corporations and non-recognized associations. Both have an
identical substratum, and the recognition of personality does not have
value other than granting to these pluralities of individuals´ variables,
which are the most appropriate form of a juridical unit.45
As derived from the theory subject matter of this section, the
legal order does not create juridical person; it only recognizes them as
individualized subjects with pre-existing rights and duties in the social
reality. This legal recognition is the element that comes to construct its
personality.
Juridical personality is a juridical fiction due to juridical person
exists by rule of law and it is necessary emphasizes it. It is necessary to
understand the rights and duties applicable to the juridical person; as
they are still the origin of legal disputes.
(6) Theory of veil. - This stance arises from the argument
that it is possible to “penetrate” the legal entity raising its “formal veil”
See FRANCISCO FERRARA, THEORY OF LEGAL PERSONS 342 (Eduardo
Shepherd & Maury trans., 1929).
45
Id.
44
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up. The theory covers the same in situations where a determined
corporate form confers directly to partners the legal consequences
from acts this entity executed to disregard it or set said legal entity
aside, with the purpose that partners respond to corporate transactions
they made with personal purposes under the protection of the
corporate structure in question, causing a patrimonial detriment to
third parties or evading legal prohibitions, that as a natural person, they
could have not overcome.
The legal scholar Rolf Serick is recognized as the pioneer in the
systematization of the study based on the analysis of diverse court
decisions. The theory of veil has its origin in United States law, having
as a frame of reference the precedent of diverse judicial resolutions
issued by United States courts, as well as opinions from different legal
scholars. This trend of thought is known as the “theory of disregard”
or doctrine of the “disregard of legal entity”.
The argument supporting this theory begins from the “abuse”
by partners of the juridical personality by commercial corporations
when they use it as “screen” for a personal benefit. These partners hide
behind “the veil” that covers them with a corporate structure, failing
contractual obligations that infringe third parties interests and evading
the law.
Frederick James Powell is considered one of the most
representative propenents of the theory of disregard in the United
States. He has defined this theory as “the non-recognition of the
juridical personality of a commercial corporation in a concrete case,
which allows said legal entity to reach natural or juridical persons
behind the same, including the underlying economic reality, in order
to apply them the corresponding positive law for the concrete
situation.”46
In English law, Laurence Cecil Bartlett Gower47 classifies the
cases in which partners are permitted to “prescind” from the legal
personality of a commercial corporation into four categories: 1) cases
related to tax matters; 2) cases of sole partner corporations; 3) cases in

46
47

Id. at 30 (citing Nicolas H. Oreggia).
Id. at 21.
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which corporations develop their activity with fraudulent purposes; 4)
holdings and subsidiaries.
On the other hand, when making a severe critique to the
concept of juridical person, the supporters of the contractual theory
assure there are not absolute and invariable concepts, and the juridical
person should be subject to an examination; especially, if under its
scope there is an abuse of the legal personality.
Now then, the applicability of this theory has used the
technique of disregard of a legal entity, which consists of setting aside
the juridical personality of the being, penetrating in the personal
substratum of the partners (shareholders), “raising the veil up” of the
legal entity.
In Mexican Positive law48, which also involves in an implied
manner, the non-recognition of said personality, as an essential
element of the legal entity which will cause to deny that commercial
corporations are subjects or rights different to those granted to
partners who gave rise to its foundation.
The above would contradict the principle contained in Article
2 of the Law of Commercial Corporations, which recognizes a
personality in legal and illegal corporations, with the requirement for
the latter to reveal themselves as such before third parties.
As a conclusion, we may affirm that juridical personality is
conceived as a “veil” that covers the legal entity, which may be raised
up or uncovered in case of its abuse and use by the partners for their
personal benefit in prejudice of third parties or to evade the
applicability of legal provisions, which, as individual persons would fail
to observe, provided, however, that making use of said person and its
personality they do overcome such obstacles for their personal benefit.

The theory of the abuse of the juridical personality, the theory of the
underestimation of the personality, the raising up of the veil (to mention only some
of the names given to this theory).
48
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2. Requirements for the legal personality. - The requirements that
help to construct or concrete the legal personality, and, at the same
time, establish its juridical concept are the following:
First of all, the patrimony appropriation theory, the theory of
the apparent subject, the atomist theory of the State and the theory of
fiction identify personality as something innate to man, therefore they
use as synonyms the terms person and personality, even when there
are different juridical figures. Likewise, they associate personality with
will or capacity. For that reason, these theories affirm that only the
natural person holds a real personality, since a human being exclusively
has a will, the collective beings are only a fiction or an appearance.
Different from the theories cited above, the theory of legal act
recognizes the own will to the legal entity, and it also distinguishes
person and personality.
In order to produce the individualization of the subject of law,
three requirements must be fulfilled. These refer in a certain manner
to the real factor and the formal factor:
1. The existence of a being or a subject of law. To specify the
personality we require the existence of a being or a subject
of law, a volitional entity considered legally real, that could
be expressed in juridical relations.
2. A situation of fact that individualizes it in the holdership
of rights and the fulfillment of obligations. Juridical
relations, who can be established as a result of a natural
phenomenon, achieve this or the will externalized by that
subject. In such a way that this one is situated or has a status
which allows to differentiate it from the other volitive
subjects; that is, it is legally individualized.
3. The recognition of individualization by the normative legal
order. This third requirement refers to legitimation49 of the

Legitimacy comes from –legitimo- that, in turn derives from the Latin
legitimus (-a, um). In common language it means “under the rules”. In the legal
literature, legitimus means, “according to law”, “fair”. For the Romans, “designate
49
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volitive subject as a holder of determined rights or certain
obligations in a juridical relationship. It is necessary that
the being or volitive subject and the situation of fact are
under a legal rule in order to individualize that person, that
is, acquire a certain legal status.
In conclusion, personality is established when a legal
assumption is updated in reality as long as it is foreseen in a general
norm of law that describes a determined situation of fact where the
subject or undetermined person is, with the purpose to individualize it
as a holder of determined rights or certain obligations in a specific
juridical relationship.
IV.

PERSONALITY IN THE COMMERCIAL LEGISLATION.

In Mexican commercial legislation there is no precept that
defines juridical personality, even when the term is also used by said
legislation; especially in adjective or procedural aspects. Thus, the legal
provisions that refer to the juridical person generally do it in function
of the necessary quality that one person shall have to intervene in
certain legal act or legal transaction of a commercial nature.50
In other commercial laws,51 the term is used in reference to the
fact that certain beings who belong to the State, in charge of regulating

something practiced or maintained as correct; produces a favorable reaction,
approval.”
50
Código de Comercio [CCo.], as amended, art. 391, Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DO], 17 de abril de 2012 (Mex.) (unless the otherwise agree, the assignor
of goodwill will answer only for the legitimacy of the credit and for the personality
from who made the assigment).
51
Among these bodies of regulatory law are the Ley de Cámaras
Empresariales y sus Confederaciones y del Código de Comercio [Law of Chambers
of Commerce and their Confederations], as amended art. 4, Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DO], 30 de abril de 2009 (Mex.); Ley de la Casa de Moneda de México
[Law of the Mint of Mexico], art. 2, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de
enero de 1986 (Mex.); Ley Federal de Proteccion al Consumidor [LPC] [Federal
Consumer Protection Law], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO] 24 de diciembre
de 1992 (Mex.); Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles [LGSM] [General Law for
Commercial Corporations], Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DO], 4 de agosto de
1934 (Mex.).
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several aspects of the commercial activity, have juridical personality of
their own, without expressing what it means.
The reference to personality cited in said legal systems is
generally in a negative way, that is, it refers to the inexistence or loss
of the same; it is a contrario sensu circumstance that allows to affirm that
persons shall demonstrate the existence of that element to execute
certain juridical acts.
The adjective precepts of the Commercial Code52 that rule this
juridical figure, do not provide a definition thereof; however, its
meaning is understood when determining that judges shall examine ex
officio the personality of the parties. They even foresee that litigants may
challenge such of their counterpart, when it is considered that the
plaintiff or defendant does not have the juridical quality he holds and
appears in court.
It is possible to conclude derived from the analysis above,
related to several commercial provisions in which it is proven the
concept of legal personality that we expressed as a personal opinion, it
is the appropriate because such element holds a practical applicability.
V.

THE PERSONALITY IN JURISPRUDENCE.

The criteria that has been established in federal courts does not
provide a clear concept of what personality is, because the courts are
limited to produce the text of the law with some variations, when
establishing that “personality is a matter that shall be examined in any
status of a trial and even ex officio since it is the fundamental basis of
the procedure.”53
In reference to a commercial corporation that appears at a trial,
it is necessary to show two personalities. First, from the juridical as a
legal entity who is legitimated in the legal cause. Second, as the one
from its representative, being understood that the latter shall prove it
Código de Comercio [CCo.], art. 1056–62 (regulating personhood and
the legal capacity of the parties).
52

See Jurisprudential Thesis II, Personhood: Its Study can be made in any Stage
of Trial, Even Officiously, Semanario Judicial de la Federación 1917-1995 41.
53
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has sufficient powers to act on behalf of the other, which should have
been granted by the corporate body authorized for said purposes. The
above has been considered by the jurisprudential criteria by the Second
Courtroom of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation.54
However, there are other criteria55 in which the personality of
a representative of a legal entity is still being considered as a derivation
of its principal.
Thus, the topic related to the personality of juridical persons is
controversial in the field of jurisprudence, because there is not
uniformity of criteria in the final judgements pronounced in that sense.
VI.

ELEMENTS OF THE LEGAL ENTITY IN MEXICAN
LEGISLATION

The Political Constitution of the United Mexican States in its
federal nature, in Articles 5, 13, 14, 16, 20 of sections V and IX, among
others, use the term person to refer to natural persons and legal
entities, and the Magna Carta considers them as subjects of law in
generic hypothesis that rule said precepts. From such normative
assumptions, it may be confirmed that the constitutional text alludes
to those who are holders of constitutional individual guarantees that
include the legal entity and the natural person as well. Afterwards, it is
deduced that the principal element that recognizes to the juridical
person is such of the subjective rights expressed as guarantees.
On its part, the Federal Civil Code in the First Book known as
“Book for Persons” includes natural persons in its First Title, in the
Second Book includes the legal entities. This Law details that legal
entities are the following: the Nation, the States and the Municipalities,
the other corporations of public nature recognized by this Law,
professional associations and others cited by Section XVI of Article
123 of the Federal Constitution, the mutual cooperative companies,
54
See Jurisprudential Thesis, Personhood in the Labor Process, Requirements that
Notarial Testimony must Satisfy Regarding Corporations, XII Federation Judicial Weekly
and its Gazette 112 (2000).
55
See Thesis 892, Personhood Derived Representation or Support, VI Semanario
Judicial de la Federación 1917-1995 613.
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those associations who are different to the above mentioned (natural
person and legal entity or juridical person) that propose political,
scientific, artistic, recreational purposes or any other legal purpose, as
long as they are recognized by law, as well as foreign legal entities of a
private nature.
From the above we conclude in conformity to the provisions
of the Federal Civil Code that rule the person subject matter of this
study, the following elements are deducted: subjective rights,
obligations and will.56
The commercial legislation57 also refers to the natural person
and the legal entity or juridical person, to qualify them as merchants,
applying for such affects an objective and subjective criteria as to the
first of them, and one formal for the second.58
Now then, the qualification as merchant that is provided by the
Commercial Code in respect to the juridical person, commercial
corporation, is an effect related to its juridical personality as it happens
in the Federal Labor Law that qualifies the worker to the individual
that provides a personal service who is subordinated to another,
whether it is a natural person or legal entity by means of the payment
of a salary. Accordingly, the element that is deduced from the
Commercial Code is the juridical personality of the legal entity that
allows it to individualize itself as merchant.
From the General Law of Commercial Corporations, the other
element that is deduced is concerned with the will of the juridical
person. However, this will is referred to the activities of the juridical
See section V.1 supra, the legal entity defined by doctrinal elements.
Código de Comercio [CCo.], as amended, art. 391, Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DO], 17 de abril de 2012 (Mex.).
58
ARCELIA QUINTANA, COMMERCIAL LAW SCIENCE 258 (2d ed. 2004)
(according to the subjective criterion, those who conduct themselves according to
law are merchants, regardless of whether or not they have a fixed place of business.
According to the objective criterion, merchants are persons with legal capacity to
enter into contracts and bind a business, engage in commercial transactions, and
make this their ordinary job. According to the formal criterion, merchants are the
personas morales formed upon satisfaction of the requirements of commercial statutes
or and other applicable laws).
56
57
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person itself which are reflected in the juridical relationships that are
established or created as a consequence of that conduct, from which
necessarily gathers subject rights and obligations for the juridical
person, as the case may be.
The elements of the legal entity which come from the
legislation are the juridical personality, the will, subjective rights and
obligations referred to a being or subject, which are coincident with
those detailed in the personal opinion.
VII.

ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE.

The legal entity as a subject of law has also been a topic for its
reference in the different criteria issued by the tribunals of the
federation.
In this way, as provided in an isolated jurisprudential criteria,
the Full Circuit Tribunals refer to the nature and to the juridical
personality of the legal entity, considering that “a legal entity is a
fictitious entity, whose juridical personality is expressed and exercised
by means of its representatives; since due to its nature, the juridical
persons need individuals, managers or administrators to represent
them, to act in their behalf because fictions do not operate by
themselves.”At the time of analyzing these criteria, we may deduct
other elements of juridical persons:


One of them identifies the faculties or subjective rights of
the juridical person;59



The other is considered as the will of the being of social
will; and another are60

59
See Thesis, Directors, The Inherent Powers of a Trustee are Governed by the
General Law of Business Corporations, XVI Judicial Weekly of the Federation and its
Gazette 1237 (2002).
60
See Thesis, Legal Representation and Corporate Manager, Differences Between
Functional or Organic Representation and Mandates, XII Judicial Weekly of the Federation
and its Gazette 759 (2001).
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Obligations of the legal entity.61

From the above, we may also conclude that jurisprudence
establishes the following elements of the legal entities:
1. The existence of a juridical being.
2. A will from said being which shall be foreseen in its bylaws
contained in the incorporation deed and expressed in its
representation bodies.
3. The legal entity is holder of rights and susceptible of
acquiring obligations, which the legal entity exercises and
fulfills.
4. It has a juridical personality of its own that distinguish the
same from the partners who incorporate and convert it in
a subject of law.
VIII.

DEFINITION OF THE JURIDICAL PERSON OR LEGAL ENTITY
FROM THE PERSONAL POINT OF VIEW

A legal entity is a juridical construction that is given with the
following five elements: the being or subject, its will, the subjective
rights, the obligations and the juridical personality.
In the specific case, the legal entity is individualized through
the recognition of the juridical personality that allows the same to
acquire the holdership of rights and being susceptible of obligations.
In consequence, the conduct of a juridical person implies its
will. The importance of the personality, in addition to individualizing
the subject as holder of rights and obligations, is also that it is the
suitable means to allow the legal entity to exteriorize itself juridically.
The factual circumstance that individualizes the legal entity and
the recognition made by the legal order is the essence that provides the
legal entity with a juridical personality, since it is a factor of legal
See Thesis, General Managers, cases in Which They Lack Standing to Obtain
an Amparo Remedy, III Judicial Weekly of the Federation and its Gazette 846 (1996).
61
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exteriorization that distinguishes it from other subjects who also have
a will and are capable of exercising rights and fulfilling obligations.
From the ideas above expressed it is asserted that juridical
personality is a creation of law, which function is to individualize the
subjects with rights and obligations, granting them legitimacy in the
ownership of said rights to exercise them, and fulfill its corresponding
obligations.
After we have established the arguments that support the
present research, it is possible to assert that the juridical figure subject
matter of the present study is not innate to the natural person,
therefore, may be applied to legal entities, ideal beings for the real
world, but real for the world of Law.
In effect, in juridical persons concur the five elements:
The first is related to the being or subject of law, that contrary
to what we may think, it does not need a physical body to legally exist,
and it is enough to have existence for the purpose of law.
The second element is the will of the subject, which is detailed
in its bylaws.
The third and fourth elements, related to the subjective rights
and obligations, are updated in the legal entity because the juridical
person holds a will. However, there are cases in which it is not
necessary the will in order to produce rights and obligations, since
there are facts that determine it even if the volitive aspect concurs.
As to the juridical personality, as the fifth element, we may
establish that the juridical personality also requires the conjunction of
diverse requirements for its conformation. One of the other
requirements that help to concretize the juridical personality is the
factual situation that individualizes that subject. This occurs when the
legal entity adopts one of the corporate structures foreseen in the
General Law of Commercial Corporations, which individualizes it as a
determined commercial corporation.
Besides, due to the recognition of those types of corporations
in the legal order above cited, we obtain other of the elements
390
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applicable to personality, which is the juridical recognition of such
individualization, at the same time, as a result of the concurrence of
said elements, the legal entity acquires a legitimate legal personality to
consider it as holder of rights and obligations.
In summary, we may conclude that, joining the five elements
that shall be met to conform said person, this is defined in the
following terms:
The legal entity is a subject of an abstract existence, legally
constructed with a will of its own, including rights, obligations and a
juridical personality that individualizes it in the relationships of law and
make it a center that generates rights and obligations of an economic,
financial and commercial nature.
Following the order of ideas set out above, the legal personality
is also susceptible to having a concept which will allow it to distinguish
this from the legal entity.
Personality is the individualization of the juridical person by
means of a factual situation in which it is placed, foreseen by a legal
norm that allows personality to distinguish it from other volitive beings
in the commercial-legal relationships in an environment of law where
the concrete case develops.
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THE COLOMBIAN SIMPLIFIED
CORPORATION: AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF A SUCCESS STORY IN
CORPORATE LAW REFORM
Francisco Reyes*
INTRODUCTION
On December 5, 2008, the Colombian government enacted
Law 1258.1 Over the five years since it was enacted, the country has
witnessed a revolutionary turnaround in its corporate law.2 Law 1258
introduced a new type of business entity to the Colombian system,
which is referred to as a Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada (SAS).3
* Chairman of the United Nations Commission for International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) 2015-2016. Author on the draft for the Colombian legislation on
Simplified Corporations and of the OAS proposed Model Act on Simplified
Corporations. Law Professor at Los Andes University School of Law in Colombia.
Visiting professor at University of Arizona, Stetson University College of Law,
Louisiana State University, University of Fribourg, University of Tilburg, and
Universidade Agostinho Neto de Angola.
1
L. 1258, deciembre 5, 2008, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.)
[hereinafter Law 1258].
2
See
Data:
Colombia,
THE
WORLD
BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/country/colombia (last visited Nov. 12, 2014)
(Colombia is a Latin American developing country. It has a mid-size economy, the
fourth in Latin America after Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. According to the World
Bank, its GDP for 2012 was U.S. $369.8 billion and its ranked 30th within 214
countries on the GDP 2012 index).
3
The entity’s name was taken from French legislation enacted in 1994
concerning the Société par Actions Simplifiée. Additional legal provisions of the
Colombian SAS were also transplanted from the French model. However, the entity
also derives its inspiration from U.S. and Colombian sources. In fact, certain reforms
initiated in Colombia almost twenty years ago (L. 222 deciembre, 20 1995, DIARIO
OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.)) which had a limited impact in the business community,
were reviewed and incorporated within the SAS law.
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Consistent with a progressive approach, this law reduced cumbersome
incorporation formalities to a filing before the Mercantile Registry.4
Moreover, the law streamlined operations, reduced costs, and
minimized formalistic requirements.5 Importantly, Law 1258 made it
clear that shareholders would be shielded from any liability concerning
obligations arising from corporate business. It also reduced oldfashioned prohibitions pertaining to shareholders and managers
activities and, most significantly, it reinforced an effective principle of
freedom of contract. Furthermore, Law 1258 introduced an innovative
enforcement environment where arbitration and administrative
adjudication superseded inefficient judicial procedures6.
The Colombian SAS legislation is a simple but comprehensive
legal system that governs relationships between shareholders and other
corporate participants and outsiders, and also between the participants
themselves. It is endowed with legal personality, invertor ownership,
and full-fledged limited liability. All these features are available to
corporate participants at the outset through an expeditious
incorporation system. Concerning relationships with outsiders, the law
provides a system of exceptional shareholder liability through the
4
Pursuant to L. 1258 art. 5, “the simplified corporation shall be created
through a contract or a unilateral decision, that must be consigned in a private
document filed before the Mercantile Registry . . . .” All traditional forms of business
entities that existed before the SAS are still subject to Article 110 of the Commercial
Code, whereby a company can only be created through a public deed granted before
a notary public. Such deed must contain at least the clauses referred to in already
quoted Article 110 (paragraphs 1 to 14), and fulfill the requirements set forth in L.
960, junio 20, 1970 [D.O.] (Colom.), for any instrument to be granted before a
Notary Public. For additional information on the proceedings required to create a
traditional type of business association in Colombia, see NÉSTOR HUMBERTO
MARTÍNEZ, CÁTEDRA DE DERECHO CONTRACTUAL SOCIETARIO 96 et seq.
(Abeledo Perrot ed., 2010).
5
See L. 1258, art. 5-8; see also Menos Trámites, REVISTA SEMANA, Jan. 11
2009, at 68; see also Las Sociedades por Acciones Simplificadas, REVISTA DINERO, Mar. 25,
2010, at 20. See also Ignacio Sanín Bernal, La ley SAS Remoza las Sociedades Comerciales
(y Crea, También, Nuevos Retos), in ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA SOCIEDAD POR ACCIONES
SIMPLIFICADA 47 (Franciso Reyes Villamizar ed., 2010).
6
See L. 1258, art. 40 (stating that all differences arising among the
corporation, shareholders, officers and directors can be submitted to arbitration); see
also Alejandra Buitrago, Colombia Simplifica Creación de Sociedades, PORTAFOLIO, Dec.
18, 2008, at 6 (“Conflicts in the SAS can be resolved at the Superintendency of
Companies or through private arbitration . . .”).
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application of the disregard of the legal entity theory, although
restricted to the events of abuse or fraud. As a result of the SAS
revolution, there is increasing awareness concerning the need to revise
anachronistic legal institutions that still hinder commerce and
represent an obstacle to economic development.
The creation of this successful entity has changed the manner
in which people do business in Colombia. The SAS has contributed
vigorously to the regulation of thousands of businesses that in the
absence of the benefits afforded by the new law would have never been
formalized. It has also permitted local and national governments to
collect millions of dollars in taxes.7 At the same time, the SAS has
fostered an exponential growth in franchise fees charged by mercantile
registries all over the country.8 Social security contributions, as well as
other payments to governmental agencies, have increased over the last
five years thanks to this new type of business entity.9 Furthermore,
several accounting, legal, and managing services have flourished along
with the new business realities that the SAS has brought about.10
Even more significant is the impact that the SAS has had in the
creation of new jobs. Statistical analysis suggests that the
unemployment rate may have gone down after the introduction of this
new type of business entity. According to statistical analysis rendered
by the National Office of Corporations (Superintendencia de Sociedades),

7
According to a report rendered on September 2013 by the Deputy
Superintendent for Economic and Accounting Matters at the Superintendence of
Companies (on file with author) for the years 2010 to 2012, the SAS paid significant
amounts of income taxes. In fact, the report states the following figures: Col$
1.311.589.000 for income taxes on 2010, Col$70.784.132.000 for 2011, and
Col$176.571.054.000 for 2012. For franchise taxes (i.e., registration fees) and State
registry tax see Table 6 below.
8
See report rendered by the Colombian Confederation of Chambers of
Commerce, March 2015 (on file with author).
9
Id.
10 See El Último Grito, REVISTA DINERO, Feb. 21, 2012 (stating that the
SAS is broadly use for all sorts of undertakings involving foreign investment). See also
Miguel Ramírez, Sociedades por Acciones Simplificadas (SAS) y sus Ventajas para los
Emprendedores, COLUMBIA LEGAL CORPORATION, (Sept. 1, 2013),
http://www.colombialegalcorp.com/sociedades-por-acciones-simplificadas-sasventajas-para-emprendedores/) (holding that this type of business entities are
intended to promote entrepreneurial and technological creativity and innovation).
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at least two and a half million people all over the country are employed
through the existing SAS.11
Furthermore, the SAS has displaced almost all traditional
business forms that existed during the 1971 Colombian Commercial
Code rule.12 Today these outdated forms represent 3.4% of business
entities that file articles of association before the country’s fifty-two
Mercantile Registries.13 Not surprisingly, the remaining 96.6% of new
incorporations corresponds to the formation of new Simplified
Corporations.14 This is probably due to the formalistic nature of the
previous regulation and the SAS’ reduced transaction costs, simplified
structure, and contractual flexibility. Moreover, the new type of entity
has sparked legal innovation and fostered new business structures that
were difficult to design in the recent past.
Law 1258 also sought to curtail opportunistic behavior by
controlling shareholders, directors, and officers. By replacing ex ante
directory rules with ex post legal standards, it has allowed for more
nuanced scrutiny of the insiders’ activities. Standards such as good
faith and fiduciary duties of directors and officers (also applicable to
controlling shareholders)15 are intended to promote honest behavior in
the day-to-day affairs of the corporation.16 In order to make these new

See supra note 7.
Those types of entities were: (1) The General Partnership (Sociedad
Colectiva), (2) The Corporation (Sociedad Anónima), (3) The Limited Liability
Company (Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada), (4) The Limited Partnership by
Quotas (Sociedad en Comandita Simple), and (5) The Limited Partnership by Stocks
(Sociedad en Comandita por Acciones).
13
See Graph 2.
14
Id.
15
Through the legal concept of “Shadow Directors” all the rules
governing fiduciary duties of directors and officers can also be applicable to
controlling corporations. According to Article 27 of Law 1258, “natural persons or
legal entities that shall intrude in any positive managing or administrative activity in
the corporation will be subject to the same liabilities and penalties applicable to
managers.”
16
The now famous case of Finagro against Mónica Semillas SAS is a good
example of the application of ex post standards in a specific case of abusive behavior.
In this case a number of sham corporations were used to unduly obtain governmental
agricultural subsidies. The Superintendence decided that this was a form of
“deputization” and, therefore, reversed the illegal transactions. See
11
12
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standards workable, an innovative enforcement system has been put in
place. A highly sophisticated and efficient corporate law has replaced
an inefficient judicial system.
Within this advanced legal framework, it is expected that the
usually high consumption of private benefits of control by majority
shareholders will decrease overtime. This qualitative change would
allow for a more reasonable allocation of economic benefits among all
shareholders. Likewise, it is expected that in the future minority
shareholders will be able to profit from the controlling shareholders’
monitoring and managerial efforts without being exposed to the
exponential risk of expropriation.17 In this manner, the conceivable
distributional effects that may stem from a more flexible regulatory
business environment will be timely enabled by the efficient
application of the above-mentioned standards.
The starting point for the Simplified Corporation’s original
proposal was the idea of facilitating the formalization of business
entities and updating the legal system in order to introduce forwardlooking approaches to corporate law. For that purpose, a thorough and
critical revision of the company law framework was required. This
analysis was made under a functional Comparative Law methodology
along with the application of relevant notions of Economic Analysis
of Law. As expected, the results of such evaluation revealed the
inadequacy of most company law provisions and the need to carry out
an overhaul of both the legal and the institutional frameworks.18

SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SOCIEDADES, JURISPRUDENCIA SOCIETARIA 335 et seq.
(vol. I, 2014).
17
The higher level of protection that can be attained with the SAS
regulation is clearly demonstrated in the amount of cases being brought before the
Court at the Superintendence of Companies. Several cases involving Simplified
Corporations have been adjudicated within the last 3 years. Such cases are
consistently reported by the Superintendence as can be seen in the publication
entitled Jurisprudencia Societaria edited by the same governmental entity. The first
volume was published in Bogotá in March 2014. The second one was published by
the same institution in July 2015. See supra SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SOCIEDADES
note 16; SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SOCIEDADES, JURISPRUDENCIA SOCIETARIA (vol.
II, 2015).
18
See FRANCISCO REYES, LATIN AMERICAN COMPANY LAW, A NEW
POLICY AGENDA: RESHAPING THE CLOSELY HELD ENTITY LANDSCAPE (2013).
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Soon after the law was passed, the business community reacted
eagerly to the new legal realities. The SAS has not only changed the
manner in which people do business in Colombia, but it can also be
credited for a significant change in the legal culture. This new type of
business association has fostered additional legal reforms to other
traditional institutions that were still present in old codes and statutes
in Colombia.19 Surprisingly, until 2008, legal scholars found these
outdated laws appropriate for the local business environment, and had
unanimously hailed this antiquated legislation as a virtuous body of
law.20
Also, Law 1258 of 2008 represents a step forward in the
manner in which corporate documents can be written. Notably, the
law permits corporations to choose the type of clauses to be included
in their own bylaws. However if the corporation’s bylaws are silent on
a matter, default provisions of general corporate law apply. Yet, despite
the option for corporations to create unique bylaws, the default rules
contain provisions, which are particularly useful for those parties who
lack the expertise, time, or resources needed to negotiate tailor-made
corporate contracts and shareholders agreements.21 To this effect, the
Colombian Mercantile Registry offices have designed and
implemented model bylaws that are extensively used by Micro Small
and Medium Entities (MSMEs)22 across the country. In this manner

For instance, Law 1429 of 2010 introduced substantial changes to the
processes of dissolution and liquidation of corporations. Following the trend
initiated with the SAS, this new law reduced unnecessary formalities and created
hasty proceedings to wind up a business corporation. L. 1429, diciembre 29, 2010,
DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
20
CUBEROS DE LAS CASAS FELIPE, SOCIEDAD POR ACCIONES
SIMPLIFICADA: NOVEDADES, ACIERTOS Y DESACIERTOS 43 (2012) (quoting Gabino
Pinzón holding that the types of business entities regulated in the comercial codes
were sufficient to satisfy the needs of business people). The author goes as far as
holding that the idea of single member simplified corporations such as the SAS is a
“conceptual mistake.” Id. at 49.
21
See L. 1258, art. 45 (stating that the by-laws are fully enforceable if there
is no specific rule to the contrary on the statute).
22
Colombian law provides rules to define the concept of MSMEs on the
grounds of the amount of assets, income and number of employees. Accordingly,
for a company to be classified as a small or medium size business it has to meet the
requirements set forth in Laws 590 of 2000, L. 590, julio 10, 2000, DIARIO OFICIAL
[D.O.] (Colom.), and 905 of 2004, L. 905, agosto 2, 2004, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]
19
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entrepreneurs can significantly reduce transaction costs and may
incorporate without the aid of costly advisors.23
Naturally, the SAS’ opt out approach also allows for private
parties to step out of the standard provisions contained in model
bylaws and to draft sophisticated agreements that are appropriate for
more complex undertakings. The enabling non-directory provisions of
Law 1258 have fostered private ordering and sparked innovation in
corporate law across the country. Aside from the boilerplate type of
agreements that are used by most start-ups, practicing attorneys are
becoming skillful at developing new legal models suitable for a more
sophisticated business environment. A survey conducted by the
Bogotá Chamber of Commerce, in the capital city, has allowed for the
identification of several types of business in which one or more SAS
can be properly used for an unlimited number of business purposes.24
The Colombian SAS represents a substantial improvement in
reducing transaction costs and providing contractual flexibility to
business parties. In accordance with this approach, Law 1258 of 2008
requires formalities to be applied only with regard to those matters that
have a functional effect on the marketplace.25 It also promotes private
ordering, fosters the drafting of innovative shareholders agreements,
and facilitates corporate capitalization through the issuance of all types
of securities.
This new type of business entity is also intended to dramatically
alter the inefficient enforcement landscape by aiding in the
development of a specialized jurisdiction in which matters are rapidly
resolved by proficient and honest judges. The deterrence effect of
decisions rendered by this jurisdiction in a short period of time has

(Colom.), which refer to the number of employees and the total assets, as measured
in current legal minimum monthly wages.
23
See, e.g., CÁMARA DE COMERCIO DE BOGOTÁ, http://www.ccb.org.co.
24
See CÁMARA DE COMERCIO DE BOGOTÁ, PERFIL ECONÓMICO Y
JURÍDICO DE LA SAS EN SU PRIMER AÑO 19-38 (2010).
25
See, for example, L. 1258, art. 5 requiring registration of the private
document of incorporation in order to provide publicity concerning basic data on
the corporation. Likewise, art. 22 sets forth minimum standards for quorum and
majorities at shareholders’ meetings.

398

2015

Reyes

4:1

impacted the business community in an unprecedented manner.26
Knowing that justice will be on the side of those who play by the rules
and that wrongdoers will be rapidly punished signals that Corporate
Governance mechanisms work27 at least in the context of closely held
corporations. It remains to be seen, however, if in the long run this
enforcement system will have a direct impact on the cost of capital. It
is foreseeable that this will be the case, as the system is rapidly
migrating from personal to impersonal exchanges. It is also expected
that this new legal reality will have an impact in the reduction of the
usually high control premium in closed corporations, and also in
incentivizing local and foreign investment by minority shareholders in
this type of business.
Six years after the enactment of Law 1258 of 2008, the success
of the Simplified Corporation has surpassed all expectations. The
empirically measured success of the Colombian SAS in both the legal
and business environment can be attributed to the simplified nature of
the substantive provisions that govern its incorporation and operation,
and to the efficient results of the specialized jurisdiction put in place
immediately following the enactment of the SAS.28
The Colombian SAS can become an export product. It is a
blend of common law and civil law approaches to business
associations. Instead of adhering to dogma or established tradition, it
In fact, before the enactment of Law 1258, conflicts between
shareholders had to be brought before the ordinary courts. After the creation of the
Corporate Court at the Superintendence of Companies litigators have found a
significant opportunity to get their cases decided in a reasonable period of time. See
Graph 8. The expeditious nature of the processes handled before the
Superintendence. Along with this significant development the periodical publication
of decisions rendered by the new court provide predictability and legal certainty both
to practitioners and parties alike. See SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SOCIEDADES, vols. I
& II supra note 17.
27
A good example of this sort of effect can be seen in the case of Serviucis
S.A. vs. Clínica Sagrado Corazón SAS reported by the Superintendence of
Companies. In this case the breach of a shareholders agreement along with an
abusive exercise of the voting right by the defendant gave rise of the application of
a remedy of specific performance by the Court. In this case the enforcement of the
agreement as well as the decision rendered against the defendant’s wrongdoing have
signaled to the business community that this sort of behavior shall not be tolerated.
See SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SOCIEDADES, supra note 16, at 385-420.
28
See Graph 2.
26
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reflects the economic needs of common business people and
successfully offers clear and sensible solutions to reduce entry barriers,
ameliorate organizational problems, and provide expedited dispute
resolution mechanisms. This legislation is also an attempt to deal with
agency problems that are common in most countries without taking
into account each jurisdiction’s ownership pattern.29 For this reason,
the Organization of American States’ (OAS) Legal Committee has
recommended the adoption of a Model Act on Simplified
Corporations for all countries in the Americas on the grounds that it
represents a “very credible case in favor of legislative reforms to permit
such innovative business forms” to promote economic growth.30
This paper briefly analyzes the evolution of the Colombian
SAS over the first five years following the enactment of Law 1258 of
2008. It provides an empirical evaluation based on statistical data
collected at the Colombian Confederation of Chambers of Commerce,
the Mercantile Registry of Bogotá, and the National Office of
Corporations.
I. EMPIRICAL DEMONSTRATION CONCERNING THE COLOMBIAN

29
The success of legal transplants in the area of closely held firms is
significantly facilitated by the homogeneity of agency problems that are present in
non-listed firms everywhere. Therefore, the dichotomy between diffuse and
concentrated ownership and the resulting differences in the identification of the
relevant agency problems become irrelevant in the context of non-listed firms.
Additionally, incentives to neutralize agency problems in closely held companies
could be applied in different jurisdictions, without regard to the economic
circumstances prevailing in each country. See REYES, supra note 18, at 60.
30
See David P. Stewart, Recommendations on the Proposed Model Act on the
Simplified Stock Corporation, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICAL
COMMITTEE TO THE FORTY-SECOND REGULAR OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 50
(2012) (the OAS Legal Committee Model Act was crafted after Law 1258. It is not
intended to serve as a partial amendment to be introduced to traditional business
forms regulated in national codes and statutes. Instead, what is recommended is that
the enactment takes place on a separate legislation that could be linked to the existing
system).
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The enactment of Colombian Law 1258 of 2008 has been by
far the most successful recent company law reform in Colombia.31 The
implementation of the SAS corporation model has given rise to a
certain degree of competition among the different types of business
associations that exist within the country’s commercial legislation. The
creation of this new business form allows entrepreneurs to choose
between a traditional legal regime, and a new modern corporate entity.
The comparative inferiority of traditional business association types
formerly used to structure closely-held companies make their future
use unnecessary. The preference of business people for the recent
legislation is evident in light of the exponential growth of the
Simplified Corporation in Colombia.32
The following empirical analysis is divided into three parts.
Part A refers to data gathered at the Colombian Confederation of
Chambers of Commerce,33 and corresponds to the evolution of SAS
in Colombia. Part B relates to information obtained by the Bogotá
Chamber of Commerce and, naturally, is restricted to the urban
perimeter of Colombia’s capital city. Part C relates to the empirical
analysis undertaken by the Superintendence of Companies concerning
the operation of the new specialized Corporate Law Court34 that
operates in the same Office.

31
See FRANCISCO REYES, REFORMA AL RÉGIMEN DE SOCIEDADES Y
CONCURSOS (1996) (certainly, previous reforms such as the one introduced by Law
222 of 1995, L. 222, diciembre 20, 1995, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.), had a
more restricted impact than the SAS. This law constituted only a “patch up” reform
to traditional corporate rules contained in the Colombian Commercial Code. Such
approach limited the scope of legislative changes that otherwise could have been
made under a more progressive orientation).
32
See
Editorial,
PORTAFOLIO.CO
(Feb.
3,
2011),
http://www.portafolio.co/archivo/buscar?producto=portafolio&q=febrero+3+de
+2011&a=2011&pagina=1&m=02&d=03.
33
Confederación de Cámaras de Comercio (CONFECAMARAS),
Bogotá, 2013 (Colom.).
34 This court is the Delegatura para Procedimientos Mercantiles de la
Superintendencia de Sociedades.
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A. National Data on SAS
1. Formalization of economic activities and number of SAS compared to
other types of business entities. – The SAS structure has been useful for
thousands of business that today confront lower entry barriers for
their regular operation. As can be observed in Graph 1, the number
of incorporations filed before the Colombian Mercantile Registries
has increased exponentially since the enactment of Law 1258 on
December 5 of 2008.
The reaction of the business community to the new legislation
on Simplified Corporations has surpassed all expectations.35 As Graph
2 shows, the SAS has acquired a level of significant importance for
local business associations of all dimensions. The data not only shows
the impressive acceptance of the SAS during this five-year period, but
also the progress made by this company type vis-à-vis the previously
existing ones.
60000
50000
40000

48084
35921

30000
20000
10000

0
2009

2010

Graph 1. Growth in formalization of business entities
between 2009 and 2010 (25.3%)

See CONFECAMARAS, supra note 33 (data for this section
(consolidated for the entire country) has been obtained directly from the
CONFECAMARAS).
35
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Graph 2. Evolution of the SAS Compared to Other Company
Types (2008-2012).
2. SAS incorporations. - In the period between December 2008 and
September 2013, 206,704 business associations were incorporated
before Colombia’s Mercantile Registries under the type of Simplified
Corporations. In September 2013 alone, 5,804 business entities were
incorporated before the country’s Mercantile Registries. Out of this
number, 5,595 were Simplified Corporations (SAS). While in
December 2008 the percentage of SAS only reached 7.42% of the total
registration of business associations, by September 2013 this type of
business corporation represented 96.4% of all registered companies
(Table 1).
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2422 70 3697

88

5203

19.8 3091 71 4302

90

%

Jan.

293

93

4846 95.6

Feb.

629

6224

93

5443 94.5

Mar.

1019 33.8 3364 74 5204 89.6 6875

94

4456 95.3

Apr.

1184 39.4 2817 74 4271

91

4637 93.7 5130 95.1

May

1424 47.6 2879 77 4961 93.5 4935 93.5 5358 95.1

June

1544 53.6 3069 79 4712 91.1 4509 93.5 4458 95.1

July

2052 59.4 2923 78 4318 91.5 4955 93.5 6259 95.7

Aug.

1773 62.4

Sept.

2316 66.5 3734 82 4772 91.1 4577 93.7 5595 96.4

Oct.

2183 67.8 3414 83 4073 92.3 4665 93.9

Nov.

1872 70.2 3275 84 4160 92.4 4087 93.1

Dec.

160

348

81 4734 91.9 4692 94.1 5405 95.8

7.42 1151 74.2 2935 82

Table 1. Incorporation of SAS between December 2008 and
September 2013, by number and percentage.
3. SAS’ regional distribution. - Naturally, most SAS incorporations
take place in regions and cities where there is a significant economic
activity, such as in the capital city of Bogotá and the State of Antioquia.
However, it is noteworthy that the penetration of this business entity
is also noticeable in less developed areas where the economy is based
on agricultural and extractive business activities, such as in Arauca.36
In these less economically active regions, the increasing importance of
SAS is evidenced by the growth of this type of business entity within
the last two years. In fact, whereas in 2011 the SAS incorporations in
Bogotá represented 44% of the total amount of business entities
formally set up in Colombia (see Graph 3), in 2012, such percentage
had decreased to 39%, showing a correlative increase of incorporations
in the other regions (see Graph 4).
For the years 2011, 2012, and 2013, the number of Simplified
Corporations has been distributed regionally according to Graphs 3, 4,
and 5 below.

36

See Graphs 3, 4, 5.
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Graph 3. Regional Distribution of SAS in 2011.
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Graph 4. Regional Distribution of SAS, 2012.
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(until September).
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Total, HUILA, 475,
SANTANDER, 486,
1%
1%

Graph 5. Regional Distribution of SAS 2013 (until September).
4. Economic activities of SAS. - Although according to the regulation
governing the SAS there is no need to define any specific business
purpose in the corporation’s purpose clause, the Mercantile Registry
keeps a record of these entities’ main economic activity. The statistical
data shows that the SAS model is mostly used for agricultural
economic activities, manufacturing undertakings, construction
business, and commercial activities (wholesale and retail) (see Table 2).
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CIIU_Sector
A Agriculture, cattle breeding,
hunting, fish breeding
B Mining
C Manufacturing Industries
D Electricity, gas, steam and air
conditioning

2011

2012 2013

Total

1682

390

1050

3122

927
5652

294 540
3474 4067

1761
13193

121

E Water and Sewer and
environmental cleaning activities
F Construction Businesses
G Wholesale commerce and
retail; vehicle and motorcycle
repair
H Transportation and Storage
I Hotels and Restaurants
J Information and
Communications
K Financial and Insurance
Activities
L Real Estate
M Professional, Scientific and
technical Activities
N Administrative services and
logistics
O Public Administration and
Defense, Social Security Plans
and Mandatory Health Insurance
P Education
Q Health and Social Assistance
Businesses
R Artistic, entertainment and
recreational activities
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5203

53

68

180

297

242
477

3397 4067

12667

13100 7472 8651

29223

3047
1287

1248 1596
643 1102

5891
3032

1146 1787

2933

560

485

1866

13733 1533 1659

16925

4102 5390

9492

2356 2043

4399

821

171

49

59

279

381

292

576

1249

1510

791

1371

3672

218

486

704

2015

Reyes
S Other services

T Home business activities
Z Unlisted business activities
(CIIU V4)
Table 2. Economic activities of SAS.
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1154

320

344

4

4

5

229

26837 234

1818
13

27300

5. Dimension of SAS undertakings in the country. - One of the most
significant observations in this empirical investigation is the success of
the Simplified Corporation for all types of undertakings irrespective of
the size segment to which the entrepreneur belongs. In fact, the
Simplified Corporation is not only important in the micro and small
business segments, but also has proven useful for large corporations.
In Colombia, as in other developing economies, Micro Small
and Medium Entities are responsible for a significant number of jobs
and income for the economy.37 The Colombian Government has
created certain criteria to define the various sizes of business
enterprises.
Table 3 shows the allocation of SAS according to the size
criteria described above for the period between January 2011 and
September 2013. The table relates to the number of SAS that can be
classified in each segment. These data demonstrate the significant
relevance of SAS to the formalization of micro and small businesses.

See Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Ross Levine, SMEs, Growth,
and Poverty: Cross-Country Evidence, 10 J. OF ECON. GROWTH 199 (2005).
37
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Number of
Company
Employees
Size

Total
Assets
2011 2012
2013
(CLMMW)
Micro
1-10
Under 501 96831 13739 167061
Small
11-50
501-5000
14827 23341 31818
Medium
51-200
5001-30000 3709 5797
8073
Large
Over 200
Over 30000
875
1398
2008
Table 3. Dimension of SAS according to legal criteria.
Table 4 provides the percentage of SAS in each of the dimension
brackets referred to above. It is noteworthy that this type of entity only
represents 4.85% of the total amount of micro businesses. This is due
to the fact that most entrepreneurs in this segment carry out their
business activities in their individual capacity (i.e., the vast majority are
natural persons). Obviously, on a different scale, the SAS represents
the broad majority of “incorporated” micro-business. As can be
observed in Table 4, the micro-business segment represents the broad
majority in terms of the number of SAS incorporated in Colombia.
Total No. Of
No. Of SAS
Percentage
Dimension
Businesses
2,374,086
115,157
4.85%
MICRO
66,792
15,635
23.40%
SMALL
15,116
3,928
25.98%
MEDIUM
4,99
921
18.79%
LARGE
Table 4. Percentage of SAS (as compared to total number of business
participants including natural persons).
6. Cancellation of SAS registrations. - Table 5 below depicts the number
of SAS cancellations for the period between January 2011 and July
2013. The empirical data show that the number of Simplified
Corporations formally going out of business is very low in comparison
to the ones that remain active and in good standing.
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2011
Total
January
165
February
172
March
389
April
214
May
177
June
186
July
174
August
173
September
237
October
215
November
213
Total
2315
Table 5. Cancellation of SAS registrations
Month

4:1
2012
Total
232
277
562
302
275
295
274
322
311
402
417
3669

2013
Total
324
383
545
496
354
425
511
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
3038

B. Empirical Analysis of Data Obtained at the Bogota Chamber of
Commerce
In the period between January 2009 and August 2 2013, 86,861
Simplified Corporations were registered before the Bogota Chamber
of Commerce. Although the majority of SAS registrations correspond
to new incorporations a small percentage relates to conversion of
traditional business forms, which existed before the enactment of Law
1258, into simplified corporations.
1. Franchise fees and registration taxes. - The figures in Table 6 include
two types of economic resources that are collected by the Offices of
the Mercantile Register. The first is a State registration tax that was
levied by Law 225 of 1995,38 Decree 650 of 1996,39 and Resolution No.
24 of 1997.40 The amount collected is charged at a 0.7% rate over the
value of the subscribed capital. This tax is paid to the State of
incorporation. The second amount relates to a franchise or registration
fee established by Decree 393 of 2002,41 and corresponds to a variable
percentage that is applied to the amount of subscribed capital. This fee
38
39
40
41

L. 225, diciembre 20, 1995,DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
L. 650, abril 3, 1996, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
L. 24, 1997, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
L. 393, marzo 4, 2002, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
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is updated every year to adjust to the legal minimum monthly wage for
each year. The amounts collected through this franchise or registration
fee go directly to the Chamber of Commerce that operates each
Mercantile Registry.
Amount

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

20,573,988

23,444,806

440,247,089

Registry Tax
Franchise Fee 1,854,524 5,982,308
and Registration

12,692,596

Table 6. Franchise Fees and State Registry Taxes (Figures above are in
thousands of U.S. dollars)
2. Public deed of incorporation versus private document. - Articles 5 and 6
of Law 1258 of 2008 allow for the incorporation of SAS to be made
either by private document or by public deed granted before notary
public.42 The latter is only required where real estate is turned in as an
in-kind contribution. It is not surprising that the majority of
incorporations (88.12%) are undertaken through a private document.
In fact, only 9% of the business parties that set up a SAS use the public
deed as a means for its incorporation (see Graph 6 and Table 7). These
figures also may suggest that most capital contributions in the SAS are
made in assets different to real estate.
Furthermore, it is important to stress that a public deed is not
needed for a business entity to convert into a SAS (see Article 31 of
Law 1258 of 2008).43 It is also noteworthy that according to this law, it
is viable for a SAS to be incorporated online. In accordance with data
provided by the same Chamber of Commerce, only for the year 2009,
1,077 corporations were incorporated online.
.

42
43

L. 1258, art. 5, 6.
Id. at art. 31.
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Number,
Record,
7,827
9% Record

Number,
Public Deed,
2,609
3%

Certification

Number,
Private
Document,
76,532
88%

Private Document
Public Deed
Resolution

Graph 6. Incorporation method.

Table 7. Incorporation Method.
Document

Number

Percentage

Record
Certification
Private
Document
Public Document
Resolution
Total

8,001
1
76,532

9.21
0
88.12

2,314
1
86,861

2.66
0
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3. SAS’ life span. - The empirical research shows that the
registration of most of the Simplified Corporations formed during the
last years have not been cancelled. This data may suggest the long
breadth nature of a substantial majority of the entities operating under
the SAS structure. This analysis is based on two sets of data: first, the
renovation of corporate registration that is made every year; and
second, the filing before the Mercantile Registry of corporate decisions
for the dissolution and liquidation of simplified corporations.
Table 8 shows figures concerning the annual renovation of
mercantile registration for the years 2009 to 2013.
Year of Registry
Number of SAS
PERCENTAGE
Renovation
2009
1394
1,60
2010
4246
4,89
2011
8648
9,96
2012
17750
20,43
2013
54823
63,12
TOTAL
86861
100
Table 8. Renovation of mercantile registration of SAS.
The data presented above implies that there is a high
conservation rate for the SAS. This is supported by the fact that the
registration of dissolution and liquidation proceedings for Simplified
Corporations represents a very low percentage in comparison with the
total amount of active SAS. In the Bogota’s Mercantile Registry, only
4,031 out of 86,861 registered SAS, filed for dissolution before the
Mercantile Registry (representing 4.61% of the sample). Out of the
4,031 that filed for dissolution, 2,919 (72%) registered the termination
of the liquidation proceeding.
4. Management. - The SAS law allows for a simplified organic
structure, where the board of directors is not a mandatory organ. In
the absence of a clause providing otherwise, one or more managers
will conduct the day-to-day affairs of the corporation.44 The empirical
research concerning the preference for a simplified organic structure

44

Referred to in L. 1258, art. 26 as legal representatives.
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in which there is no appointment of a board of directors is conclusive.45
In fact, only 921 of the total amount of analyzed SAS registered the
appointment of a board (i.e., a figure close to 1% of the total sample)
(see Table 8). This finding is interesting, because the data suggests that
the traditional regulation, which required a mandatory board of
directors to do business under the corporate form, did not match the
preferences of business people. The legal framework imposed a
burden to the parties, which represented undesirable transaction costs.
A similar situation is observable concerning the appointment
of fiscal auditors. The SAS law only requires an internal auditor to be
appointed if the corporation surpasses certain thresholds (determined
in the amount of assets or annual income). Only 3,023 fiscal auditors
were appointed. This figure represents 3.5% of all registered
companies in Bogota (see Table 9). The conclusion provided for the
board of directors is equally applicable to the fiscal auditors. It is
obvious that if businesspersons are given the opportunity to opt out
of the relevant clause, they will do so.
Board
Percentage
managed
Percentage
SAS
85,949
98.93
921
1.07
Table 9. Shareholder Managed SAS versus Board Managed SAS.
Shareholder
managed SAS

Appointment Percentage Shareholder
of Internal
monitored
Fiscal Auditor
SAS
for SAS
83,838
96.50
3,023
Table 10. Appointment of Fiscal Auditor.

Percentage

3.50

5. Unrestricted purpose clause. - Law 1258 does not require the parties
to provide for a restricted purpose clause in the corporation’s bylaws.
An empirical study conducted by the Bogota Chamber of Commerce
concluded that only 14% of the SAS created during the first year after the enactment
of Law 1258, provided for a mandatory board of directors in their by-laws. See
CÁMARA DE COMERCIO DE BOGOTÁ, PERFIL ECONÓMICO Y JURÍDICO DE LAS SAS
EN EL PRIMER AÑO 28 (2010).
45
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Accordingly, as a default rule, the law allows for the corporation to be
set up for any lawful purpose. According to previous research
conducted by the Bogotá Chamber of Commerce in 2011, most of the
simplified corporations set up in the capital city prefer the flexibility
afforded by the unlimited purpose clause to the rigidities of selfimposed restricted objects.46 A smaller percentage of SAS opted for
limited purpose clauses by specifying restricted business activities in
the corporation’s bylaws. Interestingly, during the period between
January 2009 and July 2013, a total of 2,162 amended their internal
rules in order to insert in their objects the phrase “any lawful activity.”
This move again represents a preference for flexibility and
demonstrates that the traditional system was inconsistent with
entrepreneurs’ needs and preferences.
Dimension of SAS undertakings in the country. - As already
explained the size of a business undertaking can be legally classified in
four separate categories on the grounds of their employee population
and aggregate assets. The following table shows the size of SAS
incorporated in the city of Bogotá.
Size of
the
Number of Total Assets
2009
company Employees (CLMMW)
Micro
Small
Medium
Large

1-10
11-50
51-200
Over 200

2010

2011

2012

2013

Under 501 86,362 84,776 81,744 77,954 75,679
501-5000
443 1,736 4,095 7,060 8,508
5001-30,000
46
297
849 1,484 2,097
Over 30,000
10
52
173
363
577

Table 11. Dimensions of SAS in Colombia.

46

See CÁMARA DE COMERCIO DE BOGOTÁ, EL PRIMER AÑO DE LA SAS

(2011).
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3. Empirical Observations on Enforcement
The relevance of the specialized jurisdiction created by Law
1258 of 2008 can be empirically demonstrated under several variables
that measure the efficiency of the new court to adjudicate complex
corporate law cases in a short period of time. The data collected by the
National Office of Corporations demonstrates the increasing
confidence with which private parties appear before the specialized
court to litigate all kinds of legal matters.47 It is relevant to observe that
during the period from 2008 to 2011, the complaints filed before this
court related exclusively to four different issues (appeals of previous
decisions, intra-corporate disputes, actions to set aside resolutions of
the shareholders meeting, and requests for dissolution). Alternatively,
between 2012 and 2013, the types of legal disputes were significantly
broadened to encompass additional matters (including, inter alia,
processes for lifting the corporate veil, the appointment of experts to
provide appraisals of shares of stock, and actions arising from the
abuse of rights).48 The increased scope of matters resolved at the
Specialized Corporate Court has begun to provide credibility to the
Government’s ability to enforce substantive law provisions contained
in the SAS legislation. It is probably the first time in which law in the
books is very close to law in action in Colombia.

See JOSÉ MIGUEL MENDOZA, ESTUDIO SOBRE LA NUEVA
DELEGATURA DE PROCEDIMIENTOS MERCANTILES (2013).
48
See SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SOCIEDADES, vols. I and II, supra note 17.
47
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Graph 7. Type of Corporate Law disputes litigated before the
specialized court.
In a country accustomed to protracted litigation, endless
formalities, and corruption in the judicial system, it is a great
achievement to have a jurisdiction in which these vices are absent. The
high quality of the decisions rendered by the Specialized Corporate
Court and the short time required to obtain a final judgment are
eloquent evidence concerning the great success of this legal
experiment. Graph 8 shows the efficient operation of the new
jurisdiction in terms of the average term employed by the court to
render a final decision. As it can be observed, on average, the Deputy
Superintendent produces final judgments in a reasonable four-month
term.
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CONCLUSION

Graph 8. Duration of legal processes at the Specialized Corporate
Court.
The Colombian SAS legislation has proven to be an
appropriate framework for the operation of all types of closely held
corporations. The law that gave rise to this business entity was the
result of a combination of common law and civil law types of modern
business corporations. Five years after the enactment of Colombian
Law 1258 of 2008, it seems clear that it is possible to achieve high
impact changes from a relatively simple reform of outdated corporate
law provisions.
The incorporation of more than 200,000 Simplified Stock
Corporations in the first five years following the enactment of this law
eloquently shows the usefulness of new corporate vehicles endowed
with flexibility and simplified incorporation features. Through the
SAS, Colombia has achieved higher levels of economic formalization,
access to credit and investment, increased collection of taxes, and the
creation of new jobs.
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The SAS experiment may be beneficial in other countries if
appropriately transplanted. It could be particularly useful in developing
and emerging economies where there is an increasing need for flexible
and user-friendly corporate vehicles. The success of the SAS clearly
suggests that business people prefer flexibility to old-fashioned,
misguided paternalism.
Welfare enhancement reforms such as the introduction of the
Simplified Corporation would require, however, breaking up path
dependence and overcoming certain pressure groups and backward
looking legal traditions. For this purpose it would be extremely useful
to prepare and promote a model act on Simplified Corporations. An
instrument such as this could serve as a starting point in legislative
processes for the amendment of corporate laws in several countries.
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HIGH-TECH COMPANIES AND THE
DECISION TO “GO PUBLIC”: ARE
BACKDOOR LISTINGS (STILL) AN
ALTERNATIVE TO “FRONT-DOOR”
INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS?
Erik P.M. Vermeulen*
INTRODUCTION
Financial and capital markets play a key role in the funding of
high growth technology companies. There is little doubt that
companies in highly capital-intensive, often volatile, and disruptive
sectors will eventually have to float their shares on a stock exchange to
obtain access to capital to grow and expand their operations, enhance
the company’s reputation and visibility, attract and retain talented
employees, and provide liquidity to shareholders. The traditional path
to a listing in an equity market is an initial public offering (IPO).
However, the companies that consider a first sale of stock to the public
are often overwhelmed by the costly and time-consuming legal and
financial regulations that must be complied with while pursuing an
IPO.
These costly and lengthy regulatory barriers, together with
sluggish IPO markets and their unavailability to smaller firms, have
been reasons for high-tech companies and their shareholders to look
for alternatives to IPOs.1 A popular alternative is to pursue a backdoor

* Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Professor of Business and Financial Law at
Tilburg Law School, Tilburg Law & Economics Center, the Netherlands. Senior
Counsel Corporate at Philips, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
1
See Stephen Bell, As IPOs Struggle in Australia, Reverse Takeovers Shine,
WALL ST. J.: DEAL J. AUSTL. (Jan. 23, 2013, 11:52 AM),
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listing, most often accomplished through a reverse merger or reverse
takeover.2 Both alternatives “transform” a private company into a
publicly traded company by combining directly or indirectly with a
listed company (whether through a merger, exchange offer, or
otherwise). A backdoor listing has not only allowed companies to
focus more on their business and less on compliance with “going
public” rules and regulations, but also to gain access to more liquid and
robust stock markets. In addition to the cheaper and quicker access to
capital and liquidity, backdoor listings have also been employed to
receive tax benefits that stem from “tax loss carry-forwards” in the
public shell. If the reverse merger or takeover involves a public
company that operates in the same or complementary industry or
sector as the private company, synergies are often the reason for the
backdoor listings. Moreover, besides the fact that a private company
becomes instantly “listed” on a stock exchange, a backdoor listing
usually gives shareholders of the private company the opportunity to
receive the majority of the shares of the public entity, allowing them a
tight grip on control (as if they still run a private company).3
Recently, backdoor listings have become increasingly popular
among high-tech companies in the United States. Consider venture
capital-backed RMG Networks, a Chicago-based global provider of
smart visual solutions (particularly advertisements on airplanes and
airport lounges), which went public through a reverse merger in the
United States in April 2013, bypassing the IPO procedures. RMG
Networks was first acquired by SCG Financial Acquisition
Corporation. As a result, the shareholders of RMG Networks received

http://blogs.wsj.com/dealjournalaustralia/2013/01/23/as-ipos-struggle-reversetakeovers-shine/.
2
The terms “backdoor listing,” “reverse merger,” and “reverse takeover”
are used interchangeably. These three approaches, mostly distinguished by legal
differences at their implementation stage, are alternatives to an IPO.
3
See David N. Feldman, Comments on Seasoning of Reverse Merger Companies
Before Uplisting to National Securities Exchanges, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 140 (2012). See
also DAVID N. FELDMAN, REVERSE MERGERS: TAKING A COMPANY PUBLIC
WITHOUT AN IPO (2006).
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stock in SCG. Subsequently, the listed company’s profile was changed
from SCG to RMG.4
Australia also experienced a surge in high-tech backdoor
listings in 2014.5 For instance, Australian Bitcoin focused company
digitalBTC (which was acquired by the already listed Macro Energy
and renamed to DigitalCC Limited) is another example of a high-tech
(and disruptive) company that turned to a backdoor listing to go public
in 2014.
Backdoor listings are also a common “IPO alternative” in the
real estate development sector. For instance, in October 2013, the
Hong Kong Parkview Group Limited acquired the commercial
property portfolio in China from the non-listed subsidiary of Cofco
Corporation and changed its name to Cofco Land Holdings Ltd.6
Since backdoor listings are often not excessively burdened by
complex listing rules and regulations, they are prone to fraud and
abuse. Certainly, there are probably more examples of instances where
a backdoor listing has been a prudent and effective alternative to an
IPO. However, there is also evidence suggesting that lower quality
firms pursue listings through a reverse merger. It is therefore not
surprising that policymakers and regulators have recently introduced
(or are considering) special rules and regulations that govern backdoor
listings. These rules and regulations vary depending on each country’s
respective experience with this “going public” alternative.
This paper attempts to shed light on the question of whether
and when a backdoor listing is still a sustainable alternative to the
“front door” IPO. There is no clear-cut answer to this question. For
instance, stringent and complex rules and procedures for reverse
See Sean Ludwig, Digital Signage Biz RMG Networks Goes Public at $10 a
Share in Reverse Merger, VENTUREBEAT (Apr. 8, 2013, 1:36 PM),
http://venturebeat.com/2013/04/08/rmg-networks-goes-public-reverse-merger/.
5
See Paul Garvey, ASIC Snarls at Backdoor Listings, AUSTL. BUS. REV. (July
31, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/asic-snarls-atbackdoor-listings/story-e6frg8zx-1227007785116.
6
See Esther Fung, Chinese Developers Take the Backdoor to Hong Kong Listings,
WALL
S T.
J.:
MONEYBEAT
(July
1,
2013,
10:00
PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/07/01/chinese-developers-take-thebackdoor-to-hong-kong-listings/.
4
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mergers can be found in the United States due to the scandals
surrounding backdoor listings involving Chinese companies,
significantly reducing the attractiveness of backdoor listings. Sweden,
which has minimal experience with the backdoor listing phenomenon,
has adopted a more moderate (hybrid) approach that combines a caseby-case determination of the applicable rules with a system designed
to create awareness among investors about suspicious backdoor listing
activities. More specifically, the NASDAQ OMX Stockholm has the
potential to give a reverse merger company a temporary “observation
status” to alert investors about the risks and uncertainties associated
with a backdoor listing. Theoretically, Swedish companies that are
unable or unwilling to conduct an IPO (for instance, due to eligibility
issues and/or a sluggish IPO market) would still have access to capital
and/or liquidity more quickly and with fewer costs compared to their
U.S. counterparts.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides an overview
of the general trends and facts regarding backdoor listings in countries
with a history of alternative public offerings, such as the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Australia. Section II discusses the general
perception of backdoor listings from the perspective of high-tech
companies. Since the availability of the IPO alternative also depends
on the applicable rules and regulations, Section III compares
regulatory responses to backdoor listings in the United States,
Australia, and Sweden. Section IV provides a glimpse into the future
of backdoor listings by taking into account the changing policy and
regulatory landscape designed to make it easier for young high-tech
companies to trade on stock exchanges. In fact, in an effort to spur
economic growth and job creation, policymakers, regulators, and
exchange operators are increasingly unveiling measures to relax rules
and regulations governing IPOs. This is illustrated by the signing of
the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) in the United
States on April 5, 2012. The Act introduces the Emerging Growth
Company (EGC) status. Companies that are able to secure EGC status
will be offered a transition period (or an “on-ramp” period) during
which they are exempted from a number of regulatory requirements
associated with going public. Such speedier and cheaper IPO process
will have a reductive effect on the total number of backdoor listings,
but will not make them completely obsolete.
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TRENDS AND FACTS REGARDING BACKDOOR LISTINGS

Companies need capital as they go through the stages of their
life cycles. These life cycles typically start with turning an idea into a
start-up company. The start-up company attempts to raise capital from
venture capital funds and other private investors. These investors
support the start-up by contributing money and services, which brings
the company to the next stage in its development. Ideally, this
continues until the moment the company seeks to raise capital from
the “public” by pursuing an IPO, giving private investors and venture
capitalists an opportunity to gradually exit their investment.
The IPO, however, triggers the obligation to comply with a
plethora of rules and regulations required by regulators to protect the
shareholders (and other stakeholders) in listed companies and prevent
managerial misbehavior. These rules and regulations can be divided
into three categories: (1) listing requirements to determine whether a
company is eligible to go public; (2) disclosure and transparency rules
to provide financial and other information to the market and to
enhance investor confidence; and (3) corporate governance
requirements to ensure that the company’s affairs are conducted in the
interests of all concerned. Clearly, the regulatory framework makes the
process of an IPO expensive and time-consuming. The costs of an
IPO include the fees paid to investment banks, accountants, auditors,
lawyers, and other service providers and consultants for advice and for
preparing the registration statements, prospectus, and other legal
documents. Low valuations and disappointing IPO performances are
also reasons for companies to forego the IPO route.7
It is therefore probably not surprising that companies that
need capital to fund growth and/or provide liquidity to investors have
always been looking for quicker, cheaper, and more flexible
alternatives to get access to stock markets. When it comes to floating
the shares, the idea of avoiding the costs and complexities associated
with IPOs is certainly very appealing, particularly to companies that
operate in volatile, frequently changing, and quickly evolving markets,

See Stacy Lawrence, Reverse Mergers Attract Top-Tier Biotechs in Sluggish IPO
Market, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 598 (2006).
7
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such as the Bitcoin industry.8 Moreover, control over the timing of the
listing and the information released about the IPO process is usually
very important to these companies. Clearly, control over both the
timing and the information not only enables a smoother transition
from the non-listed status to being listed on public markets, but also
provides these companies with the opportunity to withdraw their plans
without alerting the public. Backdoor listings, particularly through
reverse mergers or reverse takeovers, are examples of these alternatives
to IPOs that have gained popularity in recent decades. These
alternatives, however, are often subject to controversy because an
increasing number of alternative listings fail to meet the expectations
of investors in the post-listing period.
Indeed, the growing trend of using backdoor listings is not
necessarily the consequence of a shift toward a more preferable listing
option. Literature denouncing reverse mergers as a suitable substitute
to IPOs is plentiful, and some venture so far as to say that they are not
even comparable. For instance, a recent empirical study argues that
going public via an IPO is simply not feasible for many companies that
do not exhibit significant growth potential, do not meet minimum
revenue and income levels, or are unable to convince an investment
bank (typically the gatekeepers to the public) to underwrite its offering.
The study also shows that most reverse merger companies begin
trading in over-the-counter (OTC) markets.9 It should be noted that
gaining access to traditional forms of additional capital and ensuring a
liquid market for shares that typically come along with an IPO listing
are virtually non-existent when pursuing a reverse merger. Therefore,
a backdoor listing does not always facilitate a large infusion of new
capital from new investors because it is inherently not a capital-raising
endeavor where there is exchange of cash for shares in the
transaction.10 This observation raises the question of why a high-tech
company should pursue a backdoor listing.

8
See Peter Brown, Andrew Ferguson & Peter Lam, Choice between
Alternative Routes to Go Public: Backdoor Listing versus IPO, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH
ON IPOS, 503, 503-30 (Mario Levis and Silvio Vismara eds., 2010).
9
See Charles M. C. Lee, Kevin K. Li & Ran Zhang, Shell Games: Are Chinese
Reverse Merger Firms Inherently Toxic? (Working Paper No. 3063, 2014).
10
See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Truth About Reverse Mergers, 2
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 743 (2008).
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In this respect, it is remarkable that although backdoor listings
occur on a global scale, there are significant differences between the
characteristics, motivations, and implications of these listing options.
These differences can be explained to a large extent by differences in
the legal framework applicable to backdoor listings, and also by supplydemand dynamics (the market for backdoor listings). For instance,
backdoor listings through reverse mergers have become an attractive
alternative to an IPO in the United States throughout the previous
decade. The number of reverse mergers was even higher than the
number of regular IPOs in 2008.11
In a reverse merger, a private company that wishes to go public
through the “backdoor” merges with a public shell. Clearly, in order to
maintain the trading status, the public shell must survive the merger,
which explains the term “reverse.” As mentioned above, trades in the
public shell companies are usually carried out through electronic
quotation venues such as the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board
(OTCBB) or the “Pink Sheets” system (referring to the color of the
paper the quotations were printed on). This over-the-counter (OTC)
market mainly deals in low-grade securities issued by firms in economic
distress or in “microcap” issues that fail to qualify for a regular listing
on a stock exchange. Most of the shares traded in these OTC markets
are of such low value—many of which are “penny stock” shares
trading under U.S.D. $1 each—that they become perfect targets for
reverse mergers.
It should be noted that backdoor listings in the United States
are often accomplished through a reverse triangular merger instead of
a direct merger. This form of merger enables the parties to circumvent
expensive and time-consuming disclosures under the listing rules and
securities regulations. Under reverse triangular mergers, the publicly
listed company typically creates a new wholly owned subsidiary, which
subsequently merges into the private company. The merger must be
approved by the public shell (as shareholder of its new subsidiary) and
the shareholders of the private company. Approval from the
shareholders of the public shell company can be avoided if the

The number of reverse mergers was even higher than the number of
regular IPOs in 2008. See Igor Semenenko, Reverse Merger Waves, Market Timing and
Managerial Behavior, 2 INT’L RES. J. OF APPLIED FIN. 1453 (2011).
11
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company trades on the OTCBB. As a result of the merger, the private
company becomes the wholly owned subsidiary of the public shell,
which in return issues shares to the shareholders of the private
company. At the final stage, the name of the shell is usually changed
to the name of the private company, and the directors and officers of
the listed shell are replaced by those of the private company.
Regardless of how effective reverse mergers might be for meeting the
needs of a broad range of companies, the lack of regulatory scrutiny
has clearly caused increasing concerns about the degree to which these
mergers are used as a means of committing fraud or other securities
violations, particularly in terms of misleading financial statements.
In other jurisdictions, supply and demand dynamics, rather
than the lack of rules and regulations, explain the popularity of
backdoor listings strategies and arrangements. Consider the Australian
Stock Exchange (ASX), which is dominated by the volatile mining and
high-tech sectors. Companies seeking access to the capital market have
almost always been able to find a financially distressed listed vehicle
that could serve as a shell for a backdoor listing. For instance, hightech companies in Australia are often able to obtain the listed status
through shell companies that are active in the mining industry.
Undoubtedly, some of these high-tech companies have or will become
targets themselves and are thus fundamental in attaining the backdoor
listing aspirations of new mining companies.12 Recent data on
backdoor listings confirms this cycle: while seventy-six percent of the
Australian backdoor listings were conducted by mining companies in
2012,13 there was a surge in backdoor listings by high tech companies
(using unloved mining shells) in the first half of 2014.
Finally, in the United Kingdom, backdoor listings are often
used by companies that (1) are mainly interested in the synergies that
can be achieved by merging with (or taking over) a listed operating
company (this is often combined with raising new capital), and (2) seek
access to a wider exposure to investors and liquidity when the IPO
market is weak. What is interesting about the experience of the United
See Owen Richards, How Primary and Secondary Markets Work, ASX
INVESTOR UPDATE (2012) (on file with author).
13
See Stephen Bell, ‘Back Door’ May Be Closing for Miners, WALL ST. J.: DEAL
JOURNAL (Jan. 30, 2013, 5:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2013/01/30/backdoor-may-be-closing-for-miners/.
12
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Kingdom is that it shows that specific rules and regulations do not
necessarily make backdoor listings less attractive. On the contrary, the
“backdoor listing” practice in the United Kingdom was more
widespread than in the United States.14 However, alleged irregularities
at subsidiaries of Bumi, an Indonesian company that listed on the
London Stock Exchange through a reverse merger in the summer of
2011,15 quickly gave a negative notion to backdoor listings. This,
together with the fact that the Financial Services Authority (FSA)—
now the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)—introduced new rules
with the aim to prevent reverse takeovers of companies that are not
eligible for listing, explains the sudden decline in the use and popularity
of backdoor listings in 2012.16 The experiences in the three countries
show that, besides the applicable rules and regulations, the general
perception regarding backdoor listings also appears to play a role in
determining whether a backdoor listing provides a viable alternative to
high-tech companies that seek to float their shares.
II.

THE GENERAL PERCEPTION OF BACKDOOR LISTINGS

It is a common refrain that backdoor listings are prone to abuse
and inappropriate transactions. In the early days of the reverse merger
practice (1970s and 1980s) in the United States, a number of
opportunistic promoters were fraudulently establishing new shell
companies that subsequently raised capital through their IPOs.17 After
the shell company was established, they leaked speculative information
about an upcoming (reverse) merger to the market in the hope that the
stock price would rise, which would then give them the opportunity to
sell shares and make a significant profit. In response to this fraudulent
See Peter Roosenboom & Willem Schramade, Reverse Mergers in the United
Kingdom: Listed Targets and Private Acquirers, in INTERNATIONAL MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS ACTIVITY SINCE 1990: RECENT RESEARCH AND QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 181, 182 (Greg N. Gregoriou & Luc Renneboog eds., 2007).
15
See David Oakley, City Watchdog to Tighten Listing Rules, FIN. TIMES (Oct.
2, 2012, 9:11 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a2709378-0c8c-11e2-a73c00144feabdc0.html#axzz3myolCy8a.
16
Sylvia Pfeifer, Genel Faces Delay to Premium Listing Plan, FIN. TIMES (Feb.
23 2012, 7:05 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6dedca2c-5e44-11e1-85f600144feabdc0.html#axzz3myolCy8a.
17
See Aden R. Pavkov, Ghouls and Godsends – A Critique of Reverse Merger
Policy, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 475 (2006).
14
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practice, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed a
number of amendments to the Securities Act 1933 in 1992. The most
important rule in this context is Rule 419. This Rule introduced a
“blank check company,” which is defined as a company that: (i) is a
development stage company that has no specific business plan or
purpose or has indicated that its business plan is to engage in a merger
or acquisition with an unidentified company or companies, or other
entity or person; and (ii) is issuing “penny stock.” Rule 419 introduced
special rules for blank check companies. For instance, Rule 419
required virtually all cash raised during the IPO to be placed in escrow.
Furthermore, under Rule 419, blank check companies were prohibited
from trading in the shell’s stock prior to a reverse merger. Rule 419
also introduced a time limit of eighteen months to complete a
transaction, and failure to do so would lead to a return of the invested
cash to the shareholders.18
The regulatory restrictions on blank check companies are the
reason for the emergence of Special Purpose Acquisition Vehicles
(SPAC). Interestingly, SPACs largely mirror the blank check
companies of the 1980s that caused Congress to adopt Rule 419. The
business plan for a SPAC is simple. A SPAC is a shell company without
historical operations that was taken public through an IPO solely for
the purpose of acquiring an operating business, which is typically not
pre-determined prior to listing, within an eighteen to twenty four
month timeline. For entities looking to list through a reverse merger, a
SPAC can be a favorable partner by offering the operating company
an immediate cash infusion directly from the proceeds of the SPAC’s
IPO as well as a liquid trading market for its securities. Though a
merger with a SPAC eliminates the primary downsides associated with
a traditional reverse merger, this type of merger is often only a pipe
dream for less than exceptional operating companies, and the
likelihood of such a deal is at the whim of the SPAC’s management
group.
Despite the introduction of Rule 419 and the restrictions on
the use of SPACs, the reverse merger or reverse takeover was utilized
at a greater frequency as a mechanism to list publicly in the lead up to
2010. In fact, the number of reverse mergers eclipsed the IPO count
18

Offerings by Blank Check Companies, 17 C.F.R. § 230.419 (1992).
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in 2008 for the first time in the United States. Clearly, there exists a
cohort of promulgating instances where the use of a reverse merger
has been effective. For instance, a reverse merger can be a viable
mechanism to tap into previously untapped sources of additional
capital for companies that have exhausted other financing options and
do not meet the demanding performance criteria necessary to pursue
an IPO. In such instance, the access to Private Investment in Public
Equity (PIPE) financing, which is excluded as a financing source for
private companies, becomes an important potential source of
invaluable capital for entities with no other viable alternatives.19 A track
record of institutional investments in underperforming public
companies with relatively illiquid stocks makes this financing option
not only a realistic avenue for smaller, less reputable entities, but also
a means to eventually obtain a listing in a higher segment of one of the
major stock exchanges.20
In addition to access to additional avenues of capital, a reverse
merger tends to be both a quicker and cheaper listing option relative
to its IPO counterpart. On average, a backdoor listing through a
reverse merger can be completed in as little as a couple of weeks and
is unquestionably timelier than an IPO, which can take months. This
is recently confirmed by the CEO of Bitcoin Shop, a U.S. company
that operates a Bitcoin-based e-commerce website, who stated (after
successfully concluding a reverse merger through which the company
raised U.S.D. $1.875 million in a private placement in February 2014)
that the reverse merger only took three weeks.21 From a cost
standpoint, IPOs can run a bill north of the six-figure mark while
reverse mergers can be done for a significantly lower amount under
the standard circumstances. However, it is important to qualify the
speed and cost effectiveness of a reverse merger as it is often touted as
See David N. Feldman, Reverse Mergers + PIPEs: The New Small-Cap IPO,
in PIPES: REVISED AND UPDATED EDITION—A GUIDE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS
IN PUBLIC EQUITY (Steven Dresner & E. Kurt Kim eds., 2005), reprinted in 3 BUS. L.
BRIEF 34 (2007).
20
See Helen Luk & Heda Bayron, Sneaking in Through the Back: Chinese
Companies that have used Reverse Mergers to List on U.S. Regulators are Finally Taking Notice
and Cosing the Door, A PLUS, May 2011, at 18.
21
See Bill Meagher, Bitcoin Retailer Raises $1.9M in Reverse Merger, THE DEAL
PIPELINE, (Feb. 10, 2014, 4:03 PM), http://www.thedeal.com/content/consumerretail/bitcoin-retailer-raises-19m-in-reverse-merger.php.
19
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a surefire benefit in favor of reverse mergers when that is not always
the case. In fact, reverse mergers on the slower end of the spectrum
(more than four months) can take as long as some IPOs. Additionally,
the cost argument in favor of a reverse merger becomes questionable
after factoring for the expenses associated with a backdoor listing
along with the consideration paid to shell promoters in the form of
cash and sometimes an equity stake.
High-tech companies that face difficulties in accessing
domestic capital markets and attracting funding to help them reach the
next stage in their development also use backdoor listings to enter a
foreign market. This is particularly true if stock exchanges have a
competitive interest in encouraging foreign listings. Consider the
Chinese companies that listed in the United States via reverse mergers.
According to data collected by the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB), 159 Chinese companies completed a
reverse merger between January 1, 2007 and March 31, 2010.22 Because
taking the reverse merger route let these companies avoid the scrutiny
that would otherwise be required by state and federal rules and
regulations in the United States, the reverse merger count
outnumbered the number of Chinese companies that completed an
IPO in the United States in the same period. Clearly, even though
legally accepted, this trend was only possible with the help of a network
of U.S. advisors and consultants, such as underwriters, investment
banks, lawyers, and auditors.23
Despite the benefits of reverse mergers, there is a notion of
adverse selection in the pool of entities pursuing a listing through the
“alternative” listing route. This notion is supported by the delisting of
forty-two percent of the entities listed via the backdoor within its first
three years.24 Reverse takeovers are typically exercised by smaller and
22
See PCAOB Issues First Research Note on Chinese Reverse Mergers, PUB. CO.
ACCOUNTING
OVERSIGHT
BD.,
(Mar.
14,
2011),
http://pcaobus.org/News/Releases/Pages/03152011_ResearchNote.aspx.
23
David Barboza & Azam Ahmed, China to Wall Street: The Side-Door
Shuffle,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
23,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/business/global/reverse-mergers-givechinese-firms-a-side-door-to-wall-st.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
24
See Frederick Adjei, Ken B. Cyree & Mark M. Walker, The Determinants
and Survival of Reverse Mergers vs IPOs, 32 J. OF ECON. & FIN. 176, 189 (2008).
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lesser-known entities relative to their larger, more reputable
counterparts that list through an IPO, giving rise to a negative signaling
effect for those that elect to pursue a backdoor listing.25 This notion of
an adverse selection in entities pursuing a reverse merger is echoed in
the literature that showcases the decision tree that lay ahead of Chinese
companies, which account for a large majority of the reverse mergers
in the late 2000s, when pursuing a public listing.26 Empirical data
reveals that, despite the benefits of reverse mergers, the most wellknown and profitable Chinese companies generally elect to pursue an
IPO. By contrast, there are many examples of smaller Chinese entities
that listed through a reverse merger that are subject to a greater
frequency of class action lawsuits, are less profitable, exude lower
balance sheet liquidity, and are highly leveraged.27
Indeed, many of these Chinese companies ended up being sued
for securities law violations, particularly related to financial
misrepresentation, failure to disclose material facts, and/or deficient
internal control systems. Academic research reveals that U.S. listed
Chinese companies that pursued a reverse merger were not always in
compliance with the internationally accepted accounting standards.28
Customarily, the adoption of these standards is a prerequisite as well
as a requirement to maintain a public listing for entities pursuing a
reverse merger, regardless of the accounting practices employed in
local jurisdictions. This listing obligation underscores the growing
25
See Augusto Arellano-Ostoa & Sandro Brusco, Understanding Reverse
Mergers: A First Approach (Bus. Econ. Series 11, Working Paper No. 02-17, 2002),
available
at
http://orff.uc3m.es/bitstream/handle/10016/66/wb021711.pdf?sequence=1.
26
See Jan Jindra, Torben Voetmann & Ralph Walkling, Reverse Mergers: The
Chinese Experience (Working Paper No. 2012-03-018, 2014).
27
The 159 Chinese firms that pursued a reverse merger in the United
States in the period between January 1, 2007 and March 31, 2010 had a combined
market capitalization of U.S.D. $12.8 billion (which is less than fifty percent of the
market capitalization of the fifty-six Chinese companies that completed a U.S. IPO).
See Reverse Mergers: A Looming U.S.-China Showdown over Securities Regulation?, WHARTON
UNIV.
OF
PA.
(March
5,
2013),
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/reverse-mergers-a-looming-u-schina-showdown-over-securities-regulation/.
28
See Katherine T. Zuber, Breaking Down a Great Wall: Chinese Reverse
Mergers and Regulatory Efforts to Increase Accounting Transparency, 102 GEO. L.J. 1307
(2014).
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importance of audits and places a tremendous amount of responsibility
on the auditors of these (often times) foreign entities because they
usually serve as the only safeguard between the foreign entity and
ensuring that domestic investors receive reliable statements.
What is remarkable in this respect is that filings with the SEC
reveal that Chinese reverse mergers tended to retain their own auditors
post-merger as opposed to those of the former shell company.29 Audit
quality concerns in these mergers were only to be expected when
compliance with PCAOB accounting standards increasingly faltered.
The large majority of accounting firms employed by Chinese reverse
mergers were only inspected by the PCAOB on a triennial basis rather
than the typical annual basis, which had only compounded concerns
over fraud whirling around Chinese reverse mergers. The questionable
audit quality and non-compliance has stemmed partially from added
difficulty for U.S. registered accounting firms to conduct
comprehensive audits on companies based abroad due to language
barriers, accounting standard discrepancies, use of under qualified
assistants, the lack of enforcement of accounting laws in China, and
additional expenses as well.
The negative attention regarding backdoor listings has caused
companies to look at other financing alternatives, such as direct private
placements or private sales.30 However, although poor performing
Chinese reverse merger companies are inextricably tied to the general
perception of reverse mergers, as they account for a large proportion
of entities pursuing backdoor listing through public shell companies,
research indicates that the negative spillover effects of fraudulent
activity or reporting by Chinese companies have not always harmed
other non-Chinese companies’ backdoor listing activities. Reverse
mergers involving non-Chinese entities appear to largely escape the
wrath of investors, as the stock market reaction to news of fraud is
focused on Chinese companies as opposed to questioning reverse

See Benjamin A. Templin, Chinese Reverse Mergers, Accounting Regimes, and
the Rule of Law in China, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 119 (2011).
30
See David Thomas, The IPO Road Less Traveled: Form 10,
BIOTECHNOW (Feb. 25, 2013) http://www.biotech-now.org/business-andinvestments/inside-bio-ia/2013/02/the-ipo-road-less-traveled-form-10.
29
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mergers in general as a viable mechanism to list publicly.31 Still, the
global turbulence in the credit markets, triggered by the turmoil in the
subprime mortgage market in 2007-2008, largely brought an end to the
laissez-faire era in the backdoor listing process. For instance, in
response to the scandals, U.S. policymakers introduced legislation that
subjects reverse mergers to registration requirements and provisions
targeted at improving the companies’ accountability. The backdoor
listings rules and regulations—and their impact on high-tech
companies—will be discussed in the next Section.
III.

REGULATORY IMPACT ON BACKDOOR LISTINGS

Regulatory responses to the increase in backdoor listings vary
significantly from country to country based on a country’s respective
experience in this area. These responses can be roughly split into three
distinct approaches.32 On one end of the spectrum, the United States
has undertaken a number of initiatives spearheaded by organizations
such as the SEC and the PCAOB to curb issues stemming from reverse
mergers in the form of issuing investor warnings and more stringent
listing rules for these transactions. On the other end of the spectrum,
Sweden has only limited experience with backdoor listings (and has yet
to express concern similar to that of the United States). However, to
ensure that investors have sufficient information to distinguish
between prudent and imprudent backdoor listings, the Rule Book of
OMX NASDAQ Stockholm contains a light touch signaling system
that enables regulators to give companies involved in backdoor listings
a temporary “observation status.”33 Regulatory responses worldwide to
the widely publicized backdoor listings/reverse mergers waver
between the approaches taken by the United States and Sweden, as
See Masako N. Darrough, Rong Huang & Sha Zhao, The Spillover Effect
of Chinese Reverse Merger Frauds: Chinese or Reverse Merger? (Working Paper, 2012).
32
Rather than making a strict distinction between the different regulatory
approaches, this Section argues that regulatory measures undertaken by national level
regulators are best seen in terms of a spectrum of possible regulatory paths. It ranges
from countries that introduced special rules and regulations for backdoor listings via
countries that implemented rules and regulations that treat backdoor listings as IPOs
to jurisdictions that adopted a more flexible regulatory approach.
33
See NASDAQ OMX STOCKHOLM, RULE BOOK FOR ISSUERS 17 r. 2.7
(2015), available at http://www.nasdaqomx.com/digitalAssets/96/96156_nasdaqstockholm-s-rule-book-for-issuers—-1-january-2015.pdf.
31
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evidenced by the changes (or lack thereof) in the respective listing rules
following these developments in Australia.
A. Special Rules and Regulations for Backdoor Listings
In light of the string of alleged fraudulent activity and
accounting gaffes concentrated within entities that have undertaken
reverse mergers in the latter portion of the 2000s, the SEC and the
PCAOB acted swiftly in an attempt to halt further incidents. In
addition to issuing an investor bulletin highlighting the additional
potential risks associated with investing in companies that were
engaged in a backdoor listing process,34 the SEC imposed a wave of
more stringent listing rules for determining if and when companies are
eligible to list publicly through the “backdoor.” Additional listing
requirements include maintaining a closing share price beyond a
certain threshold, complying with all periodic filing requirements of
financial reports, and having been traded in the United States on the
OTC market or another regulated exchange for at least one year prior
(“seasoning rules”).35 These amendments, which were ultimately
approved by the SEC in November 2011, aim to address the concerns
surrounding the inaccuracies of financial statements produced by
reverse merger companies.36
In addition, the PCAOB proposed to implement a set of
supplementary auditing standards in the fall of 2011 by requiring audit
reports to disclose and identify the names of audit firms or individuals
that provided more than three percent of the total hours spent on the
most recent audit.37 The rationale for this additional requirement is
See generally Investor Bulletin: Reverse Mergers, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June
2011), http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/reversemergers.pdf.
35
See David N. Feldman, Comments on Seasoning of Reverse Merger Companies
Before Uplisting to National Securities Exchanges, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 140 (2012).
36
See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves New Rules
to Toughen Listing Standards for Reverse Merger Companies (Nov. 9, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-235.htm.
37
Moreover, the PCAOB and China entered into a cooperative
agreement in October 2012 under which PCAOB inspectors are allowed to observe
the oversight activities of Chinese regulators. In return, the agreement allows the
Chinese regulators to observe the work of the PCAOB. See PCAOB Taking Steps to
Work with China, NASBA STATE BOARD REP., Oct. 2012, at 2, available at
http://www.nasba.org/files/2012/10/OctoberSBR_2012.pdf.
34
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twofold. First and foremost, such a standard helps fulfill consistent
requests from investors for further information about the firms that
are performing audits on their investments. Second, the names of
auditing firms that are located in jurisdictions beyond the PCAOB’s
current investigatory scope is publicized under this mandate and hence
allows investors to be better informed about the quality of firms
conducting a company’s auditing. This is particularly relevant in China
where the PCAOB and other foreign regulatory bodies are currently
barred from inspecting China-based audit firms on grounds of
sovereignty and state secrecy. Though the PCAOB has been trying to
further cooperation with jurisdictions, such as China, which are
particularly salient and which make up almost five percent of the
PCAOB registered firms, additional measures, including the
publication of the names of foreign auditing firms, are useful steps
toward greater transparency in audit practices in favor of investors.
The impact of the seasoning rules and regulatory scrutiny on
“backdoor listings” is significant. Data provider PrivateRaise recorded
257 reverse mergers in 2010. After the introduction of the rules, the
number decreased to “only” 124 companies in 2013.38 Interestingly,
U.S. healthcare and biotech companies are increasingly willing to
pursue a backdoor listing despite the seasoning rules. The benefits of
the informal and flexible reverse merger process often outweigh the
costs of applying the more cumbersome seasoning rules. According to
data provider PrivateRaise, at least sixty-nine companies have availed
themselves of the reverse merger option during the first half of 2014,
and most of these companies were healthcare and biotech companies.39
Surprisingly (recall that a backdoor listing is inherently not a capitalraising endeavor), twenty-eight companies in these reverse merger

38
See Bill Meagher, Alternative Public Offering Market Is Booming, THE DEAL
PIPELINE
(Feb.
24,
2014,
1:58
PM),
http://www.thedeal.com/content/healthcare/alternative-public-offering-marketis-booming.php.
39 Bill Meagher, Investment in Reverse Mergers Doubled in Second Quarter, The
Deal Pipeline (July 21, 2014, 2:43 PM),
http://www.thedeal.com/content/healthcare/investment-in-reverse-mergersdoubled-in-second-quarter.php.
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transactions were also able to raise a respectable total of U.S.D. $85.6
million in private placements.40
B. Re-Compliance Regulation
In contrast to the United States, the financial regulatory body
in Australia has had a rather tepid response to the wave of fraudulent
backdoor listings. In fact, the Listing Rules of the Australian Stock
Exchange (ASX) makes no specific references to backdoor listings or
reverse takeovers. However, ASX Listing Rules Guidance Note 12,
which was published in December 2013 and revised in October 2014,
provides legal certainty for the companies and their advisors by
explaining how backdoor listings are regulated under Listing Rules 11.1
(including 11.1.2 and 11.1.3), 11.2, and 11.3.41 The Australian Securities
Exchange generally compels a listed entity involved in a backdoor
listing to re-adhere to listing requirements under ASX Listing Rule 11.1
(proposed change to nature or scale of activities).42 Non-compliance
with the listing rules could lead to a suspension of the quotation.
Exceptions to the re-admission process exist only if the
backdoor listing does not constitute a significant change to the nature
or scale of the activities of the listed company. However, a close
reading of the previously mentioned Guidance Note 12 shows that the
most common backdoor listings will lead to a significant change in the
nature of an entity’s activity.43 The following activities (associated with
the mining industry) are explicitly mentioned in the Guidance Note:
(1) an entity whose main business activity is manufacturing consumer
goods deciding to switch its main business activity to mining
exploration (or vice versa); and (2) an entity whose main business
activity is exploring for minerals deciding to switch its main business
activity to exploring for oil and gas.44 As for the scale of the activities,
the ASX considers a twenty-five percent change to the size of an
entity’s operations to be significant. It therefore comes as no surprise
that empirical research found that approximately seventy-nine percent

40
41
42
43
44

Id.
ASX Listing Rules, ch. 12 (Austl. Sec. Exch. 2014).
Id. at ch. 11.1.
Id. at ch. 12.
Id.
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of the backdoor listings that took place between 1992 and 2007 would
have been required to re-comply with ASX’s listing requirements.45
However, the recently revised Guidance Note 12 arguably
makes backdoor listings more appealing to high-tech companies by
giving the ASX more flexibility and leeway in interpreting the readmission rules. For instance, Guidance Note 12 includes more
flexible policies on the requirements regarding the minimum spread of
security holders (usually 400 shareholders each holding shares with a
minimum value of AUD $2,000). Guidance Note 12 also has a “20
cent rule,” which requires—with few exceptions—that shares (or other
securities) offered as part of a backdoor listing should have a minimum
issue price or sale price of A.U.D. twenty cents or more per share.
Clearly, the ASX Guidance Notes not only increase the compliance
rate with the regulatory requirements, but also enhance legal certainty
and limit possible abuse of the rules, while taking the specifics of
backdoor listings into account.
C. A Light Touch—Flexible—Regulatory Approach to Backdoor
Listings
The Listing Rules of NASDAQ OMX Stockholm also
embrace flexibility in assessing backdoor listing processes. First, Rule
3.3.8 requires listed companies to disclose information to the market
about significant changes in its identity.46 The information must be
equivalent to what is required under the IPO regulations. In order to
determine whether there is a significant change in identity, the Swedish
regulator typically takes the following criteria into account: (1) changes
in ownership structure, (2) the acquisition of a new business, and (3)
the change in market value of the listed company following an
acquisition. What is interesting is that the exchange has the possibility
to give a company’s shares a temporary “observation status” if the
disclosed information is insufficient. The rationale behind this status is
straightforward: it provides information to the market and warns
investors and potential investors of the risks and uncertainties
associated with the company or its shares. The observation status is a
flexible, but powerful mechanism to remind investors to be cautious
45
46

See Philip Brown, Andrew Ferguson & Peter Lam, supra note 8.
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm, supra note 33, at r. 3.3.8.
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about investing in companies that are subject to a reverse takeover.47
The observation status can only be granted for a limited period of time,
usually not more than six months.
Clearly, other measures in backdoor listing procedures
available to the Swedish regulator are the cancellation or suspension of
the trading in the shares of a listed company. However, if the regulator
is of the opinion that more drastic interventions are necessary,
flexibility remains an important element in the regulator’s decisionmaking process. Consider Immune Pharmaceuticals Inc., the
byproduct of a reverse merger between a privately held Israeli based
bio-pharmaceutical company (Immune Pharmaceuticals Limited) with
a listed American developer in pain and cancer treatment (EpiCept
Corporation).48 The newly merged entity hoped to achieve a public
listing on the NASDAQ OMX in Sweden following the transaction.49
It also intended to list on a U.S. securities exchange. Daniel Teper,
Immune Pharmaceuticals Inc. Chairman and CEO, highlighted the
limitations for Israeli capital markets to fulfill the financing needs of
companies operating within the life sciences space that are not
concurrently listed in the United States as the primary cause for
pursuing a public listing.50 A reverse merger was ultimately elected as
the mechanism to list, since an IPO was initially not a feasible option
at the time of the consummation of the merger.
However, even though an active listed company (such as
EpiCept), as opposed to a shell company, was involved in the reverse
merger, the newly merged Immune Pharmaceuticals Inc. was not
immediately allowed to maintain its listing on the regulated NASDAQ
OMX market in Sweden. Instead, the regulators approved trading of
the shares of Immune Pharmaceutical Inc. on NASDAQ OMX First
Id. at r. 2.7(v).
See Immune Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Immune Pharmaceuticals’ Common Stock
Approved for Trading on NASDAQ OMX First North Premier, NASDAQ
GLOBALNEWSWIRE
(November
26,
2013,
00:38
AM),
http://globenewswire.com/news-release/2013/11/26/592383/0/en/ImmunePharmaceuticals-Common-Stock-Approved-for-Trading-on-NASDAQ-OMXFirst-North-Premier.html?parent=591162.
49 Id.
50 See Gali Weinreb, Immune Pharmaceuticals Lists in US, Sweden After Reverse
Merger, GLOBES (Oct. 5, 2015 8:30 PM), http://www.globes.co.il/en/article1000870466.
47
48
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North Premier, a market for high growth companies that are in the
process of preparing for a listing at the main market.51 This decision
reflects the importance of the introduction of less regulated and more
accessible segments to smaller high-tech companies that would
otherwise consider entering the market through the backdoor. The
impact of segmented stock markets on high-tech companies and
backdoor listings will be discussed in Section IV.
IV.

SPECIAL LISTING SEGMENTS FOR HIGH GROWTH
COMPANIES AND BACKDOOR LISTINGS

The Swedish experience indicates that the outlook for
backdoor listings is dismal when high-tech companies can list on an
accessible, vibrant, liquid, and high-growth market. The question,
however, is whether the benefits of such a market are large enough for
high-tech companies to completely turn away from the backdoor
listing route to the stock market. What is important in this respect is
the gradually changing regulatory landscape for companies that
consider floating their shares on a stock exchange. Policymakers and
regulators have introduced (or plan to introduce) more flexible listing
rules and regulations to stimulate IPO activity by high-tech
companies.52 These initiatives appear to be successful. For instance,
the increase of the number of high tech IPOs in the United States in
2013 and the first half of 2014 could arguably be attributed to the
possibility of a firm to qualify as an emerging growth company (EGC)
under the JOBS Act.53
The EGC label offers several benefits to high growth
companies in the pre- and post-IPO period. In the pre-IPO period, an
EGC will only be required to include two years—instead of the usually

Immune Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra note 48.
For example, in February 2015 the European Commission started a
consultation process expected to evolve into a E.U.-wide Capital Markets Union.
The idea is that a small company’s access to financing would be significantly
improved in a more harmonized capital market. See Commission Green Paper on Building
a Capital Markets Union, COM (2015) 63 final (February 18, 2015).
53
See generally Gillian Tett, Investors Enjoy a Sweet Aftertaste to the Candy Crush
Crunch,
FIN.
TIMES
(Mar.
27,
2014,
5:30
PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/39e3e9ba-b418-11e3-a102-00144feabdc0.html.
51
52
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required three years—of audited statements in its IPO registration.54
More importantly, the special status introduces “testing-the-waters”
provisions, which allow EGCs to communicate with professional
investors (qualified institutional buyers or institutional accredited
investors) to determine investors’ interest in the company prior to or
following the date of the IPO registration statement.55 Moreover, the
JOBS Act provides these companies with the possibility to
confidentially submit a draft of its IPO registration statement for
review to the SEC.56
Also, the “on-ramp” provisions grant important reliefs in the
post-IPO period. For example, EGCs are exempted from the
obligations under Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404(b) to provide an
auditor attestation of internal control.57 Furthermore, the Act excludes
EGCs from (1) complying with the full range of executive
compensation disclosures and (2) say-on-pay votes on executive
compensation.58 Finally, EGCs need not comply with any new or
revised accounting standards until the date on which private
companies are required to apply these standards to their organization.
The success of the JOBS Act is reflected by the significant increase in
the number of EGCs that have pursued a listing after having used the
option to confidentially file their registration statements. According to
data provider Renaissance Capital, approximately seventy to eighty
percent of the 222 IPO companies (including non-venture capital
backed companies) in 2013 have availed themselves of the JOBS Act’s
confidential filing provision.59 This is not surprising since high-tech
companies value increased control over the timing of the IPO, which
is arguably provided by a confidential filing, more than the likely
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), H.R. 3606, 112th
Cong. § 102 (2012) (enacted).
55
Id. at §105.
56
Id. at §106.
57
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 404(b)
(2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2002)).
54

58
Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 953(b)(1) (2010) (codified in 15 U.S.C. 78l note).
59
See David Gelles & Michael J. De La Merced, ‘The New Normal’ for Tech
Companies and Others: The Stealth I.P.O., N.Y. TIMES: DEAL BOOK (February 9, 2014:
8:58 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/the-new-normal-for-techcompanies-and-others-the-stealth-i-p-o/?_r=0.
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discount in the stock price due to the reduced disclosure and reporting
requirements for EGCs.
Clearly, the JOBS Act is a success, but will it send the backdoor
listing option to oblivion? It is already evident that high-tech
companies have started to consider the IPO option again in the United
States. In 2014, 116 high-tech (and venture capital-backed) companies
floated their shares, compared to eighty-five companies in 2013.60
However, despite the booming high growth market segment in the
United States, there has been a surge in reverse mergers, particularly
conducted by companies that operate in volatile industries. As
discussed, despite the need to comply with onerous special reverse
merger regulation, these companies still find that a reverse merger is
quicker and easier than conducting a traditional IPO (even under the
JOBS Act).
CONCLUSION
In the previous decade, backdoor listings became increasingly
popular as a mechanism to list publicly in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Australia. However, empirical studies indicate that
backdoor listing activity has significantly decreased due to negative
publicity, the introduction of more stringent rules and regulations, and
increased regulatory scrutiny. Therefore, the question is whether
measures employed to strengthen the rules and regulations governing
backdoor listings will eventually put an end to this alternative option
of going public. The evidence is mixed. The number of and amount
raised by Chinese reverse mergers has plunged approximately fiftythree percent and ninety-five percent respectively in 2011 (compared
to 2010). In contrast, we observe a backdoor listing boom in the hightech industry in the United States and Australia in 2014.
The answers to the question of whether backdoor listing is still
a sustainable alternative for high-tech companies compared to the
“front door” IPO vary depending on a country’s respective experience
with backdoor listings. These answers can be divided into four
categories. In the first category, there are countries such as the United
States that have a vibrant, accessible, and liquid stock market for high60

See PitchBook, 2Q 2015 U.S. VENTURE INDUSTRY REPORT (2015).
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tech companies as well as a long history with backdoor listings. In such
countries, high-tech companies are willing to accept more stringent
rules, such as the seasoning rules, if the backdoor listing strategy still
offers them flexibility as well as low-cost and timing advantages
compared to the regular IPO route.
Second, in countries such as Australia, which has no special
high-tech segment on the stock exchange but has an active market for
alternative listings, backdoor listings are there to stay even during the
gloomiest days of the economy. Policymakers and regulators seem to
understand the importance of alternative public offerings by allowing
flexibility in the application of the “re-admission” rules.
The third category includes countries that have a robust and
liquid high-tech stock market, but no recent experience with backdoor
listings. The Swedish experience shows that, even though backdoor
listings are permitted, high-tech companies rarely employ this
alternative option. This can partly be explained by the lack of available
shell companies.
Fourth, even if countries have no history with backdoor
listings, policymakers and regulators should be wary of the fact that
entrepreneurial high-tech companies may start to explore alternative
public offerings if the high-tech segment of the stock market is not
accessible through relatively cheap and fast means. They should realize
that backdoor listings continue to provide a viable and legitimate listing
option for high-tech companies that are always in search for capital
and liquidity.
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COMMERCIAL LAW AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST
Jay Lawrence Westbrook*
In commercial law policy debates in the United States, the
consideration of public interests has been muted. The success of
“contractualist” ideas (along with “public choice” theory) has forced
to the background notions of broader social interests and the
significant secondary effects of commercial law rules, leaving the policy
debates focused largely on competing claims of efficiency and injustice
to the immediate parties to an activity or transaction. In this essay, I
want to explore this phenomenon in a preliminary way. My long-term
objective is to understand the reasons for this move away from
considerations of public interests and perhaps to find a way to return
those interests to their proper place.

* Benno Schmidt Chair of Business Law, The University of
Texas School of Law. I am grateful to Patrick Wolfgang, Texas ‘15,
and William Langley and Kelsi Stayart, Texas ‘16, for their help in
research for my public-interest project, starting with this article. This
paper was delivered in the summer of 2014. While its principal
points continue to reflect my views and the nature of my current
academic project, those views and the world have moved on in some
respects. In particular, I have become more careful to say “public
interests” (plural). I also note that the American Bankruptcy Institute
Commission has now delivered recommendations about bankruptcy
reform that provide a rich medium for critiques based on public
interests. See AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11
(2014).
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How did the notion of a public interest in commercial law
questions get elbowed aside when it had long been a staple of
American academic and political discourse? The primary reason has
been the rise of “public choice” theories1 and “contractualism.”2 This
essay focuses on the contractualists as its primary example. For the
most part, the contractualists are content to identify one public
interest—freedom of contract in a free market—as the singular public
interest to be served in commercial law, primarily on the basis of
efficiency.
One of the reasons that other public interest considerations
have been elbowed aside is that those who are concerned with public
interest factors do not have a church as do the public choice and
contractualist scholars. That is, these scholars have a set of
institutions—conferences, centers, and the like—and a common set of
intellectual “moves” and terminology combined with a deep sense that
their approach is almost always the best approach to any legal policy
question.
In my field of insolvency, Professor Douglas Baird has
attempted a distinction between “proceduralists” and “traditionalists”
to mark these scholars from the rest,3 but the labels are not very helpful
and the foundation for them is weak. I think it is more useful to focus
on the contractualists versus the “regulators” (both of which are
defined below).
I try in this essay to explain how and why public interests have
been ignored. The essay form permits suggestion and speculation to
substitute for precision and detailed references in these early stages of
my developing project. Many points are uncertain at this stage. I am
unclear, for example, whether the relative decline of arguments about

1
See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PUBLIC CHOICE: THE ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF A RESEARCH PROGRAM (2003).
2
See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN, JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK,
KATHERINE PORTER & JOHN POTTOW, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS
(7th ed. 2014) [hereinafter DEBTORS AND CREDITORS].
3
See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573,
576-77 (1998). For a critique of his position, see Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Empirical
Research in Consumer Bankruptcy, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2123 (2002).
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the public interest is primarily an American phenomenon or one found
in many parts of the academic world.
The most challenging element in the analysis is the definition
of the public interest as distinct from an individual or aggregate
interest. An example may help at the start. In debates about the
enforcement of form (boilerplate) contracts against consumers, those
favoring enforcement generally speak of freedom of contract in a
market society and rely on the consumer’s consent as the central reason
for enforcement. Those who would limit enforcement generally argue
(a) that the consumer does not really consent in a meaningful sense;
and (b) that, even with consent, enforcement of some or all of the form
provisions would be unjust or unfair to the consumer party.
The arguments on each side have considerable power, but my
point here is that each argument is rights-based—that is, limited to the
rights of one of the parties to the contract. The arguments may apply
to many sellers that issue form contracts and to millions of consumers
against whom they might be enforced, but this aggregation of instances
does not amount to an argument about the public interest. No doubt
the sellers’ advocates would claim that society generally is benefitted
by enforcement, and the consumers’ champions would make the same
claim about nonenforcement, but each would be speaking of the
aggregation of individual results, not a distinct collective interest that
should be included in determining an appropriate legal policy.
By contrast, other sorts of arguments—whether good or bad
on the merits—would be based on a notion of the public interest. As
a first approximation, a public interest may be defined as a concern
about the positive and negative effects of a policy on most of the
people in society, including those whose individual interests are not
directly implicated by a given transaction or activity. In our pending
example, the public interest in boilerplate might include factors
different from freedom of contract or an unjust result for the
consumer party.
There are a number of public interest concerns in the context
of form contracts. One category might be called “secondary effects.”
Consider the consumer advocate’s argument that courts or regulators
should be more ready than they have been to strike down unreasonable
and oppressive contract terms. One aspect of that claim would be the
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benefit to the consumers thus spared from enforcement of those
terms. But another would be the assertion that judicial activism would
serve the public interest by arming the sellers’ lawyers with tools to
convince their clients to draft form contracts with a more even hand.
That result might benefit society generally by giving everyone more
confidence in entering into form contracts and creating a pervasive
sense of fairness in the market place. This sort of argument differs
from the individual rights argument because it rests upon costs and
benefits to society generally rather than arguments about “true”
consent or normative beliefs about fairness. This sort of argument is
also less subject to claims of individual consent or waiver. My sense is
that this sort of shift in the focus of the argument would be important,
albeit sometimes subtle in the abstract.4
For the purposes of this paper, I have no interest in how these
arguments come out or in the numerous counter and counter-counter
arguments that would arise. The necessary point is that there may be
a public interest to be identified and that interest may have a significant
influence on the nature and direction of the debate. It can have that
effect even though it must be conceded that the importance of the
distinction is sometimes masked by the difficulty in making it. It must
also be conceded that aggregate and public interest benefits/harms
may overlap considerably, but that ambiguity does not necessarily
make the public interest less salient.
I.

THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST

In recent years, discourse in many legal fields has been
“privatized” by the assumption that the stakes—the benefits and
costs—at play in a given activity are limited to the private parties who
are individually interested in possible outcomes. Commercial scholars
are prominent among those committed to this view. Such scholars are

4
These sorts of arguments are often about “externalities,” positive or
negative, that are recognized in principal in contractualist presentations, but are often
omitted or subordinated. Externalities sometimes effect only a certain group of
people and therefore are not public interest questions in the sense that I am using
the phrase. But a fair number of public interest arguments are about ignored
externalities.
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generally found among those who embrace “public choice” theory and
among those whom I have characterized as “contractualists.”5
Loosely speaking, scholars who embrace the “public choice”
theory might claim that there is rarely such a thing as a public interest
that is relevant to a legal issue, only an aggregation of private ones that
become expressed in law largely as a matter of interest group wins,
losses, or compromises.
Next door live the contractualists, who believe that commercial
policies are best understood as a series of contracts, rather than
sovereign commands. For them, the ideal society consists of a web of
contracts freely adopted by each person. (Locke meets the Uniform
Commercial Code.) Because public law is sometimes a practical
necessity, that law should be defined by the results that private
contracts would produce if they were feasible. The contractualists are
in turn divided between those who view the contractual approach as a
useful metaphor for determining the correct legal result and others
who argue for commercial laws that facilitate actual bargains that
would replace substantive legislative rules to the maximum extent,
often by enabling the legal contortions necessary to attempt to avoid
the problem of third-party effects. Each of these views privatizes legal
thought by banishing traditional notions of a societal or collective
interest. Their opponents I will call the “regulators”: scholars who are
more sympathetic to mandatory legal rules and government regulation
in the public interest.
Both public choice and contractualism are closely related to
neoclassical economic theory and to the Law and Economics
“movement” in the U.S. and elsewhere, with its emphasis on increasing
efficiency in the generation of wealth and its disinterest in questions of
wealth distribution. They also parallel a reductionism in political
science, where the literature has been dominated by interest group
influence and legislator self-interest, rather than the actors’ beliefs and
perceptions about the public interest. In recent years, this approach
has been extended to scholarship about judges, seeking patterns of
decision-making related to political affiliations and personal
See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of
Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (2005); DEBTORS
AND CREDITORS, supra note 2.
5
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backgrounds. Much of this scholarship is useful, but like the
rhododendron it has too often exterminated valuable competitors.
These and other factors have contributed to a focus on
individual rights and obligations and thus on individual benefits and
harms. This focus has had a major impact on policy debates.
American examples of affected policy issues include the existence vel
non of private rights of action based on statutory provisions that do not
explicitly grant such rights; the nature of fiduciary and other
management duties owed to investors and creditors in corporate law;
the proper scope of arbitration clauses in both consumer and
international commercial arbitration; and the emergence of secured
creditor domination of the reorganization of distressed businesses. In
this essay, I want to address just the last one as an illustration.
II.

AN EXAMPLE: THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN
REORGANIZATION CASES

Chapter 11 reorganization lies at the heart of United States
insolvency law, and it is the primary feature of our law that has
influenced legal reformers all over the world. Yet it seems to me that
some of the central policies that drove its adoption in the United States
and its influence elsewhere in the world have become obscured in
modern scholarship. Obviously, the achievement of a law’s goal
should be the touchstone for every aspect of its implementation, yet
often in the United States goals are merely assumed and these
assumptions often change sub silencio. For example, there is
considerable discussion currently about the control of Chapter 11
proceedings by secured creditors, but relatively little attention to the
goals of Chapter 11 in relation to control rights. Because secured
creditor control effectively converts Chapter 11 to a vehicle for a
version of contractualism, it is congenial to that school but unattractive
to those who see a larger role for protective rules in the Bankruptcy
Code. The correct result of the contention between them ultimately
turns on convictions about the proper goals for reorganization law.
I do not attempt here to make the case for or against creditor
control or to answer the larger predicate question, which is the purpose
of reorganization procedures. Instead I want to put on the table some
of the public interest issues that should be part of those discussions.
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It is striking that the debate has become almost entirely rights
based, ignoring any suggestion of public interests in the outcome, just
as with the form consumer contract example discussed earlier. The
debate has been conducted by scholars committed to a private-sector,
free-market view versus those more concerned with normative values
like protecting weak parties and nonparticipating parties. As with form
contracts, the lack of apparent concern with a public interest is often
found on both sides.6
Most of the scholars who favor secured creditor control are
contractualists or quasi-contractualists. Dean Robert Rasmussen is a
pure contractualist who would use a company’s articles of
incorporation as a standard contract with creditors:
When a firm is formed, it would be required to select
what courses of action it wishes to have available if it
runs into financial difficulties down the road. . . . By
offering a discrete set of choices, the menu would
enable banks and other creditors to anticipate the
interest-rate adjustments that would be made for each
option. They could then communicate to those
establishing the firm the true cost of selecting one
bankruptcy provision over another.7
His fellow contractualists propose various other techniques for
producing contractual agreement, but all support their position with
arguments that rest on benefits to the individual firms as debtors or
creditors and consider any possible harms in the same way. Underlying
their approach is only one contention that could be read as invoking
the public interest. Professor Lynn LoPucki, a frequent opponent of
the contractualists, summarizes that argument as follows:

6
A nice example of the absence of the public interest argument is found
in the Detroit bankruptcy where little of the legal debate seems to have addressed
the public interest benefits arising from the availability to the public of a remarkable
collection of art at very low cost. Yet that interest had a major impact on the results
of the case. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy,
33 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2016) (importance to the public of preservation
of art museum).
7
Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate
Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 66-67 (1992).
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The case for freedom of contract rests squarely on the
assumption that each party chooses the contract
because the contract makes that party better off.
Because each party is better off, all parties are better
off in the aggregate. That aggregate then becomes a
proxy for “social welfare.” In the bankruptcy context,
this theory holds that thousands of correct decisions
by a debtor and each of its creditors and shareholders
will generate one correct decision—the bankruptcy
contract—in the aggregate. That decision will
maximize social welfare.8
Other contractualists hedge their commitment to contract a bit
more than Dean Rasmussen, but their caveats serve to emphasize their
concern with individual rights and obligations. Thus Professor Steven
Schwarcz limits enforceability of contract deviations from the
“default” rules of the Bankruptcy Code to those that do not offend the
principle of equality of distribution nor create an externality that would
be unenforceable as a matter of contract law.9 The former limit is
protective of the rights of claimants in a specific case, while the latter
amounts to a public policy exception, something rarely found in
American contract law and quite different from the broader and much
more common instance of a relevant public interest.
Only one contractualist article has seemed to me to rely
importantly on a public interest other than the general ground of
freedom of contract. It was written by Professor Alan Schwartz who
supported a contractualist approach with the claim that it would
further the only legitimate goal of reorganization, which for him is
generation of the lowest possible interest rate on debt capital.10
Whatever the merits of that interesting assertion, it does make a claim
about a public interest. It is probably significant that no other
contractualist scholar has taken up that argument.

8
Lynn LoPucki, Contract Bankruptcy: A Reply to Alan Schwartz, 109 YALE
L.J. 317, 341 (1999).
9
Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm,
77 TEX. L. REV 515, 542-44 (1999).
10
Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed, 109 YALE L.J. 343, 343
(1999).
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What is more surprising is that fairly often scholars who are
regulators also focus on private concerns rather than public ones. For
example, I wrote an article directly attacking the contractualist position
on secured creditor control of reorganization, but devoted it almost
entirely to the negative effects of that approach on the maximization
of value and fair distribution to the claimants rather than any
considerations beyond those immediate parties.11 Elizabeth Warren
and I launched a direct attack on the contractualists based on empirical
data, but the entire thrust of the article was that a contractualist
approach would result in disadvantage to various parties to a
reorganization proceeding.12 The principal exception was a small
section dealing with transaction costs, and even that had a focus on the
contracting parties rather than society in general.
Only two major articles on the rule maker side in the debates
about bankruptcy seem to have squarely addressed an alleged public
interest. Professor Susan Block-Lieb pointed to the adoption of
various statutes regarding pensions and retiree benefits as establishing
a public interest that should have weight in making bankruptcy policy.13
She insisted that Congressional action to support pension benefits
represented a Congressional determination that pension protection
was a general interest of our society and therefore required the
consideration of that public interest in forming bankruptcy policy.
Her discussion illustrated an important aspect of the conflict
between party-oriented arguments and public interest arguments. She
explicitly rejected the standard contractualist argument that substantive
public policy should have no place in bankruptcy, viz any concerns
about pensions must be cabined in pension law discussions, concerns
about financial speculation must be resolved in legislation directed at
financial speculation, and so on. The effect is to prevent many public
interest factors from being given weight in making bankruptcy law.
The compartmentalization of legal policy contributes substantially to a
focus on the interests of the immediate parties to a particular economic
relationship and away from a more general social or economic
See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX.
L. REV. 795, 837-52 (2004).
12
See Warren & Westbrook, supra note 5.
13
See Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 503 (2001).
11
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perspective. By taking on the argument against policy balkanization,
Professor Block-Lieb staked out a position for substantive public
interests in bankruptcy policy.
The second major article pointing out public interest
considerations in reorganization policy was written by Professor (now
Senator) Elizabeth Warren. In an article responding to the
contractualist approach, Professor Warren listed the goals of
bankruptcy as follows:
Enhance Value. By creating specialized collection rules to
govern in the case of multiple default and by requiring collective rather
than individual action, the value to be gleaned from the failing business
can be increased while the expenses of collecting that value are
decreased. Bankruptcy rules can also preserve going concern value
while they can cabin many forms of strategic behavior that would
otherwise waste collective resources.
Establish an Orderly Distribution Scheme. By moving away from
the race of the diligent at state law, there can be a considered judgment
of who should receive preferences in the event that not all parties’
expectations can be met. Distributions to parties with different legal
rights can be settled in a legislative arena. Parties with no formal rights
to the assets of the business, such as employees who will lose jobs and
taxing authorities that will lose ratable property, may profit from a
second chance at restructuring debt and giving the business a chance
to survive in situ.
Internalize the Costs of Default. A viable Chapter 11 system
reduces the pressure on the government to bail out failing companies,
thus forcing creditors to make market-based lending decisions and to
monitor their debtors more closely.
Establish a Privately Monitored System. The initiation decision in
bankruptcy is one of the hardest. A system that provides sufficient
incentives for debtors to choose bankruptcy voluntarily or for
creditors to force their debtors into it avoids the high costs that come
with a publicly monitored system, both in terms of the costs of errors
(decisions to place a company in bankruptcy that come too quickly or
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too slowly) and the costs of monitoring. Such a system also avoids the
potential politicization of such decisions.14
I have underlined portions of this list that reflect public interest
factors. It is important to note that Warren was not often able to cite
specific provisions protecting such values. Public interest factors are
often hard to tie to particular legal rules. In effect, legislators rely on
the courts to have those factors in mind, along with the structure of a
statutory system as a whole, when construing a rule.
Generally, however, the debates about secured creditor control
of reorganization and its relation to reorganization goals have settled
into a rights argument with little attention to public interest factors.
That is so despite the fact that the discussions surrounding the
proposal and adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 were filled with
public interest factors supporting reorganization. Jobs, community
stability, and a second chance for company owners were high on the
legislators’ lists of statutory goals. For example:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike
a liquidation case, is to restructure a business’s
financings so that it may continue to operate, provide
its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce
a return for its stockholders . . . It is more economically
efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it
preserves jobs and assets.15
Taking the preservation of jobs as an example, there is
evidence that public officials continue to be deeply concerned with the
preservation of jobs, but jobs have virtually disappeared from the
reorganization conversation in the United States.
This point is illustrated when competing reorganization plans
are presented to the courts. Under some circumstances, the
Bankruptcy Code permits more than one reorganization plan to be
submitted to creditors. If the necessary majorities vote in favor of both
plans, which sometimes happens, the court must decide which plan to
See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92
MICH. L. REV. 336, 344-76 (1993) (emphasis added).
15
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977).
14
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adopt. There is no statutory standard for making that choice, so the
courts are free to consult such policy grounds as they think relevant.
In the reported decisions on this point, there is little sign that the better
preservation of jobs is a legitimate tie-breaker, despite the legislative
history and despite the professed concerns of nearly all our political
leaders. The interests of communities are also ignored, despite
widespread state-level legislation in the United States designed to
protect communities against hostile takeovers.
In addition to jobs and community stability, both mentioned
by Warren, there was in 1978 an underlying theme of helping equity
owners as well. The new Chapter 11 arose from the old Chapter XI,
which was designed to permit small business owners to keep their
businesses alive through negotiating a payout plan with their creditors.
Congress intended to extend this idea by permitting management of
all businesses, large and small, to remain as the “Debtor in Possession.”
Thus we have the view of Chapter 11 reflected in the United Kingdom
terminology: “rescue” proceedings.16 That view of reorganization is
reflected in the legislative history quoted above and continued to be a
part of the culture and folklore of the new Chapter 11 well into its first
decade.
Given that history, it is far from evident that only bondholders
and other creditors are entitled to consideration while shareholders are
not. Yet at some point the focus of scholarship and practice narrowed
to the interests of the immediate parties and their statutory
entitlements. Although the abolition in 1978 of the “absolute priority”
rule (which puts shareholders at the bottom of the priority waterfall)
in its strictest form17 was intended to permit more flexibility in
protecting the interests of shareholders, a number of articles continued
to call the rule “absolute” and to decry any departure from it, which in
turn obscured the legislators’ evident interest in “rescue.”

16
See, e.g. Vannessa Finch, Re-Invigorating Corporate Rescue, 2003 J. BUS. L.
527, 536-39 (2003); see also Gabriel Moss, Comparative Bankruptcy Cultures: Rescue or
Liquidation? Comparison of Trends in National Law—England, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 115,
121 (1997).
17
John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV.
963 (1989).
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The issue is whether interest of specific owners in a specific
publicly held company is worthy of consideration, especially if equity
is “under water” or “out of the money.” The contractualists consider
that equity investors at that point cease to be parties in any real sense
because of the absolute priority rule. Thus, the law’s concern should
be solely with the interests of those who remain in the hunt. But the
public interest in ensuring that shareholder interests are appropriately
considered remains an important one, beyond recoveries in particular
cases. Is a quick exit for equity sound business policy, given the
importance of equity investing in the capital markets? That sort of
public interest should be considered in deciding, for example, whether
case law should give shareholders more protection against
undervaluation of their company and other financial maneuvers. Little
evidence can be found of an appreciation that there may be a public
interest in the resolution of that question.
The lack of consideration of a possible public interest in these
decisions—a public interest in jobs, in community stability, and in
promoting and protecting equity interests—seems especially
anomalous because they played an important part in the adoption of
the most important single reform in the 1978 Code. That reform
replaced a trustee in bankruptcy with a Debtor-in-Possession (“DIP”),
conferring extraordinary power and flexibility on the managements of
distressed businesses in Chapter 11.18 Yet the notion of protecting
owners of companies provided important support for that reform. If
they are now replaced by an assumption, often explicit, that only the
interests of creditors are important, and that the maximization of value
for creditors is the only aim of bankruptcy law, then the idea of putting
old management in charge of a company’s Chapter 11 case needs
comprehensive review. Indeed, because nowadays the result is often
to put a secured creditor in control despite its conflict of interest with
the rest of the creditors, the DIP concept seems ripe for revisiting. 19
It is in consideration of the public interest in protecting equity
investors that puts that question on the table.

11 U.S.C. §1107.
See generally A. Mechele Dickerson, Privatizing Ethics in Corporate
Reorganizations, 93 MINN. L. REV. 875 (2009).
18
19
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A POSSIBLE RESPONSE

The nature and weight of these public interest factors in the
evolution of reorganization is a long discussion far beyond the
boundaries of this essay. What I do want to suggest are possible
reasons for the lack of concern for the role of the public interest in
commercial law debates. No doubt part of the answer is political.
Regulation is not popular in the abstract, despite the recent reminders
of the effects of deregulation provided by the Great Recession. But
another reason for this lack of concern is that the regulators in
academia have been too long on the defensive and have had too little
new to offer. The contractualists have proclaimed “The End of
Bankruptcy”20 (via secured creditor control, which they embrace) and
devised ever more clever and intricate ways for contract to replace legal
provisions. All these have provided much fuel for academic reflection,
tinkering, and debate. The regulators have been “traditionalists”
defending the eroding status quo. Professors Warren and Block-Lieb
published their public interest articles a decade ago, but little new has
been done to explain or vindicate the interests they identified.
Although the contractualists have largely run out of intellectual steam
themselves, until the regulators resume a positive reform agenda at the
conceptual level the public interest will remain behind the door when
bankruptcy policy is made. The same is true throughout commercial
law.
One step that courts might be encouraged to take would be to
try to identify (or encourage the parties to identify) any public interest
factors in a commercial dispute. In an appropriate case, they could
even invite governmental agencies or NGOs to submit views and
arguments if those submissions would not unduly delay the case or
increase the expense for the private parties. Pointing out those
opportunities would be a major step forward in rediscovering the
public interests we have somehow misplaced.

See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy,
55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 754-55 (2002) (describing a fundamental shift in Chapter 11
bankruptcy from a reorganization vehicle to a means of liquidation driven in large
part by secured creditors who increasingly view the sales value of a firm’s current
assets as greater than the going-concern value of those assets in the future).
20
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most exciting and innovative aspects of South
Africa’s New Companies Act1 (“the 2008 Companies Act” or “the
Act”) is the creation of a new business rescue model in Chapter Six of
the Act (“Chapter Six”). The scheme of Chapter Six of the 2008
Companies Act2 replaces the judicial management model that was
contained in the 1973 Companies Act,3 which is the predecessor of the
current Act. Like most major pieces of legislation enacted in postapartheid South Africa, the 2008 Companies Act in general, and
Chapter Six in particular, are intended by the legislature to significantly
enlarge the capacities of both the government and the private sector
 This is the revised version of a paper presented at the 17th Biennial
Meeting of the International Academy of Commercial and Consumer Law (IACCL)
held at Istanbul Bilgi University, Turkey from July 16-19, 2014. Excellent research
assistance received from Melissa A.A. Omino, doctoral candidate, University of Fort
Hare, is gratefully acknowledged. Responsibility for any error or omission remains
exclusively mine.
 LLB (Hons); BL; LLM; SJD. Professor and Head, Department of
Mercantile Law, University of Fort Hare, South Africa.
1 Companies Act 71 of 2008 (S. Afr.). Unless otherwise indicated, all
references to statutory provisions are references to provisions of this Act. Although
enacted in 2008, the Act only came into force on May 1, 2011. Pursuant to powers
conferred under the Act, the Minister of Trade and Industry has enacted The
Companies Regulations, 2011 which are expected to assist both the application and
implementation. See GN R351 in GG 34239 of 26 April 2011 (S. Afr.).
2 Companies Act 71 of 2008 Chapter Six (S. Afr.).
3 Companies Act 61 of 1973 (S. Afr.). The 1973 Companies Act has now
been repealed by the 2008 Companies Act.
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to preserve existing jobs, create new employment opportunities, and
make the country’s economy competitive relative to its
contemporaries.4 But beyond the purely economic policy objectives,
the 2008 Companies Act was also intended to infuse the regulatory
framework governing companies with the treasured democratic values
of equality, non-racialism, and human dignity enshrined in South
Africa’s post-apartheid Constitution.5
The fact that both social and economic objectives impelled the
enactment of the 2008 Companies Act and Chapter Six can be gleaned
from the twelve objects of the Act set out in section 7. With particular
respect to Chapter Six, it is specifically stated that part of the policy
intent behind the enactment of the Act is “to provide for the efficient
rescue and recovery of financially distressed companies, in a manner
that balances the rights and interests of all relevant stakeholders.”6
Especially significant is the provision of section 5(1) of the 2008
Companies Act, which explicitly enjoins the courts to interpret and
apply the provisions of the Act in a manner that gives effect to the
purposes set out in section 7. Based on the provisions of sections 5, 7,
and Chapter Six, both judges and academics7 are in agreement that the
legislature has unequivocally signalled its preference for the rescue of
financially distressed companies as against liquidation.8 Both the 2008
Companies Act and Chapter Six constitute another glaring example of
South Africa’s attempt to use commercial legal regulatory instruments
4
SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANY LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: GUIDELINES
CORPORATE LAW REFORM, GENERAL NOTICE 1183, ¶ 1.2 (2004), available at
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/26493_gen1183a.pdf.
5 S. AFR. CONST., 2008.
6 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 7(k) (S. Afr.).
7 CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW 861-64 (Farouk H.I. Cassim et al. eds.,
2d ed. 2012); 1 HENOCHSBERG ON THE COMPANIES ACT 71 OF 2008 44-46 (Piet
Delport et al. eds. 2012) [hereinafter “DELPORT”].
8 This point was made most distinctly by the court in Koen and Another v.
Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate Ltd. 2012 (2) SA 378 (WCC) at para. 14 (S.
Afr.) as follows: “It is clear that the Legislature has recognised that the liquidation of
companies more frequently than not occasions significant collateral damage, both
economically and socially, with attendant destruction of wealth and livelihoods. It is
obvious that it is in the public interest that the incidence of such adverse
socioeconomic consequences should be avoided where reasonably possible. Business
rescue is intended to serve that public interest by providing a remedy directed at
avoiding the deleterious consequences of liquidations . . . .”
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to boost socio-economic transformation by creating conditions that
will enable significantly increased participation of the formerly
disenfranchised black majority in the mainstream economy. These
reforms will help the society overcome the multiple legacies of
apartheid with which South Africa continues to struggle twenty years
into the democratic era.
The quality of real or tangible outcomes achieved by statutory
regulatory instruments generally, and commercial law-related
instruments in particular, may depend in part on their interpretation
and application by the courts.9 To be sure, the adoption of an
interpretive approach that is conservative, largely textual or literal, and
purpose-neutral will significantly undermine the prospect of Chapter
Six achieving the public policy goals intended by law and policymakers.
Indeed, such an approach may by itself lead to regulatory failure.10 The
plausibility of this concern is clearly borne out by the experience of
“judicial management” in the courts. In this respect, it is especially
noteworthy that virtually all of the academic and judicial post-mortem
done on the judicial management scheme of the 1973 Companies Act
suggest that one of the main reasons for the dismal failure of that
scheme was the conservative judicial approach to the interpretation
and application of the requirement of “reasonable probability” (of
successful financial rehabilitation of the debtor company), which was
a prerequisite for the granting of a judicial management order under
section 417 of that Act.11 The risk of business rescue suffering the same
9
COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: A CASE-BASED APPROACH 378-79
(Mathias Siems & David Cabrelli eds. 2013).
10 Such failure would almost certainly become reality if the courts adopt a
disposition and develop a jurisprudence that is generally “creditor-friendly,” as was
the case in the judicial management era and as is still the case under the country’s
insolvency law and related processes. It should be noted here that judicial
management was first introduced into South African law through the Companies Act
of 1926 and only became consigned to history when the 2008 Companies Act came
into force. See Richard Bradstreet, The New Business Rescue: Will Creditors Sink or Swim?,
128 SALJ 352, 353-56 (2011); Anneli Loubser, The Role of Shareholders during Corporate
Rescue Proceedings: Always On the Outside Looking In?, 20 SAMLJ 372, 372-73 (2008).
11 See, e.g., David Burdette, Some Initial Thoughts on the Development of a Modern
and Effective Business Rescue Model for South Africa (Part 1), 16 SAMLJ 249 (2004);
CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 2; Pieter Kloppers, Judicial
Management Reform – Steps to Initiate a Business Rescue, 13 SAMLJ 358 (2001); Koen and
Another v. Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate Ltd. 2012 (2) SA 378 (WCC) at 2
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fate in the courts as its judicial management predecessor is significantly
heightened by the deficiencies of the 2008 Companies Act generally
and of Chapter Six in particular.12
Against the above background, it is clear that the interpretive
approach and attitude of the courts will be critical to the efficacy of the
Chapter Six rescue mechanism and, therefore, to the attainment of the
underlying public policy objectives. Without doubt, if they adopt an
(S. Afr.); Anneli Loubser, Judicial Management as a Business Rescue Procedure in South
African Corporate Law, 16 SAMLJ 137 (2004); Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others
v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd. and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 (S. Afr.); Propspec
Investments Ltd. v. Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd. 2013 (4) SA 539 (S. Afr.). Other
factors that have been identified include the absence of a business rescue culture
among all the various role players (creditors, judges, etc.) and the fact that judicial
managers were usually chosen from the ranks of liquidators who have neither the
skill nor experience in rehabilitating businesses. See Richard Bradstreet, The Leak in
the Chapter 6 Lifeboat: Inadequate Regulation of Business Rescue Practitioners May Adversely
Affect Lenders’ Willingness and the Growth of the Economy, 22 SAMLJ 195, 195 (2010). It
would seem that there were also historical factors that lay behind the spectacular
impotence and ultimate failure of judicial management. See Anneli Loubser, Tilting
at Windmills? The Quest for an Effective Corporate Rescue Procedure in South African Law, 25
SAMLJ 437, 438 (2011).
12 In this respect, the following points are noteworthy. First, consisting of
a total of 225 sections and 5 schedules, the 2008 Companies Act is about the shortest
contemporary companies’ legislation. It can in this respect be sharply contrasted with
the United Kingdom 2006 Companies Act, which consists of 1300 sections and 16
schedules; Australia’s Corporations Act 2001 made up of 1516 sections and 4
schedules; Hong Kong’s Companies Ordinance 2012, which consists of 921 sections
and 11 schedules; and India’s Companies Act 2013 consisting of 470 sections and 7
schedules. However, the interpretation and application of the Act is supported by
the Companies Regulations of 2011 made by the Minister of Trade and Industry
pursuant to powers conferred by Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 223 (S. Afr.). As
already pointed out by some academic commentators and as the emerging case law
is beginning to show, the result of this extreme minimalist approach and economy
of content is that several important issues of company law are either not covered at
all or are addressed in significantly inadequate detail. See CONTEMPORARY COMPANY
LAW, supra note 7, at 2; PIET DELPORT, THE NEW COMPANIES ACT MANUAL 3-4
(2009); Loubser, Judicial Management as a Business Rescue Procedure in South African
Corporate Law, supra note 11, at 137. Second, the deficit in the width of regulatory
coverage is exacerbated by the poor quality of legislative drafting apparent in several
parts of the 2008 Companies Act. This has already been the subject of judicial
lamentation in the emerging case law. See also DH Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz NO and
Others 2014 (1) SA 103 (S. Afr.) and Tuning Fork Ltd. t/a Balanced Audio v. Greeff and
Another 2014 (4) SA 521, ¶ 90 (S. Afr.).

462

2015

Osode

4:1

approach and attitude similar to that which was consistently visited on
“judicial management,” there is a real likelihood that the rescue
mechanism will fail at the judicial altar. Cognisant of this possibility,
this paper examines some of the Chapter Six related decisions and
pronouncements made by South African courts in the last three years,
with a view to assessing the practical or policy implications of those
decisions and pronouncements. The analysis will determine whether
the decisions are ultimately favourable to the emergence of Chapter
Six as an effective corporate rescue mechanism in South Africa.
I.

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE MAIN FEATURES OF SOUTH
AFRICA’S CORPORATE RESCUE MODEL

The scheme of Chapter Six can be activated in either one of
two ways. The first is by way of a resolution adopted by the board of
directors of a “financially distressed company” where the directors
genuinely believe that the company is “financially distressed”13 and that
there is a reasonable prospect of rescue.14 Alternatively, where the
board of such a company appears reluctant to adopt such a resolution,
and thereby activates business rescue proceedings voluntarily, any
“affected person”15 may apply to the court for an order placing the
In terms of Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(f) (S. Afr.), a company
is “financially distressed” if, within the immediately ensuing six-month period, (a) it
appears reasonably unlikely that the company will be able to pay all of its debts as
they become due and payable; or (b) it appears reasonably likely that the company
will become insolvent.
14 “Rescuing a company” is defined as the achievement of either one of
two goals, namely, (a) the restructuring of the affairs, business, property, equity, debt,
and other liabilities of a financially distressed company in a manner that maximizes
the likelihood of the company continuing in existence on a solvent basis or, (b) if it
is not possible for the company to continue in existence, results in a better return to
the company’s creditors or shareholders than would result from the immediate
liquidation of the company. See Companies Act 71 of 2008 §§ 128(1)(b)(iii), 128(1)(h)
(S. Afr.).
15 In relation to a company, the term “affected person” refers to the
shareholders or creditors, trade unions representing the company’s employees, the
employees themselves, or their representatives where they are not represented by a
trade union. See Companies Act 71 of 2008 §§ 128(1)(a), 144 (S. Afr.). The
recognition of trade unions and employees and the vesting of significant rights on
them in the corporate rescue context is one of the innovations introduced by the
2008 Companies Act and is consistent with South African law and policymakers’
13
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company under rescue.16 Irrespective of how the proceedings are
commenced, the first major consequence is that the business and
affairs are placed under the supervision and control of a “business
rescue practitioner” to whom all the “affected persons” must now look
for the possible rehabilitation of the company.17
The second major legal consequence flowing from the
commencement of business rescue proceedings is the moratorium on
legal proceedings, executions, and claims (secured and unsecured)
against the company.18 This effectively insulates a company undergoing
rescue from legal or enforcement proceedings either pending or in
prospect.19 The moratorium, which is general in its reach, arises both
immediately and automatically upon the proper commencement of the
said proceedings.20 While the effect of the moratorium does not extend
to an alteration of existing rights acquired by the company’s creditors
in the period preceding business rescue, it does effectively freeze those
rights “in the sense that creditors may not enforce their rights while
the company is under the rescue process without the written consent
of the business rescue practitioner or in certain circumstances, the
court[.]”21

conviction that these particular stakeholders deserve stronger protection in processes
and transactions aimed at resolving challenges posed by financially distressed
employers. See CARL STEIN & GEOFF EVERINGHAM, THE NEW COMPANIES ACT
UNLOCKED 411 (2011).
16
Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 129(1) (S. Afr.).
17 In this respect, although the South African business rescue scheme
shares several features with the famous 11 U.S.C. § 1101 corporate bankruptcy
management regime, it also differs sharply in that it adopts what Professor
McCormack has described as a “management displacement model” when compared
to the “debtor-in-possession” model of 11 U.S.C. § 1101. See GERARD MCCORMACK,
CORPORATE RESCUE LAW: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 80-83, 152-54
(2008). See also CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 861, 866; STEIN &
EVERINGHAM, supra note 15, at 409.
18 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 133 (S. Afr.).
19 This feature appears common to most of the corporate rescue schemes
in Anglo-American jurisdictions. MCCORMACK, supra note 17, at 156-175.
20
CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 878-79.
21 Id. 878-79. In the recent case of Moodley v. On Digital Media (Pty) Ltd. 2014
(6) SA 279 (GJ) (S. Afr.), the court held that the scope of the said general moratorium
does not extend to legal proceedings brought against a company under business
rescue and its business rescue practitioner in connection with the rescue plan,
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Perhaps the most crucial part of the business rescue process
consists of the development, approval, and implementation of a
competent rescue plan.22 Inevitably, exclusive responsibility for this
part of the process is imposed on the practitioner who must begin his
tenure by simultaneously investigating the company’s affairs and
consulting with the creditors, management, employees or their trade
unions, and other stakeholders.23 Following development of the plan,
it must be presented for approval of the creditors at a meeting which
is also open to participation by other groups of “affected persons.” 24
A rescue plan is only “approved” if it is supported by seventy-five
percent of the creditors out of which fifty percent must be claimants
who qualify as “independent creditors.”25 Implementation of the plan
can only be properly embarked upon by the business rescue
practitioner if approval has been given in accordance with the
requirements of the 2008 Companies Act.26 If the required level of
creditor support for the plan is not received, the rescue proceedings
automatically terminate, unless the practitioner or an “affected person”
pursues the very limited recourse available to him under the Act.27

including its interpretation and execution towards implementation. In reaching this
decision, the court declined to follow an earlier high court decision to the contrary
handed down in Redpath Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd. v. Marsden No and Others 2013
ZAGPJHC 148 (GSJ) (S. Afr.).
22
Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 140(1) (S. Afr.).
23
Id. § 141(1). However, there is an obligation imposed on directors by
Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 142 (S. Afr.) to provide assistance and cooperation to
the business rescue practitioner.
24 Id. § 152 (S. Afr.). For a detailed discussion of the various stakeholders’
participatory rights, see CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 899-905;
and DELPORT, supra note 7, at 500-14.
25 The term “independent creditor” is defined by Companies Act 71 of
2008 § 128(1)(g) (S. Afr.) as a creditor, including an employee, who is not related to
the debtor company. It specifically excludes the company’s directors as well as the
business rescue practitioner.
26 Id. § 152(5), (6). These provisions impose a mandatory obligation on the
debtor company, under the direction of the business rescue practitioner, to take all
steps necessary to satisfy any conditions on which the rescue plan is contingent and
to implement the plan.
27 Where a plan is rejected by the creditors, there are essentially two
options available under Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 153(1) (S. Afr.). The first is for
either the business rescue practitioner or an “affected person” to make an application
to court for an order setting aside the creditors’ negative vote on the basis that it was
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ASSESSMENT OF THE EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE

Since the 2008 Companies Act came into operation on the May
1, 2011, there have been no less than fifteen reported judicial decisions
on business rescue applications and resulting or related proceedings.
For the purposes of this paper, it is especially significant that business
rescue appears to have been granted in only one of the cases that have
come before the courts.28 Consistent with sound judicial practice, the
courts have taken the opportunity in each case to make decisions and
pronouncements on several questions pivotal in the context of the
interpretation, application, and implementation of Chapter Six. In the
discussion that follows below, this paper discusses the judicial
decisions and pronouncements on some of those questions.
A.

What Constitutes a “Reasonable Prospect of Rescue”

The most recurring questions in the emerging case law pertain
to the provision empowering a court to grant an order, at the behest
of an “affected person,” placing a company under business rescue
where, inter alia, “there is a reasonable prospect for rescuing the
company.”29 Not surprisingly, this provision also featured prominently
in the two cases on business rescue that have thus far reached the
Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”).30 The first question that the courts
have had to confront in this context, is as to what exactly the legislature
meant by the words “reasonable prospect of rescue.” Indeed, most of
the applications for business rescue made thus far have failed mainly
on the ground that the applicants were unable to meet the evidentiary
“inappropriate.” The second option is for an “affected person” or “combination of
affected persons” to make an offer to purchase the voting interests of one or more
of the opposing creditors at a value independently and expertly determined to be a
fair and reasonable estimate of the return to the said creditor(s) if the company were
to be liquidated.
28 That solitary case is African Banking Corp. of Botswana Ltd. v. Kariba
Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd. and Others 2013 (6) SA 471 (S. Afr.).
29 Id. § 131(4)(a).
30 See Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami)
Ltd. and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 (S. Afr.); and the very recent (and yet to be reported)
decision in Newcity Group (Pty) Ltd. v. Allan David Pellow NO and Others 2014 ZASCA
162. The SCA of South Africa is the highest court in South Africa for all matters
except those raising constitutional questions for which the Constitutional Court
(where the Chief Justice sits) is the apex court.
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burden implicit in this requirement.31 For supporters and enthusiasts
of business rescue in South Africa, these “pioneering” High Court and
SCA judgments32 must be troubling, partly because of the
overwhelmingly negative findings and conclusions which point to the
possibility that the courts might be unwittingly setting the bar too high
for the applicants and in the process unfairly denying access to the
remedial potential of the Chapter Six statutory scheme for financially
distressed companies and their stakeholders.33 In this regard the
decision in Southern Palace Investments (Pty) Ltd. v. Midnight Storm
Investments 386 Ltd.34 stands out. Here the court began the articulation
of the basis for its decision by noting that the 2008 Companies Act
clearly requires something less than that the debtor company’s
rehabilitation should be a reasonable probability. This, in the court’s
view, is an inference that must be drawn from the difference in
language between the 1973 Companies Act which used the words
“reasonable probability” in its s 417 and the 2008 Companies Act
where the words used in section 131(4) are “reasonable prospect”. In
other words, the legislature must have intended to set the rehabilitation
bar at a level lower than that prescribed under the 1973 Companies
Act. The court was especially critical of the judicial approach to
applications for “judicial management” when it stated that, “the
mindset reflected in various cases dealing with judicial management
See E.P. Joubert, “Reasonable Possibility” versus “Reasonable Prospect”: Did
Business Rescue Succeed in Creating a Better Test than Judicial Management?, 76 J. Contemp.
Roman-Dutch L. 550, 562 (2013) (observing that, based on the recent case law, “the
single most problematic factor that stands in the way of the granting of business
rescue orders, is the uncertainty experienced by the courts regarding the meaning of
‘reasonable prospect.’”).
32 See Swart v. Beagles Run Investments 25 (Pty) Ltd., (Four Creditors Intervening)
2011 (5) SA 422 (S. Afr.); AG Petzetakis International Holdings Ltd. v. Petzetakis Africa
(Pty) Ltd. and Others 2012 (5) SA 515 (S. Afr.); Engen Petroleum Ltd. v. Multi Waste (Pty)
Ltd. and Others 2012 (5) SA 596 (S. Afr.); Cape Point Vineyards (Pty) Ltd. v. Pinnacle Point
Group Ltd. and Another, (Advantage Projects Managers) (Pty) Ltd. Intervening 2011 (5) SA
600 (S. Afr.); Essa and Another v. Bestvest and Another 2012 (4) SA 103; Investec Bank Ltd.
v. Bruyns 2011 (5) SA 430 (WCC) (S. Afr.); Nedbank Ltd. v. Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd. 2012
(5) SA 497 (S. Afr.); Zoneska Investments (Pty) Ltd. t/a Bonatla Properties (Pty) Ltd. v.
Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd. 2012 (4) SA 590 (WCC) (S. Afr.).
33 Joubert, supra note 31, at 563.
34 Southern Palace Investments (Pty) Ltd. v. Midnight Storm Investments (Pt) Ltd.
2012 (2) SA 423 (WCC) (S. Afr.). The decision and reasoning in this case was
followed in Koen and Another v. Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate Ltd. 2012 (2)
SA 378 (WCC) (S. Afr.).
31
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applications in respect of the recovery requirement was that, prima facie,
the creditor was entitled to a liquidation order, and that only in
exceptional circumstances would a judicial management order be
granted.”35
Having made the above points regarding the significance of the
difference in the wording of sections 131(4) and 417, the court in
Southern Palace Investments seems to have lost its course when it not only
held that, in order to satisfy the lower threshold, the business rescue
applicant must provide a business plan that:
Addresses the cause of the demise or failure of the debtor
company’s business and offers a remedy that has a reasonable prospect
of being sustainable;
Provides concrete and objectively ascertainable details of:
The likely costs of making the company able to resume its
business;
The likely availability of the necessary cash resources to enable
the debtor company to meet its day-to-day expenses upon resumption
of its operations;
The availability of any other resources; and
The reasons why the applicant suggests that the proposed
business plan would have a reasonable prospect of success.36
Having indicated that the legislative intent behind the wording
of section 131(4) was to set the bar lower than was the case in the
“judicial management” era, the court in Southern Palace Investments ended
up setting the bar even higher. But perhaps more troubling is the fact
that the court’s reasoning, with due respect, drifted into the realm of
blatant error when it decided to impose, by implication, the duty to
develop and present a sound and detailed rescue plan upon the
applicant—for this is a duty that is expressly imposed on the business

35
36

See Southern Palace Investments, 2012 (2) SA 423 at para. 21.
Id.
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rescue practitioner by the pertinent provisions of Chapter Six.37
Furthermore, in terms of the minimum three months timeline that the
Act allows for the practitioner to attempt successful rehabilitation of a
financially distressed company, a careful reading of the pertinent
provisions38 would seem to suggest that the practitioner has a
minimum of four weeks, subsequent to her appointment, within which
to develop the rescue plan. But perhaps more worrisome is the fact
that the courts in Southern Palace Investments and Koen v. Wedgewood39
found that it was fair and realistic to require an applicant for business
rescue to furnish a complete business rescue plan laden with the level
of detail spelled out in their judgments as part of the minimum required
to persuade a court to exercise its discretion in favour of an application
for corporate rescue. This is because a careful reflection on the profile
of stakeholders included in the definition of “affected persons” should
suggest that such business rescue applicants would have neither the
company-specific information nor the resources required to produce a
competent rescue plan at the time of making the application under
section 131 of the 2008 Companies Act. The view and attitude adopted
by the courts in the above two cases smacks of judicial apathy towards
business rescue applicants which does not bode well for the future of
the Chapter Six rescue mechanism.
It is against the above background that the SCA’s decision in
Oakdene Square Properties40 really does make a welcome entry into the
corpus of the emerging South African business rescue jurisprudence.41
In Oakdene Square Properties, the applicants for business rescue, having
failed in the high court, argued before the SCA that the requirement of
a “reasonable prospect” for rescuing the company in section 131(4)
demands no more than a reasonable prospect of development and
delivery of a rescue plan (by a business rescue practitioner). According
Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 140(1)(d)(i) (S. Afr.). It is both surprising
and unfortunate that the decision in Southern Palace Investments was followed without
reservation in Koen and Another v. Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate Ltd. 2012
(2) SA 378 (WCC) (S. Afr.).
38 Companies Act 71 of 2008 at § 132. The court is conferred with
discretion to allow a longer time on application made to it by the practitioner. See
Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 132(3) (S. Afr.).
39 CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 861-64.
40 Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd.
and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 (S. Afr.).
41 Joubert, supra note 31, at 562-63.
37
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to them, an applicant for business rescue is therefore not required to
show a reasonable prospect of achieving one of the two goals
contemplated in section 128(1)(b). On this reasoning, all that the
applicant is obliged to show is that “a plan to do so is capable of being
developed and implemented regardless of whether or not it may fail.”42
Furthermore, according to the applicants’ contention, once it is
established that a business rescue applicant’s intention is to develop
and implement a plan whose purpose is the rescue of the debtor
company, the court should grant the application even if it is skeptical
regarding the potential of the applicant’s plan to achieve the intended
outcome.43
The SCA rejected the applicants’ arguments in toto. It held that
the words “rescuing the company”—as used in section 128(1)(b)—
require the achievement of one of the alternative goals of business
rescue. To that extent, the Court found that the argument advanced by
the applicants “is in direct conflict with the express wording of
s[ection] 128(1)(h).”44 According to the SCA, on a careful reading of
section 128(1)(b), it is evident that the development of a plan cannot
be a goal in itself, but rather it can only be the means to an end which
“must be either to restore the company to a solvent going concern, or
at least to facilitate a better deal for creditors and shareholders than
they would secure from a liquidation process.”45 Therefore, the
evidentiary burden in the view of the SCA clearly lies on the business
rescue applicant to establish grounds for the reasonable prospect of
achieving one of the twin goals of section 128(1)(b).
Fraught with greater uncertainty, and therefore more
worrisome, is the practical question as to how the business rescue
applicant ought to discharge the said evidentiary burden. Should this
applicant present the court with a detailed business rescue plan? Or
should the applicant provide details of the likely costs enabling the
company to recommence its business? Or should the applicant present
42 Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd.
and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 at para. 31 (S. Afr.).
43 Id.
44 Id. It should be noted that while Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(b)
(S. Afr.) defines the term “business rescue,” Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(h)
(S. Afr.) provides the definition of the term “rescuing the company.”
45 Id.
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details pertaining to the likely availability of the cash resources required
to enable the company to meet its day-to-day expenses? Or yet still, is
the applicant required to provide concrete factual details of the
source(s), nature, and extent of the resources that are likely to be
available to the company as well as the terms on which such resources
will be made available? In its decision on this practical question,46 the
SCA made it crystal clear that a business rescue applicant is not
required to present a detailed rescue plan. However, an applicant must
present “more than a mere prima facie case or an arguable
possibility.”47 In this respect, mere speculative suggestions and vague
averments will not suffice.48 According to the SCA, what is required of
an applicant is to establish the “reasonable grounds” on which she
believes that there is a possibility of rescuing the company. Implicit in
the court’s decision here is that the applicant must provide a factual
basis for the said grounds. Very significantly, however, the SCA held
that it would be both impractical and imprudent to prescribe the
manner in which business rescue applicants must meet this evidentiary
burden in every case. Accordingly, to the extent that the courts in
Southern Palace Investments49 and Koen v. Wedgewood50 sought to do so, they
erred.
In setting the bar for the applicant regarding what is required
to discharge the said evidentiary obligation, much judicial caution and
circumspection is required. This is because if the bar is set too high,
the practical effect will be devastating for the new business rescue
regime and the achievement of policy goals it has been enacted to
promote. Clearly, such a judicial approach will severely limit the
availability of business rescue proceedings through section 131 of the
2008 Companies Act. It is noteworthy that this particular danger and
the underlying concern has already been recognized by the high court
Id. ¶¶ 29-31. The SCA here approved and applied the approach adopted
by the High Court in Propspec Investments Ltd. v. Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd. 2013 (4)
SA 539 (S. Afr.).
47 Id. ¶ 29.
48 Id. See also Propspec Investments Ltd. v. Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd. 2013
(4) SA 539 at para. 11 (S. Afr.).
49 Southern Palace Investments (Pty) Ltd. v. Midnight Storm Investments (Pt) Ltd.,
2012 (2) SA 423 (WCC) (S. Afr.).
50 Koen and Another v. Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate Ltd. 2012 (2)
SA 378 (WCC) at para. 14 (S. Afr.).
46
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in Propspec Investments Ltd. and by the SCA in Oakdene Square Properties
where it essentially endorsed the approach and related comments of
van der Merwe J in Propspec Investments Ltd. The judges in both cases
were of one mind in the view that the bar ought to be set fairly low for
business rescue applicants, with a view favorable to maximizing the
availability and use of business rescue proceedings. In this respect, the
court in Propspec Investments Ltd.51 and the SCA in Oakdene Square
Properties52 seem to both recognize that a contrary judicial approach
would be effectively tantamount to judicial frustration of the real
prospects of attaining the legislative and policy objectives behind the
enactment of the Chapter Six provisions.53
The risk of business rescue becoming a victim of a judicial
approach that is not predisposed to magnanimity towards those
seeking to access the scheme is not far-fetched. This is because such a
judicial attitude may be easily justifiable as an appropriate response to
the real risk of abuse of business rescue proceedings by debtor
companies and/or their controllers involved in a pattern of conduct
clearly aimed at improperly defeating or delaying legitimate claims and
rights of innocent creditors.54
In some cases, such patterns of behavior have been
accompanied by evidence of misappropriation or abuse of company
funds, assets, and/or opportunities by the controller(s) of the debtor
company.55 In such cases, business rescue proceedings are simply
activated mala fides to allow the wrongdoing to continue for as long as
51 Bradstreet, supra note 10, at 353-56; Loubser, Tilting at Windmills? The
Quest for an Effective Corporate Rescue Procedure in South African Law, supra note 11, at 372.
52 Id.
53 In this respect it is pleasing to note the recent SCA decision in Newcity
Group (Pty) Ltd. v. Allan David Pellow NO and Others 2014 ZASCA 162, where the court
confirmed its approach and reasoning in Oakdene Square Properties.
54 This risk of abuse by company directors, majority shareholders and
other stakeholders has been recognized by other academic commentators. See, e.g.,
Anneli Loubser, The Business Rescue Proceedings in the Companies Act of 2008: Concerns and
Questions (Part 1), 3 J. SOUTH AFRICAN L 501, 505 (2010); DELPORT, supra note 7, at
446; Michael Steiner, The Insolvency Bill 2000: Rescue Culture in the new Millennium, 15 J.
Int’l Banking L. 61, 62 (2000).
55 See, e.g., Swart v. Beagles Run Investments 25 (Pty) Ltd., (Four Creditors
Intervening) 2011 (5) SA 422 (S. Afr.); Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm
Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd. and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 at para. 29 (S. Afr.).
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possible to the maximum detriment of the company, creditors,
shareholders and other stakeholders. Such undesirable behavior and
tendencies on the part of directors and company controllers are readily
apparent from the factual findings of the courts in the cases of Oakdene
Square Properties,56 Newcity Group (Pty) Ltd. v. Allan David Pellow and
Others57 and Swart v. Beagles Run.58 Naturally, the public would expect
the courts to be very vigilant in ensuring that the Chapter Six
provisions are not invoked by company controllers or stakeholders
acting mala fides for purposes that have little to do with achieving the
underlying policy objectives but, instead, have all to do with wanting
to co-opt business rescue proceedings into premeditated elaborate and
illegal self-aggrandizing schemes capable of being perpetrated in the
corporate context.
It is in their zeal to prevent the abuse of the Chapter Six
provisions and related judicial processes that the courts may adopt
principled positions leading to an unintended consequence, namely, a
severe restriction of the availability of business rescue proceedings and
frustration of the underlying legislative and policy intent. This could in
turn lead to the business rescue model suffering the same fate as that
which befell judicial management under the 1973 Companies Act.
Against this background, the SCA decision in Oakdene Square Properties
and the pronouncements on the applicable legal principles in Propspec
Investments Ltd. must be applauded. Clearly, business rescue-related
matters brought before the courts in the coming years will be guided
by the pronouncements of legal principle made on this critical issue by
the SCA in Oakdene Square Properties.

In Oakdene Square Properties, there was evidence of management
deadlock and related paralysis at the level of the board of directors resulting from the
active conduct of the two director-shareholders who were the applicants for business
rescue. In addition, the company had apparently been stripped of its sources of
income through questionable dealings with its main assets, which were done by one
of the said directors acting unilaterally without board approval but with the apparent
tacit support and collusion of his co-applicant.
57 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 131(4)(a) (S. Afr.).
58 Here, the facts accepted by the court showed that in the months
immediately preceding the business rescue application, the company had been
involved in a pattern of insolvent and fraudulent trading while under the control of
the sole director-shareholder who was the stakeholder behind the application.
56
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What Constitutes “Business Rescue” Under the Act

According to section 128, which is the opening definition
section of Chapter Six, “business rescue” means “proceedings to
facilitate the rehabilitation of a company that is financially distressed
by providing for”59 among others:
the development and implementation, if approved, of
a plan to rescue the company by restructuring its
affairs, business, property, debt and other liabilities,
and equity in a manner that maximises the likelihood
of the company continuing in existence on a solvent
basis or, if it is not possible for the company to so
continue in existence, results in a better return for the
company’s creditors or shareholders than would result
from the immediate liquidation of the company.60
In the academic discussions of this particular provision, there
seems to be consensus that business rescue proceedings are intended
by the legislature to have both a primary and a secondary objective—
rehabilitating the company so that it is able to continue to operate as a
solvent going concern being the primary goal, while rehabilitation for
the very limited purpose of securing better returns for creditors and
shareholders being secondary.61 The suggestion implicit in the
academic commentaries is that the proceedings must be initiated solely
for the attainment of the said primary purpose; and may only turn to
the pursuit of the secondary purpose after a realization bona fides in the
course of implementing a properly adopted business rescue plan that
the primary purpose is unattainable. This was one of the key issues that
the SCA had to confront in Oakdene Square Properties where the court
had to pronounce itself on whether a business rescue application under
section 131 of the 2008 Companies Act could succeed where the
proposed rescue plan only provides for the pursuit of the so-called
secondary objective. In other words whether the requirement of
“rescuing the company” as contemplated in section 131(4)(a) is
satisfied where it is clear from the outset that there is no real chance
Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(b) (S. Afr.).
Id. § 128(1)(b)(iii).
61 CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 864-65; DELPORT,
supra note 7, at 445-47.
59
60
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of the company being saved from immediate liquidation and that the
best the stakeholders can hope for is a better return to creditors and
shareholders than that which would result from liquidation.62
Before the SCA, the respondents (who were creditors opposed
to the business rescue application) relied on the dictionary meanings
of the words “rescue” and “rehabilitate” to argue that the statutory
definition of “business rescue” in section 128(1)(b) contemplates
proceedings aimed at the rehabilitation of a company which in turn
requires that the proceedings must be aimed at achieving the primary
goal in section 128(1)(b)(iii), which is to restore the company to the
normal healthy state of solvency.63 In the respondents’ view, the socalled secondary objective, to provide a better deal for creditors and
shareholders than liquidation, can only be an alternative goal of the
proposed business rescue plan. Accordingly, they submitted that a
proposed plan, such as that in this case, that holds out no hope of a
return of the company to a state of solvency, but provides at best for
achievement of the secondary goal, does not amount to “rescuing the
company” as required by the Act.64
The SCA held that Chapter Six of the Act, in section 128(1)(b)
provides its own meaning for the terms “rescue” and “rehabilitate,”
neither of which coincide with the dictionary meanings of the words
upon which the respondents sought to rely. In the SCA’s view,
“business rescue” under the Act means “to facilitate ‘rehabilitation’
which in turn means the achievement of one of two goals: (a) to return
the company to solvency, or (b) to provide a better deal for creditors
than what they would receive through liquidation.”65 Accordingly, the
SCA concluded that the achievement of either one of the two goals

62 Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd.
and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 at para. 23 (S. Afr.).
63 In this respect, the respondents urged the court to endorse the approach
followed by the High Court in the earlier case of AG Petzetakis International Holdings
Ltd. v. Petzetakis Africa (Pty) Ltd. and Others 2012 (5) SA 515 (S. Afr.).
64 Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd.
and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 at para. 25 (S. Afr.).
65 Id. ¶ 26.
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referred to in section 128(1)(b) qualify as “business rescue” under the
Chapter.66
The argument of the opposing creditors in Oakdene Square
Properties invited the court to adopt a narrow construction of the
meaning of “business rescue” under the 2008 Companies Act. If
accepted, such an interpretation would effectively limit the availability
of business rescue proceedings to those cases where there is at least a
reasonable prospect of the company being restored to continuation as
a going concern. Considering the policy goals and public interests
behind the enactment of South Africa’s business rescue scheme—
especially those pertaining to employment preservation and creation as
well as protection of vulnerable non-shareholder constituencies such
as employees, customers, and communities—the restriction of the
availability of business rescue only to those scenarios where there is at
least some chance of saving the debtor company as a going concern
would seem to be prima facie plausible. Indeed, it is arguable that the
primary public interest rationale behind law and policymakers’ decision
to establish the business rescue model is to make it available for use by
companies and stakeholders who find themselves with a financially
distressed company that has a chance of being restored to its status quo
prior to its financial woes.67
However, there are sound reasons why the SCA should be
applauded for shunning a narrow interpretation of the meaning of
“business rescue”—preferring instead to adopt a broad, generous
construction that will ensure the availability of the rescue provisions

Id.
The socio-economic policy goals and public interests at the heart of
modern statute-based corporate rescue schemes can be readily gleaned from the
pertinent primary and secondary sources, including the multiple reports issued or
commissioned by relevant government departments. See, e.g., CONTEMPORARY
COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 861-64; CHAIRMAN SIR KENNETH CORK,
INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE, REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE, CMND
8558 (1982); SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANY LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:
GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, GENERAL NOTICE 1183, supra note 4;
Anneli Loubser, Business Rescue in South Africa: A Procedure in Search of a Home, 40 COMP.
INT’L L. J. S. AFR. 152, 152-54 (2007); MCCORMACK, supra note 17, at 18-25.
66
67
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even in those scenarios where liquidation is inevitable.68 In the first
place, creditors and shareholders, as company stakeholders, are not
inherently undeserving of judicial sympathy and assistance when faced
with a debtor that has no reasonable prospect of survival as a solvent
going concern. Indeed, their role in the sustainable development of an
enabling environment for companies and entrepreneurs to thrive
cannot be overemphasized.69 Limiting the availability of business
rescue by excluding it from scenarios where there is only a likelihood
of creditors and shareholders receiving better returns than on
immediate liquidation would amount to adopting a statutory
interpretation that is patently hostile to these two groups of
stakeholders, both of whom are indispensable to the sustainable
growth and survival of the modern company. This is so because the
narrow definition for which the respondents argued in Oakdene Square
Properties amounted to stating that business rescue ought not to be
available where the primary beneficiaries will be creditors and
shareholders. Clearly, such anti-creditor, anti-shareholder
interpretation cannot be consistent with the underlying intention of
the legislature.70
Furthermore, as the SCA itself pointed out,71 a narrow
interpretation seeking to limit the availability of business rescue to
cases where there is a reasonable prospect of restoring the debtor
See Richard Bradstreet, Business Rescue Proves to be Creditor-Friendly: CJ
Claasen’s Analysis of the New Business Rescue Procedure in Oakdene Square Properties, 130
SALJ 44, 49-52 (2013).
69 See Bradstreet, supra note 11, at 195.
70 It should be recalled here that Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 7(k) (S. Afr.)
specifically states that one of the objects of the Act is to provide for the efficient
rescue of financially distressed companies in a manner that balances the rights and
interests of “relevant stakeholders.” To the extent that creditors and shareholders are
“relevant stakeholders,” any interpretation of a provision of Companies Act 71 of
2008 Chapter Six that is hostile to their rights and interests without compelling
justification, including being necessary for the protection of other relevant
stakeholders’ interests, would actually be inconsistent with the legislative intent
encapsulated in the wording of Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 7(k) (S. Afr.). To the
extent that the broad interpretation of the meaning of “business rescue” adopted by
the SCA in Oakdene Square Properties is more consistent with the legislative
prescription to balance the various stakeholder rights and interests, such an
interpretation is highly plausible. See Bradstreet, supra note 68, at 49-52.
71 Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd.
and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 at para. 26 (S. Afr.).
68
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company to financial health as a going concern would be one that
effectively ignores the historical context out of which the Chapter Six
provisions originate. Central to that context is the “judicial
management” model. The pertinent provisions of the 1973 Companies
Act made the proper granting of a judicial management order
conditional upon a finding of a reasonable probability that implementation
of the order will result in the debtor regaining its ability to meet its
financial obligations in the normal course of things. As indicated
above, it is now widely acknowledged in both academic and judicial
commentaries that it was the narrow restrictive meaning attributed by
the judiciary to those key words that largely led to the abysmal failure
of judicial management and its replacement with the business rescue
model under the 2008 Companies Act. As the SCA concluded, it is
unlikely that the legislature would have intended to repeat the mistakes
of the past.72
C.

Status of the Tax and Public Revenue Collection Authorities
in Business Rescue Proceedings

The fascinating question of whether the South African
Revenue Service (“SARS”) enjoys special status in business rescue
proceedings, as a preferent creditor, has come before the court in
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service v. Beginsel NO and Others.73 In
this case, SARS contended that there was no reason why it could not
have been specified as a preferent creditor in the proposed business
rescue plan seeing that section 150(2)(b) of the 2008 Companies Act
permits such a plan to create and specify the order of preference, in
which proceeds of property sold pursuant to the plan will be applied
subject to preferences conferred by the Act in section 135 upon
different classes of post-commencement creditors.74 The critical issue
for determination was whether SARS ought to be treated as a preferent
Id. ¶¶ 27-28.
Commissioner of South African Revenue Services v. Beginsel NO and Others 2012
(1) SA 307 (WCC) at para. 20 (S. Afr.).
74 In requiring that every business rescue plan contain all information
reasonably required to enable affected persons to decide whether or not to accept or
reject a plan, Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 150(2)(b) (S. Afr.) prescribes a division of
the plan into three parts: Part A providing a background; Part B setting out the debt
and business restructuring proposals; and Part C setting out the assumptions and
conditions on which the plan is based. See DELPORT, supra note 7, at 516-21.
72
73
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creditor for purposes of reckoning its voting interest,75 as well as for
purposes of distributions of proceeds from disposals of company
property by the business rescue practitioner. In advancing its case,
SARS relied heavily on the provisions of sections 96 to 103 of the
Insolvency Act No. 24 of 193676 (“Insolvency Act”), arguing that it is
a preferent creditor whose claim ranks ahead of ordinary concurrent
creditors. Based on section 103(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act, SARS
further contended that because ordinary concurrent creditors are
included in the class of concurrent creditors who would be
subordinated in a liquidation referred to in section 145(4)(b) and
because they would receive nothing on liquidation of the company in
the instant matter, they (ordinary concurrent creditors) had no voting
interest at the creditors’ meeting.77
According to the court, the meaning and practical implication
of the argument advanced by SARS is that while SARS, as preferent
unsecured creditor, would have had a voting interest equal to the value
of its claim against the company, the remainder of the (non-preferent)
concurrent creditors representing eighty-seven percent of all creditors
present at the particular meeting would have been disenfranchised
concurrent creditors under section 145(4)(b). The obvious and
inevitable result is that the vote of SARS alone would have ensured the
rejection of the business rescue plan notwithstanding the wishes of the
substantial majority of the creditors.78 The court held that the
construction of section 145(4) urged on it by SARS would lead to an
illogical result that would fail to balance the rights and interests of all
relevant stakeholders as envisaged in section 7(k) of the Act. In any
event, according to the court, that interpretation is contrary to the
ordinary grammatical meaning of the words used in the provisions of
section 145(4). In the court’s view, it is “wholly inconsistent with the
Creditors of a debtor company are conferred with voting interests in
accordance with Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(j) (S. Afr.) read together with
Companies Act 71 of 2008 §§ 145(4) and (5) (S. Afr.). These provisions effectively
fix a creditor’s voting interest at the value of her claim against the company. Some
academic commentators have taken the view that, at least for this purpose, it is
immaterial whether a creditor’s claim is secured or unsecured. See CONTEMPORARY
COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 903.
76 Insolvency Act No. 24 of 1936 (S. Afr.), as amended.
77 Commissioner of South African Revenue Services v. Beginsel NO and Others 2012
(1) SA 307 (WCC) at para. 20 (S. Afr.).
78 Id. ¶ 21.
75
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purpose and scheme of the Act, to include all concurrent creditors
under s[ection] 145(4)(b) of the Act, thereby almost certainly having
their voting interests reduced and quite possibly entirely
emasculated.”79 In this regard, the court agreed with the authors of
Henochsberg80 that such an interpretation of section 145(4) is grossly
unfair to concurrent creditors, especially given that they have a greater
level of interest in the debtor company’s rescue than the secured
creditors who can fall back on their security interest if the attempt at
business rescue turned out to be a failure.81
The practical implications of judicial acceptance of the
principle advanced by SARS would have been devastating, not only for
non-preferent creditors generally, but also for the viability and
attractiveness of business rescue proceedings in scenarios where the
debtor company is substantially indebted to SARS. By adopting a legal
position that is consistent with the principles of fairness and equality
of creditors as against one that unduly places a particular creditor in a
dominant position by enabling it to wield a casting or controlling vote
(and thereby allowing it to predetermine the outcome of creditors’
meetings), the court clearly signalled its discomfort with positions of
legal principle that are certain to have the effect of undermining
inclusive and egalitarian character of the rescue scheme that the
legislature has established in Chapter Six of the Act. The court in SARS
v Beginsel deserves to be applauded in this regard considering the fact
that, under South Africa’s tax and insolvency laws and related
jurisprudence, granting preference to the claims or legal position of
SARS is the norm rather than the exception. In this respect it would
again have been easily defensible for the court to have aligned itself to
the claim for preference by SARS ostensibly in defense of the public
interest in maximizing legal protection of claims and monies owing to
the national fiscus. It was therefore bold and courageous for the court
to refuse preferential treatment for SARS in business rescue
proceedings. The practical significance of this legal position is
Id. ¶ 32.
DELPORT, supra note 7, at 509.
81 See Commissioner of South African Revenue Services v. Beginsel NO and Others
2012 (1) SA 307 (WCC) at para. 35 (S. Afr.); See also Okkie Blom & William Maodi,
Demoting
SARS,
WITHOUT
PREJUDICE
(Sept.
2013),
http://www.withoutprejudice.co.za/index.php/issues/item/demotingsars?category_id=1.
79
80
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enhanced by the likelihood that it will serve to discourage the granting
of preference to other state-related claims that may be outstanding
against debtor companies, such as monies due under municipal and
environmental legislation.
D.

Judicial Review and Setting Aside of Resolution of Board of
Directors Commencing Business Rescue

As indicated above, the board of a financially distressed
company may voluntarily place the entity under business rescue by
adopting a resolution to that effect.82 The Act provides recourse to
unhappy stakeholders by stipulating that an “affected person” may
apply to the court for an order setting aside the board’s resolution on
either one of three grounds:83
1. That there is no reasonable basis for believing that
the company is financially distressed;
2. That there is no reasonable prospect for rescuing
the company; or
3. That the company has failed to satisfy the
procedural requirements set out in section 129 of
the Act.
However, in adjudicating over an “affected person’s” challenge
against the board’s resolution, the Act provides that the resolution may
be set aside where, “having regard to all of the evidence, the court
considers that it is otherwise just and equitable to do so.” An
interesting and important question that arose in the case of DH Brothers
Industries84 was whether the above provision constituted an additional
(fourth) ground for invalidating the said resolution of the board on

82 It is required that the resolution be supported by a majority of the board.
Accordingly, the absence of clear and credible evidence that the majority of directors
were behind the resolution is fatal. See DH Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz NO and Others
2014 (1) SA 103 at para. 16 (S. Afr.) (holding that adoption of the resolution by one
of two directors constituted a failure to satisfy the procedural requirements of section
129—which is one of the bases on which the resolution may be set aside).
83 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 130(1)(a) (S. Afr.).
84 DH Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz NO and Others 2014 (1) SA 103 (S. Afr.).
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which an “affected person” could rely.85 What seems apparent from
the text of sections 130(1)(a) and 130(5)(a) is that while the court is
empowered to set aside the board resolution on four grounds, an
“affected person” is only entitled to premise the application on one or
more of the three grounds. According to the court in the DH Brothers
Industries case, it would seem that “an application cannot be based on
this fourth ground because the application then would not qualify as
one brought in terms of section 130(1)(a).”86 Given that section
130(5)(a) essentially empowers the court to grant relief on a cause of
action which cannot, on its face, be relied upon by an applicant seeking
to set aside the board resolution in question, the court concluded that
the said provision creates an anomaly. Taking the view that “the
distinction between s 130(1)(a) and s 130(5)(a) clearly arises from a
drafting error,” the court in DH Brothers Industries held that, “the only
sensible meaning which avoids the absurdity which would otherwise
result is to construe the just-and-equitable basis as an additional
ground to the three listed in s 130(1)(a).”87 The result is that it can be
relied upon as a fourth ground or cause of action by an “affected
person” seeking relief under section 130(1)(a).88
Section 130(5)(a) specifically requires a court to consider all of
the evidence before reaching a decision on the just and equitable
ground. In the DH Brothers Industries case, the court held that the
following were factors that must be considered:


Whether the business rescue plan was properly
adopted; and



The terms of the plan and, in particular, whether it
contains any offensive provision.89

This issue was addressed by the court in DH Brothers Industries, 2014 (1)
SA 103, because the applicant-creditor specifically relied on the “just and equitable
provision” of Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 130(5)(a)(ii) (S. Afr.).
86 Id.
87 Id. ¶ 18.
88 Id.
89 Id. ¶ 19. It is submitted that there are at least two additional factors that
courts should in this context recognize as relevant, namely: (a) whether there are any
real prospects of a successful rescue given the debtor-company’s circumstances; and
(b) whether there is any evidence of the directors acting mala fides.
85
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The manner in which the court in DH Brothers Industries
resolved the anomaly and potential conflict created by the provisions
of sections 130(1)(a) and 130(5)(a) is jurisprudentially significant in
more ways than one. First, the court’s decision effectively enlarged the
provisions of section 130(1)(a) by explicitly making available a fourth
additional ground that may be invoked by company stakeholders
seeking to prevent a financially distressed company from being
voluntarily placed under business rescue by its directors. Second, given
the omnibus, open-ended (catch-all), and amorphous nature of the
just-and-equitable ground, the decision in DH Brothers Industries
significantly strengthens the hands of creditors who comprise the
stakeholder group more likely to be opposed to business rescue while
similarly weakening the prospects of such a board resolution surviving
judicial scrutiny. It is submitted that, at least on the face of it, this
decision is not supportive of the institution of business rescue.
E.

Legality of Contents of Plan: Appropriateness and Validity of
a Provision Effecting Compulsory Cession of Part of
Creditors’ Claims

In the DH Brothers Industries case, part of the fact complex was
that the opposing creditor who sought an order setting aside the
board’s resolution placing the debtor company under business rescue
was owed a debt of approximately R 5,000,000, which was secured by
deeds of suretyship provided by the company’s two directors (who
were also the only shareholders). The plan put forward by the business
rescue practitioner provided for the creditor to (a) receive 12.25% of
the face value of its claim as a dividend; and (b) cede (transfer) 75.75%
of its claim to a share trust established for the exclusive benefit of the
company. The applicant creditor contended that, to the extent that the
plan provided for a compulsory cession of a substantial part of its
claim, it was not the kind of plan envisaged under the Act, especially
given that the applicant would be rendered unable to recover the ceded
portion of its claim from the directors who acted as sureties for the
company.90
It is noteworthy that none of the provisions of the now famous
Chapter Six speaks to the effect, if any, of business rescue proceedings
90

Id. ¶ 64.
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on the liability of persons who had in the period preceding the
commencement of the proceedings furnished deeds of suretyship on
the debtor company’s behalf.91 Interestingly, section 155(9) of the Act,
which is located in the same Chapter Six, specifically provides that the
adoption of a scheme of arrangement or compromise has no effect on
the liability of a person who is a surety of the company.92 In this
respect, the applicant submitted that, given that all creditors are bound
by an adopted plan irrespective of whether or not they voted in favor,
the legislature would have included a provision similar to section
155(9) if it had been within its contemplation that compulsory cessions
of creditors’ claims could properly form part of a business rescue plan.
With respect to compulsory partial or total forfeiture of
creditors claims and/or related rights, the court in DH Brothers Industries
noted that Chapter Six of the 2008 Companies Act only provided for
(a) partial deprivation or forfeiture on the part of creditors who
consented to the discharge of their debt in whole or in part93 and (b)
enforcement of pre-business rescue debts to the limited extent
permitted by the terms of an adopted rescue plan.94 Against the
background of these two provisions, the court held that “any provision
in a plan which goes beyond a voluntary discharge of the whole or part
of a debt is not competent.”95 After noting that the plan in this case
went far beyond what was permitted by the pertinent provisions of
sections 152 and 154 and emphasizing the well-established
presumption in South African law against any deprivation of rights by
legislation, the court concluded that “it must follow as night follows

Interestingly, Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 155(9) (S. Afr.), which section
is located in the same Companies Act 71 of 2008 Chapter Six (S. Afr.), specifically
provides that the adoption of a scheme of arrangement or compromise has no effect
on the liability of a person who is a surety of the company.
92 Companies Act 71 of 2008 Chapter Six (S. Afr.) consists of twenty-eight
sections laid out in five parts (A-E). It is interesting to note that only part E,
consisting of only one section, deals with the subject of “compromise between
company and creditors.”
93 See id. § 152(4).
94 Id. § 154(2).
95 DH Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz NO and Others 2014 (1) SA 103 at para.
67 (S. Afr.).
91
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day that a plan which deprives non-acceding creditors of the right to
enforce a claim against a surety does not pass muster.”96
Most interestingly, this is one issue on which the court in DH
Brothers Industries agreed with the reasoning and conclusions of the
court in the earlier case of African Banking Corporation of Botswana Ltd. v.
Kariba Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd.97 In the latter case, the applicant
creditor bank maintained that the fact that the board of the debtor
company resolved to place it under business rescue could not deprive
it of its right to pursue the directors as sureties pursuant to the
suretyships they provided in the period preceding commencement of
business rescue. However, the practitioner took a different view,
similar to that of the shareholders who happened to be the same
directors and sureties in question. Accordingly, the bank sought a
declaratory order that the adoption of a business rescue plan, with
respect to a company placed under business rescue, would not affect
the rights a creditor has under suretyships executed with respect to
amounts owed by the company under business rescue. The court held
that there was no express provision in Chapter Six providing that the
adoption of a business rescue plan will deprive creditors of the
company of their rights as against sureties for the company’s debts.98
The court concluded that there need be no connection between a
surety and either the company in financial distress or the stakeholders,
and that whether or not a creditor is entitled to pursue a surety will, in
the ordinary course, have no bearing on the prospects of rescuing the
company. Thus, in the court’s view, the interests of sureties do not fall
within the scope of the objectives of the business rescue regime. In
this regard, it relied on the sentiments of Rogers AJ in Investec Bank Ltd.
v. Bryuns,99 where the court decided that section 133 (2) explicitly
referred to the stay of suretyship undertaken by the company and not
a suretyship undertaken by a third person for the indebtedness of the
Id. ¶ 67.
African Banking Corp. of Botswana Ltd. v. Kariba Furniture Manufacturers (Pty)
Ltd. and Others 2013 (6) SA 471 (S. Afr.).
98 Id. ¶¶ 68-69. The court also opined that: “If the legislature intended that
the adoption of a business rescue plan would have such a far-reaching consequence,
the legislature would have expressly provided for this consequence . . . . There is,
furthermore, no basis to suggest that such a provision could be read into the business
rescue regime.”
99 Investec Bank Ltd v. Bruyns 2012 (5) SA 430 (WCC) (S. Afr.).
96
97
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company. Accordingly, the court in African Banking Corporation held
that the adoption of the plan would not affect the opposing creditor
bank’s claim against the debtor company’s directors as sureties for the
debts of the company.
The overwhelmingly pro-creditor position and perspective
adopted by the courts in the three cases mentioned above are both
plausible and justifiable on a number of grounds. First, it prevents
abuse and opportunism in the context of business rescue proceedings.
This is because, as observed by the court in African Banking Corporation,
there is no functional link between the policy goal of ensuring success
for the process of rescuing a financially distressed company and the
continuation or cessation of the liability assumed by persons who
provided suretyships in support of the company’s pre-business rescue
debts. Allowing such sureties to essentially “free-ride” on the business
rescue proceedings to abandon their contractual obligations (as was
attempted by the two directors in DH Brothers Industries) smacks of
opportunism and unjust enrichment, which is the kind of conduct or
behavior that the courts are expected and indeed duty bound to
discourage.100 Second, it is required of the courts to strive to maintain
a careful balance between the relevant stakeholders’ interests in the
business rescue context.101 The development of jurisprudence that is
accepting of business rescue plan provisions aimed at advantaging
sureties by terminating their obligations under the suretyships merely
because the debtor company has been successfully placed under
business rescue inappropriately skews that balance against company
creditors and their interests. This is especially problematic given that
the impugned terms of the rescue plans in DH Brothers Industries and
African Banking Corporation sought to effectively negate existing
contractual rights of company creditors and actually did so in a manner
that was akin to “expropriation” of property rights without
compensation. Such jurisprudence does not belong in the corpus of
contemporary South African company law. Third, permitting terms in
100 Not surprisingly, the court in DH Brothers Industries found the provisions
of the business rescue plan aimed at the compulsory, non-consensual nullification of
the two shareholder-directors’ obligations under suretyships held by a number of the
creditors to be both offensive and constitute a basis on which it could be properly
concluded that it was “just and equitable” to set aside the proceedings. See DH
Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz NO and Others 2014 (1) SA 103 at para. 68 (S. Afr.).
101 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 7(k) (S. Afr.).
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business rescue plans that seek to, inter alia, terminate suretyship
obligations could undermine the integrity and credibility of the entire
corporate rescue regime by creating space and incentives for collusion
between business rescue practitioners and sureties aimed at improperly
benefiting the latter.
CONCLUSION
Prima facie, the fact that there have been significantly more
adverse judicial decisions on business rescue applications than those in
favor may be troubling for law and policy makers and their supporters
desperate to see the firm establishment of South Africa’s corporate
rescue model as well as the rapid entrenchment of a similarly
supportive judicial culture. Obviously, such a culture would be one that
is hostile to the idea of liquidating companies that have the slightest
prospects of rehabilitation, especially where, as in DH Brothers Industries,
there is no evidence of fraud or bad faith on the part of either the
business rescue practitioner or the “affected persons” supporting the
business rescue plan.102 Shareholders, employees, trade unions, and the
Companies and Intellectual Property Commission are certain to be
among those stakeholders already getting concerned about the very
poor success rate of business rescue applications thus far.
This apparently poor start to the tenure of Chapter Six can be
considered problematic from another perspective, namely, that it may
lead to the proliferation of a perception among stakeholders that the
courts are generally not supportive of, or favorably disposed toward,
business rescue applications. This perception may in turn create a
chilling effect through the under-utilization of the mechanism due to
the emergence of widespread belief that applications for business
rescue proceedings by “affected persons” are not worth the inevitable
investment of time and resources because of their limited prospects of
success. Perhaps more importantly, the resulting decline in enthusiasm
and support for the business rescue mechanism could significantly

In this respect the unmistakeable pro-rescue disposition of the courts
in India is of great interest and, from a South African perspective, probably worth
emulating. See Kristin Van Zwieten, Corporate Rescue in India: The Influence of the Courts,
1 J. CORP. L. STUD. (Forthcoming 2015).
102
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undermine the prospects of Chapter Six achieving the socio-economic
public policy goals intended for it by the legislature.
However, it is arguable that, notwithstanding the fact that the
courts’ decisions on business rescue applications have been generally
negative, the rulings and interpretive positions they have taken on most
of the pivotal questions and issues can be said to be business rescuefriendly and therefore supportive of the future development of the
mechanism. In this respect, the decisions and reasoning in the cases of
Oakdene Square Properties, Beginsel NO v. SARS, and African Banking
Corporation should be applauded in the hope that courts will
enthusiastically follow them in future cases.
Finally, judgments are also beginning to clearly show that there
are significant gaps in the framework and provisions of Chapter Six in
terms of both the omission to make express provisions on what are
important and foreseeable business rescue-related issues and the poor
drafting quality of those provisions.103 The result is that in the coming
years South Africa is likely to see sharply contrasting judicial decisions
as already appears from cases dealing with the question of “reasonable
prospect of rescue.” Accordingly, for the early years of the regime’s
implementation, company stakeholders, business rescue practitioners,
and their legal advisers will have to contend with a significant degree
of uncertainty in this area of contemporary South African company
law.104

103
This has come out most starkly in the context of the litigation around
the “binding offer” provisions of Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 153(1)(b) (S. Afr.) in
the two cases of African Banking Corp. of Botswana Ltd. v. Kariba Furniture Manufacturers
(Pty) Ltd. and Others, 2013 (6) SA 471 (S. Afr.) and DH Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz
NO and Others 2014 (1) SA 103 (S.Afr.). In the latter case, Gorven, J. lamented the
drafting-related weaknesses of the Chapter Six provisions in no less than two
paragraphs of his judgment.
104
See DELPORT, supra note 7, at 5 (predicting, two years before the 2008
Companies Act came into operation, that it will pose multiple problems that are likely
to “cause uncertainty in its application”); Anneli Loubser, The Business Rescue
Proceedings in the Companies Act of 2008: Concerns and Questions (Part 2), 4 J. SOUTH
AFRICAN L. 689, 701 (2010) (calling for legislative intervention by way of amendment
of the pertinent provisions as a matter of urgency because of “the many unclear,
confusing and sometimes alarming provisions.”).
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THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LICENSES IN INSOLVENCY:
LESSONS FROM THE NORTEL CASE
Anthony Duggan and Norman Siebrasse*
INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property-based industries have become an
increasingly vital part of the economy, but firms in these industries are
not immune from economic distress. Prominent Canadian illustrations
include the Nortel proceedings and Blackberry’s recent financial woes.
Nortel filed for protection under Canada’s Companies’ Creditors
Arrangement Act1 (CCAA) in January 2009. At the same time, various
Nortel affiliates commenced parallel proceedings under Chapter 11 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code2 and the Insolvency Act 1986 (U.K.). In Re
Nortel Networks Corp., the Canadian court approved Nortel’s
application to sell its assets in a series of going concern business sales.
The assets included a substantial patent portfolio, and many of the
patents were subject to current licensing agreements. Nortel developed
an elaborate strategy to ensure as far as possible that licensees’ interests
* Hon. Frank H. Iacobucci Chair, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto;
Professor of Law, University of New Brunswick. Research assistance provided by
Sarah Kitai (JD, 2015, University of Toronto). This article is adapted from a report
prepared for Industry Canada, The Treatment of Intellectual Property Rights in Insolvency
(September, 2013). The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do
not necessarily reflect the views of Industry Canada. We are grateful to Joe
Pascquariello, Goodmans, LLP, counsel to the monitor in the Nortel proceedings,
for providing us with background information and court documents relevant to the
issues discussed in this article. This article has also been published in Canada in the
Annual Review of Insolvency Law (2014). We are grateful to Carswell, the publisher of
the Annual Review of Insolvency Law, for permission to republish.
1 Canada’s Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA), R.S.C., 1985,
c. C-36.
2 11 U.S.C. (2014).
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would not be affected by the sale of the patents, but the broader
question raised by the case was whether a transferee of intellectual
property acquires title subject to, or free of, outstanding licenses. If
those licenses are not enforceable against a transferee, the licensee may
find itself in the unenviable position of having to re-license rights
which it had already paid for, after having invested substantial sunk
costs in reliance on those rights. The question can arise whether the
sale takes place in the course of insolvency proceedings (as with
Nortel) or whether it takes place outside the insolvency system (as
Blackberry had been planning).
In principle the answer to this question should be the same in
both contexts; otherwise outcomes may vary arbitrarily depending on
the circumstances of the sale, which in turn may skew the choice
between selling inside or outside the insolvency system. In other
words, the priority rules that apply in insolvency proceedings should
mirror the rules that apply outside insolvency. There are two main
problems in this connection. The first is that in Canada the priority
rules governing competing claims to intellectual property outside
insolvency are remarkably unsettled. The second is that while the
Canadian insolvency laws permit a debtor to sell its assets outside the
ordinary course of business, subject to court approval, they do not
specifically import the priority rules that apply outside insolvency
proceedings to determine the purchaser’s rights relative to those of
third party claimants.
In both respects, the Canadian and United States positions are
very different. By and large, the law outside bankruptcy in the United
States is that a transferee of intellectual property is bound by prior
licenses. This rule is imported into bankruptcy by section 363(f) of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which provides that, in the case of an asset sale,
the purchaser acquires title free and clear of competing interests “if . . .
applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and
clear of such interest.”3 The concern U.S. laws address is that the
licensee may have made substantial investments in reliance on the
license, which would be lost if the license was subordinate to third
party claims. The potential damage to its reliance interest would
increase the upfront risk to prospective licensees, which in turn would
3

11 U.S.C. § 363 (2014).
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have a chilling effect on the licensing of intellectual property. This
policy is also reflected in section 365(n) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
which, in general terms, limits the right of an intellectual property
owner in bankruptcy to reject (disclaim) license agreements.4 There is
a similar restriction in the Canadian insolvency law provisions
governing disclaimer of agreements,5 suggesting that the importance
of protecting the intellectual property licensee’s reliance interest has
been recognized in Canada too. The problem in Canada is that this
policy has not been carried over into the asset sale context.
The purpose of this article is to compare and contrast the
protection given to intellectual property licensees in Canada and the
United States, using the Nortel case as the focus for the discussion. Part
I expands on the underlying policy considerations. The strategy Nortel
developed for addressing licensees’ interests revolved around section
365(n) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. In Part II, we provide a fuller
account of section 365 at large and section 365(n) in particular, and of
the corresponding Canadian provisions. We discuss the Nortel case in
Part III. In Part IV, we turn to the rules governing asset sales in both
countries, making the point that in Canada, as the law currently stands,
while a debtor may be effectively precluded from disclaiming
intellectual property licenses in insolvency proceedings, it might
nevertheless be able to achieve the same result by selling the underlying
intellectual property. This possibility did not surface in the Nortel case
itself, because the sale process in Nortel was largely driven by United
States, not Canadian, law; but it is likely that in some future case the
issue will arise. In Part V, we discuss possible reforms. We conclude
that reform of Canadian law relating to the rights of licensees on
assignment of the licensed rights is urgently required, both outside and
inside of insolvency.
I.

THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Protection against termination of licenses as a result of the
licensor’s financial distress has become a pressing concern with the rise
of “patent assertion entities,” pejoratively referred to as “patent trolls,”
whose business model consists of buying and asserting patents against
4
5

11 U.S.C. § 365 (2014) (discussed infra Part II , Section A).
See, e.g., CCAA, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36; see infra Part II , Section B.
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other firms without exploiting the technology themselves.6 The $612.5
million settlement entered into by Research in Motion in consequence
of its litigation with the patent assertion entity NTP is the best known
example of trolling involving a Canadian firm, but any firm doing
business in the United States is exposed.7 At present, trolls are most
active in the United States, but at least one patent assertion entity is
already active in Canada, and there is concern that trolling will spread
further in Canada and other jurisdictions as the business model
matures.8
There are two broad types of trolling behavior.9 One is
litigation of poor quality patents to obtain litigation cost settlements,
in which the defendant finds it cheaper to settle than to challenge the
validity of the patent in court.10 The more problematic variety involves
opportunistic litigation, which takes advantage of the defendant’s
investment in the technology at issue.11 The well-known NTP v.
Research in Motion, Ltd. litigation is a classic example.12 NTP held broad
patents covering the use of cell phone frequencies for email access.13
While this idea itself was no doubt valuable, there is no question that
the large investment made by RIM (Research in Motion) in
implementing the concept also made a major contribution to the
success of the company; indeed, it is not unlikely that RIM’s
contribution very substantially exceeded the value of the idea itself.
However, RIM did not obtain a license from NTP at the outset,
apparently because it developed the concept independently and it was
not aware of the patent at the time of its investment.14 Independent
creation is not a defense to patent infringement however, and as a
6
See generally Norman Siebrasse, Business Method Patents and Patent Trolls, 54
CAN. BUS. L.J. 38 (2013).
7
See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd, (Fed. Cir. 2005); and see
Coastal Contacts Inc. v. Elastic Path Software Inc. (2013) B.C.S.C. 133 (Can.) for an
example of a smaller Canadian firm caught by a U.S. troll.
8
Dovden Investments Ltd. has filed approximately one third of patent
infringement actions in Canada in 2013. See Alan Macek, Patent Trolls in Canada?,
SLAW (June 21, 2013), www.slaw.ca/2013/06/21/patent-trolls-in-canada/.
9
See generally Norman Siebrasse, supra note 6.
10
Id. at 42.
11
Id.
12
See NTP, 418 F.3d 1282.
13
See id.
14
Id.

492

2015

Duggan & Siebrasse

4:1

patent is a property right, injunctive relief is normally granted to a
successful patentee.15 After succeeding in its U.S. infringement action
against RIM, NTP was awarded $53.7 million in damages, but armed
with a permanent injunction, it was able to extract a settlement of over
$600 million.16 This illustrates the general problem of opportunism; if
bargaining between the parties takes place after the user of the
patented technology has invested sunk costs in reliance on that
technology, the amount which the owner of the patent can extract is
not merely the value of the technology, but also the value of that
additional investment, which would have to be abandoned if no
settlement can be reached. The higher price that can be extracted
because of sunk costs is known as the “hold-up” value of the patent,
and correspondingly, the problem is commonly known as “patent
hold-up.” To use a simple analogy, if you are going to buy land to build
your retirement home, you want to negotiate the price with the
landowner before you build your house, not afterwards.
The potential for opportunism arises in patent cases because
independent creation is not a defense, and patent rights are often
poorly defined, so it may be difficult for a technology user to know in
advance whether it is infringing any patent rights. The problem of
patent trolls appears to be greatest with respect to software patents and
business methods patents, both of which are said to be particularly
poorly defined.17 More generally, however, the problem of
opportunism arises whenever the user of technology has to bargain
after investing sunk costs in reliance on that technology.18 This is
pervasive in the case of licensees. It is normal for a business user of
almost any technology to invest in its implementation. Even basic
office productivity software requires training staff in its use, and any
more specialized technology requires commensurately more specific
investment. Licensees, by definition, protect themselves against
opportunism by licensing the technology on reasonable terms before
investing in it. But the opportunism will be a threat if the license is
terminated, even though the licensee is living up to its terms and wants
15
This has changed in the United States since the decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), which held
that injunctions should no longer be granted routinely to prevailing patentees.
16
NTP, 418 F.3d at 1287, 1325-26.
17
Siebrasse, supra note 6 at 47.
18
Id. at 42-43.
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to continue using the technology. This is exactly the problem that
arises if the license can be terminated on insolvency of the licensor, or
if a licensor can effectively terminate the license simply by assigning
the intellectual property rights to a third party. Opportunism of this
type can arise with respect to trademarks or copyright just as well as
with patents, because it does not depend on features of the intellectual
property peculiar to patents.
The problem is illustrated by the recent Qimonda decision in the
United States.19 A major German semiconductor manufacturer,
Qimonda, became insolvent, and the insolvency administrator sent
letters to the licensees of Qimonda’s patents declaring that their
licenses were unenforceable under the German Insolvency Code.20
The insolvency administrator intended to re-license the patents back
to the existing licensees for the benefit of Qimonda’s creditors.21 That
is, the existing licensees would have had to pay again for licenses that
they already had. Moreover, the licensees were apparently largely other
semiconductor manufacturers who would have had to negotiate the
licenses in the face of very large sunk costs invested in their
semiconductor designs in reliance on the licensed technology, and the
re-negotiated licenses would have been substantially more expensive
than the original licenses.22
The United States litigation arose because the insolvency
administrator appointed by the Munich court sought an order from the
U.S. courts recognizing the German proceeding in order to obtain
administration of Qimonda’s U.S. patents. The U.S. courts ultimately
granted the order, but subject to the condition that licensees of
Qimonda’s U.S. patents be given the same treatment that they would
have received under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which, as described
below, provides substantial protection to existing licensees.

19
Jaffé v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 737 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 2013) (known as
Qimonda after the name of the debtor, for which Jaffé was the insolvency
administrator) [hereinafter Qimoda].
20
Insolvenzordung [InsO] [German Insolvency Code], Oct. 5, 1994,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] 2082.
21
Qimonda, 737 F.3d 14.
22
Id. (The original licenses were largely paid for in-kind with crosslicenses, which is common practice in the semi-conductor industry.).
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Qimonda illustrates the threat to the licensee’s reliance interest, which
may emerge from unilateral termination of licenses as a result of
insolvency. We will see that the recent amendments to the Canadian
insolvency laws provide some protection to licensees from termination
by the insolvency administrator, as in Qimonda, but that protection can
potentially be circumvented by termination of the rights on an
assignment of the technology by the insolvency administration, rather
than disclaimer of the license by the insolvency administrator itself.
This is a major concern because patent trolls often obtain their patents
on the insolvency of a technology company. This means that if
Qimonda were to arise in Canada, the licensees might have to renegotiate their licenses from trolls who had purchased the patent rights
from the insolvency administrator. Moreover, the rights of a licensee
outside of bankruptcy are unclear; remarkably it may well be that
license rights are unenforceable against an assignee. This means that
an intellectual property owner in financial distress might be able to
monetize its rights by assigning them to a troll prior to any insolvency,
and the troll would be able to re-negotiate with the licensee free of the
licenses, which bound the original owner.
II. The Rejection (Disclaimer) of Executory Contracts
A.

The United States’ Position

Section 365 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides for the
rejection, assumption, and assignment of executory contracts in
bankruptcy proceedings.23 All three options require court approval,
and the courts generally apply a business judgment test in determining
whether to grant approval.24 The purpose of the provisions is to
maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the
creditors by allowing the trustee to cherry-pick the debtor’s
uncompleted contracts, rejecting contracts that would be unprofitable
for the estate to perform and assuming contracts where the returns to
the estate from performance are likely to exceed the cost. The
Bankruptcy Code does not define “executory contract,” but the term
is generally accepted to mean “a contract under which the obligation[s]
of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far
11 U.S.C. § 365 (2014).
The provision imposes various other restrictions on assumption and
assignment, which are not presently relevant.
23
24
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unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would
constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other”
(the “Countryman definition”).25 The key feature of the Countryman
definition is that to qualify as an executory contract, an agreement must
remain at least partially unperformed on both sides.
Some intellectual property license agreements may fall outside
the scope of the provision for this reason. The outright sale of a
product coupled with a non-exclusive license to use the intellectual
property embodied in the product is case in point. A particular example
is where the debtor or counter-party distributes “a mass-marketed
computer software product . . . in conjunction with a ‘shrink wrap’ end
user license agreement granting the user nonexclusive rights to use the
software.”26 “The end user makes a one-time payment and receives the
software product. . . . [T]he end user may have ongoing responsibilities
under [the] license based on the restrictions in the license,” but the
licensor’s performance is complete upon delivery of the product.27
Another example is where an “author . . . licenses a completed
copyrighted work to a publisher in exchange for either a lump sum
payment or an ongoing royalty stream.”28 Here the “licensor’s
obligations are complete upon delivery of the work” and, since the
contract is not still at least partially unperformed on both sides, section
365 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code may not apply.29
On the other hand, many intellectual property licenses do fall
within the Countryman definition because there are outstanding
obligations on both sides. For example, in the case of a patent license,
the licensee will typically have “an ongoing obligation to . . . pay
royalties for the life of the agreement” and may have “[o]ther material
ongoing . . . obligations [as well,] such as sharing [the] technology with
the licensor . . . and marking all products sold under the license with
[the appropriate] patent notice.”30 For its part, the licensor will
25
Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 439, 460 (1973).
26
Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property Assets: An
Economic Analysis, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733, 759 (2007).
27
Id. at 766.
28
Id. at 762
29
Id.
30
Id. at 761.
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commonly have ongoing obligations such as giving a “nonexclusive
licensee notice of any patent infringement suit or any other use or
licensing of the process, refraining from licensing the technology to
anyone else at a lower royalty rate . . ., approving grants of
sublicenses . . ., indemnifying licensees for losses, and defending
claims of infringement.”31
Some courts in the United States have held that the licensor’s
forbearance from suing the licensee for infringement is an ongoing
obligation and that the license agreement is an executory contract on
that basis, regardless of whether the licensor is subject to any other
ongoing obligations.32 However, this view has been disputed on the
ground that by granting the license, the licensor gives up the right to
sue the licensee for infringement and the licensor’s performance is
complete at that point.33 A copyright license will satisfy the
Countryman definition if it relates to a work yet to be created or that
is still to be edited, revised, or otherwise adapted.34 In such cases, the
creative artist is subject to ongoing obligations and so the contract
remains at least partly unperformed on her side, while the publisher’s
obligation to publish the work represents an unperformed obligation
on its side.35 A trademark license will nearly always satisfy the
Countryman definition because the licensor has continuing quality
control obligations and the licensee typically has payment, reporting,
marketing, and other continuing performance obligations.36 Businessto-business software licensing agreements typically involve ongoing
performance obligations on both sides and so satisfy the Countryman
definition, but, as indicated above, business-to-consumer (end user)

Id. at 761-62; see also Peter M. Gilhuly, Kimberly A. Posin & Ted A.
Dillman, Intellectually Bankrupt?: The Comprehensive Guide to Navigating IP Issues in Chapter
11, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 2-10 (2013).
32
See, e.g., Everex Sys. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673
(9th Cir. 1996).
33
Id.; Cf. Madlyn Gleich Primoff & Erica G. Weinberger, E-Commerce and
Dot-Com Bankruptcies: Assumption, Assignment and Rejection of Executory Contracts, Including
Intellectual Property Agreements, and Related Issues Under Sections 365(c), 365(e) and 365(n)
of the Bankruptcy Code, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 307, 316.
34
Menell, supra note 26 at 763.
35
Id. at 763; Gilhuly et al., supra note 31, at 8-9.
36
Menell, supra note 26 at 764; Gilhuly et al., supra note 31, at 9-10.
31
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license agreements typically do not involve ongoing performance
obligations on the licensor’s part.37
In Lubrizol Enterprises v. Richmond Metal Finishers, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a technology license was an
executory contract to which section 365 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
applied, entitling the debtor-licensor’s trustee to reject the agreement,
subject to the court’s approval.38 The Lubrizol case was widely criticized
on both doctrinal and policy grounds and, in 1988, Congress enacted
section 365(n) to reverse the decision.39 Section 365(n) provides that
“[i]f the trustee rejects an executory contract under which the debtor
is the licensor of a right to intellectual property, the licensee” may
either: (1) treat the contract as terminated if the rejection would
constitute a repudiatory breach outside bankruptcy; or (2) elect to
retain its basic rights under the contract for the duration of the term,
including the right to enforce any exclusivity provision, subject to a
continuing obligation to make royalty payments.40 If the licensee
exercises the second option, it retains its right to the intellectual
property itself, effectively limiting the trustee’s rejection to ancillary
aspects of the agreement (for example, obligations relating to the
provision of training, maintenance, or update facilities).
B.

The Position in Canada

Section 65.11 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA),
which applies in BIA proposal proceedings, and CCAA, section 32,
which applies in CCAA proceedings, provide for the disclaimer or
resiliation (rejection) of agreements.41 The provisions were enacted in

Menell, supra note 26 at 765-66.
See generally Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 756 F.2d
1043 (4th Cir. 1985).
39
Jay Westbrook, The Commission’s Recommendations Concerning the Treatment
of Bankruptcy Contracts (1997) 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 470-72. See also
Sunbeam Prods. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., 686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2012) (rejecting the Lubrizol
reasoning); Jarrod N. Cone, A “Sunbeam” of Hope: The Seventh Circuit’s Solution
Overcoming Disparaging Treatment to Trademark Licensees Under the Bankruptcy Code, 20 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 347 (2013).
40
11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2014).
41
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.
37
38
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2005, amended in 2007, and came into force in 2009.42 The main
features are:


the trustee (monitor) must first approve the proposed
disclaimer;



following this, the debtor must notify the counter-party,
and the counter-party has fifteen days to apply to the
court for disallowance of the disclaimer;



in hearing an application by either the counter-party or the
debtor, the court must consider whether the disclaimer
would enhance the prospects of a viable restructuring43
and whether the disclaimer “would likely cause significant
financial hardship to [the counter-party]”44;



if the contract is disclaimed, the counter-party has a
provable claim in the proceedings for any loss; and



the following contracts cannot be disclaimed: eligible
financial contracts, collective agreements, a financing
agreement where the debtor is the borrower and a lease
of real or personal property where the debtor is the
landlord (lessor).

The provisions refer to “agreements” and, unlike their United
States counterpart, they are not limited to “executory contracts.”45 It is
beyond the scope of the present discussion to explore the implications

42

Statute c. 47, enacted in November 2005; Statute c. 36, enacted in June,

2007.
“[W]ould enhance the prospects of a viable proposal being made in
respect of the debtor”, BIA, R.S.C. 1985,,s. 65.11; “would enhance the prospect of a
viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company”, CCAA,
R.S.C., 1985, s. 32. This wording presupposes restructuring proceedings, as opposed
to liquidation proceedings. But it has been held that the provision should be
interpreted expansively to cover liquidation proceedings as well: Re Timminco Ltd.,
[2012] ONSC 4471 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.), at ¶¶. 51,52.
44
CCAA, R.S.C., 1985, s. 32.
45
See David Ullmann & Melissa McCready, Licensed to Steal: The Rights of
IP Licensors and Licensees in an Insolvency, ANN. REV. INSOLVENCY L. 201, 203 (2010).
43

499

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:1

of this point;46 for present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the
provisions clearly apply to intellectual property license agreements.
BIA section 65.11(7) and CCAA section 32(6) are loosely
based on section 365(n) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. They provide
that if the debtor has granted to a party to an agreement a right to use
intellectual property, the disclaimer or resiliation does not affect the
party’s right to use the intellectual property during the term of the
agreement, as long as the party continues to perform its obligations
under the agreement in relation to the use of the intellectual property.47
BIA section 65.11 applies in BIA proposal proceedings and
CCAA section 32 applies in CCAA proceedings.48 There is,
inexplicably, no corresponding provision for disclaimer in bankruptcy
proceedings. However, the courts have held that there is a common
law power of disclaimer.49 The common law power of disclaimer
derives from the trustee’s freedom not to perform the contract. Nonperformance is a breach of contract which entitles the counter-party
to the normal contract remedies. However, unless the counter-party
has a right of specific performance or a similar right, the counter-party
cannot compel the trustee to perform the contract and it will be limited
to a damages claim for which it will have to prove in the debtor’s
bankruptcy.50 In Re Thomson Knitting Co., the court held that the trustee
must elect to affirm or disclaim within a reasonable time and, failing
an election, the counter-party is entitled to assume that the trustee has
disclaimed the contract.51 BIA, section 121(1) defines “provable claim”
to mean “debts and liabilities . . . to which the bankrupt is subject” on
the date of the bankruptcy or “to which the bankrupt may become
subject during” the bankruptcy by reason of an obligation incurred
For discussion, see Anthony Duggan & Norman Siebrasse, The
Disclaimer, Affirmation and Assignment of Intellectual Property Licences in Insolvency, J.
INSOLVENCY INST. CAN. 163, 166-69.
47
BIA, R.S.C. 1985, s. 65.11(7); CCAA, R.S.C., 1985 s. 32(6).
48
BIA, R.S.C. 1985, s. 65.11(7); CCAA, R.S.C., 1985 s. 32(6).
49
Re Thomson Knitting Co. (1924), 5 C.B.R. 189 (Can. Ont. S.C. in
Bankruptcy)(aff’d (1925) 5 C.B.R 489 (Can. Ont. S.C. in Bankruptcy App. Div.));
New Skeena Forest Products v. Don Hull Sons Contracting (2005), 251 D.L.R 4th
328 (Can. B.C. C.A.); In the Matter of the Bankruptcy of North American Steamships
Ltd. 2007 B.C.S.C. 267.
50
Id.
51
See generally Re Thomson Knitting Co. (1924), 5 C.B.R. 189.
46
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before the date of the bankruptcy.52 In other words, generally speaking,
only pre-filing claims are provable claims. However, the counterparty’s claim, which arises when the trustee disclaims a contract, is a
provable claim even though it arises post-filing. This is an exception to
the general rule.53
It is unsettled whether the common law right of disclaimer
extends to intellectual property licenses. In Re Erin Features No. 1 Ltd.,
the court denied the right of a trustee in bankruptcy to disclaim a
license agreement giving the licensee exclusive rights to market a film
in Canada.54 The decision was based on the proposition that the right
of disclaimer cannot be used to disturb established property rights. On
the other hand, in Re T. Eaton Co., the court allowed the debtor in
CCAA proceedings to disclaim an agreement giving a credit card
company an exclusive license to supply credit card services to the
debtor’s customers.55 The court decided the case mainly on the basis
that restricting the debtor’s right to disclaim unprofitable contracts

BIA, R.S.C. 1985, s. 121(1).
The exception is provided for in BIA, R.S.C. 1985, s. 121(1), which
provides as follows:
52
53

“All debts and liabilities, present or future, to which the bankrupt
is subject on the da[te] on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt
or to which the bankrupt may become subject before the bankrupt’s discharge
by reason of any obligation incurred before the day on which the bankrupt
becomes bankrupt shall be deemed to be claims provable in
proceedings under this Act.” (Emphasis added).
Duncan explains the meaning of the italicized words as follows:
“The class of claims covered by [these words] include[s] cases of
contract where the trustee either disclaims or ceases to perform
the contract. In such case[s] the creditor may prove against the
estate for the damages occasioned by the breach of the contract,
and this is his only remedy.”
See Roderick J. Wood & David J. Bryan, Creeping Statutory Obsolescence in Bankruptcy
Law, 3 J. INSOLVENCY INST. CAN. 1, 14-15 (2014) (citing LEWIS DUNCAN, THE LAW
AND PRACTICE OF BANKRUPTCY IN CANADA 428-29 (Carswell ed., 1922).
54
See generally Re Erin Features No. 1, Ltd. (1991), 8 C.B.R 3d 205 (Can.
B.C. S.C.).
55
Re T. Eaton Co., (1999) 14 C.B.R. 4th 288 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.).
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would threaten the viability of restructuring arrangements.56 But the
court also held, relying on English authority and contrary to Erin
Features, that a license does not confer property rights on the licensee.
Therefore, there is no reason for treating the disclaimer of licenses any
differently from contracts at large.57
It may be a mistake to think of the issue in terms of property
rights. Disclaimer of a contract in insolvency proceedings amounts to
a breach of the contract, not rescission. The essence of a license
agreement is that the licensor promises not to sue the licensee for
infringement provided the licensee observes the terms of the license.
Outside bankruptcy, if the licensor sued the licensee for infringement
even though the licensee was in compliance with all its obligations
under the license agreement, the licensor would be in breach of its
primary obligation under the license agreement and the court would
disallow the action. In principle, the position should be the same in
bankruptcy, given that the rights of the trustee or debtor in bankruptcy
are no larger than the debtor’s rights outside bankruptcy. In other
words, disclaimer of a license should not prevent the licensee from
using the intellectual property: if the trustee or debtor sues the licensee
for infringement, the court should disallow the action, just as it would
have done if the action had been brought outside bankruptcy.
CCAA section 32 had been enacted but had not been brought
into force at the time of the Nortel proceedings. It follows that at the
time of the proceedings the right of a debtor to disclaim agreements in
CCAA proceedings was governed by the common law as outlined
above and at common law it was unclear whether a licensor could
disclaim a license agreement.
III THE NORTEL CASE
In Re Nortel Networks Corp.,58 the court approved Nortel’s
application to sell its assets, which included a substantial patent
portfolio, in a series of going concern business sales. The proposed
See generally id.
See Heap v. Hartley (1889), 42 Ch.D. 461 (C.A.).
58
Re Nortel Networks Corp (2009), 56 C.B.R. 5th 224 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.
[Commercial List]).
56
57
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patent sales were complicated by the fact that Nortel had entered into
numerous license agreements respecting the patents and it did not have
records for all of them. In other words, some of the patents were
subject to licenses Nortel could not identify. To avoid potential
disputes, which would have detracted from the value generated by the
sales, Nortel decided that the patents would be sold subject to certain
classes of licenses, including “known licenses” and “commercial
licenses.” Known licenses were licenses of which Nortel was aware;
commercial licenses were licenses Nortel had granted in the ordinary
course of its business, including end-user licenses, whether or not they
were specifically known to Nortel or the purchasers.
To deal with licensees whose rights would not be preserved by
the terms of sale (the “unknown licensees”), Nortel devised a strategy
based on section 365(n) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. As indicated
above, section 365(n) provides that if the trustee rejects an executory
contract, under which the debtor is an intellectual property licensor,
the licensee has a choice either to: (1) treat the contract as terminated;
or (2) elect to retain its basic rights under the contract for the duration
of the term. The Nortel strategy gave unknown licensees this choice.
Notices of the proposed sales were widely published, in newspaper
advertisements and elsewhere, inviting unknown licensees to identify
themselves and establish their claims by a specified date. The interests
of licensees who responded in time would continue following the
patent sales and all such licenses would be enforceable against the
patent transferee. In effect, unknown licensees who came forward by
the specified date would transform themselves into known licensees.
On the other hand, unknown licensees who failed to identify
themselves by the claims bar date would be deemed to have elected,
under section 365(n), to have their contracts terminated.
It should be noted that there was no particular class of
unknown licensees that were suspected to exist but could not be
tracked down, and it may well be that there were no unknown licensees
at all. The problem was that Nortel’s records were not sufficiently
complete to confirm this. In summary, the sale was to be subject to all
known licenses and also unknown licenses that were commercial
licenses, but the purchaser would take the patents free and clear of
unknown licenses other than commercial licenses. The objective was
to maximize the sale price while protecting the reliance interests of
503
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essentially all licensees. The patent sale procedure was approved at a
joint hearing of the Canadian and United States courts in the CCAA
and Chapter 11 proceedings, and the sale took place in late June 2011.59
The patents were bought by a consortium of technology companies
for “a record price of $4.5 billion.”60
Given the cross-border nature of the proceedings, Nortel’s
patent sale process needed to satisfy the requirements of both United
States and Canadian law. As indicated above, Canadian law at the time
of the case was unsettled. The Nortel patent sale process was designed
to ensure compliance with the United States requirements—
specifically, section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code—on the
assumption that these were more stringent than Canadian law, so that
if the sale process complied with the United States requirements it
would also necessarily comply with Canadian law.61 The picture may
have changed with the subsequent coming into force of CCAA, section
32. Section 32 is similar to section 365 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,
with section 32(6) being loosely based on section 365(n). However,
there are some potentially significant differences. First, CCAA section
32 clearly requires the debtor to identify the specific agreement it wants
to disclaim, whereas section 365 is more open to interpretation on this
point. The difference matters in cases like Nortel, because if the
debtor’s objective is to disclaim licenses it is unaware of, it will not be
in a position to provide details of individual agreements.62 Second, in
contrast to section 365(n), section 32(6) does not give the counterparty licensee a choice when the license is disclaimed between treating
the agreement as terminated and retaining its rights under the
59
Following the joint hearing, the U.S. court and Canadian court made
separate orders: see In re Nortel Networks, Inc., No. 09–10138 (KG), 2011 WL
4831218(Bankr. D. Del. July 11, 2011); Re Nortel Networks Corporation (Certain
Patents and Other Assets Bidding Procedures Order) (unreported, Can. Ont. Ct.
Justice, 2 May 2011).
60
Joseph Pasquariello and Chris Armstrong, The Nortel Stalking Horse
Sales: Maximising Value Via CCAA Flexibility, 1 J. INSOLVENCY INST. CAN. 123, 137
(2012). The consortium comprised Apple, Ericsson, Microsoft, Research in Motion,
EMC Corporation, and Sony.
61
Id. at 135.
62
But see id. at 136 (arguing that a court might be prepared to accept less
specific characteristics, such as a description of the general nature or type of
agreement, so long as the details were sufficient to enable counter-parties to identify
the agreements the debtor is proposing to disclaim).
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agreement to use the intellectual property for the duration of the term.
Section 32(6) simply provides that disclaimer does not affect the
licensee’s right to use the intellectual property for the duration of the
term.63
In the Nortel case, the debtor relied on the rejection (disclaimer)
rules to avoid the unknown licenses. What might the result have been
if it had relied on the asset sale provisions instead? Section 363 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to sell its assets free and clear
of third party interests, but only if “applicable nonbankruptcy law
permits sale of such property free and clear of such interest.”64 As a
matter of U.S. patent law, the transferee of a patent acquires title
subject to any prior license, whether or not it knew of the license.65
Therefore, if Nortel had proceeded under section 363, it could not
have sold the patents free and clear of the unknown licenses. In the
Nortel case, given the cross-border nature of the proceedings, the sale
process had to comply with the requirements of both U.S. and
Canadian law. But, assume that Canadian law alone had been in play
and Nortel had sold the patents pursuant to CCAA, section 36. Would
the sale have extinguished the licenses? It is to this question that we
now turn.
IV. ASSET SALES
Assume an intellectual property owner, A, assigns the
intellectual property to B and subsequently assigns the same
intellectual property a second time to C. Which assignment prevails?
Or suppose A grants B a license to use the intellectual property and
subsequently assigns the intellectual property to C. Can B enforce the
license against C? Parallel questions can arise in insolvency
proceedings. For example, assume A assigns its intellectual property to
63
But see id. at 155-56, note 22 (arguing that the counter-party should be
free to waive its rights under section 32(6), even though the provision does not
expressly allow for this).
64
11 U.S.C. § 363(f).
65
See Keystone Type Foundry v. Fastpress Co., 272 F. 242, 244-45(2d
Cir. 1921) (“it ha[s] long passed into the text-books that . . . an assignee acquired title
subject to prior licenses of which the assignee must inform himself as best he can,
and at his own risk”). See also, e.g., Armstrong Pump, Inc. v. Hartmann, 745 F. Supp.
2d 227, 233 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
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B and later files for CCAA protection; A wants to transfer the
intellectual property to C, perhaps as part of a going concern sale of
A’s business. Can A sell the intellectual property to C free and clear of
B’s interest? Likewise, suppose A licenses the intellectual property to
B and subsequently files for CCAA protection; can A sell the
intellectual property to C free and clear of B’s license?
In principle, priorities in insolvency proceedings should be the
same as the priorities outside insolvency proceedings. In other words,
as a general rule, the insolvency laws should not change the priority
order that applies outside insolvency proceedings, because otherwise
parties will have an incentive to use the insolvency laws
opportunistically as a means of improving their priority position.66 It is
therefore necessary to understand the priority rules governing
competing intellectual property interests outside insolvency
proceedings to establish the contours of the priority regime inside
insolvency proceedings. Unfortunately, in Canada the law outside
insolvency proceedings is remarkably uncertain. The intellectual
property statutes each provide for registration of assignments or
transfers, but the priority consequences are not clear. We will consider
first priority as between assignees and then priorities in respect of
licenses.
A.

Priorities Outside Insolvency Proceedings

1. Competing intellectual property assignments. – The Trade-marks
Act provides that a mark is transferable and the transfer may be
registered, but it is entirely silent as to the priority consequences, which
therefore presumably would be determined by provincial law.67 In
common law provinces, the rule of nemo dat quod non habet would apply,

66
See Thomas H. Jackson, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW chs. 1-2 (1986).
67
Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13, s. 48. The same is true of the
Industrial Design Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.I-9, s. 13, and the Integrated Circuit
Topography Act, S.C. 1990, c. 37, s. 21. “Where the ownership of a trade-mark is
transferred, failure to register the change of ownership could lead to the loss of the
distinctiveness of the mark. Thus a delay in the registration of an assignment does
not negate the transfer, but failure to register in due course may threaten the validity
of the mark.” TERESA SCASSA, CANADIAN TRADEMARK LAW 123 (2010.
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and a first assignee of legal title, or any property interest, would prevail
over all subsequent interests, regardless of registration.68
The Copyright Act does have a priority provision. Section
57(3) of the Act provides:
Any assignment of copyright, or any licence granting
an interest in a copyright, shall be adjudged void
against any subsequent assignee or licensee for valuable
consideration without actual notice, unless the prior
assignment or licence is registered in the manner
prescribed by this Act before the registering of the
instrument under which the subsequent assignee or
licensee claims.69
On its face this provision might seem to provide for a first-toregister priority scheme. However, in Poolman v. Eiffel Productions,70
Pinard J. in the Federal Court construed the provision very narrowly.
The plaintiff claimed to have obtained an assignment of copyright
from the author in 1964.71 The defendant obtained an assignment of
the copyright from the author in 1989.72 The defendant had no
knowledge of the purported prior assignment to the plaintiff.73 In
1991, the plaintiff presented for registration at the Copyright Office
the assignment that had been executed in 1964.74 The plaintiff claimed
priority on the basis either of prior assignment or prior registration. 75
Pinard J. held for the defendant.76 There are two points of interest.
First, Pinard J. held that section 57(3) does not establish a first-toregister priority regime. Indeed, it does not establish any priority
regime at all: “the registering of the instrument under which an interest
in a copyright is granted is not compulsory and, except as expressly
Roderick J. Wood, Security Interests in Intellectual Property: Rationalizing the
Registries, in SECURITY INTERESTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 699, 671 (Howard
Knopf, ed., 2002).
69
Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42 s. 57 (2014).
70
Poolman v. Eiffel Productions (1991), 35 C.P.R. 3d ¶384 (Can. Fed. Ct.).
71
Id. ¶ 2.
72
Id. ¶ 6.
73
Id. ¶ 16.
74
Id. ¶ 2
75
Id. ¶ 4
76
Id.
68
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provided . . . in s.57(3) above, creates nothing more than a
presumption of ownership of such interest that can be rebutted.”77
Second, Pinard J. held that ownership was to be determined as a matter
of provincial law, which in this case was the law of Quebec, where all
the transactions had taken place.78 On the facts, and relying on the
Quebec Civil Code, Pinard J. held that, even if the plaintiff had in fact
taken an assignment of the copyright from the author in 1964, the
defendant’s later assignment prevailed as being a “commercial sale”
without notice of the prior assignment.79 The defendant was therefore
the owner of the copyright.80
As Professor Vaver has remarked, Poolman effectively
“subordinated the whole federal scheme” to provincial law.81 Poolman
implies that in a common law province, therefore, the rule of nemo dat
quod non habet would apply, as discussed above, and a first assignee
would prevail whether or not it was the first to register.82 Indeed, even
a first assignee who failed to register at all would prevail, so long as
they could prove the assignment, since registration “creates nothing
more than a presumption of ownership.”83
Vaver describes Poolman as “doubtful” on the basis that “[t]he
Copyright Act provides its own national registration and priority scheme
for copyrights. Little room seems left for the different provincial

Id. ¶ 24.
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. ¶ 27
81
DAVID VAVER, COPYRIGHT LAW 248 (2000).
82
Wood, supra note 68.
83
It is not clear what independent effect Pinard J. would give to s. 57(3).
He stated that “This provision of the Copyright Act states only that a prior
assignment of an interest in a copyright must be adjudged void as against any
subsequent assignee unless such prior assignment is duly registered before the
registering of the instrument under which the subsequent assignee claims.” But, it is
not clear what this means if it does not apply on the facts of Poolman itself. But cf.
Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., [2002] (2001) 1 F.C. 495, ¶ 100 (Can. Fed.
Ct.) (where Rothstein J., in obiter, read s.51 of the Patent Act as establishing a first to
register priority rule. Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, s. 51 is in similar terms to
Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, s. 57(3) (2014)).
77
78
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schemes to operate.”84 In his view, under the priority scheme
established by section 57(3), registrable interests
usually take priority in order of registration. If the
grants are unregistered, the later grant has priority if
taken for valuable consideration without actual notice
of the prior grant. Otherwise unregistered grants are
subordinated to later registered grants, except perhaps
where reliance on the registration is fraudulent.85
Vaver’s interpretation is a straightforward reading of the
provision, and to date Poolman has not been judicially re-considered. It
is entirely possible that a different court would view the Copyright Act
as enacting a complete code, as Vaver suggests.
The priority provision in the Patent Act is section 51:
Every assignment affecting a patent for invention,
whether it is one referred to in section 49 or 50, is void
against any subsequent assignee, unless the assignment
is registered as prescribed by those sections, before the
registration of the instrument under which the
subsequent assignee claims.86
This is in slightly different terms than section 57(3) of the
Copyright Act, but it is sufficiently similar that the same problem will
arise as to whether it constitutes a complete code.87 One difference
between the two provisions is that section 57(3) specifically
subordinates interests taken with actual notice of a prior interest, while
section 51 of the Patent Act does not. Nonetheless, it has been held in
the patent context that a party taking with actual notice of a prior
VAVER, supra note 81, at 248.
Id. at 248-49
86
Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, s. 51.
87 The registration provision of the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act, S.C. 1990,
c. 20, s. 31(3), is also in similar terms. The Patent Act priority provisions have
recently been amended. . In particular, t s. 51 has been renumbered s. 49(4), and it
has been redrafted to read as follows: “A transfer of a patent that has not been
recorded is void against a subsequent transferee if the transfer to the subsequent
transferee has been recorded.” The new wording does not appear to affect the
substance of the provision.
84
85
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interest will be subordinated, so this difference on the face of the Acts
does not amount to a difference in the law.88
2. Priorities relating to licenses. - Given the uncertainty regarding
priority between assignees, it should not be surprising that the priority
of licensees is also uncertain. The traditional view is that a license is
non-proprietary in nature and that it gives the licensee a mere
contractual right against the licensor. Consequently, at common law
the nemo dat rule of priorities would not apply to give a licensee priority
against a subsequent transferee of the intellectual property. On the
contrary, the position is that, since equity will not order specific
enforcement of the license against a party who was not in privity, a
subsequent transferee of the intellectual property will have priority
over a prior licensee, even if the subsequent transferee had actual
knowledge of the license.89
Intellectual property licenses have traditionally been
assimilated to licenses generally, as not giving a proprietary interest.90
The Supreme Court of Canada has said that, under the Copyright Act,
an exclusive licensee has “a limited property interest in the
copyright,”91 at least to the extent that an exclusive licensee can sue in
its own name, though at the same time the Court confirmed that the
interest of a non-exclusive intellectual property licensee is entirely nonproprietary.92 The Patent Act is even broader; it gives any subordinate
interest holder the right to sue in its own name, though the patent
owner must be joined.93 Similarly, under the Trade-marks Act, any
licensee can sue in its own name if the owner fails to institute an action
at the licensee’s request.94 In Heap v. Hartley, the leading case for the
general proposition that an intellectual property license is not
proprietary in nature, the question at issue was whether an exclusive

Colpitts v. Sherwood (1927), 3 D.L.R. 7 (Can. C.A.).
King v. Allen (1916), 2 A.C. 54 (H.L.); see Richard E. Gold, Partial
Copyright Assignments: Safeguarding Software Licensees Against the Bankruptcy of Licensors, 33
CAN. BUS. L.J. 193, 206-07 (2000).
90
Heap v. Hartley (1889), 42 Ch.D. 461 (C.A.); Euro-Excellence Inc. v.
Kraft Canada Inc., [2007], 3 S.C.R. 20, 28 (Can.).
91
Euro-Excellence, 3 S.C.R. 2 at 22.
92
Id. at 28.
93
Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, s. 55.
94
Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, s. 50(3).
88
89
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licensee could sue in its own name.95 The specific holding in Heap v.
Hartley, that it cannot, has therefore been legislatively reversed.96
However, the ability to sue in one’s own name is only one indication
of a proprietary interest, and it is doubtful that this characteristic would
make an exclusive license proprietary for priority purposes as well.97 In
other words, the fact that an exclusive license is proprietary for the
purposes of bringing suit probably does not suffice to make it
proprietary for priority purposes.
The question, therefore, is the extent to which the statutory
priority provisions operate to affect the priority of licensees. As the
Trade-marks Act has no priority provisions, the priorities of licenses
will depend on provincial law.98 If Poolman is good law, the same is true
with respect to patent and copyright licenses, notwithstanding any
registration.
If, on the other hand, the statutory provisions of the Copyright
Act and the Patent Act do provide a complete code, the priority of
licenses will turn on the interpretation of those provisions. Under the
Copyright Act, any “licence granting an interest in [a] copyright” is
registrable99 and treated in exactly the same manner as an assignment
for priority purposes under section 57(3). It is clear that an interest in
a copyright includes an exclusive license, and Professor Vaver has
Heap, 42 Ch.D. at 464-65.
See generally id.
97
The Supreme Court in Euro-Excellence, referred to the property interest
as “limited” and it cited statutory provisions, inferring that these granted the
exclusive licensee the right to sue in its own name; so it may be that the reference to
a “limited proprietary interest” was no more than a label for a conclusion regarding
the interpretation of the Act on this point, with no wider implications. The Court
also stated that the property interest of the exclusive licensee “does not include an
interest that defeats the ownership interest of the licensor.” Euro-Excellence, 3 S.C.R.
¶ 34. This implies, without stating directly, that it could not defeat the ownership
interest of a party claiming under the licensor.
98
The Canadian Intellectual Property Office now allows registration of
security interests under that provision; James G. Fogo, Assignment and Licensing of
Trade-marks, in TRADE-MARKS LAW OF CANADA 165, 175 (Gordon F. Henderson,
ed., 1993). (The registration provisions of the Trade-marks Act provide for the
registration of the “transfer” of any registered mark. At one time “transfer” was
interpreted by the Canadian Intellectual Property Office to mean only the outright
assignment in full of all rights.).
99
Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, s. 53(2.2) (2014).
95
96

511

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:1

argued that it also includes an irrevocable non-exclusive license,
especially if the licensee has invested in reliance on the license.100 If that
is so, then irrevocable non-exclusive licenses are both registrable and
subject to the same priority rules as assignments.
The Patent Act priority provision is not entirely clear.
Exclusive licenses are clearly registrable: section 50(2) provides that
every “assignment of a patent, and every grant. . . of any exclusive
right . . . shall be registered.”101 However, the priority provision,
section 51, refers only to “every assignment,” and makes no mention
of exclusive licenses. On the one hand, it would seem logical that if it
is possible to register an exclusive license in the same manner as an
assignment, the priority consequences of registration should be the
same; on the other hand, the failure to mention exclusive licenses in
the priority provision, when they are expressly mentioned in the
registration provision, suggests a legislative intent to treat them
differently.102
Non-exclusive licenses are clearly not registrable at all under
the Patent Act. Non-exclusive licenses may also not be registrable
under the Copyright Act, as Professor Vaver’s interpretation has never
been judicially tested. It is not clear which priority rules apply to
unregistrable non-exclusive licenses. If, as Vaver argues, the federal
statutes provide a complete code, then federal law and not provincial
law should determine the priority of unregistrable interests. But there
is no case law as to what such a priority scheme might be. Alternatively,

David Vaver, The Exclusive Licence in Copyright, 9 INTELLECTUAL PROP.
J. 163, 189 (1995).
101
Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, s. 50(2).
102
As indicated in note 87, supra, the Patent Act priority provisions have
recently been amended.. Section 50(2) has been renumbered s.49(3), and it has been
reworded to read as follows: “The Commissioner shall, subject to the regulations,
record the transfer of a patent on the request of the patentee or . . . of a transferee
of the patent.” The proposed new provision omits the reference to “any exclusive
right.” Consequently, an exclusive license may no longer be registrable, unless the
courts read the reference to a “transfer” as including an exclusive license.
100

512

2015

Duggan & Siebrasse

4:1

provincial law might apply to fill the gaps in the federal priority
scheme.103
Even if they are registrable, it is generally not practical to
register non-exclusive licenses, such as end-user licenses. The result is
that a subsequent assignee will probably take clear of non-exclusive
licenses. If non-exclusive licenses are not registrable at all, and
provincial law applies, then under the common law at least the assignee
will take clear, even if it has knowledge of the prior licenses. If they are
registrable, but unregistered, then the assignee will take clear unless it
has knowledge, as a matter of the statutory priority rules.
As a matter of policy, the basic assimilation of intellectual
property licenses to licenses of real or personal property is
questionable. An exclusive license of intellectual property is
functionally very similar to an assignment, as the licensee’s rights are
normally exclusive even of the rights of the owner. On the other hand,
a non-exclusive license relating to intellectual property is different
from a license relating to tangible property. A license relating to
tangible property will affect the licensor’s ability to make use of the
property itself; a license granted to allow the licensee to post
advertisements on the wall of a building will prevent the licensor from
doing the same. However, this is not true of intellectual property. A
non-exclusive license does not prevent the licensor from making use
of the intellectual property in any way; it simply prevents the licensor
from suing the licensee for infringement. In this respect, giving
recognition to the license-holder’s rights against a third party assignee
does not prejudice the assignee. On the other hand, failing to uphold
the license in these circumstances may significantly prejudice the
licensee who may have made substantial investments in reliance on the
license. Even a non-exclusive licensee may rely heavily on a license, as
where a large corporation trains its employees in the use of a suite of
office productivity software. The vulnerability of non-exclusive
licensees to having their interests defeated by an assignment outside of
bankruptcy is therefore problematic as a matter of policy. The
unsatisfactory state of the current non-bankruptcy laws in this respect

This is implied by Poolman v. Eiffel Productions (1991), 35 C.P.R. 3d ¶384
(Can. Fed. Ct.), though the point in that case was that the Copyright Act does not
provide a priority system at all.
103
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creates a challenge for insolvency law reform: to what extent is it
possible or desirable to protect the intellectual property licensee’s
reliance interest inside bankruptcy without simultaneously undertaking
a wholesale reform of the applicable non-bankruptcy rules? We pursue
this question below.
B.

Priorities Inside Insolvency Proceedings

1. Assignments. - Assume an intellectual property owner, A,
assigns its intellectual property to B and later applies for CCAA
protection. As part of the CCAA proceedings, A wants to sell its
intellectual property to C, perhaps as part of a going concern sale of
A’s business. Can A sell the intellectual property to C free and clear of
B’s interest? The starting point is CCAA, section 36, which deals with
the sale of assets in CCAA proceedings. CCAA, section 36(1) provides
that the debtor may not sell assets outside the ordinary course of
business without court approval.104 Section 36(3) provides that in
hearing the case, the court must take account of various factors,
including the effects of the proposed sale on creditors and other
interested parties.105 Section 36(6) provides:
The court may authorize a sale . . . free and clear of any
security, charge or other restriction and, if it does, it
shall also order that other assets of the company or the
proceeds of the sale . . . be subject to a security, charge
or other restriction in favour of the creditor whose
security, charge or other restriction is to be affected by
the order.106
The provision appears to have been drafted with security
interests and the like specifically in mind, and it does not seem to
contemplate other third party interests such as the prior assignee of an
intellectual property right. However, section 36 would presumably be
read subject to the relevant non-bankruptcy law outlined above.107 On
CCAA, R.S.C., 1985, s. 36(1).
Id. s. 36(3).
106
Id. s. 36(6).
107
CCAA, R.S.C., 1985, s. 36 is similar to U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. § 363; § 363(f) provides specifically for a free and clear sale if “applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of such interest.”
104
105
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this basis, a purchaser of intellectual property in a CCAA, section 36
sale would acquire title subject to any interest which would have
priority under applicable non-bankruptcy law. BIA, section 65.13,
which applies to BIA proposals, is in similar terms to CCAA, section
36, and so the same analysis applies. There are no corresponding
provisions governing the sale of assets in bankruptcy proceedings or
receiverships but, in principle, the capacity of a trustee in bankruptcy
or a receiver to sell intellectual property free and clear of a prior
assignee’s claim should be determined by reference to non-bankruptcy
law, as described above.
2. Licenses. - Now assume that A grants B a license to use its
intellectual property and A subsequently applies for CCAA protection.
Can A, as part of the CCAA proceedings, sell the intellectual property
to C free and clear of B’s license? Again, the starting point is the
proposition that a purchaser of intellectual property in a CCAA,
section 36 sale takes subject to any competing claim that would have
priority outside insolvency proceedings. As indicated above, the
applicable law outside insolvency proceedings is unsettled. The answer
depends on whether the license is registrable so that one or other of
the statutory priority rules applies. If not, then applying provincial law,
C, who is not party to the license agreement between A and B, is not
bound even if C was aware of the license at the date of the transfer.108
This appears to be the result for trademark licenses and non-exclusive
patent licenses, which are not registrable. A different result may follow
if the license is registrable and registered, as in the case of an exclusive
patent or copyright license. But, as discussed above, there is
considerable uncertainty as to application of the Patent Act priority
provision and the scope and application of the Copyright Act
registration and priority provisions.
As noted above, U.S. law is significantly different in this
respect. In the United States, as a general rule, outside bankruptcy an
intellectual property transferee is bound by prior licenses.109 This rule
is imported into bankruptcy law by section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which provides that the trustee may sell assets free and clear of

See generally Royal Bank of Canada v. Body Blue, Inc. (2008), 42 C.B.R.
5th 125 (Can. Ont. SCJ).
109
See Keystone Type Foundry v. Fastpress Co., 272 F. 242 (2d Cir. 1921).
108
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an interest subject to certain restrictions, including a requirement that
“applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and
clear of such interest.”110 One problem with the current Canadian
position is that, if the transferee of intellectual property takes free and
clear of outstanding licenses, a licensor debtor in CCAA proceedings
can do an end run around the restriction in CCAA, section 32(6) on
disclaimer of intellectual property licenses: instead of directly
disclaiming the license, the debtor can avoid it indirectly by assigning
the underlying intellectual property to a third party purchaser. The
result may be to seriously compromise the licensee’s reliance interest,
which was the very concern CCAA, section 32(6) was enacted to
address.111
C.

Nortel Revisited

As discussed earlier, the terms of Nortel’s patent sale were that
buyers would take the patents subject to known licenses and
commercial licenses, but free of unknown licenses. The debtor also
developed a procedure aimed at giving unknown licensees an
opportunity to assert their rights under section 365(n) of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code. Licensees who responded before the specified date
became admitted to the “known licenses” fold, which meant that,
under the terms of the proposed sale, their rights were enforceable
against the purchaser. On the other hand, licensees who failed to
respond in time, or at all, were deemed to have elected under section
365(n) to treat their license agreements as terminated. Consequently,
the purchaser acquired title to the patents free and clear of licenses in
this category.
In Nortel, the sale process had to comply with the requirements
of both Canadian and U.S. law and, given section 363(f) of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code read in conjunction with U.S. patent law, Nortel
would not have been able to sell the patents free and clear of the
unknown licenses. This explains why it was forced to take the more
round-about route of relying on section 365(n) instead. But if only
Canadian law had applied, Nortel could have proceeded under CCAA
section 36 (the asset sale provision), in which case the court would
11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1).
The same point applies with respect to BIA, R.S.C. 1985, s. 65.11(7)
in relation to BIA proposal proceedings.
110
111
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probably have applied the priority rules discussed above to determine
the rights of the unknown licensees. It is instructive to compare the
result in Nortel with the result that would have followed if the Canadian
priority rules had applied.
In short, the Nortel plan put the licensees in a substantially
better position than they would have been in otherwise. First, under
the plan the sale was subject to all known and unknown commercial
licenses, including end-user license agreements. By contrast, if the
Canadian priority rules had applied, the purchasers would have taken
free of any such license unless—perhaps—the license was registered
or the purchasers had knowledge of it. Second, while the plan provided
that the purchasers were to take free and clear of any unknown license
other than a commercial license, it gave unknown licensees the
opportunity to identify themselves and to avoid extinguishment of
their claims. Licenses in this category might have included exclusive
licenses—these would certainly have been of the greatest concern to a
purchaser—and so, under Canadian law, they would have been
registrable, and a registered license probably has priority over the claim
of a subsequent transferee. In effect, the plan excused the holders of
registrable licenses for their failure to register by giving them a second
chance to publicize their claims.
The generosity of the Nortel plan brings into sharp relief the
inadequacy of current Canadian law in terms of protecting intellectual
property license holders both inside and outside insolvency
proceedings. BIA section 65.11(7) and CCAA section 32(6) protect the
licensee against extinguishment of its interest following disclaimer by
the licensor-debtor. As noted above, however, these reforms are
compromised to the extent that the licensor-debtor can sell the
underlying intellectual property interest free and clear of current
licenses. As it happens, the Nortel plan avoided this concern, but the
Nortel plan was substantially shaped by the requirements of United
States law, and there can be no guarantee that licensees will be as
generously provided for in future cases.
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V. POSSIBLE REFORMS
In the interests of economy, the following discussion focuses
mainly on patents.112 A partial response to the problem identified in
Part IV above, would be to amend CCAA, section 36 and the
corresponding provision in BIA, section 65.13 to make it clear that the
court may authorize a sale of assets, including patents and other
intellectual property, free and clear of third party claims, but only if the
laws that apply outside insolvency proceedings allow for free and clear
sales. This measure would bring the Canadian rules relating to asset
sales in insolvency proceedings more closely into line with the U.S.
position.
However, in the United States, the laws that apply outside
bankruptcy to the enforceability of a patent license against a transferee
of the intellectual property are well-established, and they favor the
licensee. By contrast, the corresponding Canadian laws are uncertain,
under-developed, and outdated. It follows that a comprehensive
solution to the issue in Nortel requires reform of not only the
insolvency laws, but the patent laws as well. Specifically, the patent
registration system should be expanded and modernized, and the
Patent Act itself should be amended to provide comprehensive and
coherent priority rules for competing claims. These new priority rules
would apply in insolvency proceedings in the same way they apply
outside insolvency, with the result that it would make no difference to
the parties’ relative entitlements whether the priority issue arises in the
context of insolvency proceedings or outside the insolvency system.113
A simpler and quicker response might be to amend BIA,
section 65.13 and CCAA, section 36 to make it clear that, while the
provisions extend to the sale of patents and other intellectual property,
the court may not authorize the sale of intellectual property free and
112
Somewhat different considerations may apply to other types of
intellectual property for which registration is not a requirement.
113
See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INSTITUTE OF CANADA, POSSIBLE
AMENDMENTS TO THE PATENT ACT AND PATENT RULES 13 (2013) (the Intellectual
Property Institute of Canada has recognized the need for reforms more or less along
these lines: “[c]larify interplay between registrations under the Patent Act/Personal
Property Security Act and bankruptcy proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency
Act/Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act.”).
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clear of current licenses.114 While a quick fix like this might be
tempting, given the challenges that would be involved in overhauling
the intellectual property laws, the temptation should be resisted.
Taking this approach would create a discrepancy between insolvency
law and the law that applies outside insolvency proceedings in the
treatment of intellectual property licenses. Specifically, the reforms
would put the intellectual property licensee in a stronger position,
relative to a transferee of the intellectual property, in the transferor’s
insolvency proceedings than it would be outside insolvency. As a
general rule, priority flips of this nature are inadvisable because they
encourage parties to use the insolvency laws opportunistically to
improve their priority position. Furthermore, the proposed reforms
would create a discrepancy between cases where the financially
troubled debtor’s asset sale takes place in insolvency proceedings and
cases where the asset sale is conducted outside the insolvency system.
In Nortel, the patent sale took place in the course of CCAA and
Chapter 11 proceedings. By contrast, Blackberry, another financially
troubled technology company, was until recently planning to sell its
patent portfolio without relying on the insolvency laws. Had the
Blackberry sale gone ahead, licensees’ interests would have been
governed by the non-bankruptcy priority rules described above. But
there is no principled reason why the parties’ entitlements, relative to
one another, should vary depending on whether the sale happens to
take place inside or outside insolvency proceedings.115

Or at least: (1) a prior registered license; (2) a prior unregistered
licensee of which the purchaser has knowledge; or (3) a license granted in the
ordinary course of the licensor’s business (for example, to an end-user).
115
The reforms proposed above may have conflict of laws implications,
for example, where a patent is registered in Jurisdiction A and the patent sale takes
place in Jurisdiction B. The conflict of laws issues are complex and require separate
study. See LEGISLATIVE REVIEW TASK FORCE (COMMERCIAL) OF THE INSOLVENCY
INSTITUTE OF CANADA AND THE CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF INSOLVENCY AND
RESTRUCTURING PROFESSIONALS, REPORT ON THE STATUTORY REVIEW OF THE
BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT AND THE COMPANIES’ CREDITORS
ARRANGEMENT ACT 8 (2014) (identifying some of the issues). See also UNCITRAL,
LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS: SUPPLEMENT ON SECURITY
RIGHTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Part X., U.N. Sales No. E.11.V.6 (2011).
114
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CONCLUSION
The Canadian insolvency laws, similar to the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code, limit an intellectual property owner’s freedom in insolvency
proceedings to disclaim licenses it has granted. The purpose of this
limitation is to protect the licensee’s reliance interest and to prevent
disruption of the licensee’s business. If the insolvency laws freely
allowed disclaimer of intellectual property licenses, they would increase
the up-front risk to prospective licensees and might have a chilling
effect on the licensing of intellectual property to the detriment of both
licensors and licensees.
Logically, this policy should also be reflected in the provisions
governing asset sales so that at least as a general rule, it should not be
possible for an intellectual property owner in insolvency proceedings
to sell the intellectual property free and clear of current licenses.
However, while this appears to be the law in the United States, the
position in Canada is much less certain. In principle, a Canadian
bankruptcy court should approach the issue with reference to the rules
which apply outside bankruptcy to priority disputes between
competing claims to intellectual property. But the applicable nonbankruptcy laws, as they currently stand, are fragmented, complex, and
unsettled. The laws are badly in need of reform.
It might be possible to amend the insolvency laws without also
reforming the intellectual property laws. However, this would be a
second-best solution. The problem is that it would make the licensee’s
position stronger or weaker, relative to a transferee of the intellectual
property, depending on whether the sale takes place inside or outside
insolvency proceedings. In other words, tackling the problem via the
insolvency laws, without reforming the intellectual property laws, may
result in arbitrary case outcomes and may induce debtors to favor asset
sales outside the insolvency system with a view to defeating licensees’
interests.
In any event, there is some urgency about the need for reform
because sales of intellectual property, and patent portfolios in
particular, are becoming increasingly common. The uncertain state of
the law threatens to reduce the returns from such sales because it
means parties must take expensive and time-consuming steps, as in
520

2015

Duggan & Siebrasse

4:1

Nortel, to clarify the purchaser’s title. It also threatens to reduce the
returns from the licensing of intellectual property because, as matters
presently stand, a prospective licensee cannot be sure that its license
will still be valid if the underlying intellectual property is subsequently
transferred.116
In today’s economy almost every business depends on licensed
intellectual property rights to a greater or lesser extent, and
consequently every business is potentially exposed to the threat of
“hold-up” by patent assertion entities which have acquired intellectual
property rights from a licensor in financial distress. This is not a remote
or theoretical problem; it is happening regularly around the world.
There is no question that the problem will come to Canada, if it has
not already. The only question is whether we will be ready when it does
arrive.

116
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES,
PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:
LESSONS FROM INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (2013) (see
Chapter 5 dealing with transfers of patents with licensing commitments, and
especially Chapter 5.2 discussing recent cases from around the world, including
Nortel).
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ONE MORE BRICK IN THE WALL: THE
IMPACT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
OF EX JURIS DEFENDANTS ON THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA
Matthew Johnson
“When I have been in Canada, I have never heard a Canadian
refer to an American as a “foreigner.” He is just an “American.” And,
in the same way, in the United States, Canadians are not “foreigners,”
they are “Canadians.” That simple little distinction illustrates to me
better than anything else the relationship between our two countries.”1
INTRODUCTION
The United States and Canada have a lengthy and historical
development of their common law and statutory standards for
obtaining personal jurisdiction of ex juris defendants in civil litigation.2
The United States’ doctrine has been developing since the midnineteenth century.3 Canada, however, followed a rigid common law

1
Sarah Lipkis, United States of Canada, WORLD POLICY BLOG (Oct. 22,
2013, 10:18 AM), http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/10/22/united-statescanada(quoting Franklin Delano Roosevelt).
2
See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (stating the proposition
that in personam jurisdiction cannot be had over an absent defendant, but in rem
jurisdiction can be had over the absent defendant’s property); see also Moran v. Pyle
Nat’l (Can.) Ltd., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393 (discussing in personam jurisdiction in tort cases
over a foreign defendant).
3
See, e.g., Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727, 731; see also J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd.
v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (holding a court may not exercise jurisdiction over
a defendant that has not purposefully availed itself to doing business within the
jurisdiction).

2015

Johnson

4:1

system until the end of the twentieth century.4 Since 1990, there have
been five important cases altering the current Canadian doctrine on
personal jurisdiction of ex juris defendants.5 Most recently, the 2012
decision of Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda marked a notable shift from
its predecessor, Muscutt v. Courcelles.6
Today, the United States’ greatest ally and biggest trading
partner is Canada.7 As China continues to establish itself as a global
economic power, retaining close ties is important for both nations. 8
Though executives, legislatures, and judiciaries exercise comity9
between nations,10 the judiciary has the ability to influence and control
the other branches’ exercise of comity through its decisions and
interpretations.11 Because of this significant judicial power, this
Muscutt v. Courcelles, 2002 CanLII 44957 (ON CA).
Id. ¶ 14-17 (citing Tolofson v. Jensen [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022; Amchem
Prod. Inc. v. B.C. (Workers’ Comp. Bd.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897; Hunt v. T&N plc.,
[1993] 4 S.C.R. 289; Morguard Inv. Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077).
6
Tanya J. Monestier, (Still) A “Real and Substantial” Mess: The Law of
Jurisdiction in Canada, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 396, 402 (2013).
7
See U.S. Relations with Canada, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (Aug. 23, 2013),
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2089.htm (noting the U.S. and Canada trade $1.6
billion worth of goods, daily, and three hundred thousand people cross their shared
border, daily); see also, Doug Lamborn, U.S. Rep. from Colorado, Building Keystone
Pipeline will Cement U.S.-Canadian Relations, THE HILL (Mar. 6, 2013),
http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/286669-building-keystone-pipeline-will-cementus-canada-relations (describing Canada as the United States’ most important trading
partner, sharing “close ties in culture, language and values”).
8
See Lipkis, supra note 1 (discussing the potential benefits of the United
States and Canada forming an E.U.-like relationship to combat the efficiency of
China’s form of capitalism); When Giants Slow Down, ECONOMIST (July 27, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21582257-most-dramatic-anddisruptive-period-emerging-market-growth-world-has-ever-seen (discussing the
slowing but steadying growth of Brazil, Russia, India, and China).
9
Comity is defined as “the recognition which one nation allows within
its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.” Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
10
See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (explaining legislatures practice “prescriptive comity” by limiting the
reach of their laws when enacting them).
11
See Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International
Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 14 (2010).
4
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comment recognizes the important role courts play in maintaining and
increasing comity between the United States and Canada.
This comment will argue that the Van Breda decision has
moved Canadian courts closer to United States courts on the issue of
personal jurisdiction over ex juris defendants, which in turn has created
increased comity among the two nations. Part II of this comment will
introduce the history of personal jurisdiction over ex juris defendants
in the United States and Canada. Furthermore, Part II will briefly
discuss comity and its international role. Part III analyzes the current
state of jurisdiction in the United States and compares it with the new
Canadian standard set forth in Van Breda. Through this comparison,
this comment will explore the opportunity for increased comity
between the two nations. Part IV proposes that the current positions
of both nations regarding personal jurisdiction over ex juris defendants
allows for greater comity between the two nations, increasing their
economic partnership and individual international strength.
I.

Historical Background of Personal Jurisdiction Over Ex Juris
Defendants in the United States and Canada and the Role of
International Comity

A.

Personal Jurisdiction Over Ex Juris Defendants in the United
States

The United States’ modern day jurisdiction found its roots in
Pennoyer v. Neff,12 but has undergone substantial change, culminating in
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.13
1. Pennoyer to International Shoe. — In Pennoyer v. Neff, the
United States Supreme Court determined due process does not give a
state the authority to assert in personam jurisdiction over an out-ofstate defendant who does not personally assent to jurisdiction.14 In
reaching this determination, the Court focused on two “principles of
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 730.
See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846
(2011); see generally Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 KAN. L. REV. 549 (2012) (discussing the evolution
of Supreme Court rulings on personal jurisdiction).
14
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 730 (citing D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165 (1851)).
12
13
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public law.”15 First, every state has jurisdiction over persons and
property within its jurisdiction. Second, a state does not have
jurisdiction over persons or property beyond its jurisdiction.16
Relying on previous state and federal court decisions, however,
the Pennoyer Court reiterated that a plaintiff who is unable to subject a
foreign defendant to in personam jurisdiction may attach a defendant’s
property within the court’s jurisdiction to hail the defendant into
court.17 But, if the defendant fails to appear, any judgment may “only
bind [the defendant] to the extent of such property.”18 The Court
noted the burdens a state may impose upon foreign persons.19
In the courtroom, Pennoyer v. Neff has essentially become
irrelevant.20 As legal scholar Michael Hoffheimer states, “[i]t is late in
the day to argue . . . Pennoyer.”21 However, the court’s reasoning is still
relevant to understanding and discussing the connection between due
process and personal jurisdiction.22 With increasing global complexity,
the United States Supreme Court found itself needing to shift toward
a new doctrine, which could better adjudicate the increased mobility of
citizens between different states.23
Nearly five decades after Pennoyer v. Neff was handed down, the
Supreme Court, in an attempt to expand the reach of Pennoyer,24 actually
began to subtly shift away from its precedent.25 The Court in Hess v.
Id. at 722.
Id. (citing Story, J., Confl. Laws, sect. 539) (emphasis added).
17
Id. at 724-25 (citing Cooper v. Reynolds 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308 (1870);
Picquet v. Swan, 5 Mas. 35 (1828)).
18
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 724 (citing Picquet, 5 Mas. 35).
19
Id. at 734-35 (conditions for marriage/divorce, requiring foreign
persons to appoint an agent to receive service of process when entering into a
partnership within the state, and conditions for enforcing obligations against
corporate officers other than personal service).
20
See Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 999, 1007 (2012).
21
Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 554.
22
Id. at 554-55.
23
See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1003.
24
Id.
25
See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927) (asserting the power
of a state to exclude a non-resident confers upon the state a power to imply
appointment of an agent through use of state highways, rendering physical presence
15
16
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Pawloski allowed the state of Massachusetts to serve an out-of-state
defendant, who was involved in an accident, pursuant to a
Massachusetts statute.26 The statute stated that in using Massachusetts’
highways, a driver appoints the registrar as his agent for service of
process.27 Thus, once a driver enters Massachusetts, he impliedly
consents that a state official may act as his agent, thereby making it
possible for the state to obtain jurisdiction over him in the event he is
involved in an accident or collision within the State’s borders.28 Despite
citing numerous authorities,29 all of which appeared to direct the court
toward a strict Pennoyer ruling, the Court opted to base its decision on
public policy reasons.30 By using this type of analysis, as well as relevant
case law,31 the Court determined that whether the appointment of a
state officer is formal or implied is “not substantial” so far as the
Fourteenth Amendment is concerned.32 Thus, by allowing an implied
appointment of an agent by non-resident drivers, the Court had a
manner in which it could obtain jurisdiction over the non-resident
driver, and despite not having attachable property it could enforce a
judgment as Pennoyer would allow.
While Hess helps illustrate the difficulties courts faced in
applying Pennoyer to modern America, it did not address the difficulties
associated with determining jurisdiction over corporations.33 Courts
formulated different rules to define when a state could and could not
claim jurisdiction over a corporation doing business within its
boundaries.34 The Supreme Court tried to settle the split in 1945 and
in the territory unnecessary for service); see also Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s
“Sovereignty” Got to Do with It? Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63
S.C. L. REV. 729 (2012) (noting the court shifted the analysis from whether
Massachusetts lacked authority to serve the defendant, rendering any judgment as
contrary to the Due Process Clause, to whether enactment of the statute violated the
Due Process Clause).
26
90 Gen. Laws Mass. as amended by Stat. 1923, c. 431, § 2.
27
See Hess, 274 U.S. at 356-57.
28
Id. at 356-57.
29
See id. at 355 (citing e.g. Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1918); Goldey
v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518 (1894); Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714).
30
See Hess, 274 U.S. at 356.
31
See id. at 356 (quoting Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 167 (1916)).
32
Hess, 274 U.S. at 357.
33
See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1007.
34
Id.
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provide a universal standard in determining jurisdiction over
corporations.35
2. International Shoe. — In International Shoe Company v.
Washington, the Supreme Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment embodies substantive criteria for deciding
personal jurisdiction issues.36 Criticism has been levied against the
Court, however, for its vagueness in defining what general jurisdiction
entails.37
International Shoe Company was a St. Louis-based company,
which sent sample shoes to approximately eleven agents located in the
state of Washington et alibi.38 Washington wanted to collect
employment taxes, which were due from International Shoe.39 Notice
was served to International Shoe’s agent in Washington and by
certified mail to its home office.40 International Shoe argued that its
activities in Washington were not “sufficient to manifest its
‘presence,’” and thus, the state of Washington violated its due process
rights in subjecting it to suit.41
In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Stone analyzed Pennoyerera decisions42 and determined that the satisfaction of due process in
personal jurisdiction “depend[s] rather upon the quality and nature of
the activity . . . .”43 Based on this principle, Chief Justice Stone
announced what is known as the “minimum contacts” doctrine.44 As
stated by Chief Justice Stone, “due process requires only that in order
to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Perdue, supra note 25, at 733.
37
See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (Black, J., concurring); Hoffheimer, supra
note 13; Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed
Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 189 (1998); Perdue, supra note 25 at
734-35.
38
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313.
39
Id. at 312-13. The commissions received by the salespersons were in
excess of $31,000.
40
Id.
41
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 315.
42
Andrews, supra note 20, at 1008.
43
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
44
Id. at 316.
35
36
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within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it. . . .”45 Chief Justice Stone continued to rule that, “the
maintenance of the suit [can]not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.’”46
Chief Justice Stone’s “minimum contacts” doctrine provides
no real guidance on how courts are to determine a corporation’s
presence within a certain jurisdiction.47 To better substantiate its new
standard, the Court returned to the Pennoyer era and sorted cases into
one of four categories.48 The categories assist in determining whether
a corporation has sufficient minimum contacts with a forum state to
allow jurisdiction.49 Chief Justice Stone asserts that those cases
involving continuous and systematic activities related to the claim at
bar, and cases involving isolated incidents not related to the claim at
bar are obvious cases in which jurisdiction could be conferred and not
conferred, respectively.50 Conversely, those cases involving continuous
activities not related to the claims at bar or single occasional acts by a
corporate agent make the jurisdictional determination more difficult.51
The “minimum contacts” doctrine has served as an expansion
of the basic principles set forth in Pennoyer v. Neff and its progeny.52 The
new test serves as a policy-based and flexible analytical approach,

Id.; but see, id. at 322 (Black, J., concurring) (the Court went too far by
announcing its new due process rule).
46
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940); see also McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91(1917)).
47
See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 561 (“the court’s new ‘minimum
contacts’ requirement added little more than the appropriate label when a court
decided that a case satisfied constitutional requirements.”); See also Douglas D.
McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 68 MO. L. REV. 753, 761 (2003)
(criticizing the minimum contacts test).
48
See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 558-61 (describing the four categories
as cases involving: (1) a corporation’s continuous and systematic contacts within a
state; (2) the casual presence of a corporate agent, or an isolated incident unrelated
to the claims at bar; (3) continuous and systematic contacts distinct from the causes
of action; and (4) single occasional acts by an agent in the state).
49
See id.
50
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
51
Id. at 318.
52
Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 561.
45
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taking into consideration concerns like fairness, to both states and
corporations.53
3. Onward Ho!: Development of the “Minimum Contacts” Doctrine. —
Since the ruling of the “minimum contacts” doctrine in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court has
proceeded to split personal jurisdiction into two categories. These
categories are 1) specific, “case-linked” jurisdiction, and 2) general
jurisdiction.54
The specific, case-linked category of cases has been bifurcated
to examine, first, the minimum contacts of a corporation within the
forum, and second, the fairness of hailing the corporation into such
forum.55 Furthermore, the Court has continued to apply this analysis
to the realm of products liability cases, adopting a “stream of
commerce” doctrine.56
The second category, general jurisdiction, involves the two
categories of cases proffered in International Shoe in which personal
jurisdiction determinations are obvious.57 The following subsections
will discuss each of the categories with more detail.58
a. Stream of commerce and fairness. – In World Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the Supreme Court set forth a “stream
See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310; see also Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 561;
McFarland, supra note 47, at 761; McMunigal, supra note 37, at 195-96.
54
Taylor Simpson-Wood, In the Aftermath of Goodyear Dunlop: Oyez! Oyez!
Oyez! A Call for a Hybrid Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in International Products Liability
Controversies, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 113, 116 (2012).
55
Id. at 117.
56
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
57
See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (cases involving continuous and systematic
activities related to the claim at bar are cases in which jurisdiction could obviously be
conferred, while cases of isolated incidents not related to the claim at bar are
situations in which jurisdiction could obviously not be conferred); see also SimpsonWood, supra note 54, at 118 (describing these cases as those in which “a foreign
defendant’s contacts with the forum do not relate to the cause of action, but are “so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum state”)
(citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (quoting Int’l
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317)).
58
The “minimum contacts” portion of category one will not be discussed,
as it was expounded upon in the previous section.
53
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of commerce” standard by determining whether a corporation
“purposefully availed” itself to the forum.59 The Court based this
doctrine on fairness.60 In doing so, the Court listed five factors to be
considered in determining whether it is fair to hail a defendant into
court in a particular forum: (1) the defendant must have a relationship
with the forum which would make it “reasonable . . . to require the
corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there,” (2)
the interest of the forum state in adjudicating the dispute, (3) “the
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,” (4) the
interest of the entire interstate judicial system in the most efficient
resolution of controversies, and (5) the interest of States in “furthering
fundamental substantive social policies.”61
World Wide Volkswagen involved New York residents who were
injured when their car, purchased in New York, exploded in
Oklahoma.62 The plaintiffs brought suit against the vehicle’s regional
distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen, and its retail dealer, Seaway, inter
alia.63 Seaway only sold cars in Massena, New York, and World-Wide’s
market only extended to New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.64
In determining the defendants could not be brought into court
in Oklahoma, the Court founded its reasoning in fairness.65 It did so
through a two-prong approach based in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.66

See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98; See also Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 441 (1961) (that stream of
commerce was originally espoused in this case).
60
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 288.
63
See id. (The plaintiffs argued that it was foreseeable that cars sold by
World-Wide and Seaway would travel to Oklahoma. From this the plaintiffs asserted
World-Wide and Seaway had minimum contacts necessary to attain personal
jurisdiction).
64
See id. at 298.
65
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 44 U.S. at 294.
66
See id. at 292, 297-99; see also Andrews, supra note 20, at 1010-11.
59
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Professor Carol Andrews67 explains that the first prong ensures
protection to foreign defendants by limiting the ability of states to
exceed their jurisdiction as “coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”68
This is evident when Justice White writes, “[we] stress[] that the Due
Process clause ensures not only fairness, but also the ‘orderly
administration of the laws.’”69
The second prong protects the defendant from litigating in an
inconvenient forum by examining facts within the five factors listed by
the court.70 In applying the second prong, Justice White notes that
fairness under the Due Process Clause does not turn on a defendant’s
ability to foresee that its product may end up in a specific forum.71
Rather, a defendant’s “conduct and connection with the forum state”
must be “such that . . . [through its] purposeful[] avail[ment] . . . it has
clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the
risk of burdensome litigation.”72
Professor Wendy Perdue73 has argued that the World Wide
Volkswagen Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause shifted
the Clause away from a procedural jurisdiction safeguard to a
substantive “defendant-focused approach.”74 This criticism certainly
carries some merit, as Justice White writes that even when fairness is
not lacking, the Due Process Clause may “divest the State of its power
to render a valid judgment.”75 Regardless of Professor Perdue’s, and
other scholars’, critical view of the Court’s reasoning in World Wide
Volkswagen, gaining in personam jurisdiction over a foreign defendant
67

Douglas Arant Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of

68

See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1010 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 44

Law.
U.S. at 292).
69

World-Wide Volkswagen, 44 U.S. at 293-94 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S.

at 319).
See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1010-11.
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 44 U.S. at 297.
72
Id.
73 Dean, University of Richmond School of Law.
74
See Perdue, supra note 25, at 733-34 (commenting that the Court
incorrectly restates the holding from Pennoyer v. Neff allowing it to shift the Due
Process Clause from a mechanism for a procedural challenge of jurisdiction to a
substantive standard by which to assess a jurisdictional challenge).
75
World-Wide Volkswagen, 44 U.S. at 294.
70
71
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requires a fairness examination under the Due Process Clause.76
However, prior to the fairness examination, the defendant had to
purposefully avail himself to that jurisdiction by introducing his
product into that jurisdiction’s stream of commerce; the mere
possibility of the product entering the foreign jurisdiction was not
enough.77
Later cases have followed the fairness standard established in
World-Wide Volkswagen.78 In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc., the plaintiff
sought jurisdiction in New Hampshire to bring suit against Hustler
Magazine.79 In holding that New Hampshire had jurisdiction to hear
the plaintiff’s claim, the Supreme Court reasoned Hustler Magazine
had sufficient minimum contacts in New Hampshire80 such that it was
fair to compel the magazine to face suit in New Hampshire.81 Beyond
the extent of Hustler’s sales in New Hampshire, the Court based its
reasoning of fairness on the second World Wide Volkswagen factor,
stating that New Hampshire had a strong interest in holding Hustler
accountable for libel committed within its jurisdiction.82 This interest
is created because Hustler’s libel of Keeton harms both Keeton and
New Hampshire’s own citizens who read Hustler’s publication.83
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz84 made a very subtle but important
change to the original two-prong standard established in World-Wide
See id. at 294-95.
See id. at 297-98.
78
See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); see also Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); see also Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
79
Plaintiff Keeton assisted in the production of Hustler Magazine. Her
name appears in several places on the magazines. Hustler sold approximately 10,00015,000 copies of Hustler Magazine in New Hampshire. Plaintiff sued Hustler,
claiming Hustler libeled her in five separate issues of its magazine. Keeton brought
suit in New Hampshire, claiming New Hampshire could exert personal jurisdiction
over Hustler. Neither plaintiff nor defendant was a resident of New Hampshire.
Keeton, 465 U.S. at 772.
80
See id. (Hustler sold approximately 10,000 to 15,000 copies of its
magazines each month in New Hampshire.).
81
Id. at 781.
82
See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 775-76.
83
See id.
84
Defendants Rudzewicz and MacShara entered into a franchising
agreement with Burger King Corp. Burger King was headquartered in Miami,
76
77
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Volkswagen.85 Above the surface, the Court’s holding was quite simple
and aligned with its predecessors.86 According to the Court, the
contract between Rudzewicz and Burger King created a “continuing
obligation” between himself and Burger King, a resident of Florida,
thereby availing himself of the “privilege of conducting business
there . . . [and being] shielded by [Florida’s] laws.”87 Thus, it was
foreseeable that he may be brought into court in Florida.88
Below the surface, however, Justice Brennan attempted to shift
the Court away from a strong defendant-centered minimum contacts
test by redefining the burden of proof required to defeat personal
jurisdiction.89 Brennan made clear that, once the plaintiff has proven
the existence of a contact, the defendant has what Professor Richard
Freer90 calls a “strikingly onerous burden.”91 That burden requires the
defendant to present a “compelling case” showing jurisdiction to be
“so gravely difficult and inconvenient [he] . . . is at a severe
disadvantage in comparison to his opponent.”92 As a result of the
increased burden on the defendant, much of the Court’s discussion in
subsequent cases has focused on the contacts of a defendant with a
forum more than the fairness of hailing a defendant into a particular
forum.93

Florida, but had a regional office in Michigan. The franchising agreement required
payments over a twenty-year period, which would total more than one million
dollars. Defendants fell behind on payments to Burger King and subsequently
entered into negotiations with Burger King’s Michigan and Florida offices to settle
payment issues. After negotiations broke down, Burger King filed suit in Florida.
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 464-68.
85
See Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: The
Ironic Legacy of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 551, 570-72 (2012).
86
See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 462 (a Michigan defendant had contracted
with a Florida corporation, which, according to the court, fairly availed him to
Florida’s jurisdiction since the contract had an abundance of requirements, all having
a connection with Florida).
87
Id. at 476.
88
Id. at 474.
89
See Freer, supra note 85, at 571-72.
90 Robert Howell Hall Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.
91
Id. at 572.
92
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477-78 (quoting Bremen v. Zapata-Off Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972)).
93
See Freer, supra note 85, at 574-76, 581, 589.
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Interestingly, despite the increased burden of proof on the
defendant, two years later, in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of
Cal.,94 the Court used the fairness standard to find that Asahi could not
be brought into court in California.95 Justice O’Connor and three other
justices determined that, in addition to jurisdiction being unfair,
California lacked sufficient contacts with Asahi.96 The Court reasoned
that “[t]he ‘substantial connection’ between the defendant and the
forum State necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come
about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum
State.”97 Simple awareness by a defendant that its product will be swept
into a particular forum through a stream of commerce does not
amount to purposefully directing its product toward that state by
placing the product within such stream.98
Post-Asahi, to gain specific personal jurisdiction over a
defendant, a forum must survive a two-prong approach.99 First, it must
prove minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum.100 In
the case of a corporation the Court will look to whether or not the
defendant purposefully placed its product in the stream of
commerce.101 Second, it must prove that it is fair to hail the defendant
into the forum.102 With the post-Burger King increased burden of proof
upon the defendant to rebut jurisdiction by arguing the forum is unfair,

94
Plaintiff was a California citizen whose wife died in a motorcycle crash
after one of the tires blew out. Plaintiff brought suit against Cheng Shin Rubber
Industrial Co., Ltd. Cheng Shin sought indemnification from Asahi Metal Indus. Co.
Cheng Shin bought parts from Asahi and incorporated those parts in tires it sold.
Cheng Shin did approximately twenty percent of its business in the United States.
Asahi has no offices, property, or agents in California. Its offices were located in
Japan. Asahi, 480 U.S. 102.
95
See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114; see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 576 (Asahi is
the only case in which fairness was used to reject jurisdiction).
96
Freer, supra note 85, at 574-75.
97
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
98
Id.
99
See Freer, supra note 85, at 552-53; see also Andrews, supra note 20, at
1010-11.
100
See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310.
101
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98.
102
See id.
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defendants’ best chance of overcoming jurisdiction is proving a lack of
contacts, and the case law has reflected this shift towards contacts.103
b. Goodyear v. Brown: A look at general jurisdiction. – As
discussed earlier, Chief Justice Stone in International Shoe classified
two categories of cases: those in which the alleged acts are tied directly
to the contacts of the defendant and those in which the alleged acts are
not tied to the contacts of the defendant.104 Professor Carol Andrews
has termed cases: in which the alleged acts are tied directly to the
defendant’s “continuous and systematic” contacts as “easy yes” cases;
in which the defendant had “isolated” contacts with the forum or the
alleged acts are not tied to those contacts as “easy no” cases; in which
the defendant’s contacts were extensive but the alleged acts were
unrelated or instances where the defendant’s contacts were “isolated”
but the alleged act was tied to those contacts as “maybe” cases.105
Andrews further notes that the “easy yes” cases and the
“maybe” cases involving isolated but related contacts have been
termed by the court as specific jurisdiction.106 Those cases were
discussed above. This subsection seeks to inform the reader as to the
Court’s position on the “easy no” and continuous but unrelated
contacts cases, now termed general personal jurisdiction.107
The most recent case involving general personal jurisdiction is
Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations v. Brown.108 The defendant contested
jurisdiction in North Carolina as improper.109 The defendants had no
connections to North Carolina outside of their parent company and a
small fraction of tires they sold in North Carolina, typically custom
ordered for specific vehicles.110 According to the Court, the “paradigm
forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction . . . for a corporation

See Freer, supra note 85, at 589.
See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317-18; see also Hoffheimer, supra note 13.
105
See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1008-09.
106
Id. at 1009.
107
See id. at 1009-10.
108
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2848 (subsidiaries of Goodyear U.S.A. were
sued by the parents of children killed when a bus, using tires manufactured by the
subsidiaries, rolled over near Paris, France).
109
Id. at 2852.
110
Id.
103
104
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[is] . . . one in which [it] is fairly regarded as at home.”111 Hoffheimer
states that the Court understands “at home” as relating to the
defendant’s state of incorporation, its principal place of business, and
potentially anywhere in which it has “substantial, continuous, and
systematic activity.”112 Using the paradigmatic forum analysis, the
Court determined that the defendant subsidiaries’ connections to
North Carolina “fall far short of the ‘continuous and systematic general
business contacts’ necessary” for jurisdiction over them on claims
“unrelated to anything that connects them to the State.”113
In reaching its conclusion, the Court contrasted the prior case
of Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.114 Perkins involved a Philippine
mining company which ceased its operations to Ohio during World
War II.115 The company’s president maintained an office in Ohio and
supervised its mining activities from the Ohio office.116 The Court in
Perkins found that, because Ohio was the principal place of business,
even temporarily, general jurisdiction was proper in Ohio.117
The Court also compared another prior case, Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,118 in which general jurisdiction in
Texas was found improper when a Colombian helicopter operation
company was sued in a wrongful death suit.119 The defendant’s only
ties to Texas were: acceptance of checks drawn on a Houston bank
account; helicopters, equipment, and training services purchased from
a Texas corporation; and personnel training in Texas.120 The Helicopteros
Court concluded “‘mere purchases [made in the forum State], even if
occurring at regular intervals, are not enough [for general] jurisdiction

Id. at 2853-54.
See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 551.
113
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984)).
114
See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
115
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856.
116
Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48.
117
See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856; see also Perkins, 342 U.S. 437.
118
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408.
119
See id. at 415-16.
120
See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856 (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416).
111
112
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over a non-resident corporation” when the purchase transactions are
not related to the cause of action.121
The Goodyear Court leaned towards the reasoning of
Helicopteros, indicating that the only way in which systematic activity
within a forum will allow for general jurisdiction is if such activity takes
place at extremely high volumes.122
After Goodyear, the state of general jurisdiction is not fully
known. It appears that the Court stripped general jurisdiction down
to the point that it is only applicable in cases in which the corporation
is, literally, “at home” in the forum.124
123

Thus, to obtain jurisdiction over an ex juris defendant in the
United States, a forum must be able to obtain either specific
jurisdiction, which is focused on minimum contacts and fairness, or
general jurisdiction, which is focused on whether the defendant is “at
home.” The Goodyear court informed us that, since International Shoe,
the Supreme Court has focused primarily on cases involving specific
personal jurisdiction.125 Nevertheless, general jurisdiction still exists as
an option for plaintiffs who cannot obtain specific jurisdiction over a
defendant.
Having surveyed the development of American jurisprudence
on personal jurisdiction over ex juris defendants, we must proceed to
survey such jurisprudence in Canada.
B.

Personal Jurisdiction Over Ex Juris Defendants in Canada

Modern day personal jurisdiction in Canada is rooted in the
English House of Lords, which developed a “real and substantial

See id. at 2856 (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418).
See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 592; but see Freer, supra note 85, at
587-88 (arguing that even high levels of sales activity is unlikely to justify general
personal jurisdiction).
123
See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 551.
124
See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 551; see also Freer, supra note 85, at
585.
125
See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854.
121
122
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connection” test.126 After Indyka, the real and substantial connection
test was employed three more times before, in 1990, becoming
“enshrined as a central jurisdictional principle” in Morguard Investments
Ltd. v. De Savoye.127
In 1993, Hunt v. T&N PLC. made clear that the principles
enunciated in Morguard were constitutionally founded.128 Over the next
nineteen years, the Supreme Court of Canada defined what a “real and
substantial” connection was, culminating its efforts in its 2012 decision
of Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda.129 This section will summarily track
the Supreme Court of Canada’s development of the real and
substantial connection test from its roots in Indyka to its current state
following Van Breda.
1. Early Development of the “Real and Substantial Connection”
Doctrine. — The real and substantial connection doctrine originated in
the English case Indyka v. Indyka.130 Prior to Indyka, an English woman’s
ability to obtain a divorce was dependent upon a set of particular
rules.131 With the introduction of the real and substantial connection
test, the previous rules were replaced by a general principle revolving
around the strength of a person’s connection with a particular
forum.132 The Supreme Court of Canada expanded the use of the real
and substantial connection test, in Moran v. Pyle National (Canada) Ltd.,
to torts.133
In Moran, the Supreme Court of Canada held it reasonable to
find a real and substantial connection with a forum, thereby allowing
that forum to have jurisdiction, if a defendant could reasonably foresee
that its product would cause injury and be used and consumed in the
Joost Blom, Q.C. & Elizabeth Edinger, Conflicts of Law: The Chimera of
the Real and Substantial Connection Test, 38 U.B.C L. REV. 373, 374-76 (2005)(stating that
the English case Indyka v. Indyka established a more uniform system of divorce).
127
Id. at 377-78.
128
Id. at 378, 385.
129
See generally, Blom, supra note 126; Peter J. Pliszka, My Place or Yours?
SCC Sets New and Improved Test for Jurisdiction in Canada, 80 DEF. COUNS. J. 273 (2013).
130
See Blom, supra note 126, at 375.
131
Id. at 375-76.
132
Id. at 376.
133
See Moran v. Pyle National (Can.) Ltd., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393, 408-09; see
also Blom, supra note 126, at 377.
126
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foreign jurisdiction.134 The Court’s decision resembled its American
counterpart’s stream of commerce inquiry.135 Like the Court in WorldWide Volkswagen, the Moran Court would require a strong enough
relationship between the defendant and the forum to make it fair to
require the defendant to litigate in the foreign forum.136
The Moran holding further compares with the American tort
case of Calder v. Jones.137 The United States Supreme Court held in Calder
that California could assert jurisdiction over two Florida journalists,
with essentially no contacts to California, because they wrote a libelous
story about a California citizen with the knowledge and expectation
that it would be widely circulated in California.138 In both cases, the
American and Canadian Supreme Courts showed they were willing to
extend a stream of commerce-like analysis to tort cases.
Almost two decades after Moran, the Supreme Court of Canada
once again relied on the real and substantial connection test.139 In
Morguard v. De Savoye, the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the issue
of whether a judgment in one province could be recognized by
another.140 In determining that the Alberta judgment should be
recognized in British Columbia, La Forest J. focused on balancing
order and fairness.141 Order, La Forest J. opined, dictates that a foreign
provinces’ judgment should be recognized across Canada for reasons

Moran, [1975] 1 S.C.R. (Can.) at 409.
See Asahi, 480 U.S. 102; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286 (1980);
see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
136
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Moran, [1975] 1 S.C.R. at
(Can.) 409.
137
Calder, 465 U.S. 783.
138
Id. at 789-90.
139
Morguard Inv. Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. (Can.) 1077; Blom,
supra note 23, at 378; Monestier, supra note 6, at 180-81.
140
Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. (Can.) at 1082. The Ontario Court of Appeal
subsequently explained that, though Morguard explained the real and substantial
connection test “from the perspective of recognition and enforcement, La Forest J.
made it clear that precisely the same real and substantial connection test applies to
the assumption of jurisdiction against an out-of-province defendant.” Muscutt v.
Courcelles, [2002] CanLII 44957, para. 38 (ON CA).
141
Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1102-03; see also Blom, supra note 126, at
381.
134
135
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of comity.142 La Forest J. compared this idea to the United States’ full
faith and credit clause.143
Fairness, La Forest J. determined, was more important than
order.144 While order provided ample reasoning to support judgment
recognition across Canada, fairness was a necessity.145 La Forest J.
described fairness as the relationship between the jurisdiction’s
contacts and the defendant or subject matter of the suit.146
Accordingly, the Morguard court acknowledges three grounds upon
which a court can claim jurisdiction over a defendant: 1) the defendant
is served in personam; 2) the defendant consents to jurisdiction through
agreement or attornment;147 and 3) there is a real and substantial
connection between the defendant or cause of action and the forum.148
Though Morguard focused on the recognition of interprovincial
judgments, La Forest J. provides undertones throughout his opinion
which seem to relate the expressed principles to the realm of private
international law.149

See Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. (Can.) at 1096-97.
See id. at 1100, 1102.
144
See id. at 1102-03; see also Blom, supra note 126, at 381 (arguing the
Morguard decision sacrificed order for fairness).
145
See Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1103.
146
Id.
147
“Attornment occurs when a defendant, by his or her conduct consents
or submits to a jurisdiction . . . without reserving its right to challenge the claimant’s
chosen jurisdiction at a later time.” Melissa Kehrer & John A. Olah, Trips, Traps and
Jurisdiction
Part
2,
CLAIMS
CAN.
(Feb.
2008),
http://www.claimscanada.ca/issues/article.aspx?aid= 1000219849&er=NA; see also
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 147 (9th ed. 2009).
148
Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1103-04. For a hypothetical example of all
three grounds, see also Stephen C. Nadler, Navigating the Litigation Landscape in Canada:
Securing Evidence and Enforcing Judgments, BUS. LAW TODAY, Jan./Feb. 2008, at 42; Cf.
Monestier, supra note 6, at n. 2 (noting Beals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, places the most
importance on whether there is a real and substantial connection, while other indicia
(presence and consent) bolster the real and substantial connection).
149
See Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1095 (“Modern states, however, cannot
live in splendid isolation and do give effect to judgments given in other countries in
certain circumstances”); id. at 1097 (“what must underlie a modern system of private
international law are principles of order and fairness, principles that ensure security
of transactions with justice”); id. at 1098 (noting that the United States and European
countries have created more generous rules for recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments).
142
143
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Shortly after Morguard, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Hunt
v. T & N plc.,150 reiterated the importance of order and fairness but
chose not to further define the scope and application of the real and
substantial connection test.151 La Forest J. wrote that the real and
substantial connection test was a flexible test which simply “captured
the idea that there must be some limits on claims to jurisdiction.” 152
The Hunt opinion details some prior applications of the real and
substantial connection test, concluding that “no test can perhaps ever
be rigidly applied . . . [and] the assumption of . . . jurisdiction must
ultimately be guided by the requirements of order and fairness, not a
mechanical counting of contacts or connections.”153
The plaintiff in Hunt, a resident of British Columbia, alleged he
was injured due to the tortious behavior of the defendants domiciled
in Quebec.154 The plaintiff brought action in British Columbia and
sought production of various documents.155 The defendants refused to
produce the documents on the ground that they were not required to
do so because they were protected by the Quebec Business Concerns
Records Act.156 On the basis of Morguard, the Supreme Court of Canada
held that the Quebec Act was not applicable to the proceedings in
British Columbia.157
The Hunt decision elevated the Morguard principles to
constitutional status, indicating that they cannot be overridden by
provincial courts.158 The Court determined that the idea of Canadian
Hunt v. T & N plc., [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289.
Blom, supra note 126, at 385.
152
Hunt, [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 325.
153
Id. at 326; cf. Calder, 465 U.S. 783 (focusing on the fairness of California
exercising jurisdiction despite a lack of contacts); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
293-94 (stressing that the Due Process Clause ensures fairness and the orderly
administration of the laws); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250 (1958) (describing
the evolution of American in personam jurisdiction from the rigid Pennoyer v. Neff to
the more flexible Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington).
154
Hunt, [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 297.
155
Id. at 298.
156
Id. at 298; see generally Robert Wisner, Uniformity, Diversity, and Provincial
Extraterritorality: Hunt v. T & N plc., 40 MCGILL L.J. 759, 762 (1995) (explaining the
Quebec Business Concerns Records Act is a blocking statute, prohibiting the removal of
business documents from the province for the purpose of litigation).
157
See Hunt [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 331-32.
158
See id. at 324; see also Blom, supra note 126, at 385.
150
151
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provinces giving full faith and credit to the judgments of other
provinces was a “constitutional imperative[],” and while provinces may
enact legislation regarding the recognition of judgments of other
provinces, Morguard established a minimum threshold for order and
fairness which the provinces must respect.159
The international undertones of Morguard and its emphasis on
the importance of order and fairness, subsequently echoed in Hunt,
were expressed together in McNichol Estate v. Woldnik.160 McNichol Estate
involved a Florida chiropractor, Dr. Puentes, being sued in Ontario
following the death of Louis McNichol, an Ontario resident who died
in Florida.161 Dr. Puentes was the only non-resident of Ontario named
in the lawsuit.162 Dr. Puentes argued to have the real and substantial
connection test applied to him separately from the other defendants.
The Ontario Court of Appeal refused to do so.163
Rationalizing why it chose not to apply the real and substantial
test to Dr. Puentes separately, the Court argued to do so “would be a
step backwards . . . away from the recognition of the increasingly
complex and interdependent nature of the modern world community
which lies at the heart of [Morguard’s and Hunt’s] reasoning.”164 Further,
the Court wrote, “it would mute the influence of the underlying
requirements of order and fairness.”165 The decision of the Court
emphasizes that the order and fairness dictated by the real and
substantial connection test extends beyond inter-provincial disputes to
foreign disputes.
2. What is a real and substantial connection?: The modern real and
substantial connection doctrine.- While the Canadian Supreme Court chose
not to expand upon the real and substantial connection test in Hunt,
the Ontario Court of Appeal did do so in Muscutt v. Courcelles.166 The
Hunt [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 324.
McNichol v. Woldnik, [2001] CanLII 5679 (ON CA).
161
Id. at para. 1.
162
Id.
163
Id. at para. 12-15.
164
McNichol, 2001 CanLII at para. 12.
165
Id.
166
See Muscutt,(2002) CanLII. 44957. The Canadian Court system is
similar to that of the United States. Provincial trial courts appeal to provincial courts
of appeal, which appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. Thus, just as American
159
160
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Ontario court listed eight factors to consider when determining
whether a forum can ascertain jurisdiction over a foreign defendant:
the connection between the forum and the plaintiff’s claim; the
connection between the forum and the defendant; unfairness to the
defendant in assuming jurisdiction; unfairness to the plaintiff in not
assuming jurisdiction; the involvement of other parties to the suit; the
court’s willingness to recognize and enforce an extra-provincial
judgment rendered on the same jurisdictional basis; whether the case
is inter-provincial or international in nature; and comity and the
standards of jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement prevailing
elsewhere.167
Legal Scholar Tonya Monestier notes that the Supreme Court
of Canada never explicitly endorsed the Muscutt factors.168 The Ontario
Court of Appeal, following the rationale of the Supreme Court of
Canada’s opinion in Morguard, believed that fairness to both parties was
important, and that the eight factors provided for fairness as well as
flexibility, as Morguard discussed.169 This led to the biggest criticism of
the Muscutt factors: only the first two factors actually dealt with a
connection of any sort between the forum and the claim or
defendant.170 Despite this criticism from scholars, the Muscutt factors
were considered influential in other provinces.171
The eight factors were challenged in Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van
Breda.172 The Canadian Supreme Court found it necessary to more
clearly articulate factors defining what a real and substantial connection
appellate courts can act in the absence of action by the Supreme Court, so can
provincial appellate courts in Canada.
167
Muscutt, (2002) CanLII 44957 (Can.) at para. 75-104.
168
Monestier, supra note 6, at 183.
169
See Muscutt, (2002) CanLII 44957 at para. 72, 86-88; see also Monestier,
supra note 6, at 193-94.
170
See Monestier, supra note 6, at 184 (“[The final six factors] are not
strictly concerned with the connection of the forum to the parties and the cause of
action.”) (quoting Bastarache J., in Castillo v. Castillo, 2005 SCC 83, para. 45)); Stephen
G.A. Pitel, Reformulating a Real and Substantial Connection, 60 U.N.B.L.J. 177, 182 (2010);
see also Blom, supra note 123, at 394 (“Only the first two of the eight factors are strictly
factual in nature”).
171
Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, (Can.) para. 48-51
available at http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/8004/index.do.
172
See Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17 (Can.).
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is, in line with current trends in Canadian jurisprudence.173 The Van
Breda Court acknowledged that this was the direction the Ontario
Court of Appeal was heading in, but that the list of connecting factors
should not include factors based on fairness, efficiency, and comity.174
As a result, the Canadian Supreme Court replaced the list of
eight factors in Muscutt with four factors of its own: the defendant was
domiciled in the province; the defendant carries on business in the
province175; the tort was committed in the province; and a contract
connected with the dispute was created in the province.176 In creating
these four connecting factors, the Court rejected the fairness and injury
factors from Muscutt on the grounds that they are too attenuated and
should not be separated from the factual factors announced in Van
Breda.177
Of particular interest to this comment is the Van Breda court’s
removal of the Muscutt factor considering whether an action is interprovincial or international in nature. The Court determined that issues
relating to foreign law may remain helpful in determining
jurisdiction.178 However, it cautioned that focusing on juridical
disadvantages in jurisdictional analysis is not “consonant with the
principle of comity which should govern legal relationships between
modern democratic states.”179
The four connecting factors create a rebuttable presumption
for the defendant, but do not create a rebuttable presumption in favor
of the plaintiff.180 Thus, the Van Breda Court moved from what it saw
as an over-inclusive, unpredictable list of factors, to a more fact-based,
See id., 2012 SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 75-79 (indicating that the CJPTA
and other sources of jurisprudence need to be aligned with a set of rebuttable
presumptive factors).
174
Id. ¶¶ 74, 79, 82, 84.
175
See id. ¶ 87 (recognizing that though carrying on business in the
province may be a presumptive factor in favor of jurisdiction, there are some
business activities such as advertising and web site access in the jurisdiction which
cannot give rise to a presumption of jurisdiction).
176
Id. ¶ 90(d).
177
Id. ¶¶ 84-89.
178
Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 63.
179
Id.
180
See id. ¶¶ 92-93; see also Pliszka, supra note 129, at 277.
173
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clear set of factors for determining whether a real and substantial
connection exists.181 As an example of this rebuttable presumption, the
Court posed the hypothetical situation in which the factor at issue is
that a defendant carries on business in the forum.182 According to the
court, a possible rebuttal to this presumption is that the subject matter
of the suit is unrelated to the defendant’s business activities in the
forum, similar to one of the categories of cases identified in International
Shoe.183
Van Breda involved a couple who contracted in Ontario with
Club Resorts Ltd. for sport services at a club in Cuba, managed by
Club Resorts.184 Shortly after the trip began, Ms. Van Breda was
catastrophically injured on the beach when a metal contraption
collapsed on her.185 Upon return from Cuba, Ms. Van Breda and Mr.
Berg moved to Calgary and British Columbia, but never returned to
Ontario.186
Relying on the four presumptive factors created by the
Canadian Supreme Court, the Court held that the Ontario court could
exercise jurisdiction.187 The Court reasoned that because the contract
for services was created in Ontario, the Ontario court properly claimed
jurisdiction.188 According to the court the injury resulted from the
obligations created by the contractual relationship which began in
Ontario.189

See Pliszka, supra note 129, at 4.
Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17, (Can.) at para. 96.
183
Id.; cf. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (continuous and systematic contacts
may not be enough to support jurisdiction).
184
Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17, (Can.) at para. 2-3 (The contract created an
obligation for Mr. Berg to teach two hours of tennis per day at the resort in return
for room and board at the resort for himself and Ms. Van Breda).
185
Id. ¶ 4.
186
Id.
187
Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 118.
188
Id. ¶ 117. The court determined that Club Resorts’ advertising in
Ontario was not sufficient to establish jurisdiction because advertising is often
international or global, and allowing advertising to confer jurisdiction would subject
large commercial organizations to jurisdiction almost anywhere in the world, id. ¶
114.
189
Id. ¶ 117.
181
182
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Despite the shift in Van Breda to a more delineated set of
factors, Monestier believes that the court too quickly discounted
“fairness” to achieve “order.”190 While Monestier acknowledges that
the Canadian Supreme Court moved in the correct direction with its
decision in Van Breda, she believes the Court moved to a system which
is too rigid.191 While this is a fair criticism of the Van Breda decision,
the general consensus is that the change was a much needed one, as
Ms. Monestier herself acknowledges.192 The shift by the Canadian
Supreme Court in Van Breda recognizes the Court’s desire to dissipate
the attempt to balance “fairness” and “order” in favor of order.193
II.

ANALYSIS

As Ms. Monestier points out, the change in tide made by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Van Breda ushers in a new understanding
and era of ex juris jurisdiction in Canada.194 Because of the new
direction of Canadian ex juris jurisdiction, the Canadian Supreme Court
has more closely aligned ex juris jurisdiction in Canada with that of the
United States. As a result, the United States and Canada will be able to
increase comity with one another resulting in greater cooperation in
transnational cases. Further, greater cooperation between the two
nations may further smooth the path for increasing economic ties with
one another.
A.

A Fading Border: Closing the Gap Between Canadian
Jurisdiction and American Jurisdiction

Professor Black acknowledges that recognition of foreign
judgments is more likely when the two countries involved have similar

Monestier, supra note 6, at 398.
Id. at 412.
192
Id. at 410-11; see also Pliszka, supra note 129.
193
See Monestier, supra note 6, at 410; compare Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17
(Can.) at para. 99 (stating that a court is not required to hear only the tort which
could be connected with the jurisdiction when there are multiple torts at issue), with
McNichol, (2001) CanLII 5679 at para. 12 (“I do not agree that where an action has
some claims with an extra-territorial dimension, and others which have none, the
former must be tested in isolation”).
194
See Monestier, supra note 6, at 410-11.
190
191
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or identical standards for personal jurisdiction.195 As the new tide in
Canadian ex juris jurisdiction commences, the Van Breda factors appear
to align the new Canadian jurisdiction closer to that of the United
States.196
1. Van Breda Factors One and Two: A Defendant-Centric Approach.
– The first Van Breda factor, whether or not the defendant was
domiciled in the province, aligns itself well with the minimum contacts
doctrine provided in International Shoe.197 At the base of Justice Stone’s
approach in International Shoe is the previous notion of personal
jurisdiction dating back to Pennoyer, a defendant domiciled in a state is
subject to personal jurisdiction.198 This a very defendant-centric
approach.
The first Van Breda factor has brought personal jurisdiction in
Canada to a clear, defendant-centric approach as well.199 The court
stated that a plaintiff’s presence in a jurisdiction is not sufficient to
create a relationship between the jurisdiction and the subject matter,
but that a defendant may always be sued in a jurisdiction in which he
resides.200 This language has the same basic notion as that in Pennoyer,
the defendant’s domicile is the important consideration.201 Further, by
looking at Keeton, the United States Supreme Court’s relative disinterest
in the domicile of the plaintiff is just as clear as that of the Canadian
Supreme Court.202

195
See Vaughan Black, A Canada-United States Full Faith and Credit Clause?,
18 SW. J. INT’L L. 595, 606-10 (2011).
196
See Burger King, 471 U.S. 462; Keeton, 465 U.S. 770; World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286; Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310; Hess, 274 U.S. 352; Gray, 22 Ill. 2d
432; Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.).
197
See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para.
86.
198
See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; see also Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720.
199
See Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 {Can.) at para. 86; see also Pliszka, supra
note 129, at 5-6.
200
See Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 86.
201
See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720.
202
Compare Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780 (stating that a plaintiff’s “lack of
residence will not defeat jurisdiction established on the basis of defendant’s
contacts”), with Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 at para. 86 (stating that a plaintiff’s
presence in a jurisdiction “will not create a presumptive relationship between the
forum and either the subject matter of the litigation or the defendant”).
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Van Breda’s second factor, whether the defendant carries on
business within the province, is linked to the idea of purposeful
availment, originating in Gray v. American Radiator,203 but first used by
the United States Supreme Court in Worldwide Volkswagen.204 Once
again this factor, like its American counterpart, is defendant-centric.205
The Canadian Supreme Court determined that the broad
announcement of a rule relating to the business activities of a
defendant in a forum was ill-advised.206 The United States Supreme
Court came to this same conclusion in World-Wide Volkswagen.207
Additionally, the Canadian Supreme Court’s explanation of
this factor is similar to general jurisdiction in the United States.208 Part
of the Canadian Supreme Court’s explanation states one way to satisfy
this factor is through “maintaining an office [in the jurisdiction].”209
Such reasoning is precisely what the United States Supreme Court used
in Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co. to determine the defendant was
domiciled in Ohio.210
While the first two Van Breda factors have aligned U.S. and
Canadian personal jurisdiction as they relate to the domicile and
business activities of the defendant, the last two factors revolve around
the subject matter at dispute in a case.
2. Van Breda Factors Three and Four: Subject Matter Focus. - Van
Breda’s third factor, whether the tort was committed in the province,
finds an American counterpart in both Pawloski and Keeton.211 This

203
204
205
206
207
208

See Gray, 22 Ill. 2d at 441.
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98.
See Pliszka, supra note 129, at 5-6.
See Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 87.
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853-54; see also Hoffheimer, supra note 13,

at 551.
Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 87.
See Perkins, 342 U.S. 437.
211
See Keeton, 465 U.S. 770 (considering the desire of the jurisdiction in
which the harm was incurred to resolve the case); see also Hess, 274 U.S. 352 (involving
a car accident in a jurisdiction the defendant did not reside in); Van Breda, [2012]
SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 88.
209
210
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factor and the fourth factor both focus on the subject matter at
dispute.212
While the minimum contacts doctrine focuses on the
defendant’s locale and actions, it also examines the impact of the tort
action in the jurisdiction.213 Keeton serves as the best example. The
Keeton court focused attention on the idea that the state in which the
tort took place has an interest in remedying the harm done within its
borders.214
The Van Breda Court appears to be addressing the same
concern through this factor. It describes Tolofson v. Jensen215 as the
common law starting point for serious consideration of the situs of a
tort as a factor to consider in jurisdictional analysis.216 Tolofson
determined that in some tort cases, the lex loci delicti must apply to help
preserve order.217
Van Breda’s fourth factor, whether a contract connected with
the dispute was made in the province, finds similarities to Burger King.218
Both cases place upon their respective jurisdictional standards an
impetus to consider the creation of a contract sufficient for
recognizing jurisdiction over the parties.219 In doing such both courts
concerned themselves with addressing the impact of the subject matter
at dispute in determining jurisdiction.

See Pliszka, supra note 129, at 5-6.
See, e.g., Keeton, 465 U.S. 770.
214
See id. at 776.
215
Tolofson v. Jensen; Lucas (Litigation Guardian of) v. Gagnon, [1994]
3
S.C.R.
1022
available
at
https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scccsc/en/item/1209/index.do (then click on PDF document).
216
See Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 88.
217
Tolofson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. at 1058.
218
See Burger King, 471 U.S. 462; Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para.
88.
219
See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 480-81; Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at
para. 88.
212
213
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Recognition of Foreign Judgments

Since the decision in Morguard, Canada has been recognizing
and enforcing United States’ judgments with more consistency. 220
Justice LaForest wrote in Morguard, “[m]odern times [require that] the
flow of wealth, skills, and people across boundaries be facilitated in a
fair and orderly manner.”221 Thus, while Morguard is limited to intraprovincial judgment disputes,222 Canadian courts have expanded its
mandate to include foreign judgments.223
The Canadian Supreme Court emphasized in Van Breda that
jurisdiction and recognition of judgments are intertwined.224 As a
result, the framework used in determining a court’s jurisdiction can
have an impact on a court’s recognition of judgments and vise versa.225
Further, in Muscutt, the Canadian Supreme Court emphasized that one
aspect of comity includes the consideration of jurisdictional standards
as well as judgment recognition and enforcement in other countries.226
Considering this, along with Black’s observation that greater
international judgment recognition occurs when countries have similar
personal jurisdiction standards, the opportunity for increased comity
between the United States and Canada is greater after Van Breda.
The choice by Canadian courts to expand recognition and
enforcement to foreign judgments has not been applauded by all of
Canada, its legal scholars, and even its courts and judges.227 However,
as Canadian attorney Allison Sears notes, “[i]t seems a fair assumption
however, that the ease with which the Court embraced the extension
220
See Black, supra note 195, at 612; Ivan F. Ivankovich, Enforcing U.S.
Judgments in Canada: “Things are Looking Up!”, 15 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 491, 491 (199495).
221
Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1078 (Can.).
222
See Ivankovich, supra note 220, at 499.
223
See Black, supra note 195, at 612.
224
See Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 16.
225
Id.
226
See Muscutt, [2002] CanLII 44957 at para. 102.
227
See, e.g., Foreign Judgments Act, R.S.N.B. (2011) c. 162; see also Civil
Code of Quebec, S.Q., c. 64, arts. 3155-63 (1991); Allison M. Sears, Beals v. Saldanha:
The International Implications of Morguard Made Clear, 68 SASK. L. REV. 223, 229-30
(2005) (stating Justice LeBel disagreed with the majority in Beals v. Saldanha, (2003)
SCC 72, believing that the test should be focused more on fairness to the defendant).
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of Morguard into the international realm was largely due to the similarity
between the Canadian and American legal systems.”228
Even more so than Canada, the United States recognizes and
enforces Canadian judgments. To this effect, a majority of states have
adopted statutes similar to the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments
Recognition Act.229 This act allows for recognition of foreign court
judgments which are final, conclusive, and enforceable where
rendered.230
One of the three requirements for non-recognition is that the
foreign court lacks personal jurisdiction.231 As a result, though Canada
and the United States have much in common with one another and, to
an extent, already recognize and enforce one another’s judgments,
bringing the two countries’ standards for personal jurisdiction closer
together will likely decrease the opportunity for this non-recognition
requirement to materialize.
Because both countries currently recognize one another’s
judgments with very little friction, the impact of aligning the two
standards for personal jurisdiction will not be all that substantial.
However, though the impact seems minimal, it is an issue which is
worthy of discussion.232 Four Canadian provinces do not currently
apply the Morguard standard to American judgments.233
Further, there is Canadian legislation limiting recognition in
certain areas, most notably, antitrust and judgments rendered under
the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996.234
While the LIBERTAD issue is substantially legislative, further
aligning personal jurisdiction standards may encourage those
Sears, supra note 227, at 242.
Todd J. Burke, Canadian Class Actions and Federal Judgments: Recognition
of Foreign Class Actions in Canada, BUS. LAW TODAY, Sept./Oct. 2007, at 48.
230
13 U.L.A. 261 § 1(2) (1986).
231
Id. § 4(a)(1)-(3).
232
See Black, supra note 195, at 619.
233
New Brunswick, Quebec, and British Columbia do not enforce foreign
judgments, and Saskatchewan will only enforce the damages portion of a judgment,
but not the punitive portions. See Black, supra note 192, at 613-14.
234
See Black, supra note 195, at 614.
228
229
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provinces which take issue with enforcing foreign judgments to
become more cooperative with U.S. courts in recognizing judgments.
Similarity between the two standards may provide greater assurance
that the treatment parties in Canada receive is similar to that received
by parties litigating in the United States.235
Are there other measures which would be more appropriate?
Numerous authors have written about the idea of either a bilateral
treaty or enforcement convention to assist the two countries in their
recognition of one another’s judgments.236 However, as professor
Black acknowledges, the chances of the legislatures of either country
taking the required initiative to enact such a treaty or convention is not
particularly likely.237 With the floundering likelihood that these
measures will be taken, bridging the gap between the two countries’
personal jurisdiction standards seems to present itself as a more viable
solution, or at the very least, a holdover until a more definite solution
can be achieved.
C.

Van Breda’s Implications for Foreign Class Action Suits

Moving beyond enforcement of one another’s judgments, the
new real and substantial framework defined in Van Breda has its
greatest implications in cases that have yet to be decided. More
specifically, in the future of transnational class action suits.238
When it comes to a Canadian court recognizing a class action
judgment rendered in the United States, one of the major factors, and
only one concerning this comment, in determining whether to enforce
the judgment is whether there is a “real and substantial connection in
favor of the foreign jurisdiction.”239 Canada and the United States

See id. at 610.
See, e.g., Black, supra note 195 (discussing his view that an enforcement
convention between the U.S. and Canada, while also evaluating other scholars’
suggestions regarding conventions and treaties).
237
See id. at 625.
238
See Burke, supra note 229, at 51 (noting that proper jurisdiction is a
major factor in recognition of class action judgments in Canada).
239
Burke, supra note 229, at 50 (citing Currie v. McDonald’s Restaurants
of Canada Ltd., (2005) CanLII 3360 (ON CA)).
235
236
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differ from one another in certain aspects of class action litigation,
including how classes are defined240 and issue requirements.241
As Currie informs us, the presence of a real and substantial
connection is important.242 This requirement is also expressed in the
United States in the Uniform Money Judgment Enforcement Act.243
Thus, the movement towards similar standards of personal jurisdiction
has the potential to increase the frequency of recognition of United
States class actions which include Canadian citizens.
To what extent the new definition of the real and substantial
connection standard will have on class actions is still unproven. More
specifically, how many of the members in a class will have to meet the
standards set forth in Van Breda?244 The direction of Canadian courts
is likely to lead to a requirement that only one of the class members
meets one of the presumptive Van Breda factors.245 This determination
finds support in the Canadian focus on common issues class
definition.246
However, this is the point at which a question arises regarding
whether class actions based in Canada will be enforced in the United
States since American courts define classes based on amount in
controversy requirements.247 The history of U.S. recognition of
Canadian judgments and the importance put on a minimum
contacts/real and substantial connection under the Uniform Act, along
240
The United States has a numerosity requirement for a class to be
created. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Canada only requires two persons to create a class. Class
Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C., c. 50, §§ 4(1), 7, 27 (1996); Class Proceedings Act 1992,
S.O., c. 6, §§ 5(1), 6, 25 (1992); see also Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v.
Dutton, [2001] SCC 46, at para. 37.
241
The United States has an amount in controversy requirement to certify
a class. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Canada requires that there be a common issue to certify a
class. See, e.g., B.C. Class Proceedings Act, Division 3, Part 3, s. 20(3)(a).
242
See Currie, [2005] [Can.] CanLII 3360 at paras. 11-2.
243
See Burke, supra note 229, at 51.
244
See David Paulson, Note, Canada Update: A New Framework for
Determining Jurisdiction, the Application of Forum Non Conveniens, and Limitations of the
Solicitor-Client Privilege, 18 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 411, 416-17 (2012).
245
See id. at 417.
246
See B.C. Class Proceedings Act s. 20(3)(a); see also Burke, supra note
226, at 49.
247
28 U.S.C. § 1332.
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with Justice Winkler’s recognition that “practical differences [between
U.S. and Canadian classes] are more apparent than real,” leads to the
belief that the new Van Breda factors are more likely to lead to greater
cross-border enforcement than detract from it.248
D.

What’s to Become of Us?: The Implications of Van Breda on
the U.S.-Canadian Trade Partnership

Finally, the implications of the Van Breda decision on comity
and trade between the two nations is of significant importance. Justice
LaForest noted the importance of movement of people, skills, and
wealth.249 In 2013 the U.S. exported 277,038.3 million dollars worth of
goods to Canada while importing 305,384.8 million dollars worth of
goods from Canada.250 The staggering amount of trade that these two
countries share illustrates the importance of the economic friendship
between these nations. While that partnership has been in existence
for decades and will likely continue for decades to come, what
underlies those numbers is the sheer amount of interaction that U.S.
and Canadian persons and companies have with one another. From
interaction, conflict arises. That conflict must be directed toward the
courts of either the U.S., Canada, or both. The increased efficiency that
the Van Breda decision provides may be miniscule or large. Only time
will tell. However, as Professor Black notes, to shrug off the minor
differences between the U.S. and Canadian courts regarding personal
jurisdiction would be a mistake.251 Those differences do not produce
much wake in the individual case, but in the aggregate the transaction
costs become much more significant.252 With a partnership as large as
that of the U.S. and Canada, the alignment of their personal jurisdiction
standards may have a positive effect on lessening those transaction
costs and thus trade costs.253

248
See Burke, supra note 229, at 51 (quoting Justice Winkler in regards to
the Nortel Networks litigation).
249
Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1096.
250
Trade in Goods with Canada, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c1220.html(last visited Jan. 26,
2014).
251
See Black, supra note 195, at 619.
252
See id. at 617, 624.
253
See id. at 617.
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CONCLUSION
The development of personal jurisdiction over ex juris
defendants has developed in the form of the minimum contacts test in
the United States, and the real and substantial connection standard in
Canada. Both tests value the importance of fairness and order.
The minimum contacts test has evolved into a test which
focuses on the connection between the defendant and the forum. It
was not until 2012 that Canada caught up. Prior to the Van Breda
decision, the real and substantial connection standard focused on the
plaintiff, defendant, and nature of the claim. Van Breda narrowed that
focus to the defendant and subject matter of a claim, further aligning
the U.S. and Canadian personal jurisdiction standards.
As a result, greater comity between the U.S. and Canada can
ensue. While as of late there has not been large amounts of friction
between these two countries, commentators have noted that even a
small amount of friction is worth addressing, because aggregate
transaction costs involved in a trade partnership as large as that the
U.S. and Canada have can be large.
Any steps toward streamlining transactions, in this case judicial
cooperation, comity, and judgment recognition, can help in reducing
those costs. Reduced transaction costs leads to more efficient trade
and a greater relationship between the U.S. and Canada.
Realistically, the impact of the Van Breda decision will likely be
relatively small in respect to the relationship between the U.S. and
Canada, but as Pink Floyd sang “[it’s] just another brick in the wall.”254

PINK FLOYD, Another Brick in the Wall Part 2, on THE WALL (Columbia
Records 1979).
254
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MAKING ENDS MEET: USING A MARKETBASED APPROACH TO INCENTIVIZE
FOREIGN VESSELS TO COMPLY WITH
THE AIR EMISSION STANDARDS OF
MARPOL ANNEX VI*
Xiaoxin Shi**
INTRODUCTION
Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) sets mandatory air emission
standards for ocean-going vessels. Ratifying countries are required to
enact legislation to implement MARPOL Annex VI (Annex VI)
within their jurisdictions. The United States adopted Annex VI
through the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS), 1
administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Two
The conclusions of this paper reflect the author’s findings between
late 2013 to early 2014, when the paper was completed. Since then, there have been
new developments in the Chinese policies and regulations on air emissions from
ships and vessels. The most significant development is the new Emission Control
Area (ECA) Implementation Plan, promulgated by the Chinese Ministry of
Transport on December 2, 2015 (http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/201512/04/content_5019932.htm). The Plan establishes three ECAs along China’s
coast. Beginning on January 1, 2016, ports within the three ECAs will start to
require ships to switch to 0.5% sulfur fuel while berthing. Starting on January 1,
2019, all ships will be required to switch to 0.5% sulfur fuel when operating in the
three ECAs. Before December 31, 2019, the Ministry of Transport plans to
evaluate the effectiveness of the fuel switching program and decide whether to
mandate all ships operate within the ECAs to switch to 0.1% sulfur fuel and
whether to extend the geographical scopes of the ECAs.
**
Master of Philosophy 2010, The Chinese University of Hong Kong;
J.D. 2015, The Pennsylvania State University School of Law.
1
The Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1915
(2008).
*
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Emission Control Areas (ECAs) have been established under Annex
VI in the U.S. territory.2 All vessels of United States registry or
nationality to which MARPOL applies, if found to have violated the
emission standards of ECAs within the U.S. territory, are subject to
criminal or in rem civil liabilities.3
The majority of the vessels calling at U.S. ports are registered
in foreign countries, many of which have not yet fully enforced
Annex VI through domestic legislation. 4 Employing judicial
proceedings as the primary instrument to enforce the compliance of
foreign flagged vessels, therefore, could be cumbersome and
expensive administratively, especially considering the large number of
calls at U.S. ports. This paper explores the perspectives of marketbased mechanisms, as supplements to judicial enforcement, to
incentivize the compliance of foreign flagged vessels when operating
in ECAs in the United States, and ultimately, to foster the
enforcement of Annex VI in all major destinies of international
shipping.
This paper first introduces the regulative scheme to enforce
MARPOL Annex VI standards on foreign ships operating in U.S.
waters in Section II. Technological alternatives to achieve compliance
and their constraints are also discussed, along with the review of
The North American Emission Control Area (ECA) was jointly
proposed by the United States, Canada, and France, approved by the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2010 and came into effect on August 1, 2012. See
Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], North American Emission Control Area, Res. MEPC.190(60)
(Mar. 26, 2010). The United States also proposed the United States Caribbean Sea
ECA, which was adopted by the IMO in 2011 and will take effect on January 1,
2014. See Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], Designation of the United States Caribbean Sea Emission
Control Area and Exemption of Certain Ships Operation in the North American Emission
Control Area and the United States Caribbean Sea Emission Control Area under Regulations
13 and 14 and Appendix VII of MARPOL Annex VI, Res. MEPC.202(62) (July 15,
2011).
3
33 U.S.C. § 1908.
4
See U.S. DEP’T of TRANSP., VESSEL CALLS SNAPSHOT, 2011 (2013).
In 2011, foreign-flagged vessels accounted for 89% of calls at U.S. ports. The
number of U.S.-flagged vessels calling at U.S. ports had a range of 6,869 to 7,356
between 2006 and 2011. Id. at 8; see also Sandra Y. Snyder, EPA’s Category 3 Marine
Emission Standards: Mimicking MARPOL Annex VI or Mocking the Clean Air Act? 71
BROOK. L. REV. 1065, 1089 (2005) (most vessels entering U.S. ports are foreign
vessels).
2
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relevant Annex VI provisions. Section III leads a comparison of
Annex VI regulative schemes in the United States and a major marine
trade partner, China. The comparison concludes that the United
States and U.S. shipping companies are likely to bear unfair burdens
administratively and financially in enforcing this multi-national
convention due to the uneven regulative landscape globally. Having
examined, from an economic perspective, the factors that could
affect the effectiveness of enforcement measures, Section III
recommends using incentive programs as an interim solution to
solicit wider voluntary compliance while foreign countries such as
China are yet to give effect to Annex VI through domestic legislation.
Finally, Section IV discusses the feasibility of two main types of
potential market-based incentive programs, cap-and-trade and
emission credit trading, to provide non-complying foreign ships a
“last offer” to avoid criminal penalties for violation of Annex VI
while operating in U.S. waters. This paper favors an emission credit
trading program, considering the increasing demand of international
shipping service, in general, and the need to synergize technological
developments in the ship building industry with the regulatory
requirements of Annex VI.
I.

ANNEX VI ENFORCEMENT SCHEME FOR FOREIGN FLAGGED
VESSELS CALLING AT U.S. PORTS

Foreign flagged vessels, just as U.S. flagged vessels, are
regulated under the APPS when they operate in U.S. waters. Vessels
have to use low-sulfur fuels, the quality and quantity of which are
documented in Bunker Delivery Notes, and provide engine
certificates to prove compliance with Annex VI standards. Civil or
criminal liabilities may be imposed for violations. The U.S. Coast
Guard, under an agreement with the EPA, has the authority to
undertake onboard inspections.
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MARPOL Annex VI and Its Adoption in the United States

MARPOL,5 as modified by Protocol of 1978,6 is the main
international convention to prevent marine environment pollution
from ocean-going vessels.7 Annex VI of MARPOL sets limits for
NOx,8 SOx,9 and particulate matter (PM)10 emissions from ocean5
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
Nov. 2, 1973, 1973 U.S.T. Lexis 322, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184 [hereinafter MARPOL
Annex VI].
6
Protocol of 1978, Feb. 17, 1978, 1978 U.S.T. Lexis 322, 1340
U.N.T.S. 61.
7
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL),
INT’L
MAR.
ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Internation
al-Convention-for-the-Prevention-of-Pollution-from-Ships-(MARPOL).aspx (last
visited Feb. 15, 2015).
8
NOx (Nitrogen Oxides) forms through the diesel engine combustion
process when the temperature reaches 2000 degrees Kelvin (equivalent to about
3140 Fahrenheit) and the nitrogen in the air reacts with oxygen. The amount of
NOx emission is not strongly affected by the specific fuel consumption, but is
dependent on the temperature, pressure, and duration of combustion time of the
engine fuel. Most nitrogen is oxidized into nitric oxide (NO) in the early stage of
combustion. Some of the NO will convert to nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and nitrous
oxide (N2O) during the later expansion process and in the exhaust. NO x is the
mixture of NO, NO2, and N2O. One way of measuring NOx emission is based on
the main engine’s rated speed, presented as revolutions per minute (rpm). See
LAURIE GOLDSWORTHY, DESIGN OF SHIP ENGINES FOR REDUCED EMISSIONS OF
OXIDES
OF
NITROGEN
§2
(2002),
available
at
http://www.flamemarine.com/files/AMCPaper.pdf. NOx emission is significantly
higher when an engine operates at lower rpm (50 to 550); Lasse Johansson,
Emission Estimation of Marine Traffic Using Vessel Characteristic and AIS-Data
19 (Sept. 19, 2011) (Master’s thesis, Aalto University), available at
www.lib.tkk.fi/Dipl/2011/ urn100529.pdf. NOx are precursor components for a
photochemical reaction through which ozone is formed, and catalysts for the
formation of acid rain. Id. at 5. Exposure to NOx, even if for a short term from 30
minutes to 24 hours, would adversely affect the human respiratory system,
including airway inflammation in healthy people and increased respiratory
symptoms in people with asthma. Nitrogen Dioxide, U.S. ENV’L PROT. AGENCY,
http://www. epa.gov/air/nitrogenoxides/health.html (last updated Feb. 14, 2013).
9
SOx is the mixture of SO2, SO3, and SO4. The amount of SOx
emission from vessels is directly related to the sulfur content of marine fuel burned.
See Johansson, supra note 8; Zoi Nikopoulou et al., The Role of A Cap-and-Trade
Market in Reducing NOx and SOx Emissions: Prospects and Benefits for Ships Within the
Northern European ECA, 227(2) J. ENG’G FOR THE MARINE ENV’T 136, 136 (2013).
Current world-wide average sulfur content in marine fuel is about 2.7% (27,000
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going vessels that are of 400 gross tonnages or more, and general
enforcement and monitoring procedures. 11 The International
Maritime Organization (IMO), a United Nations specialized agency
responsible for improving maritime safety and preventing pollution
from ships, administers the enforcement of Annex VI worldwide.12
Annex VI requires ratifying states to designate certain sea areas as
ECAs where “mandatory measures” are required to control the
emission of “NOx or SOx and [PM] or all three.” 13 These
“mandatory measures” include limiting the sulfur content of fuel oil
to reduce SOx and PM emissions through Regulation 14, 14 and
prescribing three “tiers” of design standards for marine diesel engines
ppm). DONALD DABDUB & SATISH VUTUKURU, AIR QUALITY IMPACTS OF SHIP
EMISSIONS IN THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN OF CALIFORNIA 2 (2008). SOx can
react with other compounds in the atmosphere to form small particles, which can
penetrate deeply into lungs and cause or worsen respiratory diseases. Sulfur Dioxide,
U.S.
ENV’L
PROT.
AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/sulfurdioxide/health.html (last updated June 28,
2013). The SOx particles usually spread up to a few hundred kilometers depending
on weather and wind conditions. In the presence of catalysts such as NO x, SOx can
form H2SO4 causing acid rain. Johansson, supra note 8.
10
PM (Particulate Matter), measured by PM2.5 (diameters of the
particulates are less than 2.5 μm) and PM10 (diameters of the particulates are less
than 10 μm), is produced during combustion in the form of soot, ash, organic and
elemental carbon, SO4 and its associated water molecules. The amount of PM
emission from vessels is linearly dependent on the sulfur content of the fuel oil. See
Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 136-37; Johansson, supra note 8. PM contains
microscopic solids and liquid droplets small enough to get into the lungs and cause
a range of health problems to the lungs, respiratory systems, and heart. Particulate
Matter,
U.S.
ENV’L
PROT.
AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/particlepollution/health.html (last updated Mar.
18, 2013).
11
See MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5.
12
See Introduction to IMO, ABOUT IMO, http://www.imo.org/
About/Pages/Default.aspx(last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
13
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 2, ¶ 8. Emissions of
NOx, SOx, and particulate matter from ocean-going vessels could cause adverse
impacts to the environment and public health, including premature mortality,
cardiopulmonary disease, lung cancer, chronic respiratory ailments, acidification
and eutrophication. Id., Appendix III Criteria and Procedures for Designation of
Emission Control Areas, ¶ 1.2.
14
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 14. In ECAs, upper
limits of the sulfur content of fuel oil used on board ships are 1.50% m/m before
July 1, 2010; 1.00% m/m on and after July 1, 2010; 0.10% m/m on and after Jan. 1,
2015. Id. ¶ 8.
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to control NOx emission through Regulation 13.15 Depending on
the vessel’s operational area and the time when the vessel engine is
installed, different levels of NOx emission standard apply: Tier I
standard applies to engines that are installed on a ship constructed
between 2000 and 2011;16 Tier II standard applies to engines that are
installed on ships constructed on or after January 2011, and if
operating outside ECAs, ships constructed on or after January 1,
2016;17 the most stringent Tier III standard applies to engines that
are installed on ships constructed on or after January 1, 2016 if such
ships operate in ECAs.18 Notably, at the 65th session meeting held in
May 2013, the IMO considered the proposal of delaying the
implementation of Tier III standards in ECAs until January 1, 2021.19
The IMO eventually made only a partial compromise. At the 66th
session meeting in 2014, the IMO decided to uphold the original
Considering the long service life of ocean-going vessels that may last
for decades, MARPOL Regulation 13 sets three “tiers” of NOx emission standards
for marine diesel engines that are installed on ships constructed between 2000 and
2011, after 2011, and after 2016. These emission limits are relative, presented in
formulas with the rated engine speed (rpm, revolutions per minute) as the variable.
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 13.
16
For engines that are installed on ships constructed on or after
January 1, 2000 and before January 1, 2011, Tier I standard applies: NO x emission
shall be under 17.0 g/kWh when the rated engine speed is less than 130 rpm; under
45×n(-0.2) with “n” being the rated engine speed is between 130 rpm and 2,000 rpm;
under 9.8 g/kWh when the rated engine speed is above 2,000. MARPOL Annex
VI, supra note 5, Regulation 13, ¶ 3.
17
For engines that are installed on ships constructed on or after
January 1, 2011, and ships constructed on or after January 2016 and operate outside
ECAs, Tier II standard applies: NOx emission shall be under 14.4 g/kWh when the
rated engine speed is less than 130 rpm; under 44×n(-0.23) with “n” being the rated
engine speed is between 130 rpm and 2,000 rpm; under 7.7 g/kWh when the rated
engine speed is above 2,000. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 13, ¶¶
4, 5.1.3.
18
Tier III standard applies to marine diesel engines that are installed
on ships constructed on or after Jan. 1, 2016 and operate within ECAs. NO x
emission from such ships shall be under 3.4 g/kWh when the rated engine speed is
less than 130 rpm; under 9×n(-0.2) with “n” being the rated engine speed is between
130 rpm and 2,000 rpm; under 2.0 g/kWh when the rated engine speed is above
2,000. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 13, ¶¶ 5.1.1, 5.1.2.
19
IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee 65th Session Pushes Forward
with Energy-Efficiency Implementation, INT’L MAR. ORG. NEWS BRIEFS (May 21, 2013),
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/18MEPC65ENDS.aspx.
15
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2016 deadline for Tier III NOx requirement for marine diesel engines
installed on new ships constructed on or after January 1, 2016, and
accept the proposed delay until 2021 for engines installed on large
yachts, viz. ships that are of less than 500 gross tonnage and 24
meters or more in length.20
Annex VI affords ratifying states with broad authority in
enforcement. But such authority is qualified when the violation is
caused by non-availability of low-sulfur fuels that are in compliance
with MARPOL standards. To ensure compliance by ships, regardless
of their country of registry, port states shall use “all appropriate and
practicable measures of detection and environmental monitoring,”
including inspection and bringing proceedings.21 Port states “shall
[also] take all reasonable steps” to provide low-sulfur fuel at ports
and terminals in their jurisdictions.22 If a ship furnishes evidence,
primarily through documentation, of good faith attempts to secure
compliant fuel yet no such fuel is available,23 the port state shall
consider “not taking control measures.”24 Importantly, Annex VI
explicitly provides that no deviation or delay of voyage should be
required in order to achieve compliance.25
The United States ratified Annex VI in 2008 26 and
implemented the mandatory air emission standards domestically
IMO, REPORT OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION
COMMITTEE ON ITS SIXTY-SIX SESSION MEPC 66/21, 36 (2014), available at
http://www.uscg.mil/imo/mepc/docs/MEPC66-report.pdf.
21
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 11, ¶¶ 1, 2, 4.
22
Id. Regulation 18, ¶ 1.
23
Id. ¶¶ 2.11, 2.12.
24
Id. ¶¶ 2.3, 2.5.
25
Id. ¶ 2.2.
26
Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments
in Respect of Which the International Maritime Organization or Its Secretary-General Performs
Depositary
or
Other
Functions
(2015),
available
at
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/
StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20-%202015.pdf.
Seventy
five
countries have ratified MARPOL Annex VI. Status of Conventions, INT’L MAR. ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/
About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx
(accessed by
clicking on the “excel chart listing ratifications by State”). Ratifying parties “shall
co-operate” in enforcement of the provisions of this Annex. MARPOL Annex VI,
supra note 5, Regulation 11, §1.
20
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through amendments made in 2008 to the APPS27 and the Clean Air
Act.28 Currently, two ECAs have been established covering virtually
all U.S. coastlines. The North American ECA came into force on
August 1, 2012, extending up to 200 nautical miles from the Pacific
coast, the Atlantic coast, the Gulf coast, and the eight Hawaiian
Islands.29 The United States Caribbean Sea ECA, covering coastal
waters around Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, was approved
by the IMO in 2011 and became enforceable starting January 1,
2014.30 Emissions of SOx, NOx, and PM are all regulated in both
ECAs.
B.

Enforcement Measures of MARPOL Annex VI on Foreign
Flagged Vessels Operating in U.S. Waters

MARPOL Annex VI affords no differentiated treatment of
foreign flagged vessels and U.S. flagged vessels. 31 The APPS
provides that Annex VI applies to all foreign flagged vessels “in” or
bound for “a port, shipyard, offshore terminal, or the internal waters
of the United States.”32

33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1915.
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (2006).
29
IMO, North American Emission Control Area, Resolution MEPC.
190(60) (Mar. 26, 2010); OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION AND AIR QUALITY, U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA-420-F-10-015, DESIGNATION OF
NORTH AMERICAN EMISSION CONTROL AREA TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM
SHIPS
(2010),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/
otaq/regs/nonroad/marine/ci/420f10015.pdf.
30
IMO, Designation of the United States Caribbean Sea Emission Control
Area and Exemption of Certain Ships Operation in the North American Emission Control
Area and the United States Caribbean Sea Emission Control Area under Regulations 13 and
14 and Appendix VII of MARPOL Annex VI, Resolution MEPC.202(62) (July 15,
2011); OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION AND AIR QUALITY, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA-420-F-11-024, DESIGNATION OF EMISSION
CONTROL AREA TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM SHIPS IN THE U.S. CARIBBEAN
(2011)
31
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships (MARPOL), Art. 5(4) (with respect to the ship of non-parties to the
convention, parties shall apply the requirements of the present convention as may
be necessary to ensure that no more favorable treatment is given to such ships).
32
33 U.S.C. § 1902 (5)(A), (B).
27
28
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Civil penalties would be imposed for failure to provide
documentation to prove compliance with Annex VI and each day of
non-compliance would be considered a separate violation.33 For noncompliant vessels, the U.S. EPA requires a corrective action plan
signed by the ship owner or operator, and would report the noncompliance to the ship’s country of registry.34 A class D felony is
committed if a ship owner or operator “knowingly violates” Annex
VI.35 Up to one half of the criminal fines may be paid to the “person
giving information leading to conviction.”36 The U.S. Coast Guard is
responsible for conducting ship inspections to verify compliance and
investigations to establish criminal liability.37
1. Enforcement of Regulation 14 for SOx and PM emissions. - To
comply with Regulation 14, ships must use low-sulfur fuel, 38 be
eligible for exemptions,39 or use “equivalents.”40 Because the price

33 U.S.C. § 1908 (2008); OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL VESSEL
COMPLIANCE (CG-CVC), U.S. COAST GUARD, ECA JOB AID: DOMESTIC &
FOREIGN VESSELS (2012).
34
OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL VESSEL COMPLIANCE (CG-CVC), U.S.
COAST GUARD, ECA JOB AID: DOMESTIC & FOREIGN VESSELS (2012).
35
33 U.S.C. § 1908, (a) (2008).
36
Id.
37
Memorandum of Understanding Between United States Coast
Guard and United States Environmental Protection Agency Regarding
Enforcement of Annex VI as Implemented by the Act to Prevent Pollution from
Ships, June 27, 2011, available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/documents/annexvi-mou062711.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
38
Regulation 14 of Annex VI specifies that ships operating within an
Emission Control Area shall use fuel oil with sulfur content lower than 1.00%
m/m on and after July 1, 2010, and lower than 0.10% m/m/ on and after January
1, 2015. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 14, ¶ 4. The term “lowsulfur fuel” in this paper is used broadly to include low-sulfur residual fuel, marine
diesel oil, and marine gas oil. See Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 141.
39
Regulation 3 of Annex VI provides that ships on trial for emission
control technology research could be exempted from certain Annex VI provisions
if compliance would impede the technology development. MARPOL Annex VI,
supra note 5, Regulation 3, ¶ 2. See, e.g., Anna Lee Deal, Liquefied Natural Gas as a
Marine Fuel: A closer look at TOTE’s Containership Projects 12 (Nat’l Energy Policy Inst.
Working
Paper,
May
7,
2013),
available
at
http://www.glmri.org/downloads/lngMisc/NEPI%20LNG%20as%20a%20Marin
e%20Fuel%205-7-13.pdf (TOTE obtained a waiver from the EPA and Coast
Guard allowing the company to operate its ships using distillate fuels above
33
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of low-sulfur fuels is much higher than that of standard fuels,41 a
common practice to achieve compliance without splurging on cleaner
fuel is to flush the fuel piping systems and fill the settling tanks with
low-sulfur fuel only when approaching an ECA.42 But fuel switching
is less straightforward than it seems. Changing fuels when the fuel
temperature is still very high causes loss of engine power.43 Hence,
vessels need to slow down when switching fuels to avoid
malfunction.44 Additionally, because the low viscosity of low-sulfur
fuel45 and the incompatibility of fuels46 when mixed harms diesel

regulative limit within the ECA during the conversion of these ships to liquefied
natural gas so as to provide savings for the expensive environmental project).
40
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 4, ¶ 1.
41
See THEO NOTTEBOOM ET AL., ANALYSIS OF THE CONSEQUENCES
OF LOW SULFUR FUEL REQUIREMENTS 16 (2010), available at www.schone
scheepvaart.nl/downloads/rapporten/doc_1361790123.pdf.
42
See DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), MARPOL 73/78 ANNEX VI
REGULATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF AIR POLLUTION FROM SHIPS:
TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 17 (2009), available at
www.dnv.com/binaries/marpol%20brochure_tcm4-383718.pdf; Chengfeng Wang
et al., Cost-Effectiveness of Reducing Sulfur Emissions from Ships, 41 (24) ENV’T SCI.
TECH. 8233, 8234 (2007), available at http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/
10.1021/es070812w (switching from high-sulfur marine fuels with a sulfur content
of 2.7%, the worldwide average, to low-sulfur marine fuels with sulfur content not
exceeding 1.5% can reduce about 44% of SO2 emissions).
43
DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 42.
44
AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, FUEL SWITCHING ADVISORY
NOTICE
17
(2010),
available
at
http://www.eagle.org/eagleExternal
PortalWEB/ShowProperty/BEA%20Repository/References/ABS%20Advisories/
FuelSwitchingAdvisory (operational manual for fuel switching and training for staff
is necessary).
45
Main operational problems caused by the low viscosity of low-sulfur
fuel are the reduced effectiveness of the fuel as a lubricant, loss of capacity in fuel
supply and circulation pumps, and increased chances of leakage of fuel through the
fuel pump barrel and plunger, and suction and spill valve push rods, and less energy
generated per volume of fuel. AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, FUEL SWITCHING
ADVISORY NOTICE 9, 10(2010).
46
Incompatibility between different fuels would result in excessive
sedimentation, sludging, and separator and filter problems. Hence, an additional set
of fuel supply systems may be necessary. DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note
42.
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engines and boilers, modifications to the fuel system are often
necessary.47
Annex VI encourages technological innovation by affording
flexibilities in achieving compliance. Under Regulation 4, port states
can allow “any fitting, material, appliance or apparatus . . . or other
procedures, alternative fuel oils, or compliance methods” so long as
such alternatives are as effective in terms of emission reductions as
the measures provided by Annex VI.48 If obtaining low-sulfur fuel is
difficult, installing desulfurization units to achieve compliance is also
technically feasible and permissible under MARPOL Annex VI. 49
But the high cost of such exhaust gas cleaning systems make this
alternative unattractive.50 Even if the cost of a desulfurization unit
itself is justified, its installment would probably require re-designing
the fuel system due to the limited space in the engine room, and
therefore lead to additional investments in vessel retrofitting. 51
Another rapidly developing technology,52 because of the heightened
environmental standards driven by MARPOL Annex VI, is using
47
See AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, FUEL SWITCHING ADVISORY
NOTICE 11-14 (2010) (modifications that may be needed include installing
separate purifier and piping system for the low-sulfur fuels, additional fuel coolers
if the vessel operates in summer and tropical conditions, special fuel injection
pumps); DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 42 (ship owners may consider
upgrading the capacity of diesel tanks, or installing an additional set of service
and settling tanks for low sulfur fuels).
48
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 4, ¶ 1.
49
AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, FUEL SWITCHING ADVISORY
NOTICE 7 (2010); DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), MARPOL 73/78 ANNEX VI
REGULATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF AIR POLLUTION FROM SHIPS:
TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 16 (2009) (exhaust gas cleaning
alternatives will also reduce PM emissions); see Chengfeng Wang et al., supra note
42, at 8234.
50
DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 49 (further technological
developments or legislation are needed to lower the installation costs of a
desulfurization unit, which is about $1 million (USD) to $2 million (USD), to make
this alternative cost-beneficial).
51
See AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, FUEL SWITCHING ADVISORY
NOTICE 12 (2010); DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 49, at 17-18.
52
See, e.g., Bridget C. Brett, Potential Market for LNG-Fueled Marine
Vessels in the United States 34 (June 2008) (Master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/44920#files-area
(the four main manufactures who have the technology for LNG-fueled vessels are
Rolls-Royce, GE, Wärtsilä, and MAN Diesel).
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Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) as a marine fuel. 53 The costeffectiveness of conversion to LNG varies from vessel to vessel, and
is affected, primarily, by three factors: (1) the amount of time the
vessel operates in an ECA; (2) LNG tanker size relative to the vessel
size; and (3) LNG fuel availability.54
However, Regulation 4 leaves the gap of identifying
“equivalents,” i.e., alternative compliant measures, to the port states
to fill in through bilateral negotiations. Currently, the United States
requires foreign port states to submit to the U.S. Coast Guard
proposals of equivalents for compliance. 55 The United States is
seeking IMO’s coordination in identifying equivalents56 to minimize
the need for enforcement actions if the U.S. Government disagrees
with the equivalents approved by other port states.57 Absent IMO’s
Natural gas is a type of fossil fuel consisting mainly of methane
(CH4). Id. Gaseous Natural gas transforms into liquid, called Liquefied Natural Gas
(LNG), when the natural gas is cooled to -162 Celsius degrees. LNG creates the
economics of scale by saving 99% of the space that natural gas with the same
energy content in gaseous form would take. Id. at 15-16. NLG is considered the
cleanest form of fuel because it contains no sulfur and thus all SO x emissions and
most PM emissions are eliminated. Because LNG burns at lower temperatures than
standard fuels, NOx emissions are also reduced significantly. Johansson, supra note
8. The use of LNG as marine fuel became economically attractive when natural gas
became cheaper than residual oil in early 2006. Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at
143. But the cost of LNG-fueled systems is generally 12% higher than the capital
investment for a standard diesel engine. Bridget C. Brett, supra note 52, at 57.
54
Anna Lee Deal, supra note 39, at 12 (LNG facilities are being
planned for Cameron Parish and Port Fourchon in Los Angeles, along the
Mississippi River, and in the Great Lakes region).
55
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 16711/CG-CVC Policy Letter,
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE EMISSION CONTROL
AREAS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE UNITED STATES JURISDICTION AS DESIGNATED
IN MARPOL ANNEX VI REGULATION 14 (2012), § 5b(ii).
56
See Letter from Jeffrey G. Lantz, Dir., Commercial Regulations and
Standards, U.S. Coast Guard, and Margo Tsirigotis Oge, Dir., Office of Transp.
and Air Quality, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Koji Sekimizu, Secretary-General of
Int’l
Mar.
Org.
(Mar.
12,
2012),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/nonroad/marine/ci/letter-epa-and-uscg-toimo.pdf.
57
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 16711/CG-CVC Policy Letter,
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE EMISSION CONTROL
AREAS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE UNITED STATES JURISDICTION AS DESIGNATED
IN MARPOL ANNEX VI REGULATION 14 (2012), § 5b(ii).
53
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intervention, countries such as the United States, which are enforcing
Annex VI in advance of the other countries, might have to act as the
de facto global administrator of Annex VI.
The Bunker Delivery Note, where the quality and quantity of
fuel oil supplied to vessels for combustion purposes is documented,58
serves as the main evidentiary source for verifying compliance with
Regulation 14. If the sulfur content of fuel oil exceeds Annex VI
limits, 59 and no exemption or equivalents apply, the ship owner
should provide documentation to prove that best efforts were made
to procure compliant fuel oil and notify the EPA of the nonavailability of such fuel oil before entering the ECA. 60 Taking
together the regulative requirements and available technologies,
owners of ships registered in countries where Annex VI is not fully
enforced or no equivalents under Regulation 4 are formally
established would probably have no choice but to change voyage
plans, with the hope61 of avoiding criminal charges in the United
States.
2. Enforcement of Regulation 13 for NOx emissions. - The
reduction of NOx emissions is a function of multiple factors,
including: engine design, engine age, fuel type, operational mode,
energy efficiency,62 and any add-on emission reduction equipment.63
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 18, ¶ 6.
Id. Regulation 14, ¶ 4.
60
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTERIM GUIDANCE ON THE NONAVAILABILITY OF COMPLIANT FUEL OIL FOR THE NORTH AMERICAN EMISSION
CONTROL AREA (2012), 3-4; OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL VESSEL COMPLIANCE (CGCVC), U.S. COAST GUARD, ECA JOB AID: DOMESTIC & FOREIGN VESSELS (2012),
§ 3.
61
Evidence of good-faith attempt to secure low-sulfur fuel as required
by Annex VI is only relevant in EPA’s determination of the appropriate
administrative actions, but does not necessarily remove the possibility of finding
criminal liability. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 60, at 4-5.
62
NOx emission is actually a side effect of engine designs that aim to
enhance energy efficiency by maximizing the completeness of fuel combustion, i.e.,
increasing the pressure and temperature of combustion process. PER KÅGESON,
MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENTS FOR NOX ABATEMENT IN THE BALTIC SEA 10
(2009),
available
at
http://www.cleanshipping.org/download/2009_11_nox_report_baltic_sea.pdf
(Air Pollution and Climate Series 24, the European Environmental Bureau and the
European Federation for Transport and Environment).
58
59
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To a certain extent, the level of compliance with the NOx emission
standards of Annex VI reflects the sophistication of technological
research and development in the shipbuilding industry. 64 The
See DAVID COOPER & TOMAS GUSTAFSSON, METHODOLOGY FOR
CALCULATING EMISSIONS FROM SHIPS: 1. UPDATE OF EMISSION FACTORS 13-15
(2004). The technical issues involved in restricting engine design to minimize air
emissions are complex not only because the engine design has to fit various ship
configurations but also because of safety concerns as ships must be able to depend
on their sources of power in tough weather conditions and navigational hazards. See
generally Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], Supplementary Information to the Final Report of the
Correspondence Group on Assessment of Technological Developments to Implement the Tier III
NOx Emission Standards under MARPOL Annex VI, MEPC 65/INF. 10 (Feb. 8,
2013) (countries including the United States, Finland, Japan, Germany, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom reviewing technology developments to achieve Tier III
standards for NOx emission that is to be in force in 2016).
64
Several technically feasible means exist to achieve the relative
standards for NOx emission under Annex VI. For low-speed two-stroke engines,
compliance can be achieved through replacing conventional fuel valves by lowNOx slide valves. For other engines, compliance is achieved through more complex
engine modifications, including miller cycling, which achieves a lower temperature
in the combustion chamber without a loss in power output; direct water injection,
which rebuilds the engine to enable fresh water being sprayed into the combustion
air to remove NOx from the exhaust gas; exhaust gas recirculation, where exhaust
gases are filtered, cooled, and redirected into the engine to reduce the combustion
temperature; selective catalytic reduction, a commercialized catalytic exhaust
treatment system that is applicable to both new vessels and retrofit installations;
humid air motor, which prevents NOx formation during combustion by adding
water vapor to the engine’s combustion air; and low-NOx engines, which employs
techniques to control fuel injection, spray formation, and fuel-air mixture to reduce
temperature throughout the combustion process. See KÅGESON, supra note 62, at
10-13 (Air Pollution and Climate Series 24, the European Environmental Bureau
and the European Federation for Transport and Environment); Seita Akimoto et
al., Techniques for Low NOx Combustion on Medium Speed Diesel Engine, 2(1) BULLETIN
OF
THE
MECH. ENG’G SCIENTIFIC J., 8 (2000), available at
http://www.jime.jp/e/publication/ bulletin/english/pdf/mv28n012000p08.pdf;
KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 10 (Air Pollution and Climate Series 24, the European
Environmental Bureau and the European Federation for Transport and
Environment). Tier I and II standards of Annex VI, Regulation 13 are achievable
with relatively simple engine modifications. See Johansson, supra note 8, at 20 (some
engine manufactures have already been producing Tier II compliant engines for the
last decade). The international shipbuilding industry is more concerned with the
compliance with the Tier III standards. See Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], Supplementary
Information to the Final Report of the Correspondence Group on Assessment of Technological
Developments to Implement the Tier III NOx Emission Standards under MARPOL Annex
VI, MEPC 65/INF. 10 (Feb. 8, 2013). Currently, only three technologies could
63
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primary evidentiary source for verifying compliance is the
International Air Pollution Prevention Certificate,65 which should be
issued to individual engines based on emission tests on the engine
manufacturer’s test bed. 66 Therefore, although ship owners or
operators seem to be the directly affected parties, the underlying
rationale of Regulation 13 is to urge manufacturers to design vessels
that meet higher emission standards by creating market demand from
the ship owners and operators.
In 2010, the EPA published a rule to regulate NOx emissions
from new Category 3 engines with the same level of stringency as
Annex VI, Regulation 13.67 The EPA rule applies to Category 3
engines installed on U.S. vessels only.68 The regulated parties are
mainly the manufacturers of Category 3 marine diesel engines, 69
most of which are incorporated in Finland, Germany, and Japan.70
The U.S. vessel manufacturing industry is affected only to the extent
that domestic vessel manufacturers have to adapt vessel designs and
manufacturing processes to the new engine designs.71

meet Tier III standards: selective catalytic reduction, humid air motor, and liquefied
natural gas engine. Jerzy Herdzik, Emissions from Marine Engines Versus IMO
Certification and Requirements of Tier 3, 18 J. KONES POWERTRAIN & TRANS. 161,
165-66 (2011) (IMO’s Tier III standards would require sharp increase in the
development of new control systems adapted to the operation of compliant marine
engines).
65
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 1, ¶ 1; MARPOL
Regulation 13, ¶ 7.3; MARPOL Appendix I, Form of International Air Pollution
Prevention (IAPP) Certificate (Regulation 8).
66
DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 49, at 9 (later onboard
verification procedures are initially decided by the engine manufacturer).
67
Category 3 engines refer to compression-ignition engines at or
above 30 liters per cylinder. See 40 C.F.R. § 94, 1042 (2010).
68
40 C.F.R. § 94.1 (b)(2). See also Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d
404, 412-13 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (upholding the EPA’s decision not to regulate
Category 3 on foreign-flagged vessels because of particular deference to agency
decision under the Clean Air Act).
69
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS:
CONTROL OF EMISSION OF AIR POLLUTION FROM CATEGORY 3 MARINE DIESEL
ENGINES (2009), pt. 1 at 5-6, pt. 8 at 3.
70
Id.
71
Id.
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For foreign vessels, the NOx emissions are instead controlled
directly through implementing ECAs.72 Hence, the compliance of
foreign vessels with NOx emission standards relies largely on whether
their countries of registry have given effect to Annex VI through
legislation. The U.S. EPA plays only a secondary role in the sense
that it has no direct control over the upstream regulatory necessities,
viz., engine designs of the vessels that are registered and
manufactured in foreign countries. As such, an “administrative
vacuum” exists in enforcing Regulation 13 on foreign vessels.73
II.

CHALLENGES OF ENFORCING ANNEX VI: AN UNEVEN
GLOBAL REGULATIVE LANDSCAPE

In the United States, APPS sets a rather low threshold for
finding criminal liability, risking the efficiency and economy of the
administrative enforcement process. In most foreign countries that
are major maritime trading partners with the United States, however,
Annex VI has not been fully enforced. The disparity between the
compliance environments at calling ports in different countries needs
to be addressed to minimize the enforcement cost borne by the
United States in implementing Annex VI.
A.

“Knowing Violation” as the Legal Threshold for Finding
Criminal Liability

The owner or other parties involved in a non-compliant
foreign flagged vessel who “knowingly violates” MARPOL would be
criminally charged. 74 But APPS provides no other language to
substantiate the threshold of “knowing violation.” The EPA
guidelines indicate indirectly that criminal liability could be found if
the ship has previously reported non-availability of compliant fuel oil,
or if insufficient quantity of compliant fuel oil is obtained at U.S.
ports even though the ship operator knows that the vessel will return

40 C.F.R., Summary III, A.
See generally Snyder, supra note 4, at 1072-80 (criticizing EPA’s
Category 3 rule as inadequate for not extending to foreign vessels).
74
33 U.S.C. § 1908 (a) (2008).
72

73
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to the ECA and complaint fuel oil is unavailable outside the ECA. 75
The EPA also refuses to consider the cost of compliant fuel oil as a
relevant factor to establish “unavailability.”76
Recent cases regarding enforcement of MARPOL on foreign
vessels indicate that federal courts are unlikely to limit finding
criminal liability, especially when the violation is caused by an
affirmative action, as opposed to omissions. In United States v. Pena,
the court confirmed the conviction of a surveyor of an institute
organized in Florida for failing to conduct the required survey under
MARPOL Annex I of a Panamanian-flagged vessel. 77 The court
found “knowing violation” was established when the non-compliant
performance of the ship had been in place for months and the
defendant surveyor did not test the parts of the ship that he knew
were not functional.78
MARPOL Annex I was enforced in a more aggressive
manner in United States v. Sanford Ltd. 79 Defendant Sanford is a
fishing company incorporated in New Zealand and transports cargo
to U.S ports on a regular basis. Sanford was charged, inter alia, for not
recording discharges of oily bilge water in the vessel’s Oil Record
Book (ORB), even though such omission occurred in the high seas
before entering U.S. water and would not necessarily result in
criminal liability under the MARPOL enforcement regulations in
New Zealand.80 The court upheld the conviction on two grounds.
First, although finding APPS does not intend to apply
extraterritorially, the court reasoned that the triggering point of the
violation is “at the moment a vessel enters a U.S. port with an
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTERIM GUIDANCE ON THE
NON-AVAILABILITY OF COMPLIANT FUEL OIL FOR THE NORTH AMERICAN
EMISSION CONTROL AREA (2012), at 8.
76
Id. at 5.
77
United States v. Pena, 684 F.3d 1137, 1143-44 (11th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 573 (2013) (upholding U.S. jurisdiction over foreign
flagged vessels).
78
Pena, 684 F.3d, 1152-53.
79
United States v. Sanford Ltd., 880 F. Supp. 2d 9, 11 (D.C. 2012)
(finding that the law-of-the-flag doctrine does not bar the U.S. Government from
prosecuting defendants for their violations of MARPOL implemented by the Act
to Prevent Pollution from Ships).
80
Id. at 12.
75
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inaccurate ORB” rather than when the omission occurred.81 Second,
the court held that the defense of being subjected unfairly to the
peculiar rules of a foreign sovereign does not prevail when the U.S.
and foreign regulations for implementing MARPOL are “on their
face . . . functionally identical.”82 However, the court narrowed this
holding to cases where the regulations of the United States and the
foreign country are unlikely to be in conflict.83 The court noted
implicitly that a “balancing of the delicate and important interests of
comity and sovereignty” might be needed in some cases.84
In a similar case, United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A.,85 defendant
Ionia, incorporated in Liberia and headquartered in Greece, was
convicted for making false entries in the ORB to conceal illegal
discharges of oily wastewater and obstructing a federal investigation.
The court upheld the order of forty-eight months of probation, a
corrective ship management plan, and a fine of $4.9 million (USD).86
The court held that the amount of the criminal fine, although not
calculated based on the sentencing guidelines, was nevertheless
reasonable given the culpability of the violation.87 The sentencing
was enforced through several hearings during the subsequent three
years.88
B.

Enforcement of Annex VI Outside the United States: China
as an Example

Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 21-23 (finding the discrepancies as to the interpretation of
“machinery space” insufficient to support a finding of material difference between
the U.S. and New Zealand regulations).
83
Sanford Ltd., 880 F. Supp. 2d, 22.
84
Id.
85
United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d 303, 305 (2d Cir. 2009).
86
Id. at 310.
87
Id.
88
See United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-CR-134 (JBA), 2011
WL 5304117 (D. Conn. Nov. 1, 2011); United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07CR-134 (JBA), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126089 (D. Conn. Oct. 28, 2011); United
States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-CR-134 (JBA), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87122
(D. Conn. Aug. 3, 2011); United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-CR-134
(JBA), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12996 (C. Conn. Feb. 9, 2011); United States v. Ionia
Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-CR-134 (JBA), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109063 (D. Conn.
Oct. 11, 2010); United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-CR-134(JBA), 2009
WL 3074727 (D. Conn. Sept. 22, 2009).
81
82
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The benefits of implementing Annex VI will be fully realized
only when both U.S. and foreign vessels actually operate under the
same environmental standards.89 Not all countries, however, perceive
air emissions from marine vessels as a significant pollution source as
the United States does.90 A review of regulations and policies on air
pollution control in China, an example of one of the largest
waterborne trading partners with the United States, 91 shows that
such foreign countries are unlikely to enact legislation in the near
term to implement Annex VI as stringently as the United States.
China has not enacted particular laws or regulations to
implement Annex VI,92 and will not do so, at least, until after 2015.
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 69, pt. 6 at 1.
Although the prioritization of sectors targeted in a country’s air
pollution control strategy is not always “objective,” numbers do found a persuasive
basis. In the United States, the transport sector contributes to about 54% of total
NOx emissions. ANDREW AULISI ET AL., GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING
IN U.S. STATES: OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS FROM THE OZONE TRANSPORT
COMMISSION (OTC) NOX BUDGET PROGRAM 3 (Margaret B. Yamashita ed., World
Resources Institute, 2005), available at http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/pdf/
nox_ghg.pdf (estimation based on inventory data released in EPA reports
reviewing the performance of OTC NOx Budget Program); see also The 2011
National Emissions Inventory, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (last updated on Dec. 24,
2013), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/net/2011 inventory.html (emission sources
from transport sector contributes about 62% to the total NO x emissions from fuel
combustion, gas stations, industrial processes, and road and non-road mobile
sources). In other countries, the transport sector may contribute less to the total air
pollutant emission by percentage than that in the United States due to the
differences in industrial structure. In China, for example, the transport sector
contributes only about 9% to the total NOx emissions in 2005. J. Xing et al.,
Projections of Air Pollutant Emissions and Its Impacts on Regional Air Quality in China in
2020, 11 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY AND PHYSICS 3119, 3129 (2011), available at
http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/11/3119/2011/acp-11-3119-2011.html.
The
major source of NOx emissions is instead power plants. Id. at 3128.
91
The waterborne container trade between China and the United
States was at 29,477,025 TEUs in 2012. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., U.S. Waterborne
Foreign Container Trade by Trading Partners (Sept 26, 2013), http://www.
marad.dot.gov/library_landing_page/data_and_statistics/Data_and_Statistics.htm
(last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
92
China ratified MARPOL Annex VI in 2010. Status of Conventions,
INT’L
MAR.
ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/About/
Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx (last updated Sept. 30,
2012). Ratifying parties “shall co-operate” in enforcement the provisions of this
Annex. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 11, ¶1.
89
90
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Only a set of quasi-regulative rules promulgated by the Ministry of
Transport in 2010 requires that ships should hold certificates issued
by the Marine Administration in accordance with international
treaties that the Chinese government entered into or ratified. 93
However, this 2010 rule does not make reference to MARPOL
Annex VI or specify what certificates the ships should hold. 94
Provisions of the 2010 rule are so generally stated that its on-theground enforcement cannot be realized until the adoption of more
specific regulations or plans.95
Moreover, the approach employed by Chinese policies is
rather different from the MARPOL approach to control air emission
from waterborne transport. Once the numbers of national emission
caps and energy saving objectives are established96 for every five-year
planning period, 97 the air pollution control policies for different
sectors and sub-sectors are essentially allocations of the national
goal.98 Hence, air emissions from the marine transport sector are
Zhonghua renming gongheguo chuanbo jiqi youguan zuoye
huodong wuran haiyang huanjing fangzhi guanli guiding (中华人民共和国船舶及
其有关作业活动污染海洋环境防治管理规定) [Management Provisions on
Preventing Pollution of Marine Environment from Ships and Related Activities of
the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Ministry of Transport, Oct. 8,
2010, effective Feb. 1, 2011), art. 1, 5, http://www.gov.cn/flfg/201012/02/content _1758149.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
94
Id.
95
See Nengye Liu & Frank Maes, Prevention of Vessel-Source Marine
Pollution: A Note on the Challenges and Prospects for Chinese Practice under International Law,
42 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L LAW 356, 358-59 (2011), available at
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00908320.2011.619373
.Usf9sRr8U5s.
96
See Guowuyuan guanyu yingfa shi’erwu jieneng jianpai zonghexing
gongzuo fang’an de tongzhi (国务院关于印发”十二五”节能减排综合性工作方
案的通知) [State Council’s Notification on Promulgating the Integrated Work Plan
for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction for the Twelfth Five Year]
(promulgated by the State Council Aug. 31, 2011, No. 26), available at
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-09/07/content_1941731.htm.
97
See The First Ten Five-Year Plans of the People’s Republic of China, THE
CENTRAL PEOPLE’S GOV’T OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Mar. 20, 2006),
http://www.gov.cn/test/ 2006-03/20/content_231421.htm.
98
See Andrew C. Mertha, China’s “Soft” Centralization: Shipfting
Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations, 184 CHINA QUARTERLY 791, 796-800 (2005), available
at http://falcon.arts. cornell.edu/am847/pdf/Soft%20Centralization%20Final.pdf;
see also Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development,
93
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regulated based on the total amount of emissions for specified
pollutants and reduction in energy consumption, rather than
prescribing standards for marine fuels and diesel engines as
MARPOL Annex VI does.99 Currently, China is in the twelfth fiveyear planning period, which runs from 2011 until 2015. 100 The
Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction,
one of the master national policies for this planning period, sets a
target of reducing energy consumption of vessels for marine and
inland waterway transportation by 10% to 6.29 kilograms of coal
equivalent per ton of goods per 1,000 kilometers by 2015.101

49(4) J. ECON. LITERATURE 1076, 1082-84, 1086-92 (2011), available at
www.sef.hku.hk/~cgxu/04_Xu.pdf (the functioning of Chinese government is not
a mixture of de facto federal state and a centralized regime: regional
decentralization exists as to economic governance, while other political and policy
decision-making processes follows closer to an authoritarian regime).
99
See Jiakuai tuijin luse xunhuan ditan jiaotong yunshu fazhan zhidao
yijian (加快推进绿色循环低碳交通运输发展指导意见) [Guiding Principles on
Promoting Green Low-Carbon Transport Development] (promulgated by the
Ministry of Transport, No. 323, May 22, 2013) (“Guiding principles (zhidao yijian)” are
less rigid policies than “Opinions (yijian).”), available at Ministry of Transport website:
http://www.moc.gov.cn/2006/jiaotongjj/07jiaotjnw/wenjiangg/201305/t2013052
7_1417741.html;(2013年运输行业节能减排工作要点) [Key Tasks for Energy
Saving and Emission Reduction in 2013 in Transport Sector] (promulgated by the
Ministry of Transport, No. 37, Jan. 10, 2013), available at
http://www.moc.gov.cn/2006/jiaotongjj/
07jiaotjnw/wenjiangg/201301/t20130118_1356606.html; Gonglu shuilu jiaotong
yunshu jieneng jianpai shi’erwu guihua (公路水路交通运输节能减排”十二五”规
划) [The Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction in
Road and Water Transportation] (promulgated by the Ministry of Transport, July 8,
2011),
available
at
http://www.moc.gov.cn/zhuzhan/zhengcejiedu/guihuajiedu/shierwuguihuaJD/xi
angguanzhengcefagui/201110/t20111010_1064457.html.
100
See Guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shierge wunian guihua
gangyao (国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要) [The Outline of the
Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Social and Economic Development] (promulgated by
the State Council, Mar. 16, 2011), available at http://www.gov.cn/
2011lh/content_1825838_2.htm.
101
Jieneng jianpai shi’erwu guihua (节能减排”十二五”规划) [The
Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction] (promulgated
by the State Council, No. 40, Aug. 6, 2012), Table 1, available at
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2012/content_2217291.htm (last visited
Oct. 22, 2013).
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Subsequently, the Ministry of Transport (MoT) announced in
the sector’s leading policy102 that building green ports would be a
major task during the twelfth five-year planning period. This “green
port” policy trickles down to retrofitting port infrastructures to use
alternative powers in place of diesel fuel, including upgrading rubbertired gantry to use electricity instead of fuel,103 scaling up the use of
shorepower and solar power at ports, and establishing automatic
management systems to monitor energy consumption on vessels.104
Government funding for such projects generally shall be no more
than ¥10 million (RMB), according to the Temporary Management
Measures for Special Funding for Energy Saving and Emission
Reduction Projects in the Transport Sector issued jointly by the
MOT and the Ministry of Finance.105

Gonglu shuilu jiaotong yunshu jieneng jianpai shi’erwu guihua (公
路水路交通运输节能减排”十二五”规划) [The Twelfth Five-Year Plan for
Energy Saving and Emission Reduction in Road and Water Transportation]
(promulgated by the Ministry of Transport, July 8, 2011), section 4, sub-section 7,
available
at
http://www.moc.gov.cn/zhuzhan/
zhengcejiedu/guihuajiedu/shierwuguihuaJD/xiangguanzhengcefagui/201110/t201
11010_1064457.html (last visited Oct 22, 2013)
103
Rubber-tiered gantry (RTG), also called transtainer, is a mobile
gantry crane used for stacking containers at container terminals. Diesel rubber-tired
gantry (RTG) can represent a large percentage of a port’s total fuel consumption.
Electricity-powered RTGs offer a promising alternative in face of the increasing
price of diesel fuel and more stringent ambient air standards. The cost of
converting a diesel RTG to an electric cable reel connected one is approximately
$250,000. The effectiveness of such fuel-to-electricity conversion depends primarily
on the availability of electrical infrastructures connecting to the port, the remaining
service life of the RTG, and how much the RTG is used. ELEC. POWER RESEARCH
INST., ELECTRIC CABLE REEL RUBBER-TIRED GANTRY CRANES: COSTS AND
BENEFITS
1,
4
(2010),
available
at
http://www.epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspx?ProductId=0000000
00001020646.
104
Id.
105
Jiaotong yunshu jieneng jianpai zhuanxiang zijin guanli zhanxing
banfa (交通运输节能减排专项资金管理暂行办法) [Temporary Management
Measures for Special Funding for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction Projects
in the Transport Sector] (issued by the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of
Transport, No. 374, June 20, 2011), chapter 2, art. 7, available at
http://jjs.mof.gov.cn/
zhengwuxinxi/tongzhigonggao/201107/t20110704_570700.html.
102
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Recently, the Chinese government heightened the sulfur
content standard for marine fuel oils. Under the new standard, the
maximum sulfur content of fuel oils shall be 3.5% m/m,106 which
comports with Regulation 14 of Annex VI for ships operating
outside ECAs.107 Thus, even if all ships registered in China use fuel
oils with less than 3.5% m/m sulfur content, many of them would
still fail the U.S. standard since virtually all U.S. waters are in ECAs,
where the sulfur content of fuel oils should be less than 1.00% m/m
starting from July 1, 2010108 and 0.10% m/m starting from 2015.109
The above review of policies and regulations shows that
marine vessels have not moved to the top of the air-cleaning agenda
of the Chinese government. 110 Any further legislation or
policymaking to give effect to the terms of MARPOL Annex VI in
China would probably only take place during the next planning
period at the earliest, viz., after 2015. Given this timing, China would
have to implement the most stringent emission standards provided in
Regulation 13 and 14 by the implementation schedule specified in
Annex VI to be comparable with U.S. standards.111
C.

Deficiencies of the Current Enforcement Mechanism

1. Deficiencies on a global scale. - A compliance environment
that exposes foreign ships with rotating crews, trading at different
ports where the stringency of a treaty is approached differently, poses
106
Chuanyong ranliaoyou (船用燃料油) [Marine Fuel Oil Standard]
(issued by the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and
Quarantine, Standardization Administration, GB/T 17411-2012, July 1, 2013).
107
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 14, ¶1.2.
108
Id. ¶ 4.2.
109
Id. ¶ 4.3.
110
See also Qiang Zhang et al., Cleaning China’s Air, 484 NATURE 161,
161-62 (2012) (curbing emissions from power plants and coal consumption in
general remains the priority for tackling air emission for China given the country’s
continued rapid economic growth, even though tremendous governmental efforts
have been made to raise the operational standards for coal-fired power plants).
111
Recall that starting from January 1, 2015, the sulfur content of fuel
oil used on board ships shall be less than 0.10% m/m and Tier III standard for
NOx emission would start to apply in ECAs for engines installed on ships that are
constructed on or after January 1, 2016. MARPOL Regulation 13, ¶ 5.1.2;
MARPOL Regulation 14, ¶ 4.3. Again, MARPOL needs to be cited to earlier (see
earlier notes) or if this is MARPOL VI it needs to be cited as such.
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a daunting management challenge. 112 The uneven enforcement
landscape for MARPOL Annex VI is the quintessence of a
“prisoner’s dilemma” situation 113 for which international
environmental conventions that are not self-executing are often
criticized.114 If ratifying countries do not take enforcement measures
of similar stringency, 115 some countries could obtain economic
112
See, e.g., Claudia Copeland, Cruise Ship Pollution: Background, Laws and
Regulations, and Key Issues, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 26 (2010),
http://www. eoearth.org/view/article/51dac6ac5948612528000716/ (the General
Accounting Office found that the process for referring cruise ship violations to
other countries does not appear to be working and recommended that the IMO
encourage member countries to respond when pollution cases are referred to
them).
113
The Prisoner’s Dilemma was initially developed by Merrill Flood
and Melvin Dresher in 2950, later named by A.W. Tucker. Paul W. Grimm &
Heather Leigh Williams, The Judicial Beatings Will Continue Until Moral Improves: The
Prisoner’s Dilemma of Cooperative Discovery and Proposals for Improved Morale, 43 U. BALT.
L.F. 107, 108-09 (2013) [hereinafter Grimm & Williams, Judicial Beatings] (citing to
Robert Axelrod’s book “The Evolution of Cooperation”). The Prisoner’s Dilemma
is one of the models in the game theory trying to explain how self-interested,
rational individuals interact in a collective decision-making process. MARTIN J.
OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 15-18 (1994). It
involves a scenario where two prisoners, retained separately under interrogation,
must decide whether to keep silent or to confess. Grimm & Williams, Judicial
Beatings, 43 U. BALT. L.F. 107, 108 (2013). Under the theoretical model of
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the rationality exercised by individuals for their best interests,
instead of leading to a scenario where all individuals’ interests are maximized,
instead tends to lead to inefficient resource allocation, suboptimal environmental
standards, and hence harms the overall welfare of the group of individuals. See
Kirsten H. Engle, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To
the Bottom”? 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 275-76 (1997).
114
See ROSS A. KLEIN, GETTING A GRIP ON CRUISE SHIP POLLUTION,
FRIENDS
OF
THE
EARTH,
17-28
(2009),
http://www.foe.org/sites/default/files/CruiseShipReport_Klein.pdf
(criticizing
MARPOL for not being self-executing resulting in its low on-the-ground
effectiveness); John Charles Kunich, Fiddling Around While the Hotspots Burn Out, 14
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 191 (2001) (the Convention on Biological
Diversity is another example where the Convention carries no real consequences
for those ratifying countries which take no action, such as domestic legislation, to
enforce the terms of this international agreement).
115
See Robert W. Hahn & Kenneth R. Richards, The Internationalization
of Environmental Regulation, 30 HARV. INT’L L.J. 421, 429 (1989) (country has
incentive to develop a competitive advantage in industrial production by enjoying
the benefits of the other countries’ environmental protection activities, while taking
limited action at home country).
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advantages by holding to more relaxed environmental standards
intentionally. 116 This “race to the bottom” phenomenon, or
“reluctance to move to the top” phenomenon, in response to
regulations on maritime safety and pollution has already been
observed in the international shipping industry.117 Therefore, if landbased transport routes are available to replace certain sections of
marine transport routes, the business interests of U.S. ports would
likely be adversely affected by the heightened environmental
standards, which often implicate increased operational cost for
shipping.118

116
See Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability:
Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 67, 80-82 (1996) (states respond to the interstate competition for
industry by lowering regulatory standards forming a “race to the bottom”
phenomenon, which might be remedied by promulgating federal laws); but see
Karen Palmer et al., Tightening Environmental Standards: The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost
Paradigm, 9(4) J. ECON. PERSP. 119, 129-30 (1995) (arguing generally that no clear
evidence to establish the conclusion that higher environmental regulation in the
United States has a large adverse effect on economic competitiveness on U.S.
firms, especially considering that the stringency of U.S. environmental regulations is
actually similar to that of European regulations).
117
Alan Khee-Jin Tan, VESSEL-SOURCE MARINE POLLUTION: THE
LAW AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 7 (James Crawford & John
S. Bell eds., 1st ed. 2006) (whenever any actor in the shipping industry tries to
maintain safety and pollution prevention standards, he is faced with the prospect of
losing business to cheaper standards; as a result, the proliferation of new rules and
regulations confers a competitive advantage on sub-standard operators). But the
other countries disadvantaged by the “race to the bottom” might push legislation to
raise the environmental standard globally, when their firms already developed or
have the capacity to develop the advanced manufacturing technologies to achieve
such higher standards, to turn themselves back to the leadership in the industry. See
RIMA MICKEVICIENE, THE ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBALIZATION 202, 216
(Piotr Pachura eds. 1st ed. 2011) (a large part of technical innovations in the
shipbuilding industry has to be presented in relation to the goal of reducing exhaust
gas emissions).
118
See Erin Tanimura, Pacific Merchant II’s Dormant Commerce Clause
Ruling: Expanding State Control over Commerce Through Environmental Regulation, 47 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 419, 421-26 (2013) (arguing that the court’s ruling in favor of
California’s more stringent air emission standards on ships would disadvantage
business and commercial interests as these standards would increase the operational
cost by $30,000 (USD) per call); Harilaos N. Psaraftis & Christos A. Kontovas,
Balancing the Economic and Environmental Performance of Marine Transportation,
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART D 15, 458, 459 (2010) (a side-effect of
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Theoretically, the threat of civil penalties and criminal
punishment would induce the shipping industry, and eventually the
shipbuilding manufacturing industry, to modify their practice as a
whole to internalize the business externalities, viz., the environmental
and health impacts caused by air emissions from marine vessels.119
But before reaching that point, the industries have to first internalize
the increased shipping costs due to delays in voyages to obtain
compliant fuels, 120 or otherwise face possible civil penalties. The
industry tends to respond by using cost-saving measures that usually
require less capital investment than new engine designs or ship
retrofitting.121 Generally speaking, under the pressure of both the
higher environmental standards and continued preference of cheaper
carriers from powerful clients such as oil companies,122 ship owners
would choose to register their international vessels in countries where
MARPOL is implemented much less seriously,123 even though no
differentiated treatment based on flag state is afforded officially,124
hire cheaper and usually ill-trained seafarers who are more likely to
cause environmental violations, and demand standard quality ships to

requiring speed reduction, a way to reduce ship emissions, in short but sometimes
deep sea shipping may induce a shift to more environmentally intrusive land-based
transport modes).
119
See Stephen J. Darmody, The Oil Pollution Act’s Criminal Penalties: On
a Collision Course with the Law of the Sea, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 89, 118-21
(1993).
120
See infra text accompanying notes 127-34.
121
See generally Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 145 (for a Selective
Catalytic Reduction system for NOx control, a 2.7 years of payback period is
required for 100% return on investment; for a Humid Air Motor system for NOx
control, a 3.8 years of payback period is needed for a 51% return on investment for
a new ship, and a 4.2 years of payback period is needed for a 37% return on
investment for retrofitting).
122
KHEE-JIN TAN, supra note 117, at 40 (the volatile freight rates
during the past few decades have caused oil companies to count for the cheapest
available rate at any time, and therefore tend to favor sub-standard operators).
123
See generally DEP’T OF TRANSP., COMPARISON OF U.S. AND
FOREIGN-FLAG
OPERATING
COSTS
68-69
(2011),
available
at
http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Comparison_of_US_and_Foreign_Flag_
Operating_Costs.pdf (the higher environmental costs when operating in the United
States is one main reason accounting for the higher operational costs incurred by
U.S. flagged vessels than foreign-flagged vessels).
124
See 33 U.S.C. § 1902 (5)(A), (B) (2008).
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be delivered at the lowest price possible.125 In response, shipbuilders
often use cheaper materials, rendering ships more vulnerable.126
For different reasons, including the limited time and
resources of administrative agencies to undertake thorough
inspections or bring prosecutions, or simply “good luck,” 127 the
number of vessels that operate in full contravention with MARPOL
remains “unacceptably high,” both in the United States 128 and
internationally.129 Apparently, some vessels are still able to continue
business as usual by taking the risk of being caught then
implementing those cost-saving measures discussed above. 130
Arguably, one reason for the large number of violations could be that
the punishment is not severe enough to carry a sufficient deference
effect. However, given the precedents of imposing a criminal fine in
the millions of dollars,131 a more plausible inference should be that
the MARPOL standards have not operated in synergy with the
economics of the maritime transport sector.132 In fact, this lack-ofKHEE-JIN TAN, supra note 117, at 6.
Id.
127
See ROSS A. KLEIN, supra note 114 (many reports of MARPOL
violation have come from citizen observations and therefore detection of violations
could be missed, unless the cruise ship staff and the company for which they work
report voluntarily); Jeanne M. Grasso & Gregory F. Linsin, United States: Current
Trends in MARPOL Enforcement – Higher Fines, More Jail Time, The Banning of Ships, and
Whistleblowers
Galore,
MONDAQ
(Oct.
7,
2011),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/148086/Marine+Shipping/Current+Tre
nds+In+MARPOL+Enforcement+Higher+Fines+More+Jail+Time+The+Banni
ng+Of+Ships+And+Whistleblowers+Galore (more than 50% of the MARPOL
cases in recent years stem from whistleblowers making reports to the Coast Guard).
But the number of whistleblowers for Annex VI violations might decrease as it
would be rather difficult to detect excessive air emission with naked eyes.
128
David P. Keho, United States v. Abrogar: Did the Third Circuit Miss the
Boat? 39 ENVTL. L. 1, 41 (2009).
129
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), COST
SAVINGS STEMMING FROM NON-COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS IN THE MARITIME SECTOR 47 (2003).
130
See generally id. at 4 (about 5,000 to 7,500 substandard commercial
vessels are engaged in international trade).
131
Ionia, 555 F.3d at 310 (imposing a fine of $4.9 million (USD)).
132
This inference should not be simply rephrased as “the compliance
cost is too high.” Virtually no regulated party would ever gratefully applaud the
reasonableness or inexpensiveness of compliance measures. The meaning of
“synergy” can be understood from two perspectives: monetary cost and the
125
126
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synergy could well be the reason for IMO to finally consider and
agree with delaying the implementation of Tier III standards for NOx
emission for five years. The industry is frustrated with this expensive
“green storm.”133 More incentives in the enforcement regime for
compliance with MARPOL seem to be needed.134

prevalence of technologies to achieve compliance in the regulated industry. Of
course, the rare availability of necessary technologies that can be commercialized in
the market is accountable for the high monetary cost. See THEO NOTTEBOOM ET
AL., supra note 41, at 70-71 (concluding based on analysis of European shipping
industry that Annex VI requirements may be quite costly for the shipping industry,
driving up the cost by 25.5% to 40% depending on the specific type of low-sulfur
fuel used).
133
Remarks of Christopher Koch, President & CEO of the World
Shipping Council, World Trade Association of Philadelphia 2 (Nov. 8, 2013),
available
at
http://www.worldshipping.org/publicstatements/CLK_Philadelphia_Speech__November_8_2013.pdf
(criticizing
MARPOL Annex VI as “the single most expensive environmental regulation the
shipping industry has ever faced”).
134
See KHEE-JIN TAN, supra note 117, at 17 (MARPOL is far from
really working).
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2. Deficiencies viewed from the perspective of foreign flagged vessels. One chief concern has been the non-availability of low-sulfur fuels
since IMO’s adoption of Annex VI. In the final working group report
to IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) at the
57th session meeting in 2008, the International Petroleum Industry
Environmental Conservation Association135 cautioned that the oil
industry did not expect marine fuels at 0.10% and 0.50% sulfur
content would be available to all regions by desired dates of 2015 and
2020, respectively.136
The availability of low-sulfur fuel under the scenario of full
compliance with MARPOL Annex VI is too complex an issue to be
generalized by a “yes” or “no” conclusion. 137 The prediction of
availability depends on the combination of multiple factors including
the enforcement area, fuel price, cargo load, volume of pre-purchased
fuels under the contracts between vessel operators and fuel suppliers,
projected capacity of refineries, shipping route, number of suppliers
at specific ports, and the type of fuel used. 138 Although some
135
The Int’l Petroleum Industry Envtl. Conservation Ass’n (IPIECA)
is the global oil and gas industry association for environmental and social issues
veering over half of the world’s oil production, formed in 1974 following the
launch of the United Nations Environment Program. IPIECA is the industry’s
principal channel of communication with the United Nations. About Us, IPIECA:
THE GLOBAL OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND
SOCIAL ISSUES (2013), http://www.ipieca.org/about-us.
136
See IMO, Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships: Report of the Working
Group on Annex VI and the NOx Technical Code, MEPC 57th Session Agenda Item 4,
MEPC 57/WP.7 (Apr. 4, 2008); see also MARPOL Annex VI Revision Signals New
Low-Emissions Era, Annex VI Special Report (May 19, 2008), available at
http://www.bunkerworld.com/news/magazine.download?magazine_item_id=120
(Linda K. Wright, Global Director at ExxonMobil Marine Fuels, warned at the
29th International Bunker Conference held in April 2008 that there is no guarantee
that sufficient low-sulfur fuel will be available and the oil industry’s misgivings
about the significant refinery investment cost associated with producing more lowsulfur fuels).
137
See TETRA TECH, LOW-SULFUR FUEL AVAILABILITY STUDY 2-3, 11
(2008),
http://www.portoflosangeles.org/DOC/REPORT_Fuel_Availability_Study_Final
_041408.pdf.
138
See id. at 53-60, 62-67, 76; MICHELLE KOMLENIC ET AL.,
EVALUATION OF THE AVAILABILITY OF LOW SULFUR MARINE DISTILLATE FUEL
FOR OCEAN-GOING VESSELS THAT VISIT CALIFORNIA 9-12 (2008), available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2008/fuelogv08/ appffuel.pdf.
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estimation findings are more optimistic than others, the common
conclusion is that low-sulfur fuel (less than 0.5% m/m sulfur
content) shortages exist mainly in Central and South America and
Asia, especially in China,139 Japan, and Korea.140
Ideally, port states should exercise their responsibilities under
Annex VI to formally establish equivalents, such as add-on exhaust
cleaning systems to reduce air emissions, which vessels shall use in
case of non-availability of low-sulfur fuels.141 Absent such formal
recognition of alternative compliance measures, the solution to avoid
regulative penalties would be to store up compliant fuels at ports
along the voyage when compliant fuel is available. However, for
foreign flagged ships which are registered in countries where lowsulfur fuel is likely to be unavailable and do not have predictable
schedules to visit U.S. ports, they seem to have little incentive to
purchase more low-sulfur fuel than what is necessary to sail out of
the ECA.142 When such vessels decide to visit U.S. ports again, they
may have to change planned voyages to buy low-sulfur fuel since the
compliant fuel is unlikely to be readily available at their departing
terminals.143 Otherwise, they would likely face criminal charges for a
“knowing violation” in the United States.144

Low-Sulfur Marine Fuel in the Pipeline, CHINA DAILY (Sept. 4, 2010,
10:56
AM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/201209/04/content_15731857.htm (PetroChina planned to expand its provision of lowsulfur bunker to Yangshan port near Shanghai to satisfy increased demand).
140
See TETRA TECH, supra note 137, at 68-72; DET NORSKE VERITAS
(DNV), supra note 49, at 15 (highly uncertain as to whether the availability of low
sulfur fuel will be adequate in worldwide ports); KOMLENIC ET AL., supra note 138,
at 57; Starcrest Consulting Grp., Evaluation of Low Sulfur Marine Fuel Availability
– Pacific Rim 3 (2005), available at http://webcache.googleuser
content.com/search?q=cache:E8b1JJZr3g4J:www.portoflosangeles.org/DOC/RE
PORT_Fuel_Study_Pacific_Rim_Exec_Sum.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
141
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 4, ¶ 1.
142
See generally Deal, supra note 41, at 4 (ECA compliant fuel, blend of
marine distillates and ultra low sulfur diesel, is about 25% to 30% more expensive
than the marine distillate fuel that is currently used in TOTE ships).
143
See id. (there is currently not enough distillate fuel to meet global
demand for the world’s entire commercial fleet to switch from residual fuel oil to
distillate fuel to meet fuel standards when operating in ECAs).
144
See supra text companying notes 73-87.
139
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Additionally, shipping companies have been using “slowsteaming,” a technique that emerged along with the soaring fuel
prices in 2002 and global environmental movement for greenhouse
gas reduction, to reduce fuel cost.145 Some voyages now take longer
than they used to.146 The increased expenditure on fuels to comply
with Annex VI would only make this practice more prevalent, at least
in the short term. As such, an enforcement regime that structures
itself around the “panacea” of criminal liability, 147 coupled with
issues associated with the availability of low-sulfur fuel and the costsaving culture of the shipping industry, is likely to operate contrary to
the intent of Annex VI of preserving the freedom of navigation on
the high seas.148
3. Deficiencies viewed from the U.S. perspective. - Litigation arising
from the enforcement of Annex VI on specific vessels has been silent
except for suits against the creation of ECA. 149 Given that the
memorandum between the EPA and the Coast Guard to enforce
Annex VI was only signed in 2012,150 current enforcement venue can

145
See Remarks of Christopher Koch, supra note 133; RASMUS
JORGENSON, SLOW STEAMING: THE FULL STORY, MAERSK 2, available at
http://www.maersk.com/Innovation/WorkingWithInnovation/Documents/Slow
%20Steaming%20-%20the%20full%20story.pdf.
146
See Ronald D. White, Ocean Shipping Lines Cut Speed to Save Fuel Costs,
L.A. TIMES (July 31, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/31/business/la-fislow-sailing-20100731 (some freighters were taking fifteen days to make a Pacific
crossing that used to take eleven days).
147
See Keho, supra note 128, at 41 (the U.S. Department of Justice has
used a two-pronged approach that involves the prosecution of both the corporate
ship operators and chief engineers or other supervisory crew members as the best
way of changing the non-compliance culture and increasing deterrence in the
shipping industry); Darmody, supra note 119, at 143.
148
See MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 18, ¶ 2.2 (no
delay or change of planned voyages shall be required to achieve compliance).
149
See Alaska v. Kerry, No. 3:12-cv-00142-SLG, 2013 U.S. Dis. LEXIS
133687, at 21-100 (D. Alaska 2013) (State of Alaska sued the Secretary of States
and the EPA for the designation of ECA under the APPs and the Administrative
Procedure Act but the suit was dismissed by the court).
150
Memorandum of Understanding Between United States Coast
Guard and United States Environmental Protection Agency Regarding
Enforcement of Annex VI as Implemented by the Act to Prevent Pollution from
Ships, June 27, 2011, available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
documents/annexvi-mou062711.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
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be presumed to be primarily administrative. 151 But the effective
administration of compliance by foreign flagged vessels, especially
those registered in countries where Annex VI is not fully enforced
and do not participate regularly in the U.S. commerce, is likely to
become more difficult.
As the Annex VI enforcement scheme rolls out, incidents
where “knowing violation” could be established are likely to increase,
despite the deterrence effect of criminal charges. On the one hand,
the number of foreign flagged vessels calling at U.S. ports is likely to
increase continuously.152 The total number of vessels of the top
twenty-five flags of registry was 28,178 as of January 31, 2013,
increased by 14% of the total in 2010.153 This 14% increase comes
almost entirely from countries and regions where no ECAs are
designated.154 On the other hand, the situation of low-sulfur fuel
shortages and lack of regulation on engine designs is likely to
continue due to some foreign countries’ reluctance to adopt
regulations to enforce Annex VI during the next few years.155 Many
vessels might still choose to keep their businesses as usual, especially
if they do not spend much time in ECAs. Furthermore, “knowing
violation” is a low threshold for finding criminal liability, 156
See generally KLEIN, supra note 114, at 17-28 (violations of MARPOL
standards are largely revealed by reviewing of ship logs and reports from citizen
observations; as such, a large number of violations may not be detected).
152
See America’s Ports: Gateways to Global Trade, AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION
OF
PORT
AUTHORITIES
(2013),
http://www.aapaports.org/Industry/content.cfm?ItemNumber=1022 (by 2020, the total volume of
cargo shipped by water is expected to be double that of 2001 volumes).
153
U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Top 25 Flag of Registry (Sept 27, 2013),
http://www.marad.dot.gov/library_landing_page/data_and_statistics/Data_and_S
tatistics.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
154
Id. These countries and regions include Liberia, Marshall Islands,
Hong Kong, Singapore, Malta, China, Japan, Antigua and Barbuda, and Malaysia.
Id.
155
See supra section III, C, 2.
156
See David M. Uhlmann, Environmental Crime Comes of Age: The
Evolution of Criminal Enforcement in the Environmental Regulatory Scheme, 2009 UTAH L.
REV. 1223, 1235 (2009) (numerous commentators criticized that the Congress had
reduced the mental state requirement for environmental crime when it changed the
“willfulness” standard to the “knowingly” standard, and the number of
environmental criminal cases surged because of the adoption of this standard); see
also Wesley D. Sherman, The Economics of Enforcing Environmental Laws: A Case for
151
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considering the practical difficulties for some vessels to obtain means
to achieve compliance. Courts have also been relaxing the standard of
proof to establish the required mens rea in environmental crime
cases. 157 Such a relaxed threshold for finding criminal liability
expands prosecutorial discretion,158 which could counterbalance the
deterrence effect of these environmental laws.
To deter crimes, one fundamental economic theory is that the
expected cost of punishments on the violators should exceed the
gains from violation.159 If p is the possibility of being criminally
charged and M is the monetary loss incurred because of the criminal
charge and eventual penalties, the expected cost of punishments is
p×M.160 For vessel owners, the gain from a violation is primarily the
avoided capital investment in the air emission control measures to
maintain the operational cost at the pre-regulation level. If such
capital investment is C, non-compliance seems to be more attractive
economically if C > p×M.
To enhance the deterrence effect, enforcement agencies
could try to increase p, the possibility of a criminal charge. A major
Limiting the Use of Criminal Sanctions, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 87, 95, 104
(2007) (culpability should be established based on a higher level of mens rea than
“knowing” violation considering that courts do not require the knowledge of the
environmental law at issue, the seriousness of the penalties, and the complexity of
the environmental laws).
157
See Darmody, supra note 119, at 122-26.
158
Uhlmann, supra note 156, at 1242.
159
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76(2)
THE J. OF POLITICAL ECON. 169, 180 (1968).
160
This formula is adapted from Becker’s proposal. In Becker’s
formula, the cost of punishments is the probability of conviction multiplied by
costs to the offender. But deterrence should arguably take effect when an offender
thinks of the possibility of being served by a court order. So the actual cost of
punishments could be distorted since the actual conviction is also affected by many
technicalities of the trial process, and tends to be smaller than the probability of
being charged. These technicalities of the trial process might not play in the minds
of offenders when they learn the charges through word of mouth and media
exposure, and feel being deterred. Alternatively, the cost of punishment may be
magnified if it is calculated based on the probability of detection, because the
discretion of government agencies and whistleblowers tend to make the actual
number of criminal proceedings brought against the offenders less than the
number of detected violations.
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implication is on agency budget because criminal convictions are
generally more costly than agency adjudication.161 Also, enforcing the
implementation of corrective action plans, as in the Ionia case, could
be lengthy.162 If no additional budget is allocated, agencies might be
left with wide prosecutorial discretion to decide whether to bring an
enforcement proceeding. 163 Courts are generally deferential to
prosecutor discretion164 as it is a function of resource allocation,
policy considerations, and the delegation of power from Congress to
allow agencies to resolve the ambiguity of the statute.165 However,
even though foreign defendants are unlikely to prevail on claims
challenging such agency discretion in prosecuting Annex VI
violations, reputational criticisms from the public against such
practices may emerge, ultimately compromising the integrity of the
enforcement regime.
Alternatively, the severity of penalties could be raised through
judicial discretion to increase the cost of punishment, p×M. But, the
shipping industry has been using a controversial arrangement called
161
See Roger Bowles et al., The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal
Sanctions: An Economic View and Policy Implications, 35(3) J. OF LAW AND SOCIETY 389,
405, 415 (2008) (raising the probability of detection is costly); see also Wesley D.
Sherman, The Economics of Enforcing Environmental Laws: A Case for Limiting the Use of
Criminal Sanctions, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 87, 95 (2007) (a criminal justice
system is more costly than using administrative law to protect the environment).
162
See Sherman, supra note 161, at 85-88.
163
See David A. Barker, Environmental Crimes, Prosecutorial Discretion, and
the Civil/Criminal Line, 88 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1405 (2002) (prosecutorial discretion
became a concern when the Environmental Crimes Section of the Department of
Justice refused to prosecute a substantial number of referrals from EPA and
refused to consent to some prosecutions sought by local U.S. Attorneys); see
generally Charles J. Babbitt et al., Discretion and the Criminalization of Environmental Law,
15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 3-4 (2004) (environmental administrators and
the prosecutors to whom they refer criminal cases together enjoy very broad
prosecutorial discretion, limited primarily by the Constitution and the rules of
prosecutorial ethics).
164
See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1984) (holding
non-mutual collateral estoppel does not apply to governmental litigant); see also
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943) (“the good sense of
prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries
must be trusted”).
165
See Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the
Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J.
2407, 2453, 2456, 2460 (1995).
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“one-ship” companies to limit their exposure to liability.166 Under
such arrangements, shipping carriers are shielded behind the
corporate veil by organizing companies for the sole and explicit
purpose of owning that ship.167 The limited capital of such shell
companies is likely to hinder the fulfillment of judgment, particularly
concerning the payment of huge criminal fines. Moreover, unlike the
compensation and penalty calculation in oil spill cases, the estimation
of the economic harm to third parties caused by inhaling additional
air pollutants such as SOx and NOx from a vessel tend to be more
speculative, primarily because of the considerable lapse between
exposure to air pollutants and actual formulation of diseases,
numerous intervening causes, and the difficulties in measuring the
scale of harmful level of exposure. Hence, non-monetary sanctions
seem to be a more pragmatic redress to Annex VI violations.168
As to the capital investments by foreign vessels to achieve
compliance, C, the EPA could play only a limited role except for
trying to engage industries to provide sufficient low-sulfur fuels.
Foreign manufacturers and buyers of ocean-going vessels169 would
have to decide together who should bear the up-front cost of
advanced design170 if the buyers intend that their ships meet Annex
VI standards. 171 The buyers also need to take into account

KHEE-JIN TAN, supra note 117, at 34-35.
Id.
168
See Roger Bowles et al., The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal
Sanctions: An Economic View and Policy Implications, 35(3) J.L. & SOC’Y 389, 405 (2008).
169
See generally MICKEVICIENE, supra note 117, at 207 (China has
surpassed Japan in 2006 in ship building. South Korea, in 2009, became a main
player in the global ship building industry, exporting ships to about 169 countries
and regions, mainly to Asia and Europe).
170
See generally ALAN E. BRANCH, ELEMENTS OF SHIPPING 28 (8th ed.
2007) (in choosing the type of ship to be built, the ship-owner must consider the
primary trade in which she is to operate, which governs the size and propelling
machinery, and the cost and availability of fuel, the length and duration of voyages,
minimum carrying capacity required, and other technical and statutory
considerations); see also Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 136, 147 (switching to
LNG would increase shipbuilding costs by 20 to 25%).
171
See MICKEVICIENE, supra note 117, at 202, 214 (government
subsidies and favorable loads, mandatory requirements on domestic ocean going
ship buyers to order ships at domestic yards, and cheap labor are the main reasons
for China’s high-order book volumes).
166
167
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technological developments and associated uncertainties 172 during
the time lapse between the order and delivery.173 In many countries,
governments are extending generous credit facilities, subsidies,
favorable tax treatment, and direct investment grants to maintain
their national yards as competitive in the global market.174 These
financial instruments, at the discretion of foreign governments, could
be powerful instruments to impose Annex VI compliance conditions.
In contrast, the regulative authority of a U.S. government agency
appears pale in these contract negotiations.
III.
A.

MAKING “ENDS” MEET

The Need for Market-Based Requirements

Previous discussions on the deficiencies of the Annex VI
enforcement regime indicate that certain additional elements may be
necessary to change the weights of the two sides of the formula. An
option that is within the control of the EPA is to provide incentives,
so that C – I < p×M, where I is the monetary incentives obtained
from participating in governmental programs.
Programs that are initiated by the government and industry
leaders to provide incentives to induce wider voluntary compliance
based on market-based principles, often referred to as Market-Based
Mechanisms (MBMs), are not new in the United States.175 MBMs
172
See Frederick Adamchak & Amokeye Adede, LNG AS MARINE
FUEL, 7 (Gas Technology Institute training materials, 2013) (one main problem
with using LNG as marine fuel is the “chicken-and-egg” situation between ship
owners. This is when developers for LNG fueling infrastructures and ports remain
uncertain as to who would and should act first), available at
http://www.gastechnology.org/ Training/Documents/LNG17-proceedings/7-1Frederick _Adamchak.pdf.
173
World Shipping Council, The Liner Shipping Industry and Carbon
Emissions Policy, 17 (2009) (ships are often ordered in a set of four to ten. Moreover,
they are ordered three or more years in advance of delivery), available at
http://www.worldshipping.org/pdf/liner_shipping_co2emissions_policy_septemb
er.pdf.
174
BRANCH, supra note 170, at 481.
175
See generally EPA CLEAN AIR MARKETS DIVISION, AN OVERVIEW
OF THE REGIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET (RECLAIM) 1-2 (2006)
(RECLAIM is the first trading program in the national created to reduce SO2 and
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provide business operators means to reduce compliance costs as
much as possible176 while the industrial standard is under transition
in response to regulative changes.177 MBMs would also likely reduce
the practical disparities for shipping companies when they operate
worldwide, and eventually help overcome the political difficulties in
bringing comparable environmental standards to all voyages’ end
destinations.
MBMs are most suitable when the emission standards can be
achieved through alternative technologies and the cost of emission
abatement differs widely among regulated sources.178 Both of these
conditions are present in the case of enforcing Annex VI. In addition
to fuel-switching,179 the industry has also identified several alternative
technologies including selective catalytic reduction systems, humid air
motor systems, seawater scrubbers, and using LNG-fueled vessels.180

NOx
emissions
in
urban
areas),
available
at
www.epa.gov/airmarket/resource/docs/ reclaimoverview.pdf.
176
See ROBERT N. STAVINS, EXPERIENCE WITH MARKET-BASED
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS 2-3 (Karl-Göran Mäler et al. eds., 2001)
(holding all firms to the same environmental target/standard can be expensive and
sometimes counterproductive).
177
See Mel Davies, Emissions Trading for Ships – A European Perspective,
118(3) NAVAL ENG’G J. 131, 132 (2006) (ship emission trading could offer a way of
complying on short notice, as a transition mechanism in the face of increasingly
stringent regulations on a range of emissions from ship. The cost and long service
life of cargo vessels may render regulations that require drastic changes of industrial
standards within few years impracticable); See World Shipping Council, The Liner
Shipping Industry and Carbon Emissions Policy, 17 (2009) (a container ship capable of
carrying 8,500 TEU’s costs approximately $100 million (USD) and will be used for
20
to
25
years),
available
at
http://www.worldshipping.org/pdf/
liner_shipping_carbon_emissions_policy_presentation.pdf.
178
See James J. Corbett et al., AN EVALUATION OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE
INCENTIVES TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM REGIONAL FERRIES: TECHNICAL
MEMORANDUM
TWO
14-15
(2004),
available
at
http://policy.rutgers.edu/vtc/documents/ProgEval.FerryEmissions.pdf.
179
See generally Theo Notteboom et al., ANALYSIS OF THE
CONSEQUENCES OF LOW SULFUR FUEL REQUIREMENTS 2 (2010) (alternative fuels
include low-sulfur fuel oil, marine gas oil, marine diesel oil), available at www.schone
scheepvaart.nl/downloads/rapporten/doc_1361790123.pdf.
180
Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 141; see also ENNIO CODAN ET
AL., IMO III EMISSION REGULATION: IMPACT ON THE TURBOCHARGING SYSTEM
2-3
(2010),
available
at
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Studies show that depending on the vessel’s conditions, the costeffectiveness of the same technology varies. Generally, compliance by
bigger vessels is less expensive than smaller vessels.181 Compared
with fuel switching, NOx abatement technologies take longer to
introduce because they usually take about ten years to be amortized,
and hence, more risk-taking is involved in investment.182 Vessels that
approach the end of their service life183 or those that spend a small
portion of service time inside ECAs are likely to struggle the most
under the current Annex VI enforcement scheme.184 It has been
reported that some shipping carriers have started passing the
increased compliance cost on to customers. 185 The increased
shipping price, an unintended effect of Annex VI, calls for the wellrecognized flexibilities that MBMs could offer.186

http://www05.abb.com/global/scot/scot267.nsf/veritydisplay/1abd7848c784998
1852578110051bee0/$file/IMO%20III%20Emission%20Regulation.pdf.
181
KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 13.
182
Id.
183
See KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 26 (it is better for infrequent
visitors or ships with few remaining years in operation to just pay for the costs of
pollution); PER KÅGESON, ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR REDUCING SHIPPING
EMISSIONS: A PILOT PROJECT FOR THE BALTIC SEA 10 (2006) (abatement of SOx
differs from that of NOx because a shift to low sulfur fuel might still be cost
effective even for ships that are approaching the end of their operation life),
available at www.airclim.org/sites/default/files/ documents/apc24_0.pdf.
184
See Mel Davies, Emissions Trading for Ships – A European Perspective,
118(3) NAVAL ENG’G J. 131, 136 (2006).
185
See Jim Romeo, New IMO Low-Sulfur Fuel Regulations Creating
Challenges for Vessel Operator, PROF’L MARINER (Nov. 8, 2012, 11:29 AM),
http://www.professional mariner.com/December-January-2013/New-IMO-lowsulfur-fuel-regs-creating-challenges-for-vessel-operators/ (ZIM Integrated Shipping
Services Ltd. said that it will implement a low-sulfur fuel charge of $20 (USD) per
20-foot equivalent unit for trade between North Europe/Mediterranean and all
North American coasts in both directions); see also Michiel Vervloet, Emission
Trading in the Shipping Industry: Where Goes/Is the Money? (Dec. 5, 2010)
(unpublished Masters’ thesis, Ghent University) (on file with University Library,
Ghent University), at 11.
186
See generally T.H. Tietenberg, Economic Instruments for Environmental
Regulation, 6(1) OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 17, 18, 30 (1990) (because emissions
trading allows the issue of who will pay for the pollution from who will install
pollution control measures, it introduces additional flexibility).
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Possible Market-Based Mechanisms (MBMs)

MBMs could be categorized broadly as emission charges or
emission trading regimes.187 Based on the “polluters pay” principal,
emission charges could take the form of a tax, an abatement subsidy,
or differentiated service fees. 188 Sweden pioneered differentiated
fairway dues at ports to encourage reductions in NOx and SO2
emissions at ports since 1998.189 Because all major ports participated
in this program, adverse economic impacts, if any, on port businesses
have not been evident.190 Norway launched a NOx tax, forming a
funding pool, which provides grants to fund vessels to apply
emission reduction technologies.191 Without getting into details, two
main concerns arise if a MBM is designed that voluntarily imposes
additional dues based on the environmental performance of vessels.
First, the program would risk diluting the force of Annex VI
enforcement regime by shifting the focus on vessels to ports,
weakening the regime’s deterrence effects. Adequate levels of
regulative pressure on foreign vessel owners should be maintained
since they have to invest in emission control measures eventually.
Second, viewed from ship owners’ standpoint, the purpose of the
environmental charges duplicates that of the civil penalties under
APPS.
Therefore, this comment focuses on the other two main types
of emission trading schemes: cap-and-trade and emission credit
trading. This comment argues in favor of an emission credit trading
mechanism based on a consumption-emission formula. This MBM

See DAVID HARRISON ET AL., ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR
REDUCING SHIPS EMISSIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 1, 9, 29, 45, 66 (2005),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/pdf/task3_final.pdf; Tietenberg,
supra note 186, at 18-21.
188
See JINHUA ZHAO, IRREVERSIBLE ABATEMENT INVESTMENT
UNDER COST UNCERTAINTIES: TRADABLE EMISSION PERMITS AND EMISSIONS
CHARGES
18
(2000),
available
at
http://www.card.iastate.edu/
publications/dbs/pdffiles/00wp252.pdf; see also Tietenberg, supra note 186, at 2021.
189
HARRISON ET AL., supra note 187, at 45-46 (Germany, Finland, and
the State of Alaska also have such environmental programs at their ports).
190
KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 16.
191
Id. at 34-35.
187
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could be offered to the violator as a final leniency before the
prosecutor brings a criminal proceeding.
1. Cap-and-Trade (Allowance Trading). - Under a cap-and-trade
scheme, the regulatory body sets a figurative cap for total emission
on the industry, and allocates emission allowances to participating
companies, which are the existing pollution sources.192 Companies
may continue to emit pollution as permitted by the pollution amount
prescribed by the allowances until the allowances expire. When the
initial allowances run out, the companies are supposed to purchase
un-used allowance from other companies, which manage to reduce
emissions through improved technologies.193 The government might
auction off the allowances to the highest bidders or, in a
corresponding amount to the polluter’s historical emission data, free
of charge.194
Studies on cap-and-trade programs indicate that vessels could
potentially decrease a considerable amount of the cost on emission
control technologies through participation in such programs.195 For
SO2 emission reduction, a market-based approach that allows vessels
in ECAs to either undertake fuel switching, install exhaust cleaning
systems, or purchase SO2 emission allowances from other vessels
could save each vessel up to $63 million (USD), annually.196
One option is to create an emission cap based on
geographical area. Under this scenario, a macro-level design issue is
192
See generally EPA CLEAN AIR MARKETS DIVISION, AN OVERVIEW
REGIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET (RECLAIM) 1-6 (2006);
Tietenberg, supra note 186, at 18-20.
193
Id.
194
See generally Sergey Paltsev et al., ASSESSMENT OF U.S. CAP-ANDTRADE PROPOSALS 4-5 (2007) (the free distribution of allowances to upstream
entities may create an inequitable outcome whereby the emission costs are passed
on to downstream fuel users. Meanwhile, the revenue from auctioning permits
could be directed to those who ultimately bear the cost of abatement), available at
http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/38460/MITJPSPGC_Rpt146.pdf
?sequence=1.
195
See Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 151.
196
Wang et al., supra note 42, at 8233, 8235 (the estimation is based on
analysis of U.S. foreign commerce ships traveling in European or U.S. West Coast
ECAs).
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whether emission trading between different sectors should be
permitted. Some researchers’ answer is an ambitious “yes.”197 As an
initial matter, a sufficient number of participating entities are required
to keep the allowance trading market active.198 Permitting vessels to
trade with land-based emission sources not only ensures the scale of
the market, but also benefits the shipping industry substantially since
abatement costs for shipping are lower than that for land-based
installations in general.199 However, an over-inclusive trading scheme
might give more room for companies to buy allowances or use basic
cost-saving measures rather than being induced to invest in green
technologies. 200 To determine whether the participating vessels
would become “lazy” under such a program, an in-depth analysis of
the emission reduction capacities of different sectors, which operate
under quite different environmental and technical standards, would
be required.
Another option is to impose a cap on the shipping industry
itself. A major concern about the cap-and-trade mechanism is its
economic impact on the shipping industry as a whole.201 Reliance on
ocean shipping to transport goods internationally is expected to rise,
because ocean shipping is already one of the most economically and
environmentally efficient modes of long-distance transportation.202
See KRISTINA HOLMGREN ET AL., GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
TRADING FOR THE TRANSPORT SECTOR 69 (2006), available at http://www3.
ivl.se/rapporter/pdf/B1703.pdf.
198
See EPA Clean Air Markets Division, AN OVERVIEW OF THE
REGIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET (RECLAIM) 17-18 (2006)
(RECLAIM is criticized for not being an actually active market with few entities
participating in its trading actions).
199
HOLMGREN ET AL., supra note 197, at 69.
200
Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental
Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 231, 275-85 (1999).
201
WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL, THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY AND
CARBON EMISSIONS POLICY, 9-10 (2009), available at http://www.
worldshipping.org/pdf/liner_shipping_carbon_emissions_policy_presentation.pdf.
202
WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL, THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY AND
CARBON EMISSIONS POLICY, 9, (2009), available at http://www.world
shipping.org/pdf/liner_shipping_carbon_emissions_policy_presentation.pdf;
see
also KHEE-JIN TAN, supra note 117, at 7 (the biggest contributor to marine pollution
is land-based sources and pollutions from ships contributes a relative small fraction
of the overall marine pollution (12%)).
197
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Posing emission caps on the shipping industry is likely to force the
industry to eventually purchase allowance from other sectors where
similar cap-and-trade mechanisms apply.203 As such, a large amount
of money would flow into other sectors that are not subject to the
same air emission standards as the shipping industry.204 The emission
reduction in other sectors would be a proxy to verify the
effectiveness of emission control measures in the shipping industry.
The result would probably be an “open-ended” regime where the
actual emission reduction becomes difficult to track.
Further, a cap-and-trade mechanism might not be effective in
terms of engaging new polluters. Experience of the Acid Raid
Program of SOs trading shows that most of the trading under the
Program has been internal, namely, acquiring excess allowances from
within the company, rather than inter-regional or inter-company.205
If a cap-and-trade mechanism were applied to the shipping industry,
large international shipping companies, which are already leading the
industry’s emission reduction endeavors, would possibly prefer
obtaining extra allowances internally to avoid delays and transaction
costs. As a result, there might not be enough active allowances for
trade with new ships.
2. Emission credit trading. - A more straightforward model is
to focus on the difference in emissions between vessels, targeting the
non-compliant vessels. 206 The emission credit trading mechanism
would require the establishment of a baseline of different ship
models in terms of the correlation between the power output and the
amount of pollutant emission.207 Alternatively, correlation could be
WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL, THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY AND
CARBON EMISSIONS POLICY 9 (2009).
204
See also IMO, Review of MBMs: Consolidated Proposal of Efficiency
Incentive Scheme (EIS) Based on the Leveraged Incentive Scheme (LIS) and the Vessel Efficiency
Systems (VES), Submitted by Japan and the World Shipping Council, GHG-WG 3/3/2
(Feb. 24, 2011), available at http://www. worldshipping.org/industryissues/environment/air-emissions/Japan_-_WSC_Consolidated_Proposal__GHGWG_3-3-2.pdf.
205
Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict between Tradable
Pollution Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” Principals, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465,
488-92 (2000).
206
See Vervloet, supra note 185, at 33.
207
See KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 24.
203
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established between the energy efficiency index of a ship 208 or a
modification of the index,209 and the amount of pollutant emission
for the determination of the baseline. Trading entities should be
primarily vessels. The participation by ship manufacturers should be
limited or even prohibited, because the estimation of emission
amount would be too speculative before the vessel is put into
operation.210
The amount of credits that a vessel obtains would be
determined on the amount of deviation of the vessel’s performance
from this baseline. The most powerful credit generators are large
vessels that operate in ECAs for their entire service time. The
purchasers who would benefit most from this scheme would be
vessels that spend a small portion of their time inside ECAs.211 Noncompliant vessels could be offered to opt-in to this trading
mechanism; or else criminal proceedings would likely be brought.
This offer could also be made during the plea bargaining stage. 212
Such offer should be conditioned on the facts that render the
immediate implementation of compliant measures not cost-effective,
such as the fact that the vessel is approaching its service life.
Although, such program design requires a large volume of record
keeping, it is nevertheless necessary for conveying a clear message to
the polluters: this offer in lieu of criminal proceeding is not a way
See IMO, Amendments to the Protocol of 1997 to Amend the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as Modified by the Protocol of
1978 Relating Thereto (Inclusion of Regulations on Energy Efficiency for Ships in MARPOL
Annex VI), Resolution MEPC.203(62) (July 15, 2011). The regulation requires ships
to be certified based on an assessment of Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI)
and all ships shall have Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plans. The EEDI is a
non-prescriptive, performance-based mechanism that leaves the choice of
technologies to the industry, as long as the required energy efficiency level provide
in Regulations 20 and 21 is attained. The amendment came into force on January 1,
2013. Id.
209
See Vervloet, supra note 185 at 33-34.
210
Id.
211
See Mel Davies, Emissions Trading for Ships – A European Perspective,
118(3) NAVAL ENG’G J. 131, 136 (2006).
212
See also James B. Nelson, Alternative Sentencing under the MARPOL
Protocol: Using Polluters’ Fines to Fund Environmental Restoration, 10 HASTINGS W.-N.
W.J. ENV. L. & POL’Y 1, 23-26 (2003) (advocating the use of alternative sentencing
provisions to MARPOL prosecutions to provide funding for clean-up projects to
correct the harm caused by the defendant’s actions).
208
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through which vessels could pay to pollute, but only a regulative
mercy considering the violator’s economic hardship.
Additionally, participating foreign-flagged vessels should be
required to designate local agents for service of process. 213 An
independent trans-governmental authority could be established to
monitor and verify the quality of credits.214 This entity could be
financed through the civil penalties collected from the non-compliant
ships.
C.

General Considerations on MBMs

Ideally, the MBM should be built under a bilateral agreement
between the United States and its major waterborne trade partners
that have not enforced Annex VI in full, such as China. Although
treaties and executive agreements are treated alike under international
law, an executive agreement would be preferable from a U.S. point of
view, because no advice and consent of the Senate would be required
as long as the executive agreement does not contradict statutory
provisions.215 The EPA would have the authority to run this trading
program under the 1990 Amendments of the Clean Air Act, which
added Title IV, relating to controlling acid deposition including SOx
and NOx.216
Manifestly, the influence of a governmental agency, acting on
its own, is rather limited when its ultimate purpose is to induce
domestic legislation in a foreign country. Therefore, the overall
structure of a bilateral agreement would lay a stronger foundation for
the subsequent agreements on the technical parameters of the MBM;
See SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., OVER A DOZEN
YEARS OF RECLAIM IMPLEMENTATION: KEY LESSONS LEARNED IN
CALIFORNIA’S FIRST AIR POLLUTION CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, Chapter 1, 8
(2007).
214
See also Richard E. Ayres, Expanding the Use of Environmental Trading
Programs into New Areas of Environmental Regulation, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 87, 117
(2000).
215
See Kathryn C. Wilson, The International Air Quality Management
District: Is Emissions Trading the Innovative Solution to the Transboundary Pollution Problem?,
30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 369, 384-85 (1995).
216
1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 101549, 104 Stat. 2399.
213
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the discussion of which could be led by agencies in the respective
countries. Further, high-level official negotiation is more likely to
identify and define the necessary flexibilities to connect the priorities
of the United States and targeted foreign countries in controlling air
pollutions. Given the facilitation by national governments, as
opposed to administrative agencies delegated with the authority to
enforce Annex VI under national laws, companies are more likely to
agree upon the qualifying emission reduction measures to meet the
same emission standards under Annex VI.
Finally, two important technical components need to be
agreed upon under the bilateral agreement. The first component to
be established is the eligible equivalents. 217 A clear mutual
understanding of equivalents would not only help keep the trading
market active,218 but also benefit the later monitoring and verification
of emission credits during implementation. The second component
to be clarified is the monitoring and reporting procedures. Safeguards
need to be established to prevent fraud and missed reporting, and
furthermore, to ensure information transparency.219 When necessary,
penalties should be imposed on repetitive violation of reporting
rules.220
CONCLUSIONS
The current U.S. regulatory scheme to enforce Annex VI
leaves an administrative vacuum in terms of ensuring foreign-flagged
vessels’ compliance when operating in U.S. waters. The conventional
combination of civil penalties and criminal charges is challenged
when the enforcement of international environmental law is achieved
through an uneven worldwide regulatory landscape and depends
See KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 18.
See Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 149 (switching to 1% sulfur
residuals, without other alternative compliance measures, has the major
disadvantage in that it does not create cost efficient credits for trading in the
emissions’ markets).
219
See SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., OVER A DOZEN
YEARS OF RECLAIM IMPLEMENTATION: KEY LESSONS LEARNED IN
CALIFORNIA’S FIRST AIR POLLUTION CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, Chapter 5, 1-3
(2007).
220
Id. at 9-10.
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heavily on the technological developments in the private sector. This
comment recommends an emission credit trading mechanism as a
supplement to the current Annex VI enforcement regime. The credit
trading mechanism would encourage firms, based on their superior
knowledge about the market and effectiveness of various
technological options, to find the best solution in response to the
regulative requirements without compromising their valued
commercial interests. If the establishment of a credit trading
mechanism is initiated through high-level official dialogues, as
recommended by this comment, the U.S. enforcement agencies
would be afforded a proper platform to work with foreign agencies
to establish compliance equivalents under Annex VI. MBMs,
therefore, would serve an important role in making the current rigid
enforcement regime more adaptive during the transition period
where firms are yet to phase out substandard vessels and plan for
investments in vessel designs that are far more environmentally
friendly.
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